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Synaesthesia is a condition in which a 
stimulus elicits an additional subjective 
experience. For example, the letter E 
printed in black (the inducer) may 
trigger an additional colour experience 
as a concurrent (e.g., blue). Synaesthesia 
tends to run in families and thus, a 
genetic component is likely. However, 
given that the stimuli that typically 
induce synaesthesia are cultural artefacts, 
a learning component must also be 
involved. Moreover, there is evidence 
that synaesthetic experiences not only 
activate brain areas typically involved 
in processing sensory input of the 
concurrent modality; synaesthesia seems 
to cause a structural reorganisation of the 
brain. Attempts to train non-synaesthetes 
with synaesthetic associations have 
been successful in mimicking certain 
behavioural aspects and posthypnotic 
induction of synaesthetic experiences 
in non-synaesthetes has even led to the 
according phenomenological reports. 
These latter findings suggest that 
structural brain reorganization may not 
be a critical precondition, but rather a 
consequence of the sustained coupling 
of inducers and concurrents. Interestingly, synaesthetes seem to be able to easily transfer 
synaesthetic experiences to novel stimuli. 
Beyond this, certain drugs (e.g., LSD) can lead to synaesthesia-like experiences and may 
provide additional insights into the neurobiological basis of the condition. Furthermore, 
brain damage can both lead to a sudden presence of synaesthetic experiences in previously 
DEVELOPING SYNAESTHESIA
Topic Editors:  
Nicolas Rothen, University of Sussex, UK
Julia Simner, University of Edinburgh, UK
Beat Meier, University of Bern, Switzerland
Developing synaesthesia: a subset of the figures 
from the different contributions in this Research 
Topic
Copyright: Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolić, 2014; 
Terhune at al., 2014; Sinke et al., 2014; Asano and 
Yokosawa, 2013
3 July 2015 | Developing SynaesthesiaFrontiers in Human Neuroscience
non-synaesthetic individuals and a sudden absence of synaesthesia in previously synaesthetic 
individuals. Moreover, enduring sensory substitution has been effective in inducing a kind of 
acquired synaesthesia.
Besides informing us about the cognitive mechanisms of synaesthesia, synaesthesia research 
is relevant for more general questions, for example about consciousness such as the binding 
problem, about crossmodal correspondences and about how individual differences in 
perceiving and experiencing the world develop. Hence the aim of the current Research Topic 
is to provide novel insights into the development of synaesthesia both in its genuine and 
acquired form. We welcome novel experimental work and theoretical contributions (e.g., 
review and opinion articles) focussing on factors such as brain maturation, learning, training, 
hypnosis, drugs, sensory substitution and brain damage and their relation to the development 
of any form of synaesthesia.
Nicolas Rothen and Beat Meier initiated and managed the research topic. Nicolas Rothen, 
Beat Meier, and Julia Simner edited articles of the research topic.
Citation: Rothen, N., Simner, J., Meier, B., eds. (2015). Developing Synaesthesia. Lausanne: 
Frontiers Media. doi: 10.3389/978-2-88919-579-4
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Synaesthesia is a variation of human experience that involves the automatic activation of unusual
concurrent experiences in response to ordinary inducing stimuli. The causes for the development
of synaesthesia are not well understood yet. Synaesthesia may have a genetic basis resulting in
enhanced cortical connectivity during development. However, in some cases synaesthesia has a
sudden onset, for example, caused by posthypnotic suggestions, drug exposure, or brain injury.
Moreover, associative learning during a critical developmental period also seems to play an impor-
tant role. Synaesthesia may even be acquired by training in adulthood. In this research topic,
we bring together topical hypotheses, theories and empirical studies about the development of
synaesthesia.
According to the immune hypothesis introduced by Carmichael and Simner (2013), the genes
that are responsible for normal cortical development are also involved in the development of
synaesthesia. As many of these genes have a function for both the immune system and for alter-
ing connectivity via axonal guidance, synaptic connectivity, and pruning, the interaction between
the central nervous system and the immune system during early life may play a pivotal role in the
development of synaesthesia. A common genetic basis of synaesthesia and autism spectrum disor-
dersmay also explain the higher prevalence of synaesthetes among patients diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder reported by Neufeld et al. (2013).
Likewise based on a neurochemical basis, Brogaard (2013) put forward the serotonergic hyperac-
tivity hypothesis for the development of synaesthesia. Accordingly, excessive serotonin in the brain
may be a common cause for synaesthesia induced by psychedelic drugs, brain injury, and in indi-
viduals with autism. Motivated by similar assumptions, Terhune et al. (2014) used a psychophysical
approach to test this hypothesis. They found no support, neither for the serotinergic hyperactivity
hypothesis nor for a related, reducedGABA levels hypothesis. Similarly, null findings were reported
by Sinke et al. (2014) in an investigation on the relationship between multisensory integration and
event related potentials. Nevertheless, consistent with previous research, they found evidence for
alterations in early visual processing in synaesthesia.
According to the neonatal hypothesis synaesthetic associations between basic shapes and colors
may be present already early in childhood. Brang et al. (2013) hypothesized that even when these
associations can be refined by experience they can interfere with learning novel shape-color asso-
ciations later. In an empirical study they found support for this hypothesis. Other determinants of
synaesthetic associations include ordinality (e.g., the position in a grapheme sequence; e.g., “c” is
the third letter in the alphabet) and sound. In a Japanese sample of synaesthetes, Asano and Yoko-
sawa (2013) addressed the relative impact of ordinality, sound, and shape as potential factors that
might determine the specific color of a grapheme in English and in Japanese (Hiragana). For Hira-
gana characters, they found that ordinality, sound and shape all contributed to the prediction of
color attributes while for English only ordinality and shape were predictive. These results under-
line the important role of ordinality due to its primacy when learning the graphemes in childhood.
Notably, ordinality can be considered as conceptual information.
Despite the notion that synaesthesia is a perceptual phenomenon, Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and
Nikolic´ (2014) emphasize that the stimuli that trigger synaesthesia (i.e., the inducers) often take
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the form of concepts and only the synaesthetic experiences (i.e.,
the concurrents) typically exhibit clear perceptual properties.
This also holds for sequence-space synaesthesia, in which ordi-
nal elements are experienced as occupying locations in extended
areas of space. According to Price and Pearson (2013) this may
very well be a variety of normal visuospatial imagery that has
evolved as a mnemonic strategy to overcome developmental
retardation of the phonological loop. Interestingly, an extended
phenomenological investigation of spatial-form synaesthesia in
a single case showed that often the synaesthetic experience fol-
lowed an internal verbalisation of the inducer, indicating an audi-
tory component to this form of synaesthesia (Gould et al., 2014).
Moreover, the insights into and the kinds of synaesthetic experi-
ences seemed to expand during the interview (cf. Price, 2014 for
further considerations). These findings are in line with the learn-
ing theory of synaesthesia put forward by Watson et al. (2014).
They emphasize the mutual influences of learning and synaesthe-
sia and suggest that it may have evolved (and survived) because it
is useful for learning.
A related question concerns whether synaesthesia can be
induced by training and hypnosis. In a comprehensive review,
Rothen and Meier (2014) conclude that behavioral facets of
synaesthesia can be induced by training, but so far there is lit-
tle evidence that this is also accompanied by a “synaesthetic”
experience. In their commentary, Colizoli et al. (2014) ask for
additional training studies which should be evaluated accord-
ing to a diagnostic checklist. Specifically, they suggest that for
each trained individual, consistency, bandwidth, automaticity,
conscious experience, perceptual nature, and presence should
be assessed, and potential demand effects controlled. Anderson
et al. (2014) used hypnosis to investigate a potential performance
advantage in a visual search task previously reported for genuine
grapheme-color-synaesthetes. This did not materialize. How-
ever, accurate responses were associated with reports of more
intense colors, suggesting that colors induced by posthypnotical
suggestions were only perceived after successful target detection.
Last, but not least, two studies directly addressed the
development of synaesthesia, that is, the consistency of inducer-
concurrent pairs in grapheme-color synaesthesia across child-
hood development and the adult lifespan. In a longitudinal study,
Simner and Bain (2013) found a protracted developmental tra-
jectory from age 6 to age 11 with an age-related increase of the
number of consistent grapheme-color associations. Meier et al.
(2014) used a cross-sectional approach to investigate age-related
changes in more than 400 grapheme-color synaesthetes aged 18–
91. They found a decrease of the number of consistent grapheme-
color association in older age. Together these findings suggest
that synaesthesia follows a similar developmental trajectory as
many other cognitive functions.
Overall, this Research Topic provides a comprehensive
overview of different approaches available to address the devel-
opment of synaesthesia. There may be large individual differ-
ences in the developmental trajectory and across different forms
of synaesthesia. So far, the focus was mainly on the development
of grapheme-color- and sequence-space synaesthesia which both
involve cultural artifacts as inducers. Future studies should also
address the development of other forms, for example, sound-
color synaesthesia.
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Synesthesia is a hereditary, neurological
condition in which a wide range of com-
mon stimuli (e.g., letters, sounds, flavors)
trigger unexpected secondary sensations,
for example, synesthetes listening to music
might see colors in addition to hearing
sounds (Ward et al., 2006; see Simner
and Hubbard, 2013, for review). Current
explanations of synesthesia posit struc-
tural and/or functional differences in the
synesthete brains, and frame their mod-
els in terms of excess cortical connectivity
or altered cortical feedback. Here, we pro-
pose an immune hypothesis of synesthe-
sia, which supplements existing models by
suggesting how such altered connectivity
may arise and how associations between
synesthesia and other conditions might be
explained.
Two categories of model seek to explain
the generation of synesthetic experiences,
and more recent models are a hybrid
of both (Brang et al., 2010). The cross-
activation model (Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001) suggests that excess con-
nectivity between functional areas of the
cortex allows activation in one cortical
area (e.g., auditory cortex) to directly
trigger activation in another (e.g., visual
cortex). Evidence in support of this model
comes for example from diffusion tensor
imaging (DTI) and shows that exces-
sive connectivity is indeed a feature of
the synesthetic brain (Rouw and Scholte,
2007). Re-entrant and disinhibited feedback
models propose that synesthetic sensations
are caused by disinhibited feedback from
higher cortical areas (e.g., in parietal lobe)
failing to suppress non-relevant activation
from lower cortical areas (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001). This type of disinhib-
ited feedback may result from excessive
activity of excitatory neurons within
the delicate balance between both exci-
tatory and inhibitory neurons in the
brain (Hubbard et al., 2011). Despite
appearing superficially different, con-
nectivity and feedback models need not
be mutually exclusive. It is unlikely that
altered feedback happens entirely in the
absence of changes in cortical connec-
tivity, given the Hebbian principle that
simultaneous activity strengthens inter-
connectivity between neurons. Therefore,
these two approaches might be considered
somewhat unified in that connectivity
models propose aberrant connectiv-
ity as the primary causal mechanism
underlying synesthesia whereas feedback
models might allow altered connectivity
as an indirect consequence of disinhibited
feedback.
While these models are now more than
a decade old, explanations of how these
cortical characteristics might arise have
proven elusive thus far (but see Brang
and Ramachandran, 2008; Mitchell, 2013)
and we explore this here. Synesthesia is
thought to be primarily neurodevelop-
mental in nature (Spector and Maurer,
2009). Consequentially, known processes
of brain development are likely to be
implicated in its emergence. We propose
that insight might be gained from examin-
ing the functionality of genes that regulate
the types of altered synesthetic corti-
cal connectivity assumed in these mod-
els above (i.e., genes for axon guidance,
synapse density). This is the approach we
follow here.
DUAL GENE FUNCTIONALITY:
CONNECTIVITY AND IMMUNITY
Above, we saw that current models link
synesthesia to altered structural connec-
tivity, misregulated feedback mechanisms,
or a combination thereof. Explaining how
synesthesia develops might therefore come
from considering the developmental pro-
cesses responsible for cortical connectivity.
The immune system is known to play a sig-
nificant role in these processes (for review,
see Boulanger, 2009) and we ask here
whether a propensity to develop synes-
thesia may be linked to the expression of
immune proteins in the CNS, since this
expression can be conferred by genes with
functions of both immunity and corti-
cal development. Indeed, many genes have
been shown to have precisely this dual
functionality (Boulanger, 2009). As well as
their immunity function, such genes act
in cortical development, altering structural
and/or functional connectivity by influ-
encing the development of axonal guid-
ance, synaptic connectivity, and synaptic
pruning. One outcome of these changes
may therefore be the anomalous pattern
of connectivity proposed by the cross-
activation theory in the development of
synesthesia. Alternatively, the immune sys-
tem could have a direct influence on
excitatory neuronal activity, leading to the
outcomes proposed by disinhibited feed-
back models. This is because the immune
system plays an important role in the
initial development and subsequent plas-
ticity of glutamatergic synapses, the pri-
mary excitatory transmission pathway in
the mammalian cortex (Fourgeaud and
Boulanger, 2010).
CAN THE IMMUNE SYSTEM
INFLUENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE BRAIN?
Is it plausible to make a link between
the immune system and regulation
of the central nervous system (CNS)?
Isolated from the rest of the body by
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 563 |
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the blood-brain-barrier, the CNS was
once thought to barely interact with the
immune system, leading to the long held
view that the CNS was “immune priv-
ileged” (McAllister and van de Water,
2009). However, research now shows
a complex communication between
the CNS and immune system, with
wide-reaching consequences for brain
regulation and development, both in
health and disease (Elmer and McAllister,
2012). Immune proteins are known to
play a role at many stages in the devel-
opmental pathway. They are integral
components of phases critical to brain
development and plasticity, such as neu-
ronal guidance, synapse development, and
synaptic remodeling (Boulanger, 2009).
We therefore hypothesize that CNS and
immune system interaction may be the
biological mechanism which confers the
predisposition to develop synesthesia.
Which aspects of the immune sys-
tem are known to exhibit the type of
dual functionality under discussion in this
article (i.e., functionality in both immu-
nity and cortical development)? Several
areas of this extraordinarily complicated
system are worth highlighting. The com-
plement system is one possible candidate—
a complex cascade of protein interactions
involved in immunity which has also
been shown to play an important role
in tagging of synapses to be eliminated
by pruning during development (Stephan
et al., 2012). Another candidate relates to
cytokines, which are immune proteins that
have also been shown to play significant
roles in neurogenesis and synaptic plas-
ticity (Bauer et al., 2007). A third can-
didate relates to major histocompatibility
complex (MHC) proteins, which are an
integral part of the adaptive immune sys-
tem found on the surface of the majority
of nucleated cells and widely expressed in
neurons of the CNS (Boulanger, 2004).
In addition to fulfilling a crucial func-
tion in immune response, MHC class I
molecules and related components are
thought to be involved in a range of
developmental processes, such as activity-
dependent plasticity and synaptic refine-
ment (Boulanger, 2009). The MHC locus
contains several hundred genes, and has
also been widely implicated in a range of
autoimmune conditions, such as multiple
sclerosis (MS), irritable bowel syndrome
(IBS), and rheumatoid arthritis (Fernando
et al., 2008). We point out, however that
the immune system consists of many
hundreds of individual factors and pro-
cesses. Given this, our suggestions above
should be considered speculative and by
no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, we
consider them to each be plausible candi-
dates for future investigation.
We end this section by asking whether
existing studies into the genetics of synes-
thesia would support our immunity
hypothesis. In other words, have they
identified areas of the genome contain-
ing immune system genes? Research into
synesthesia genetics is in its infancy and
as yet, there are insufficient data to draw
firm conclusions. No synesthesia genes
have yet been identified and no firm
mode of inheritance has yet been eluci-
dated. However, evidence from the two
existing studies on the genetics of synes-
thesia (Asher et al., 2009; Tomson et al.,
2011) have identified several chromoso-
mal regions of interest, and these regions
do contain immune function genes. Asher
et al. (2009) found significant linkage to
chromosome 2q24 and possible linkage
to areas on other chromosomes (5q33,
6p12, and 12p12), while Tomson et al.
(2011) identified a candidate region on
chromosome 16q12.2-23.1. The authors
of both studies draw the conclusion that
synesthesia is likely to be a condition influ-
enced by a variety of genes in multiple loci.
Nonetheless, the chromosomal regions of
interest highlighted in these two investiga-
tions do contain immune function genes
(e.g., interleukin-17, a cytokine protein
found on chromosome 6p12), although
we wish to be clear that many other viable
candidates also lie outwith these regions.
THE IMMUNE HYPOTHESIS AS A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF
CO-MORBIDITIES
An immune hypothesis of synesthesia
might additionally explain recent co-
morbidity data which suggests that hav-
ing synesthesia may be associated with
increased risk of other clinical conditions.
Carruthers et al. (2012) report an associ-
ation between synesthesia and IBS, having
found an elevated prevalence of synesthe-
sia in a population of people with IBS.
Other researchers have raised the possi-
bility that synesthesia may also be found
at elevated rates within populations with
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007) or
migraine (Alstadhaug and Benjaminsen,
2010). The immune system plays a promi-
nent role in all of these conditions (Collins,
2002; Bruno et al., 2007; Enstrom et al.,
2009), suggesting that altered immune sys-
tem function may be a common causal
link. If so, the immune model proposes
a plausible framework by which to inves-
tigate co-morbidity between synesthesia
and other conditions. If this hypothesis is
correct, we might ask whether the preva-
lence of synaesthesia is also higher in pop-
ulations with other autoimmune condi-
tions. Indeed, recent data from our lab has
led us to explore whether developmental
synaesthesia might occur more prevalently
in people with the radiological profile of
multiple sclerosis (MS), for example, a
demyelinating disease of the human CNS
(Simner et al., submitted). A maladaptive
immune system is an undisputed factor
in the pathogenesis of MS (Trapp and
Nave, 2008), and the majority of genes
implicated in MS have an immune func-
tion (Gourraud et al., 2012). The immune
hypothesis of synaesthesia might therefore
lead us to investigate whether synaesthesia
and autoimmune conditions such as MS
could share overlapping genetic origins in
contributing to cortical development and
immune function.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
We have proposed that CNS/immune sys-
tem interactions during early life may play
a role in the development of synesthe-
sia. We have asked whether genes with
dual functionality in brain development
and immunity may be at the origin of
existing models of synesthesia, and this
mechanism would provide a framework to
investigate associations between synesthe-
sia and other immune-related conditions.
We make our proposal here as a model
for developmental synesthesia, although
not all cases of synesthesia are develop-
mental in nature. Synesthesia may also
be acquired, for example as a result of
brain injury (Schweizer et al., 2013) or
induced by consumption of psychoactive
drugs such as Lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD; e.g., Cytowic, 1989). Our hypothesis
does not speak directly to such cases, and
it is not yet known whether these different
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forms of synesthesia have the same neural
origins or mechanisms. It is interesting to
note however that immune system activity
is elevated after brain injury, and processes
such as apoptosis do become activated
(Griffiths et al., 2010). It is therefore at
least plausible to ask whether the immune
systemmight also play a role in the appear-
ance of non-developmental synesthesias.
Identification of genes that contribute to
the development of synesthesia will make
a significant contribution to the validity
of this hypothesis, and whether synesthesia
has one cause or many.
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There is increasing evidence from case reports that synesthesia is more common in
individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC). Further, genes related to synesthesia
have also been found to be linked to ASC and, similar to synaesthetes, individuals
with ASC show altered brain connectivity and unusual brain activation during sensory
processing. However, up to now a systematic investigation of whether synesthesia is
more common in ASC patients is missing. The aim of the current pilot study was to test
this hypothesis by investigating a group of patients diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome
(AS) using questionnaires and standard consistency tests in order to classify them as
grapheme-color synaesthetes. The results indicate that there are indeed many more
grapheme-color synaesthetes among AS patients. This finding is discussed in relation to
different theories regarding the development of synesthesia as well as altered sensory
processing in autism.
Keywords: Asperger syndrome, autism, synesthesia, prevalence, development
INTRODUCTION
SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesia is a non-pathological phenomenon in which spe-
cific sensory stimuli (e.g., a sound) or concepts (e.g., time units
or numbers) lead automatically to additional, internally gen-
erated sensations (e.g., colors, textures or shapes). A stimulus
leading to synaesthetic sensations is termed “inducer,” while the
internally generated synaesthetic sensation is termed ‘concur-
rent’ (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). The most investigated
type of synesthesia is grapheme-color synesthesia (GCS) in which
numbers and/or letters are perceived in specific colors, occurring
in about 1.1–2.0% of the population (Simner et al., 2006). The
consistency of the specific synaesthetic couplings, i.e., that a cer-
tain letter always triggers a sensation of the same color, has been
defined as one of the key features of synesthesia (Cytowic, 1995)
and it has been shown to persist over long time periods (Simner
and Logie, 2007). Although the view that synaesthetic coupling is
always consistent over time has been questioned recently (Simner,
2012), consistency tests (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Eagleman
et al., 2007) are still used as gold standard to distinguish synaes-
thetes from non-synaesthetes. A standardized online test battery
(http://www.synesthete.org) has been developed for the classifica-
tion of GCS, as well as other types of synesthesia (e.g., auditory-
visual synesthesia, spatial-sequence synesthesia, etc.). However,
up to now the test for GCS is the most commonly used and its
potential to differentiate synaesthetes from non-synaesthetes has
been validated (Eagleman et al., 2007). Another key characteristic
of synesthesia is the automaticity of consistent couplings, which
can be tested with a speeded consistency test where inducers are
presented either in a synaesthetically congruent or incongruent
color (Eagleman et al., 2007). The idea of this test is that, as
synesthesia occurs automatically, synaesthetes should be able to
quickly distinguish synaesthetically congruent from incongruent
trials. Indeed, synaesthetes have been shown to respond much
more accurately in this test than controls.
As synesthesia runs in families, it is likely to have a genetic
component: about 40–50% of synaesthetes report a first-degree
relative who is also a synaesthete (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996;
Barnett et al., 2008a,b). Further, specific gene loci have been iden-
tified as being related to this phenomenon (Asher et al., 2009;
Tomson et al., 2011). However, as different types of synesthesia
can occur within the same family, and as the synaesthetic expe-
riences are highly individual for each synaesthete, it has been
suggested that a genetic predisposition to develop synesthesia
exists in general, but that the development of individual couplings
is influenced by environmental factors (Barnett et al., 2008a,b).
The neuronal mechanisms underlying synesthesia still remain
to be clarified. In GCS, there is evidence of the involvement
of visual, parietal, and frontal brain areas (Rouw et al., 2011),
whereas involvement of the parietal cortex has also been found
in sequence-space (Tang et al., 2008) and (language-unrelated)
auditory-visual synesthesia (Neufeld et al., 2012a).
INDICATIONS FOR A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTISM SPECTRUM
CONDITIONS (ASC) AND SYNESTHESIA
Together with his co-workers, Simon Baron-Cohen published
a case study on a remarkable man with synesthesia, Asperger
Syndrome (AS) and savantism (Bor et al., 2007). They suggested
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that co-occurrence of AS and synesthesia might increase the like-
lihood of savantism. But there is also evidence for a linkage
between ASC and synesthesia. While synesthesia is character-
ized by additional, internally generated sensations and in rela-
tion to that also often by unusual brain activation in sensory
cortex regions (Rouw et al., 2011), altered sensory processing
and sensory symptoms are also commonly found in individu-
als with ASC, e.g., in the visual (Simmons, 2009) and auditory
domain (O’Connor, 2012; Samson et al., 2006). According to a
recent review, sensory hypo- and hyper responsiveness are more
frequent in ASC than in other developmental disabilities and
atypical neural activity following sensory stimulation has been
found in ASC patients even at the level of the primary sen-
sory cortex in the auditory, tactile, and visual domain (Marco
et al., 2011). It has been demonstrated that auditory stimuli
can trigger responses in both auditory and nearby visual brain
regions in autistic individuals (Kemner et al., 1995). Similarly,
co-activation of the color processing area in the fusiform gyrus
has been found in GCS (Hubbard, 2007) in response to the
presentation of colorless graphemes. Further, increased connec-
tivity has been detected in the brains of individuals with autism
(Courchesne et al., 2005) as well as in synaesthetes (Rouw and
Scholte, 2007; Jaencke et al., 2009; Haenggi et al., 2011). Findings
showing altered brain anatomy in autistic individuals have led to
the hypothesis that there is a developmental bias in ASC toward
forming more short range connections, leading to hyper connec-
tivity of local networks (Casanova and Trippe, 2009). Moreover,
it has been suggested that cross-activation of adjacent brain
areas are the mechanism underlying synesthesia (Hubbard and
Ramachandran, 2005).
Besides these similarities, there is some evidence for a genetic
linkage between ASC and synesthesia. Cytowic pointed out that
about 15% of synaesthetes report having a first-degree rela-
tive with dyslexia, autism or attention deficit disorder (ADD)
(Cytowic, 1995). A recent whole genome investigation with
auditory-visual synaesthetes revealed a significant linkage of this
type of synesthesia to genes which have previously been shown to
be linked to autism (Asher et al., 2009; IMGSAC, 2001).
Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence for synesthesia in
ASC patients (Harrison and Hare, 2004) and preliminary data
based on self-report suggest that synesthesia is more common in
individuals with AS (Johnson et al., 2011).
However, a systematic investigation into the relationship
between AS and synesthesia using standardized tests is missing up
to now. Here we tested a group of individuals diagnosed with ASC
for GCS. We hypothesized that this type of synesthesia is more
common in individuals with ASC.
METHODS
DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS
DSM-IV criteria for AS in child- and adulthood (A.P.A., 1994)
were thoroughly explored by a self-developed semi-structured
interview (“Diagnostic interview: AS in adulthood”). After a
general medical anamnesis (somatic, psychiatric and social his-
tory, including childhood development) the second part specifi-
cally explored symptoms related to AS. This part contained the
sections: social interaction and communication (e.g., empathic
abilities, friendships and interest in peers); special interests (e.g.,
in specific objects/topics); stereotype behavior (e.g., rituals, reac-
tion to disturbance of rituals); and other characteristics (e.g.,
clumsiness, increased sensitivity toward sensory stimuli). Each
section addressed child- and adulthood separately. Additionally,
eye contact, facial expressions, prosody, “mirroring” of affections,
and clumsiness were observed during the interview. The duration
of the interview was about 90min. Diagnosis was completed with
information from personal interviews, either by telephone or in
written form, with observers in child- and/or adulthood, such as
partners, friends, parents or siblings. In some cases, school reports
completed anamnesis.
All patients were interviewed by the same experienced investi-
gator. Diagnosis was only confirmed if all DSM-IV criteria were
clearly fulfilled. Retrospective data on the development of speech
were assessed. Two male patients were excluded from the study
retrospectively, as the possibility of delayed speech onset could
not be reliably excluded in these cases.
Additionally we used two self-rating scales to complement
diagnosis: the autism-spectrum quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) and the empathy quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004). The AQ is an instrument for quantifying
where an individual is placed on the continuum from typical to
autistic, a high score indicating more pronounced autistic traits.
The AQ consists of 50 items which are divided into five subscales:
social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communica-
tion, and imagination. The EQ is an instrument for estimating
the empathic abilities of an individual and a high score indicates
greater empathy. It consists of 40 items on empathy and 20 filler
items. Baron-Cohen suggested a cut-off score of ≥32 points for
the AQ (80% of patients with AS scored more than 32 points)
and a cut-off score of ≤30 points for the EQ (81% of patients
with AS scored less than 30 points). However, the score for 20%
of Baron-Cohen’s patients was outside these cut-offs. Therefore
those patients whose score was outside the autistic range were also
included, as long as they fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for AS.
Every patient was examined for axis-I co-morbidity by using
the German version of the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (Wittchen et al., 1997).
PARTICIPANTS
All patients diagnosed with AS between February 2008 and June
2011 in the Clinic for Psychiatry of the Hannover Medical School
(n = 29, 8 women) received a written or oral invitation to par-
ticipate in the study, for which a small amount of monetary
compensation was offered. The study was described as involv-
ing computer tests and questionnaires. Nothing was mentioned
about synesthesia before participation to avoid a recruiting bias.
In all, 21 patients (5 women, mean age = 37.9 ± 11.3 years) gave
informed consent to participate in the study and completed the
tests, as well as the questionnaires. The study was approved by the
local ethics committee.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Once a participant arrived, he received a short description of
synesthesia. A few examples of the different types of synesthe-
sia, including GCS, were described. Furthermore, it was explained
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that synesthesia does not mean associations (e.g., associating the
word “love” with the color red, or metaphorical associations,
such as “being angry” = “seeing red”). Most of the participants
claimed that they never heard of synesthesia before. After the
introduction, participants were asked whether they experience
color sensations when seeing numbers or letters. Participants then
performed a consistency test for GCS (Eagleman et al., 2007),
an offline version of the Synesthesia Test Battery (http://www.
synesthete.org) on a PC. During this test, the numbers from 0
to 9 and the 26 letters of the alphabet were presented in black
ink on white background on a computer screen. Each stimulus
was presented separately and three times in a randomized order,
so that there were 108 stimuli in total. Subjects were instructed
to choose the color which they thought best fitted the presented
grapheme by moving a cross-hair cursor on to a color matrix (see
Figure 1A). As there was no time pressure to choose the colors in
this test, the completion time varied (from about 20min to 1 h).
After the test, participants completed a short questionnaire,
a German version of the questionnaire used in the prevalence
investigation by Simner et al., consisting of six questions (see sup-
plementary material) which were rated on a six-point Likert scale
to assess each participant’s subjective view concerning consistency
and vividness of potentially synaesthetic sensations experienced
during the consistency test (Simner et al., 2006). Participants were
asked whether their answers to these questions would be the same
for numbers and letters and, if that was not the case, to fill in
the questionnaire twice, once for numbers and once for letters.
Responses ranged from “strongly disagree” (“trifft gar nicht zu”)
to “strongly agree” (“trifft voll zu”) and were coded from 0 to 5.
Scores between 0 and 30 could be achieved, with higher num-
bers indicating synesthesia (the highest score per question, 5, was
assigned to “strongly agree” for questions 1, 3, 5, and 6 and to
“strongly disagree” for questions 2 and 4). As a group of 20 known
grapheme-color synaesthetes scored on average 26.4 in this ques-
tionnaire (SD = 4.64), the synaesthetic range has been defined
as a score between 17 and 30 (lower bound = two standard
deviations below mean score) (Simner et al., 2006).
In order to prevent false classification of participants using
memorizing strategies to give consistent responses like synaes-
thetes, the consistency test was followed by a speeded consistency
test. The latter is designed to test for the criterion of automatic-
ity and is based on the assumption that the possibility of giving
correct responses from memory is ruled out if the response has
to be given quickly. (Eagleman et al., 2007). In this task, partici-
pants see a colored grapheme presented on the screen for 1 s. In
50% of trials, the color is congruent with the synaesthetic color
reported by the participant, in the other 50% of trials the color is
incongruent, thus different from that color. In each trial, partic-
ipants are instructed to report as quickly as possible by pressing
a button whether the color of the letter is congruent with their
synaesthetic color or not. The test consists of 108 trials and takes
approximately 10min.
FIGURE 1 | Graphical surface of the consistency test and examples of
consistency test results for different patients. (A) Participants selected a
color for each item presented on the screen by moving a cross-hair cursor
over a color matrix. The majority of patients reported not perceiving colors
when seeing numbers or letters and made inconsistent color choices as in
(B). Accordingly, those patients have rather high scores in the consistency
test (>1.0). This is consistent with their reports and their low scores in the
six-point questionnaire (<17). Three patients made consistent color choices
(score <1.0) for letters and numbers (C) or numbers only (D) which was
consistent with their reports and six-point questionnaire scores (those
patients claiming to perceive synesthesia differently for numbers and letters
completed the questionnaire twice, separately for numbers and letters).
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Participants were only classified as synaesthetes if they fulfilled
all three criteria: (1) subjective experience of synesthesia (assessed
by self-report and short questionnaire), (2) consistency (indicated
by a consistency score lower than 1.0 for those items for which
synesthesia was reported) and (3) automaticity of synaesthetic
sensations (indicated by an accuracy level of at least 80% in the
speeded consistency test).
At the end, an extensive interview, based on a synesthesia ques-
tionnaire, was conducted to obtain additional information about
the subjective experience of GCS, as well as other synesthesia
types, and to collect some data on the patients (age, sex, educa-
tion, etc.). One part of the synesthesia questionnaire was a list of
possible possible inducers and concurrents, as in the question-
naire by Simner et al. (2006). Participants were asked to indicate
any of synesthesia they thought they may have by drawing lines
on the questionnaire between listed inducers and concurrents.
They were further asked to name any additional type of synesthe-
sia involving inducers or concurrents which were not on the list,
or to modify items to describe the sensation in a better way. All in
all, the whole investigation took approximately 2 h per subject.
DATA ANALYSIS
Consistency test
As GCS is characterized by stable grapheme-color mapping, color
consistency was calculated for the color choices per grapheme
made during the three runs. The color variation was calculated
from the geometric distance of the RGB (red green blue) val-
ues chosen for each item within the three trials. A consistency
score was then calculated as the mean geometric distance per item
over all N items (Eagleman et al., 2007). N was 36 – X (X = the
number of items for which the “no color” button was chosen).
Synaesthetes usually achieve scores smaller than 1.0, indicating
greater consistency, while controls usually achieve higher scores
(on average 2.0) indicating less consistent color choices.
Speeded consistency test
The percentage of correct responses in all 108 trials, as well as
the mean response time, was then calculated. Synaesthetes have
been shown to give 94% correct responses on average, while con-
trol subjects have an average of 67% correct responses (Eagleman
et al., 2007). Therefore synaesthetes can be expected to respond
correctly to at least 80% of the trials in this test.
Statistical procedure
For each participant, consistency score, short questionnaire score,
percentage of correct responses and reaction times in the speeded
consistency test were calculated. Patients were classified as synaes-
thetes if they (1) reported experiencing synesthesia before testing,
(2) reached a consistency score <1.0 and an accuracy of >80%
in the speeded consistency test. In this test, reaction times of
participants classified as synaesthetes and those classified as non-
synaesthetes were compared to make sure that the former did not
achieve higher accuracy by taking more time for their responses.
For synaesthetes reporting synesthesia for both letters and num-
bers, mean reaction time for all graphemes was used while for
those reporting synesthesia for numbers only, mean reaction time
for numbers only was used. These reaction times were compared
to (1) mean reaction times for all graphemes and (2) mean reac-
tion times for numbers only in classified non-synaesthetes using
two-sample t-tests. The same comparisons were made for consis-
tency scores and percentage of correct responses in the speeded
consistency test.
The percentage of patients classified as synaesthetes in the
whole group included in the study, as well as in the group of
patients tested, was calculated. To exclude the possibility that the
percentage of synaesthetes found in the current study might be
influenced by a recruiting bias (patients with synesthesia might
be more likely to participate in a study), we used the percentage
of synaesthetes found in the total sample of patients included,
conservatively assuming that the eight patients who could not
be tested would have been classified as non-synaesthetes. A two-
sided 95% Wald confidence interval was calculated for the per-
centage of synaesthetes in the whole sample, which was then
compared with prevalence calculations of GCS in the general pop-
ulation. The prevalence of grapheme-color synaesthetes has been
found to be 1.1% in museum visitors and 1.4% in students, when
only those synaesthetes who perceived colors for both numbers
and letters were counted. When those participants who per-
ceived colors for numbers only were also counted as synaesthetes,
Simner et al. found 2.0% grapheme-color synaesthetes in the uni-
versity sample. As we also included both types of grapheme-color
synaesthetes here, that is, those who perceive colors for letters and
numbers and those perceiving colors for numbers only, we used
the 2.0% as reference for our study. If GCS is more prevalent in
AS patients, we would expect the 95% Wald confidence interval
of our estimated percentage to range above 2.0%.
Furthermore a power calculation with nQuery7.0 based on the
exact test for a single proportion was performed to investigate
whether the sample size was appropriate for the comparison.
RESULTS
PATIENTS REPORTING GCS
Twenty-nine patients were included in the study, whereby 21 were
tested. Out of those, six (two females) reported perceiving col-
ors induced by letters and numbers or by numbers only. One of
these six cases (patient 11) did not achieve a consistency score
smaller than 1.0 (1.36 for all items, 1.27 for numbers). He also
had only a marginal questionnaire score of 16 and described his
sensations “more like feelings” than visual sensations and some
numbers had “two colors at the same time” for him. It is not
clear whether this is the reason for the relative inconsistency of
his color choices during the test. He was therefore classified as
non-synaesthete. The five remaining patients who reported per-
ceiving synesthesia reached scores within the synaesthetic range in
both the consistency test and speeded consistency test, either with
regard to both letters and numbers or to numbers only (accord-
ing to the type of synesthesia they reported). Out of these, one
patient (patient 17) achieved a score of only 16 in the question-
naire which is just below the cut-off value of 17. He had said
previous to the testing procedure that he might perceive colors
for numbers and letters but that this happens more on a subcon-
scious level. Even after completing the test he claimed that he was
not sure if he really “sees” the colors, although it seemed quite
clear to himwhich colors he should choose. He was also uncertain
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whether the color sensations occur automatically and whether
they have always been the same, which is likely to be the reason
why he responded rather conservatively to some questions in the
six-point questionnaire. He further claimed to have difficulties
concentrating and understanding the questions of the six-point
questionnaire. As he achieved a clearly synaesthetic score of 0.75
in the consistency test and accuracy of 92.59% in the speeded con-
sistency test (RT = 0.67 s), indicating that his color associations
for graphemes are consistent as well as automatic, he was clas-
sified as a synaesthete. The four remaining patients scored clearly
within the synaesthetic range in the questionnaire (21–26), as well
as in the tests (see Table 1). In addition, all five patients classified
as synaesthetes reported experiencing types of synesthesia other
than GCS (for details see Table 2).
PATIENTS NOT REPORTING GCS
There was one patient (patient 15) who claimed to be unsure as
to whether he perceives colors induced by graphemes; he had
a score of 15 in the six-point questionnaire (which is within
the non-synaesthetic range, although relatively close to the cut-
off value of 17), but as his test scores were clearly within the
non-synaesthetic range (consistency score = 1.83, speeded con-
sistency = 76.9% correct) he was classified as a non-synaesthete.
Among the remaining patients, no others claimed to perceive col-
ors when seeing numbers or letters and none of them reached a
score higher than 17 (0–14) in the six-point questionnaire, or a
score ≤1.0 in the consistency test (see Table 1, for a test example
see Figure 1B).
For the 16 patients who were classified as non-synaesthetes,
the consistency score was between 1.19 and 2.59 (mean = 1.99;
SD = 0.44) and the accuracy in the speeded consistency test was
between 28.70and 79.63% (mean = 63.52%; SD = 13.90%). The
mean questionnaire score was 8.44 ± 4.99.
When looking at RGB values for numbers only, the 16 patients
classified as non-synaesthetes reached consistency scores between
0.92 and 3.29 (mean = 1.73; SD = 0.43) and an accuracy in the
speeded consistency test between 33.33 and 83.33% (mean =
67,35%; SD = 15.03%).
Table 1 | Demographic data, questionnaire score and consistency test results of all participants.
ID Age Gender Reported Reported Verified Questionaire Consistency Speeded Speeded
Comorbidities GCS GCS score score consistency consistency
[% correct] [RT]
L N N + L N N + L N N + L N
1 50 m – – – 8 8 1.54 0.92 – – – –
2 40 f Depression N + L N + L 25 25 0.35 0.37 97.22 96.67 1.24 1.25
3 23 m Depression N N 16 26 1.00 0.73 91.67 96.67 0.78 0.78
4 47 m – – – 12 12 2.59 2.56 49.07 56.67 1.99 1.72
5 62 f – – – 6 6 1.19 1.32 73.15 76.67 3.25 2.78
6 22 f ADHD – – 2 2 2.07 1.91 75.93 70.00 1.15 1.13
7 42 m – N N 17 21 1.97 0.86 68.52 83.33 1.61 1.61
8 25 m – – – 0 0 2.32 2.44 48.15 40.00 0.29 0.28
9 40 m ADD – – 6 6 1.87 1.94 74.07 83.33 1.54 1.45
10 23 m – – – 13 13 2,4 3,60 28,70 33,33 0.67 0.75
11 35 m – N+L – 16 16 1.36 1.27 79.63 80.00 1.26 1.10
12 54 f – – – 11 11 1.79 1.52 75.00 80.00 1.24 1.19
14 40 m – – – 14 14 1.63 1.88 58.33 63.33 0.35 0.35
15 23 m ADHD ? – 15 15 1.83 1.74 76.85 76.67 0.65 0.66
16 48 m Dyslexia – – 6 6 2.37 1.54 66.67 63.33 1.24 1.18
17 26 m ADD depression
anxiety disorder
N + L N + L 16 16 0.75 0.53 92.59 90.00 1.22 1.08
18 35 m – – – 9 9 2.52 1.99 59.26 60.00 0.67 0.71
19 39 m Depression – – 8 8 2.04 1.46 63.89 70.00 1.54 1.61
20 35 f Pain disorder
mild agoraphobia
N(+ L) N(+ L) 13 24 0.95 0.89 87.96 93.33 0.92 0.91
21 39 m ADD. depression – – 9 9 1.77 1.89 67.59 73.33 0.98 0.98
22 48 f – – – 0 0 2.51 1.63 56.48 83.33 1.25 1.17
Prior to the tests, participants were asked whether they associate colors with numbers (N) or letters (L); they performed a consistency test, as well as a short
questionnaire regarding their color associations during the test, and a speeded consistency test. In the questionnaire, synaesthetes usually have a higher score (>17),
while in the consistency test lower scores indicate higher consistency which synaesthetes usually achieve (<1.0). In the speeded consistency test synaesthetes
usually respond very accurately (on average 94%) compared to controls (on average 67%). Scores lying within the synaesthetic range are marked in red. Note that
patient 13 was excluded from the study retrospectively, as the possibility that he had delayed speech onset could not reliably be excluded.
GCS, grapheme-color synesthesia; m, male; f, female; AD(H)D, attention deficit (Hyperactivity) disorder.
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Table 2 | Additional synesthesia types reported by patients classified
as grapheme-color synaesthetes.
ID Age Gender Profession Strength of
GCS for
numbers
compared to
letters
Additional
synesthesia types
reported
2 40 f Historian,
retired
Equally
strong
Word→color,
Name→color,
Month→color,
Weekdays→color
3 23 m Unemployed Stronger for
numbers
Word→shape,
Number→pattern,
Number→character
(OLP),
Weekdays/
month→space
(sequence-space
synesthesia),
Month→temperature,
Sound→touch,
Musical note→color,
Musical note→number,
Touche→motion,
Emotion→color,
Object→emotion,
Voice→character,
Color→music,
Geometric
shape→emotion
7 42 m Journalist Numbers
only
Three-dimensional
shapes→emotion,
Colore→motion,
Number→character
(OLP),
Other people’s
emotions/
intentions→colored/
3-dimensional shapes
17 26 m Motor-
mechanic
Equally
strong
Month→color,
Weekdays→color,
Pain→color,
Dates→space
(sequence-space
synesthesia),
Music→color,
Tone→color,
Sound→color,
Letters→character
(OLP)
20 35 f Student
(sociology &
media
sciences)
Stronger for
numbers
Numbers→gender/
valence (OLP),
Weekdays→color/
emotion,
Music→color/shape/
movement/texture,
(Continued)
Table 2 | Continued
ID Age Gender Profession Strength of
GCS for
numbers
compared to
letters
Additional
synesthesia types
reported
Tone→color/
movement,
Objects→character,
Pain→color/
temperature,
Geometrical
shapes→color,
Movement→shape,
Weekdays/
month→space
(sequence-space
synesthesia)
All patients classified as grapheme-color synaesthetes reported synesthesia
types other than GCS, which were assessed by a questionnaire containing a
list of possible inducers and concurrents.
f, female; m, male; OLP, ordinal linguistic personification.
COMPARING PATIENTS CLASSIFIED AS GC-SYNAESTHETES WITH
THOSE CLASSIFIED AS NON-SYNAESTHETES
The consistency scores, percentages of correct responses and reac-
tion times in the speeded consistency test (both for all graphemes
and numbers only) for the two groups were compared (see
Figure 2). The distributions of all metrics were found to be not
significantly different from normal distribution (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-Test) and therefore independent-sample t-tests were
used for comparisons. Patients classified as synaesthetes were sig-
nificantly more consistent in their color choices in the consistency
test [t(20) = 5.79; p < 0.001] and in the speeded consistency test,
regardless of whether the percentages of correct responses for
the synaesthetes (letters and numbers or numbers only, depend-
ing on synesthesia type) were compared to the values for all
graphemes [t(19) = 4.19; p < 0.001) or numbers only [t(19) =
3.47; p < 0.001) in the non-synaesthete group. However the reac-
tion times in the speeded consistency test were not significantly
different between groups when comparing the synaesthetes’ val-
ues to non-synaesthetes’ values for all graphemes [t(19) = 0.44;
p = 0.67) or numbers only [t(19) = 0.24; p = 0.81). There was
no significant correlation between response time and accuracy
(R = 0.23, p = 0.31).This strongly suggests that those patients
classified as synaesthetes did not achieve higher consistency by
memorizing responses.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
All in all, six patients reported GCS and, of these, it was possible
to verify five as synaesthetes: two perceiving letters and num-
bers equally in color, two perceiving only numbers in color and
one perceiving strong colors induced by numbers and compara-
tively weak color associations induced by letters. These patients
made up 23.8% of all patients tested and 17.2% of all patients
included in the study (see Figure 3). For the more conservative
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of consistency and reaction times for patients
identified as synaesthetes with those for patients identified as
non-synaesthetes. Participants were divided into two groups: those
identified as synaesthetes (N = 5, dark gray bars) and those identified as
non-synaesthetes (N = 16, light gray bars). (A) Mean consistency scores
(GC-synaesthetes: mean =; SD =, non-synaesthetes: mean = 1.99; SD =),
(B) mean percentage of correct responses in the speeded consistency test
and (C) mean reaction times in the speeded consistency test are shown.
Note that for the two synaesthetes who reported synesthesia for numbers
only, the scores and reaction times for numbers only were used. Error bars
represent between-subject standard errors, stars indicate level of
significance.
FIGURE 3 | Comparison of the percentage of patients who were
identified as grapheme-color synaesthetes with the prevalence
estimations in the general population. Even when assuming that the
patients who could not be tested would be classified as non-synaesthetes,
the associated 95% Wald confidence interval (3.5–31.0%) still exceeds the
prevalence reported by Simner et al. (2006).
estimation of 17.2%, the 95% Wald confidence interval extends
from 3.5% to 31.0%, exceeding the prevalence of 1.1–2.0%
found in the general population (Simner et al., 2006). Therefore
the rate of synaesthetes was significantly higher in the patient
group than in the general population. For the sample of tested
patients the 95% Wald confidence interval extends from 5.6%
to 42.0%.
The power calculation for the exact test for a single proportion
with a two-sided type I error of 5% demonstrated that the sample
size was large enough for the observed effect. The probability of
proving a difference between 2 and 17.2% (the most conservative
scenario) with 29 patients is 89%.
OTHER SYNESTHESIA TYPES
Overall, 36 types of synesthesia other than GCS were reported by
patients, regardless of whether they were classified as grapheme-
color synaesthetes or not (see Table 3).
DISCUSSION
RELATION BETWEEN SYNESTHESIA AND ASC
The results of the current pilot study indicate a much higher
prevalence of GCS (between 3.5 and 31%) in patients with AS
than in the general population. Although the sample size in
this study is too small to make assumptions about the specific
prevalence of synesthesia in individuals with ASC, there is strong
evidence of increased prevalence in these patients, based not only
on self-report, but on verification by standardized tests. Given
that co-occurrence of synesthesia and ASC by chance is per se very
unlikely (Bor et al., 2007), the current results clearly suggest a link
between AS and synesthesia. This is in line with other reports of
synesthesia in ASC patients (Harrison and Hare, 2004; Bor et al.,
2007; Johnson et al., 2011) and with theoretical models showing
that changes in sensory perception are linked to altered neuronal
connectivity in ASC (Plaisted, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006, 2013).
The possible reasons for such a linkage will be discussed below,
taking these models into account.
There is considerable evidence for altered sensory perception
in autism. For example, “sensory hypersensitivity” (Baron-Cohen
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Table 3 | List of reported synesthesia types apart from GCS
Synesthesia type Number of reports Synesthesia type Number of reports
Sequence→space 7 Geometric shape→sound 1
Sequence→texture 1 Geometric shape→emotion 1
Day→color 4 Geometric shape→color 1
Month→color 2 Object→emotion 1
Month→temperature 1 Object→texture 1
Word→color 1 Object→charatcer 1
Word→movement 1 Electrical towers→character 1
Word→shape 2 Place→color 1
Number→pattern 1 City→color 1
Number→character (OLP) 3 Event→color 1
Sound→color 1 Touch→color 1
Sound-touch 1 Pain→temperature 2
Music→colored spapes 1 Pain→color 1
Music→odor 1 Pain→sound 1
Musical note→color 1 Emotion→color 2
Musical note→number 1 Emotion→shape 2
Color→music 2 Emotion→taste 1
Color→character 1 Movement→shape 1
With the assistance of the experimenter, all participants completed an extensive questionnaire where they were asked to report any other type of synesthesia they
thought they might have by drawing lines between the inducers and concurrents listed. Patients were also encouraged to add inducers or concurrents to the list if
they thought they had a type of synesthesia that was not represented. If requested, the experimenter explained any types of synesthesia which were unclear to
the participant in more detail, giving some examples.
Reports from all study participants were considered here, regardless of whether they were classified as grapheme-color synaesthetes or not. Only the types of
synesthesia reported are listed.
OLP, ordinal linguistic personification.
et al., 2009) has been detected in different modalities (vision,
audition and touch) in ASC individuals (Bonnel et al., 2003;
Bertone et al., 2005; Blakemore et al., 2006; O’Riordan and
Passetti, 2006; Tommerdahl et al., 2007; Heaton et al., 2008;
Simmons, 2009). Further, increased brain activation in primary,
as well as more associative, areas connected with visual process-
ing has been found in a wide range of different cognitive tasks, as
reported by a recent meta-analysis (Samson et al., 2012). Sensory
hypersensitivity in the modality of the concurrent has also been
detected in synaesthetes (Banissy et al., 2009) and enhanced visual
evoked potentials unrelated to synaesthetic sensation have been
found in synaesthetes as well (Barnett et al., 2008a,b). Therefore
both phenomena are likely to be related to altered low-level
perception.
The differences in low-level perception in autism have
been explained by different models. An enhanced discrim-
ination model proposes that hyperfunctioning of low-level
perception, together with a deficit in recognizing similarities
between stimuli or situations on the perceptual and atten-
tional level, causes a lack of generalization (Plaisted et al.,
1998; Plaisted, 2001). Similarly, a model of enhanced per-
ceptual functioning in autism (EPF model) suggests that the
main differences in perceptual processing between autistic and
non-autistic individuals are determined by more locally ori-
ented low-level sensory perception (leading to enhanced low-
level discrimination) and more autonomy of low-level process-
ing, e.g., reduced top-down influence (Mottron et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the authors propose that there is enhanced mid-
level perception in more associative areas, but in a non-
strategic, bottom-up or parallel fashion. This model empha-
sizes that variations in brain organization are the cause of
the detected cognitive differences and atypical brain activa-
tion patterns toward more low-level areas (e.g., more posterior
visual areas) during higher order perceptual tasks. Enhanced
interaction between locally close sensory areas has not only
been suggested to be a mechanism of an altered perception
in autism, but also in synesthesia. Here the model of cross-
activation proposes increased communication between locally
adjacent brain areas involved in processing of inducer and con-
current, which would be the grapheme processing area and
the color area in the fusiform gyrus in the case of GCS
(Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005).
If hyperconnectivity between sensory brain regions is the cause
of altered sensory perception in autism as well as synesthesia, it is
possible that a mutation in specific genes related to the develop-
ment of structural or functional connections in the brain might
increase the likelihood of both phenomena. For example, prun-
ing have been suggested to be the reason for both synesthesia
(Maurer, 1993; Hubbard et al., 2005) and AS (Bor et al., 2007),
and increased increased (functional and structural) brain con-
nectivity has been detected in synaesthetes (Rouw and Scholte,
2007; Jaencke et al., 2009; Haenggi et al., 2011) as well as Asperger
patients (Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Courchesne et al.,
2005; Turner et al., 2006). Support for common genetic causes
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comes from a genetic marker demonstrated to be most signifi-
cantly related to auditory-visual synesthesia has also been shown
to been shown to be associated with ASC (Asher et al., 2009).
Besides the evidence for enhanced low-level perception and
connectivity in synesthesia and ASC, there is also evidence for
the involvement of associative brain regions in both phenom-
ena. Increased activation in associative cortex regions involved in
higher order sensory processing has been found in ASC individ-
uals in the visual domain (Samson et al., 2012), while increased
functional connectivity between frontal areas (Noonan et al.,
2009) and between posterior cingulate and medial temporal cor-
tex (Monk et al., 2009) has been found using fMRI. In synesthesia,
the parietal cortex especially has been found to be hyperacti-
vated in different types of synesthesia (Tang et al., 2008; Rouw
et al., 2011; Neufeld et al., 2012a) and this region has also
been found to be more strongly connected to the sensory areas
involved in inducer- and concurrent processing (van Leeuwen
et al., 2011; Sinke et al., 2012; Neufeld et al., 2012b), support-
ing the idea of top-down modulation of sensory areas by this
higher-order associative region. It has been suggested in the so-
called two-stage model that a combination of both increased local
connectivity between sensory brain reagions and modulation of
these connections by higher-order areas may be a mechanism of
synesthesia (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005; Hubbard, 2007).
The evidence for both low-level and top-down mechanisms in
synesthesia implies that, while some components of synaesthetic
perception might be “hard-wired,” others might be more flexible
and cognitive in nature. In line with this, it has been proposed
that synesthesia has genetic, as well as developmental, compo-
nents; for example, the likelihood of developing synesthesia seems
to be related to genetic components, whilst the specific synesthe-
sia type and the specific inducer-concurrent inducer-concurrent
pairings are developed highly individually in every synaesthete
(Rouw et al., 2011).
Therefore it is likely that synesthesia does involve building
associations early in life. Further, we are currently unable to dis-
tinguish between synesthesia and associations, as the latter can
also occur consistently and automatically if they are overlearned
rather than built spontaneously. While originally synesthesia was
often described as a “merging of the senses” and the term ‘synes-
thesia’ itself underlines its perceptual character, researchers point
out nowadays that inducers are often conceptual rather than
sensory in nature (Eagleman, 2012; Juergens and Nikolic´, 2012;
Simner, 2012). It has been suggested recently that synesthesia
might help to fill a “semantic vacuum” (which arises, for exam-
ple, when a child learns letters) with meaning (Nikolic´, personal
communication). Evidence for this theory comes from the fact
that synesthesia is much more common for abstract inducers,
such as letters, numbers or days (Day, 2005; Simner, 2012), and
that for these inducers the context – and therefore the semantic
content – determines the synaesthetic color rather than percep-
tual features (Juergens and Nikolic´, 2012). Therefore, synaesthetic
experiences might make abstract information more concrete by
acting as concrete labels and in that way make it more memoriz-
able (Rothen et al., 2012). Synesthesia might, therefore, be one
possible solution to the semantic vacuum problem, used pref-
erentially – but not exclusively – by individuals suffering from
deficits in abstract/conceptual thinking. It has been found that
individuals with ASC differ from typical individuals regarding
conceptual processing by being biased toward local instead of
global processing, leading to a theory of ‘weak central coher-
ence’, or a weakened drive to detect meaning by looking at the
“big picture” (Happé and Frith, 2006). Difficulties in generalizing
information might evoke a tendency in ASC patients to label oth-
erwise abstract concepts with a concrete sensory experience, e.g.,
a color. On the other hand, enhanced memory abilities as found
in individuals with ASC and Savant syndrome (Treffert, 2009) can
be explained a more concrete way of processing information for
these individuals. Besides the highly concrete representation of
abstract concepts in savants, which has been reported anecdotally,
(Murray, 2010), theoretical models showing the development of
exceptional abilities related to autism point to the parallels with
synesthesia (Murray, 2010; Rothen et al., 2012; Mottron et al.,
2013). Specifically, the relation to synesthesia has been discussed
in great detail in the context of veridical mapping, the coupling
of homolog elements of recurrent isomorphic patterns, which
has been proposed as an extension to the above-mentioned EPF
model (Mottron et al., 2009). Veridical mapping includes, but is
not restricted to, the strategic use of “if p, then q” rules (Mottron
et al., 2013). The enhanced tendency to detect these rules within a
system has been referred to as hypersystemizing, which has been
suggested to be related to autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).
Interestingly, those domains which are most common as inducer
categories (numbers, language, calendrical calculation, music) in
synesthesia are (overlearned) linguistic sequences (Simner, 2012;
Juergens and Nikolic´, 2012) which are also domains that are
highly “systemizable” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). Further, the
majority of synaesthetic inducers, as well as concurrents, con-
sist of a series of homogeneous, meaningfully ordered elements
(Mottron et al., 2013). In that sense, synesthesia can be regarded
as resulting from associations between correspondingmembers of
two homologous series and, therefore, as a form of veridical map-
ping. If veridical mapping is enhanced in ASC, this would explain
the greater tendency of those individuals to develop synesthesia.
In conclusion, shared genetic components leading to differ-
ences in brain anatomy (including local connectivity) and, in rela-
tion to that, altered cognitive mechanisms like increased veridical
mapping and a greater tendency to concretize abstract informa-
tion might make individuals with ASC more likely to develop
synesthesia.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The main weakness of this study is the relatively small subject
number – especially compared to other prevalence investigations.
However, we tried to avoid response biases (1) by including all
patients diagnosed by a single institution in a certain time period
and (2) by not mentioning synesthesia before commencing test-
ing, in order to avoid response bias driven by motivation to
participate (which might be enhanced in individuals who believe
that they are synaesthetes). Furthermore, the aim of the current
study was not to evaluate the specific prevalence of synesthesia
in AS patients, but to test the hypothesis that synesthesia is more
common in this group than in the general population. Our results
clearly support this hypothesis. On the other hand, they do not
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clarify whether AS is more common among synaesthetes. The
question of the prevalence of AS in synaesthetes will have to be
investigated in future studies.
Another critical point of this investigation is the diagnostic
procedure. There is no standard for diagnosing AS according
to the DSM-IV criteria in adulthood. The “Autism Diagnostic
Interview – Revised” is often used, but this interview is based
purely on information from the parents, with many questions
concerning the patient’s childhood. However, in adults that is
often difficult, as patients do not wish to involve their parents
in the diagnostic process or they are not available. Also, the
retrospective recall of the childhood period may be imprecise.
Therefore the diagnostic process for autism in adulthood is cur-
rently problematic, especially if no diagnosis has been made in
childhood. We tried to minimize this problem by a thorough
exploration of the DSM-IV criteria for child- and adulthood, by
interviewing and observing the patients, and by supplementing
this with information from third parties or, for example, from
school records.
One might argue that instead of the prevalence estimation by
Simner et al. a control sample of the same sample size as our
patient group could have been used as a comparison. We believe
that it is appropriate to compare our data with the prevalence esti-
mation by Simner et al., as the latter is a very reliable source due to
the large sample size. In addition, we used the same instructions
and questionnaires, as well as a similarly designed synesthesia test.
It should be mentioned that our sample of participants differs
from the sample tested by Simner et al. regarding the sex ratio:
while Simner et al. tested approximately the same number of men
and women in the museum study (582 female and 608 male) and
more women than men in the university study (327 female and
173 male), the majority of our participants were male (16 of 21).
While Simner et al. found GCS to be equally common in men
and women (1.1:0.9), a previous study suggested that it is about
six times more common in females (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996).
If the unbalanced sex ratio in our study affected the results, it
might, therefore, be expected that an even higher percentage of
synaesthetes would be found in a sample with a balanced sex ratio.
Interestingly, two of the five patients classified as synaesthetes
were women, although only five women were tested in total.
Given that AS is believed to be far more common in boys
than in girls (8:1) (Remschmidt and Kamp-Becker, 2007), one
might find the male/female ratio of 3.5:1 (2.75:1 in the whole
sample) in this study surprising. However, there is more recent
evidence that the proportion of AS actually varies less between
males and females (on average 4.6:1, but varying in different states
of the U.S.A. from 2.7:1 to 7.2:1) (Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention, 2012). Lying within the range found in the
United States, the male/female ratio in this study is therefore quite
representative.
Further work is needed to examine the relationship between
AS and synesthesia by investigating a larger group of Asperger
patients and the possible reasons for the linkage or similarities
between the two conditions. In addition, it would also be of great
interest to learn whether the prevalence of ASC, or the occurrence
of autistic traits (e.g., assessed by AQ and EQ), is higher among
synaesthetes.
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Though synesthesia research has seen a huge growth in recent decades, and tremendous
progress has been made in terms of understanding the mechanism and cause of
synesthesia, we are still left mostly in the dark when it comes to the mechanistic
commonalities (if any) among developmental, acquired and drug-induced synesthesia.
We know that many forms of synesthesia involve aberrant structural or functional brain
connectivity. Proposed mechanisms include direct projection and disinhibited feedback
mechanisms, in which information from two otherwise structurally or functionally separate
brain regions mix. We also know that synesthesia sometimes runs in families. However,
it is unclear what causes its onset. Studies of psychedelic drugs, such as psilocybin,
LSD and mescaline, reveal that exposure to these drugs can induce synesthesia. One
neurotransmitter suspected to be central to the perceptual changes is serotonin. Excessive
serotonin in the brain may cause many of the characteristics of psychedelic intoxication.
Excessive serotonin levels may also play a role in synesthesia acquired after brain injury. In
brain injury sudden cell death ﬂoods local brain regions with serotonin and glutamate.
This neurotransmitter ﬂooding could perhaps result in unusual feature binding. Finally,
developmental synesthesia that occurs in individuals with autism may be a result of
alterations in the serotonergic system, leading to a blockage of regular gating mechanisms.
I conclude on these grounds that one commonality among at least some cases of acquired,
developmental and drug-induced synesthesia may be the presence of excessive levels of
serotonin, which increases the excitability and connectedness of sensory brain regions.
Keywords: acquired synesthesia, autism spectrum disorder, drug-induced synaesthesia, left-hemisphere injuries,
multisensory perception, savant syndrome, serotonin hypothesis, traumatic brain injury
INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia is an extraordinary way of perceiving the world,
involving experiences of connections between seemingly unre-
lated sensations, images or thoughts (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987;
Cytowic, 1989; Rich and Mattingley, 2002; Sagiv and Ward, 2006;
Brogaard, 2012). For example, seeing the number 7 may lead to
an experience of navy blue, hearing the word “bliss” may ﬂood
the mouth with the ﬂavor of bread soaked in tomato soup and
hearing the key of C# minor may elicit a bright purple spiral
radiating from the center of the visual ﬁeld. The trigger of the
experience is called “the inducer,” whereas the additional experi-
ence towhich it gives rise is called“the concurrent”(Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001). In visual synesthesia, the concurrent may be
projected out into space and experienced as located in the visual
scene outside the subject’s mind, or it may be merely imagis-
tically or semantically associated with the inducer (Dixon et al.,
2004).
The two key characteristics of synesthesia regardless of whether
it is of the projector or associator type is that it involves an aberrant
binding of features fromdifferent sensory or cognitive streams that
are associated with atypical conscious experiences or thoughts and
that these experiences or thoughts are automatic, that is, synes-
thetes cannot suppress the association between an inducer and
its concurrent. Other characteristics of the condition are speciﬁc
to the different forms. According to Grossenbacher and Lovelace
(2001), there are three different types of synesthesia:
(1) Developmental, or genuine, synesthesia
(2) Acquired synesthesia
(3) Drug-induced synesthesia
Developmental synesthesia, the most common type, is a form
of the condition that has persisted since birth or early childhood
and that remains relatively stable and systematic over time: each
inducer has a highly speciﬁc concurrent. (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987; Mattingley et al., 2001; Simner et al., 2006). It also tends
to run in families (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996). For the most com-
mon forms of developmental synesthesia, the Synesthesia Battery,
an automated online test, allows for rigorous testing of both
the tightness of the synesthetic association and its stability and
systematicity over time (www.synaesthete.org; Eagleman et al.,
2007).
Acquired synesthesia is a form of the condition that emerges
after brain injury or disease or artiﬁcial technologies like sen-
sory substitution (Ward and Wright, 2012). It has been reported
following stroke (Ro et al., 2007; Beauchamp and Ro, 2008;
Thomas-Anterion et al., 2010; Schott, 2012), traumatic brain
injury (Brogaard et al., 2012; Brogaard and Marlow, 2013), neu-
ropathology involving the optic nerve and/or chiasm (Jacobs et al.,
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1981; Armel and Ramachandran, 1999; Afra et al., 2009), seizures
(Jacome and Gumnit, 1979), migraine (Alstadhaug and Ben-
jaminsen, 2010), post-hypnotic suggestion (Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2009) and sensory substitution (Ward and Wright, 2012). Audio-
visual synesthesia has been reported to be the most common
acquired type (Afra et al., 2009). Like developmental synesthe-
sia, acquired synesthesia tends to be automatic and systematic
over time, though in some cases it only persists for a limited
time period (Jacome and Gumnit, 1979; Lessell and Cohen,
1979; Afra et al., 2009). Experientally, acquired synesthesia may
be indistinguishable from developmental synesthesia, though it
is sometimes less inducer-speciﬁc, that is, the same concur-
rent may have several different inducers (Brogaard et al., 2012).
Cases have also been reported in which the acquired experience
is simpler than the developmental counterpart, often similar to
light ﬂashes (phosphenes) or pure color experiences (Afra et al.,
2009).
Drug-induced synesthesia is a blending of sensory or cogni-
tive streams that is experienced during exposure to a hallucinogen
(psilocybin, LSD, mescaline, peyote; Shanon, 2002; Friedrichs,
2009; Sinke et al., 2012). Unlike the developmental and acquired
varieties, the drug-induced form is usually limited to the most
intense phases of intoxication, though in some cases it continues
for weeks or months after exposure to the drug (Abraham, 1983;
Ffytche, 2007). Experientally, drug-induced synesthesia can vary
from simple color experiences to complex, surrealistic landscapes
consisting of, for example, oddly shaped objects with multi-
colored contours or images with ornamental or kaleidoscopic
compositions (Hintzen and Passie, 2010).
Though synesthesia research has seen a huge growth in
recent decades, and tremendous progress has been made in
terms of understanding the mechanism and cause of the con-
dition, we are still left mostly in the dark when it comes to
the mechanistic commonalities (if any) among developmental,
acquired and drug-induced synesthesia. It is widely believed
that most forms of the condition involve functional or struc-
tural aberrant brain connectivity. The proposed mechanisms
include direct or indirect projection through increased struc-
tural connectivity (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a,b; Hub-
bard et al., 2005; Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Jancke et al., 2009;
Hanggi et al., 2011; Zamm et al., 2013), functionally driven
disinhibited-feedback mechanisms (Grossenbacher and Lovelace,
2001; Dixon et al., 2006; Esterman et al., 2006; Neufeld et al.,
2012), and mixed models (Hubbard, 2007; Ward, 2013). How-
ever, it is unclear what causes the onset of the condition
and whether the different types of synesthesia have different
causes.
One proposal by Brang and Ramachandran (2007) suggests
serotonin (5-HT) as a causal factor. Their speciﬁc suggestion is
that “serotonin S2a receptors are the ‘synesthesia receptors’ in
the brain” (p. 903). In support of this hypothesis they list four
pieces of evidence: (i) LSD produces synesthesia by selectively
activating serotonin 5-HT2A receptors. (ii) Prozac (ﬂuoxetine), a
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor that increases 5-HT1 recep-
tor activity thereby inhibiting 5-HT2A, blocked synesthesia in
two subjects. (iii) the anxiolytic drug Wellbutrin (bupropion),
which presumably inhibits 5-HT2A receptor activity, temporarily
abolished synesthesia in one subject, (iv) melatonin, a brain hor-
mone derived from serotonin that can disinhibit 5-HT2A receptor
activity, temporarily induced grapheme-color synesthesia in a
subject with number-form synesthesia.
Thus, Brang and Ramachandran’s (2007) suggestion is that
serotoninmay be functionally implicated in generating synesthetic
experience through 5-HT2A receptor activity. In the formulation
of the hypothesis Brang and Ramachandran (2007) do not spec-
ify which of the 5-HT2A receptors in the brain cause synesthesia,
whether the serotonin receptors that are“synesthesia receptors”are
inhibitory or excitatory, whether serotonin could be structurally
implicated in causing synesthesia through altered structural con-
nectivity during brain development and whether the serotonin
hypothesis may also explain cases of acquired synesthesia. My
aim in this paper is to develop the serotonin hypothesis to ten-
tatively answer these questions by looking at a wider range of
evidence.
More speciﬁcally, my proposal is that excessive extracellular
serotonin (5-HT) can be a trigger of persistent or transient synes-
thesia in all the groups through excitatory mechanisms. Though
serotonin traditionally has been considered an inhibitory neuro-
transmitter,more recent evidence suggests amore complex picture
according to which serotonin can function both as an inhibitory
and an excitatory neurotransmitter. For example, serotonin helps
reduce fear processing in the amygdala via GABA modulation but
it exerts an excitatory effect on cortical brain activity when it binds
to 5-HT2A serotonin receptors on layer V pyramidal neurons
(Barkai and Hasselmo, 1994; Aghajanian and Marek, 1999).
As indicated by Brang and Ramachandran (2007), the sug-
gestion that serotonergic activity may be a trigger of synesthesia
has the greatest degree of evidential backing in the case of drug-
induced synesthesia. It has been shown in several studies that
psychedelic hallucinogens that function primarily as serotonin
agonists, such as psilocybin, LSD and mescaline, often induce
transient, often auditory-visual synesthesia, presumably through
an alteration of functional brain connectivity. Though not all sero-
tonin agonists elicit synesthetic experience, it is widely agreed that
the mechanism of action for the class of serotonergic hallucino-
gens is through binding of serotonin to the 5-HT2A serotonin
receptor (Presti and Nichols, 2004; González-Maeso et al., 2007).
Excessive serotonin levels may also play a role in synesthe-
sia acquired after brain injury. Research has shown that necrosis
following tissue damage leads to local neurotransmitter ﬂooding
caused by an excessive release of serotonin and glutamate (Busto
et al., 1997; Hinzman et al., 2010), a phenomenon that can have
long-range consequences even when the injury is minor. This
ﬂooding appears to lead to increased functional or structural inter-
connectedness among different brain regions in some individuals,
and in some cases this increased connectivity may be a cause of
synesthesia.
Developmental synesthesia has been reported as a condition
in autism-spectrum disorders (Ornitz et al., 1978; Grandin, 1995;
Kemner et al., 1995; Harrison and Hare, 2004; Asher et al., 2009;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2009), and is believed to be more frequently
occurring in individuals with autism compared to the general pop-
ulation (Cytowic, 1989). It is suggested below that synesthesia
accompanying autism may be a serotonergic condition, resulting
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from excessive serotonin levels in early childhood that could pos-
sibly lead to decreased extracellular levels of serotonin in one
hemisphere and compensatory increased levels in the other hemi-
sphere. One piece of evidence for this comes from PET scans of
people with high-functioning autism which have revealed that in
the majority of cases serotonin synthesis is suppressed in the left
hemisphere and increased in the right hemisphere, though in some
cases it is reversed (Chandana et al., 2005). Recent genetic studies
furthermore suggest a genetic link between autism spectrum dis-
order and developmental synesthesia in non-autistic individuals
(Asher et al., 2009). Whether there is a mechanistic link between
autism and cases of developmental synesthesia in non-autistic
individuals remains to be established.
In what follows I will provide detailed evidence for the
hypothesis that one commonality among at least some cases
of acquired, developmental and drug-induced synesthesia is the
presence of excessive levels of serotonin or serotonin-agonists,
which increase the excitability and connectedness of sensory brain
regions through 5-HT2A receptors in cortical neurons.
ACQUIRED SYNESTHESIA
The acquired form of synesthesia usually emerges subsequent to
traumatic brain injury or neuropathologic insult to the brain
(Beauchamp and Ro, 2008; Afra et al., 2009; Brogaard et al., 2012).
Several studies have hypothesized that these acquired synesthesias
occur from plasticity of the sensory systems resulting in increased
connectivity (Ro et al., 2007; Beauchamp and Ro, 2008). This the-
ory has additionally been studied in at least one case of acquired
synesthesia (Ro et al., 2012). Ro et al. (2012) found that connec-
tions between the auditory and somatosensory cortices in healthy
controlswere strengthened in a subjectwith auditory-tactile synes-
thesia acquired after a right ventrolateral thalamic lesion that
deprived her somatosensory cortex of normal somatosensory
input.
It remains largely unknown how a brain lesion may give rise
to the plastic changes that lead to the increased connectivity.
One possibility is that it is caused by increased neurotrans-
mitter activity in cortical regions adjacent to the affected site.
This increase is believed to contribute to the pathophysiology
and neurological dysfunction after traumatic brain injury (Busto
et al., 1997; Bullock et al., 1998; Robertson et al., 2001; Werner
and Engelhard, 2007; Hinzman et al., 2010). In traumatic brain
injury tissue damage makes the cells shift to anaerobic glycoly-
sis, resulting in an accumulation of lactic acid. The anaerobic
metabolism cannot by itself maintain the energy levels, so ATP-
stores are depleted and the membrane ion-pumps, which depend
on ATP, fail. This leads to membrane degradation of vascular
and cellular structures and necrotic or programmed cell death
(apoptosis), resulting in excessive release of excitatory neuro-
transmitters, particularly serotonin and glutamate (Busto et al.,
1997; Hinzman et al., 2010). This excess in extracellular sero-
tonin and glutamate availability affects neurons and astrocytes
and results in over-stimulation of serotonin and glutamate recep-
tors. It is believed that this over-stimulation effect can happen
even in mild traumatic brain injury, as the release of neuro-
transmitters is vast even with minor lesions (Konrad et al., 2011;
Perez-Polo et al., 2013). Other types of brain injury that have been
reported to trigger synesthesia, such as stroke (Ro et al., 2007;
Beauchamp and Ro, 2008; Afra et al., 2009; Thomas-Anterion
et al., 2010; Schott, 2012), also cause neurotransmitter ﬂooding
after necrosis. It has been found, for example, that even a brief
ischemic stroke may trigger complex biochemical events that lead
to progressive apoptotic and necrotic neuronal cell death (Yuan,
2009).
The increased levels of serotonin and glutamate immediately
following brain injury do not normally stay elevated for very long
(Eysel et al.,1999). Eysel et al. (1999) induced1.5 to 2mmlesions in
the striate cortex of cats using surface photocoagulationor ibotenic
acid injections. Single cell measurements revealed that activity
was decreased at the border of the lesion and increased in a ring
around the lesion during the ﬁrst days to weeks following the
induction but it returned to normal after about a month (Eysel
et al., 1999). Despite the fact that serotonin does not seem to stay
elevated for more than one month following a brain lesion, there
is suggestive evidence that the temporary elevation may sufﬁce
for creating long-lasting functional, and possibly also structural,
changes (Giza and Prins, 2006; Konrad et al., 2011; Perez-Polo
et al., 2013). It has furthermore been reported that initial increases
in neurotransmitter levels following brain injury or disease may
be followed by down-regulation of receptors in ipsilateral brain
regions (Giza and Prins, 2006).
One hypothesis for how brain injury or disease may cause
synesthesia, then, is that the initially elevated neurotransmitter
levels down-regulate serotonin receptors in neural regions in the
ipsilateral hemisphere, leading to decreased serotonin levels. Indi-
viduals who acquire synesthesia also sometimes develop autistic
traits and savant-like abilities of the sort seen in 10 percent of autis-
tic individuals (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007; Treffert, 2009; Brang
and Ramachandran, 2011; Rogowska, 2011; Brogaard et al., 2012;
Schott, 2012; Ward, 2013). Emerging savant skills have also been
reported in many other cases of central nervous system injury or
disease later in life (Fay, 1987; Dorman, 1991; Miller et al., 1998,
2000; Lythgoe et al., 2005; Tammet, 2006; Treffert, 2006, 2009;
Snyder, 2009). As is known from studies of autistic savants, down-
regulation of the serotonergic system in one hemispheremay result
in an upregulation of the serotonergic system in contralateral
brain regions (DeLong, 1999; Takeuchi et al., 2012), which might
explain the development of savant skill and synesthesia follow-
ing brain injury (Treffert, 2009). A second hypothesis is that the
elevation in serotonin and glutamate levels in the days or weeks
after brain injury can trigger disinhibited feedback or a struc-
tural binding of features through serotonergic hyperactivity in
sensory neurons or neurons in parietal cortex involved in mental
imagery. The latter have been found to be plausible neural corre-
lates in at least one case of acquired synesthesia (Brogaard et al.,
2012).
The second hypothesis is more plausible than the ﬁrst when
synesthesia is acquired after brain injury. It would explain the
increased ipsilateral connectivity found in at least one case of
acquired synesthesia (Ro et al., 2012). It gains further support
from the fact that the onset of synesthesia following brain injury
has been reported to occur shortly after the injury rather than
months later, which indicates that it is the initial neurotrans-
mitter ﬂooding that causes the onset. Furthermore, if the ﬁrst
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hypothesis were correct, then the affected region would have to
be crucially implicated if the down-regulation triggers an upregu-
lation in other areas, an assumption that cannot be conﬁrmed at
the present time. The ﬁrst hypothesis may have a greater degree of
support for synesthesia acquired after frontotemporal dementia.
Cell death in frontotemporal dementia does not normally occur
via necrosis that leads to neurotransmitter ﬂooding. However, it
is well known that patients with this condition have deﬁcits in
serotonergic anddopaminergic signal-transmission. These deﬁcits
may account for some of the cognitive and behavioral impair-
ments of the disease. As prefrontal areas are known to exert
inhibitory control over other brain regions, decreased activity
in these neural regions could lead to a disinhibitory enhance-
ment of neural activity and connectivity in unaffected cortical
regions (DeLong, 1999; Treffert, 2009), which could also explain
why this type of dementia frequently is reported as a cause of
savant skills (Miller et al., 2000). Regardless of whether the synes-
thesia is acquired after brain injury or dementia, neuroimaging
might help reveal whether the unusual binding is functional or
structural. For example, if it is functional, we should expect to
ﬁnd increased connectivity in functional connectivity analyses on
fMRI data.
The above considerations raise the question of why only a small
fraction of brain injury patients acquire synesthesia-like experi-
ences. One possible answer is that individual differences originate
in variance in the degree of plasticity of the subject’s brain prior
to the incident. Research on brain injury in children has shown
that alterations in neurotransmission during the critical period
when a brain region is most plastic can promote outgrowth of
abnormal neural connections (Giza and Prins, 2006). Since it is
likely that there are signiﬁcant individual differences in the plastic-
ity of the mature brain, it is possible that some subjects are more
susceptible to the formation of new neural connections than oth-
ers. Individual differences are no doubt also grounded in variance
in the location of the injury. Synesthesia-like experiences may be
much more likely to develop if sensory regions or neural areas
implicated in mental imagery are affected.
Given the broad range of conditions that can trigger acquired
synesthesia it is unlikely that there is a single mechanism underly-
ing all cases. Some cases appear to be quite similar in persistence
and phenomenology to well-known forms of developmental
synesthesia and are likely to share a neurological basis with some
of these varieties of synesthesia. For example, autistic savant
Daniel Tammet describes in his book Born on a Blue Day that
he acquired synesthesia after childhood seizures. Though his
grapheme-color synesthesia appears unusually rich, it may have
neurological underpinnings akin to more typical developmental
forms. Other forms of acquired synesthesia appear to be tran-
sient and may well be a more direct product of excitatory neural
activity, similar in many respects to synesthetic experience occur-
ring under the inﬂuence of hallucinogens (see below). An example
would be synesthesia experienced during occipital and temporal
lobe seizures, which can lead to brief experiences quite similar to
psychedelic experiences (Devinsky and Luciano, 1991; Cytowic,
1997; Sacks, 2012). Some forms of acquired synesthesia could be
undergird by a different mechanism not typically found after drug
intoxication or aberrant neural development. In cases in which
synesthesia and savant syndrome are acquired in the same inci-
dent, the two conditions may well be triggered in similar ways.
This could be the case for Tammet, who reports having synes-
thesia matching not only digits but also the product of digits.
His synesthesia could possibly be an imagistic manifestation of
number processing in the parietal cortex. One observation that
supports this hypothesis is that the lack of increased activity in the
visual cortex in response to synesthetic tasks found in an imaging
study comparing brain activity in Tammet and controls (Bor et al.,
2007). Butmore researchneeds to be done to settle these questions.
In most cases of acquired synesthesia the research component has
taken place several years after the onset of the condition. If we
could perform the research (e.g., neuroimagining studies) closer
to the onset, we might be able to determine whether serotoner-
gic hyperactivity in sensory neurons is implicated in the sudden,
unusual binding of features.
DRUG-INDUCED SYNESTHESIA
Drug-induced synesthesia is a blending of perceptual or cog-
nitive streams that emerges in subjects under the inﬂuence of
psychedelic hallucinogens, psychoactive substances that alter per-
ception, mood, and a variety of cognitive processes. A myriad
of ﬁrst-person reports indicate that synesthesia occurs during
psychedelic intoxication. Some reports suggest an altered percep-
tion of the world that blends normally distinct senses. Reports
of colored music are particularly frequent (Shanon, 2002, 2003;
Sinke et al., 2012). In other cases external objects appear to the
perceiver as having an unusual wealth of colors, textures and
shapes that undergo rapid changes. Subjects report seeing melt-
ing windows, breathing walls and spiraling geometrical ﬁgures
crawling over the surfaces of objects. Reﬂecting on a DMT ses-
sion one subject, described by Cott and Rock (2008), reported
that “The room erupted in incredible neon colors, and dissolv-
ing into the most elaborate incredibly detailed fractal patterns
that I have ever seen.” The authors characterize this as a hallu-
cination, and it is admittedly difﬁcult to distinguish synesthesia
and hallucinations, particularly because some forms of synesthe-
sia probably are best characterized as hallucinations (Sagiv et al.,
2011). A crucial difference seems to be that hallucinations proper
do not have a phenomenally apparent inducer, whereas synesthe-
sia does. Another difference is that most forms of synesthesia are
experienced as endogenous images or representations (i.e., associ-
ator synesthesia, Dixon et al., 2004). Yet another difference is that
synesthetes know that the concurrent experience is not a veridical
perception, whereas hallucinations tend to evoke the experience
of the veridicality of the perception (Terhune and Cohen Kadosh,
2012).
It is by now fairly well established that two major classes of
psychedelic hallucinogens, the indoleamines (e.g., LSD and psilo-
cybin) and the phenethylamines (e.g., mescaline), are potent
partial agonists at serotonin 5-HT1A/2A/2C receptors, with 5-
HT2A receptor activation directly correlated with hallucinogenic
activity (Glennon, 1990; Vollenweider et al., 1998; Nichols, 2004;
Presti and Nichols, 2004; though see e.g., Previc, 2011 for a
different perspective). Though the mechanism of action varies
for different hallucinogens, it is believed that 5-HT2A receptor
activation of cortical neurons is responsible for mediating the
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signaling pattern and behavioral response to hallucinogens (Presti
and Nichols, 2004; González-Maeso et al., 2007). However, the
activation of the cortical serotonergic systemdoes not fully explain
the perceptual effects of psychedelic drugs, as not all 5-HT2A ago-
nists (or partial agonists) have an excitatory mechanism of action
and not all 5-HT2A agonists have psychedelic effects (e.g., methy-
sergide). So, this raises the question of what other factors need to
be present for drug-induced hallucinations to occur.
A promising suggestion for how the hallucinatory effects occur
is that hallucinogens activate layerV pyramidal neurons in the cor-
tex, which engage in gating functions in communication between
the cortex and subcortical brain regions (Barkai and Hasselmo,
1994). When a hallucinogen binds to the 5-HT2A receptor, this
gives rise to an excitatory response (Scruggs et al., 2003; Nichols,
2004). Recent research suggests that co-transmission of gluta-
mate and monoamines is a frequent occurrence in the central
nervous system (Trudeau, 2004; Ciranna, 2006). The 5-HT2A
receptors, speciﬁcally, have been found to increase glutamate
release (Ceglia et al., 2004; Torres-Escalante et al., 2004). There
is furthermore evidence suggesting that the hallucinogen psilo-
cybin targets a cortical receptor complex that forms when the
glutamate mGluR2 receptor interacts with the serotonin 5-HT2A
receptor (González-Maeso et al., 2008). Increased release of gluta-
mate in response to hallucinogen administration should enhance
cortical metabolic activity, a ﬁnding that has been conﬁrmed by
Vollenweider et al. (1997). Perceptual changes have been found to
correlate with increased metabolic activity in the frontomedial
and frontolateral cortices, anterior cingulate, and temporome-
dial cortex (Vollenweider et al., 1997). There is also some evidence
from EEG studies that activation of 5-HT2A receptors increases
the excitability of cortical sensory networks by modulating alpha
oscillations (8–12 Hz; Kometer et al., 2013). Brain waves in the
alpha frequency range have been shown to regulate the excitability
levels of cortical sensory networks through inhibition (Klimesch,
2011). The increased excitatory action of serotonin and gluta-
mate in sensory regions might explain why hallucinogens mimic
aspects of psychosis during intoxication (Aghajanian and Marek,
1999; Pralong et al., 2002; Nichols, 2004; González-Maeso et al.,
2008).
The view that the hallucinatory effects of hallucinogens are
primarily a result of enhanced neural activity may appear incon-
sistent with a recent fMRI study showing that psilocybin causes
decreased activity in the ACC/medial prefrontal cortex and a
signiﬁcant decrease in the positive coupling between the medial
prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex, and that these
ﬁndings were correlated with subjective effects (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2012). As Lee and Roth (2012) point out, however, these
results are consistent with the observation that 5-HT2A receptors
are found on both layer V glutamatergic neurons and GABAer-
gic interneurons. Furthermore, there is also a direct activation
of GABAergic interneurons through the synapses of pyramidal
cells onto the interneurons (Markram et al., 2004). So, a large
excitatory response in a pyramidal neuron will lead to a large
inhibitory response in the interneuron. Lee and Roth (2012) pro-
pose that the effects of psilocybin could be due to both excitatory
(e.g., pyramidal) and inhibitory (e.g., GABAergic interneuronal)
neuronal circuits and that it may be the effects on the inhibitory
neuronal circuits that gave rise to the measured BOLD response
(see Figure 1).
To my knowledge, no model of how hallucinogens trigger
synesthesia has yet been proposed. One natural proposal would be
that the mechanisms in developmental and drug-induced synes-
thesia are similar. There is, however, some reason to doubt this
suggestion. The phenomenological differences between devel-
opmental and drug-induced synesthesia are quite striking (see
Sinke et al., 2012 for a review). As experiences causally supervene
on neurological processes, experiences that are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent in their phenomenology are bound to have signiﬁcantly
different neurological underpinnings. So, we should expect some
differences in the underlying mechanisms.
One tentative suggestion is that drug-induced synesthesia,
like hallucinations, originates in the hyperactivity of layer V
pyramidal cells resulting from the binding of hallucinogens to
5-HT2A receptors in the cells’ dendrites, which then increases
local glutamate levels. Layer V pyramidal cells bind multisensory
information through feedback loops that synchronize oscillatory
neural responses (Guillery and Harting, 2003). In the visual and
the auditory cortices layer V neurons form feedback loops with
local neurons as well as neurons in the thalamus and prefrontal
cortex. Projections to thalamus play a role in discriminating
among incoming information and integrating information from
different sensory channels, whereas projections to the prefrontal
cortex play a role in higher-order processes and the generation
of a conscious representation. In normal multisensory percep-
tion, low-level multisensory binding of incoming signals from
visual and auditory channels occurs spontaneously in the audi-
tory cortex via thalamocortical feedback loops, when the spatial
and temporal attributes of incoming signals match (Schroeder
FIGURE 1 | Psilocybin, which is inactive, is metabolized to the active
ingredient psilocin. Psilocin then triggers a 5-HT2A excitatory response in
layer V pyramidal neurons and an inhibitory response in GABAergic
interneurons. The inhibitory response produces a decreased BOLD
response. Adapted from Lee, H.-M. and Roth, B. L. (2012). Hallucinogen
actions on human brain revealed. PNAS 109, 6: 1820–1821.
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/6/1820.full
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and Foxe, 2005). Excessive excitatory activity in layer V pyra-
midal neurons, however, results in a destabilization of layer V
projections to the thalamus through GABAergic neuronal cir-
cuits (Kim and McCormick, 1998; Markram et al., 2004). This
has a number of consequences, such as decreased attentional
discrimination among incoming stimuli, allowing more infor-
mation to ﬂood the sensory cortices, a loss of stimulus-speciﬁc
inhibition, an resultant increase of random (or environmentally
under-constrained) activity in the thalamus, and a disruption of
low-level, spontaneous integration of multisensory stimuli on
the basis of actually matching spatial and temporal attributes.
The disruption of low-level integration mechanisms can result
in incongruent experiences, such as hearing an object hit the
ﬂoor prior to seeing it fall. Another result of this disruption of
low-level integration may be a coupling of stimuli that do not
belong together. A common synesthetic experience during hal-
lucinogen intoxication is colored, geometrical grids, matrices or
fractals induced by music (see Sinke et al., 2012 for a review).
These types of visual experience also frequently occur without
an inducer, probably as a result of random activity in the thala-
mus (Behrendt and Young, 2004; Sagiv et al., 2011). One possible
mechanism for drug-induced synesthesia, then, is that the brain
assumes that an experience that results fromoccipital processing of
random thalamic activity matches auditory stimuli, leading to an
unusual low-level binding in the auditory cortex (see Figure 2). As
a result of this aberrant binding, the two inputsmaybe experienced
as an inducer-concurrent pair, for example colored, geometrical
music.
The proposed mechanism leads to the testable prediction that
drug-induced synesthesia will not usually be systematic. In devel-
opmental cases sound-color synesthesia is systematic in the sense
that very speciﬁc sounds normally trigger very speciﬁc colors.
Given the aberrant binding proposed, however, it appears that
drug-induced sound-color synesthesia will not tend to be system-
atic because random activity will be paired with available auditory
information. So, we should expect that the same sound may have
many different colors and shapes.
There are only few reports of drug-induced synesthesia that
endures post-exposure, though there is evidence that other prac-
tices that can induce altered states of consciousness, such as
meditation and posthypnotic suggestion, frequently cause endur-
ing synesthesia (Walsh, 2005; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). The
suggested mechanism may help explain why drug-induced synes-
thesia is seldom persistent over time. The hypothesis proposed
is that occipitally processed random activity is coupled with
available auditory information during drug-induction. The ran-
dom activity does not persist in the same magnitude after
drug exposure, which may explain why the synesthetic expe-
riences and hallucinations tend to subside. But what further
decreases the chance that the synesthesia persists would be the
lack of a one-one mapping or even a many-one mapping from
inducer to concurrent, which we might expect will make the
unusual synesthetic binding less likely to be retained as a neural
connection.
The proposed mechanism of hyperexcitability followed by dis-
ruption may appear to be inconsistent with a related ﬁnding for
FIGURE 2 | Psilocybin, which is inactive, is metabolized to the
active ingredient psilocin. Psilocin then triggers a 5-HT2A excitability
response in layer V pyramidal neurons and an inhibitory response in
GABAergic interneurons. This leads to thalamic destabilization, which
triggers random thalamic activity. The occipitally processed random
activity is paired with available auditory information in layer V
pyramidal neurons, which yields synesthetic experience. Adapted from
Figure 1.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 657 | 28
“fnhum-07-00657” — 2013/10/17 — 21:48 — page 7 — #7
Brogaard Developmental, acquired and drug-induced synesthesia
developmental synesthesia. It is believed that enhanced cortical
excitability at an early developmental stage might contribute to
atypical grapheme-color binding, even though it does not appear
to be a direct cause of synesthesia at later stages (Asher et al.,
2009; Tomson et al., 2011). A recent study reported data that
were consistent with the idea that at later stages the hyperex-
citability can hinder synesthesia by producing excess noise in
the visual cortex and thereby reducing conscious awareness of
the atypical binding of features (Terhune et al., 2011). However,
I think that this suggestion can be reconciled with the pro-
posed mechanism for drug-induced synesthesia. It is plausible
that hyperexcitability may no longer play a functional role at
later stages of developmental synesthesia (Terhune et al., 2011).
Hallucinogenic serotonin agonists, however, appear to intro-
duce a signiﬁcant amount of hyperexcitability that can offset
normal binding by disrupting low-level integration mechanisms.
It is possible that some varieties of developmental synesthesia
form in early childhood in a way similar to the way drug-
induced synesthesia is here hypothesized to form temporarily
later in life, but there would be certain differences: develop-
mental synesthesia is systematic so if synesthesia develops in
childhood as a result of a disruption of low-level integration,
it is not a result of random activity in the thalamus. Fur-
thermore, the presence of the hyperexcitability during brain
development must somehow make it more likely that the unusual
binding persists over time than when the hyperexcitability is
drug-induced.
A version of the proposed model also appears consistent with
the ﬁndings of Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009). The team induced
strong projector grapheme-color synesthesia using posthypnotic
suggestion in a group of highly suggestible college students. In
most cases the synesthesia was found to endure and to display
the phenomenal characteristics of developmental grapheme-color
synesthesia. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009) provide evidence suggest-
ing that the induced synesthesia resulted from posthypnotically
triggered disinhibited feedback. However, their results seem
equally consistent with a model that proposes disruption of low-
level integration. One shortcoming of both mechanistic proposals
for synesthesia induced post hypnosis is that they do not explain
why the condition tends to enduremuch longer thandrug-induced
synesthesia.
A further interesting question is whether the above model
could be adapted to explain acquired synesthesia in which necro-
sis leads to neurotransmitter ﬂooding and elevated local serotonin
levels. Though we do not have enough data on acquired synes-
thesia to make any ﬁrm conclusions at this point, it remains
a possibility that some forms of developmental synesthesia are
acquired in childhood in the same way as the persistent cases
of acquired synesthesia, whereas temporarily acquired synes-
thesia is mechanistically akin to drug-induced synesthesia. If
this is correct, then we should expect drug-induced synesthesia
and temporarily acquired synesthesia to both lack systematic-
ity, as they would result from pairing features with random
information. We should furthermore expect persisting forms
of acquired synesthesia to have the same patterns of perma-
nence and systematicity as at least some forms of developmental
synesthesia.
DEVELOPMENTAL SYNESTHESIA IN AUTISTIC AND
NON-AUTISTIC INDIVIDUALS
Though it is difﬁcult to say whether alterations in the serotonergic
system play a role in the development of the most common forms
developmental synesthesia, such as week-color and grapheme-
color, developmental synesthesia seen in autism spectrumdisorder
is plausibly triggered by unilateral changes in the serotonergic sys-
tem (Milner, 1973; Chugani et al., 1997; DeLong, 1999). There is
not yet any solid evidence that autism and synesthesia are mech-
anistically related but there appears to be a statistical correlation
as well as a possible genetic connection between the two condi-
tions: synesthesia as well as sensory and perceptual abnormalities,
such as hyper-responsiveness to sensory stimulation, are often
reported as signiﬁcant symptoms in autism-spectrum disorders
(Ornitz et al., 1978; Grandin, 1995; Kemner et al., 1995; Harri-
son and Hare, 2004; Asher et al., 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).
Cytowic (1989) states that 15 percent of people with autism expe-
rience synesthesia, which would be signiﬁcant compared to the
4.4 percent of the general population (Simner et al., 2006). How-
ever, a systematic population study of the correlation between
autism and synesthesia has not yet been completed. About 10
percent of individuals with autism also have savant syndrome,
and all three conditions have frequently been reported to occur
together (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007; Bor et al., 2007; Rothen et al.,
2012). Recently, a genetic link between synesthesia and autism was
suggested (Asher et al., 2009). Despite the lack of solid evidence
for a mechanistic connection between autism and synesthesia,
the existing statistical and genetic correlations give us reason to
explore how serotonin may be related to synesthesia in autis-
tic individuals. I will look at the evidence for the serotonin
hypothesis for autism and then propose some testable predic-
tions about how serotonin may give rise to synesthesia in autistic
individuals.
The evidence that serotonin plays a crucial role in autism is
overwhelming. About 30 percent of autistic individuals have a 25
to 70 percent increase in blood levels of serotonin, also known
as hyperserotonemia (Schain and Freedman, 1961; Chugani et al.,
1997, 1999; Veenstra-VanderWeele et al., 2012). Hyperserotone-
mia has also been found to a similar degree in ﬁrst-degree healthy
relatives (Leboyer et al., 1999). As serotonin cannot normally cross
the blood-brain barrier in adults, high blood levels of serotonin
are not necessarily a good indicator of high extracellular serotonin
in the brain. High blood levels of serotonin, however, may indi-
cate brain levels of serotonin in young children, as the blood-brain
barrier is not fully developed until the age of two. Higher rates of
autism have also been found in children exposed in utero to drugs
that increase 5-HT levels, such as cocaine (Kramer et al., 1994).
The high levels of serotonin in young children can negatively affect
the development of serotonin neurons through negative feedback.
As serotonin neurons develop and the extracellular levels of the
neurotransmitter increase, growth of serotonin neurons is nor-
mally curtailed through a negative feedback mechanism, leading
to a loss of serotonin terminals (DeLong, 1999; Whitaker-Azmitia,
2005). This decrease in serotonin terminal development has also
been found in animal studies administeringmonoamine oxidaseA
and B inhibitors or serotonin reuptake inhibitors during gestation
(Whitaker-Azmitia et al., 1994).
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Several PET imaging studies have suggested that autism may
be a lateralized syndrome, with decreased serotonin release from
raphe terminals in one hemisphere (typically the left) and ele-
vated serotonin release in the contralateral hemisphere (Chugani
et al., 1997, 1999; Chandana et al., 2005). Signiﬁcantly increased
language impairment was found in subjects with decreased sero-
tonin synthesis in the left hemisphere compared to individuals
with right-hemisphere abnormalities and those without cortical
asymmetry. Further evidence for the lateralization theory comes
from studies indicating functional improvement with selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), such ﬂuoxetine (DeLong,
1999). SSRIs block serotonin transporters, preventing extracel-
lular serotonin from being transported back into the cell. When
children with autism are treated with SSRIs, the symptoms they
share in common with individuals with major depressive disorder
and anxiety disorders drastically improve. The children’s range
of interests broaden, their perceptual experiences normalize, their
memory and cognitive functions improve and anxiety and phobias
become less prominent. Depleting brain serotonin in a tryptophan
depletion paradigm, on the other hand, results in a worsening
of the mood-related symptoms of autism as well as behav-
iors such as whirling, ﬂapping, rocking and pacing (McDougle
et al., 1996), though it does not affect the other symptoms of
autism.
One possible explanation of the asymmetry is that the early
serotonin depletion in the dominant left hemisphere leads to
overcompensation in the right hemisphere. It has been reported
that a decrease in extracellular serotonin over time may lead
to an excessive spread of thalamocortical axon branches, result-
ing in lower information-transmission and structural changes in
affected cortical regions aswell as underdeveloped long-range con-
nections between different brain areas (DeLong, 1999; Mueller
et al., 2013). When the decrease in serotonin is left-lateralized,
this leads to a general hypoexcitability of the left hemisphere
and a wider right parietooccipital region compared to individuals
with mental retardation or miscellaneous neurological disorders
(Hier et al., 1979). The reversal of the asymmetry may be the
result of initial right-hemisphere dominance, as indicated by
a higher incidence of left-handedness and improved language
skills in autistic individuals with decreased serotonin synthesis
in the right hemisphere (Chandana et al., 2005). These results
may explain why savant syndrome occurs in ten percent of autis-
tic individuals. The leading hypothesis is that savant syndrome
is caused by a lesion or birth defect in one hemisphere that
results in overcompensation by the other hemisphere (Pesenti
et al., 2001; Snyder et al., 2003; Young et al., 2004; Treffert, 2009;
Loui et al., 2011).
A hemispheric effect does not provide clear evidence for a role
of serotonin in synesthesia, as not all individuals with autism
have synesthesia. But the expected high frequency of synesthesia
in autistic individuals together with the lateralization hypoth-
esis point to the possibility that increased extracellular levels
of serotonin in the autistic brain may be a causal inﬂuence
on the genesis of synesthesia in individuals with this disor-
der. There appears to be two ways in which serotonin could
be implicated in synesthesia in autistic individuals. One possi-
bility is that the high serotonin levels in very young children
with autism sometimes trigger altered multisensory processing.
Another possibility is that compensatory high serotonin levels in
the contralesional hemisphere sometimes cause unusual feature
binding. If the former hypothesis is correct, then we should expect
to ﬁnd evidence of synesthesia in autistic individuals at a very
young age.
There are multiple ways that elevated serotonin levels may lead
to synesthesia in autistic individuals. If the onset of synesthesia in
autism occurs at an early age, it could be the result of serotonin-
triggered hyperactivity in glutamatergic neurons in layer V and
resulting destabilization of thalamic connections. If this hypoth-
esis is correct for synesthesia in autistic individuals, then we
should expect that the synesthetic connections can persist only
in the form of tight memory connections after the subsequent
loss of serotonin-terminals in large areas of the brain. Accord-
ingly, on the assumption that projector synesthesia is not normally
mnemonic, we should not expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant number
of projector synesthetes among autistic individuals. Another way
synesthetic connections could form would be through the early
excessive formation of neural pathways. Persisting synesthesia in
this case would require that the early formed structural connec-
tions could survive the extensive pruning that appears to take place
when serotonin-terminals are lost. If the onset of the synesthesia
does not occur at an early age, structural or functional synes-
thetic connections could still form in the spared right-hemisphere
regions that are also believed to be responsible for the savant
skills founds in 10 percent of autistic individuals. Structural
connectivity mechanisms have been proposed for standard cases
of grapheme-color synesthesia, suggesting unusual connectivity
between the color area and the fusiformgyrus (Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2001a,b; Hubbard et al., 2005). Enhanced anatomical
connectivity near the fusiform gyrus conﬁrming this hypoth-
esis has been reported for grapheme-color synesthesia (Rouw
and Scholte, 2007; Jancke et al., 2009; Hanggi et al., 2011) and
sound-color synesthesia (Zamm et al., 2013). Whether a struc-
tural connectivity mechanism also underlies synesthesia in autism
could fairly easily be tested by using a DTI paradigm to look
at whether there are similar patterns of localized hyper-cortical-
connectivity in autistic individuals with synesthesia. If the onset of
the synesthesia does not occur at an early age, there is also the pos-
sibility that it is the result of impaired higher-order multisensory
integration associated with decreased functional and structural
connectivity (Mueller et al., 2013). This would make developmen-
tal synesthesia in autism very different from other cases, which
appear to be a result of increased structural or functional con-
nectivity. There is, however, a fairly strong reason against this
mechanism as explanatory of synesthesia in autistic individuals.
Impaired multisensory integration in autism amounts to a fail-
ure to associate two high-level sensory input that neurotypical
individuals would associate (Mueller et al., 2013), not a persistent
success in associating two input that neurotypical individuals do
not associate.
Whether a hyperactive serotonergic system can contribute to
developmental synesthesia innon-autistic individuals is unknown.
As autism is partly deﬁned by sensory processing deﬁcits, the
emergence of synesthesia in autism could be a consequence of
other sensory alterations and originate from a unique set of
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mechanisms distinct from those present in other cases of develop-
mental synesthesia. But some data points indicate that serotonin
may be mechanistically involved in producing synesthetic expe-
rience through altered functional connectivity. As Brang and
Ramachandran (2007) observed, there is some reported phar-
macological evidence suggesting that developmental synesthesia
in non-autistic individuals could sometimes be a serotonergic
condition. Pharmacological evidence for the serotonin hypoth-
esis was also reported by Cytowic (1989). He describes a patient
with life-long synesthesia who developed epilepsy as an adult and
subsequently experienced less vivid synesthetic experiences when
treated with the anti-epileptic drug Tegretol (carbamazepine),
which is known to increase extracellular levels of serotonin
(Cytowic, 1989, p. 174). The reports from Cytowic (1989) and
Brang and Ramachandran (2007) may seem to provide evidence
against serotonin triggering synesthesia via excitatory activity,
as the increased serotonin levels apparently inhibited synesthe-
sia. However, both ﬂuoxetine and carbamazepine have been
shown to signiﬁcantly increase GABA and reduce glutamate lev-
els, which would block the excitatory effects of serotonin in
cortical areas (Kamal, 2010). So, these data suggest that sero-
tonin may be functionally involved in generating synesthetic
experience either through a disinhibited feedback mechanism
or by making unusual structural binding available for con-
scious processing. The pharmacological evidence thus lends some
support to a disinhibited feedback mechanism, which suggests
that synesthesia is not a result of altered structural connec-
tivity but arises from altered functional feedback connections.
This type of mechanism has received prior support from psy-
chophysical and neuromagining studies of non-autistic synes-
thetes (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001; Dixon et al., 2006;
Esterman et al., 2006; Neufeld et al., 2012). A recent imaging
study of 14 auditory-visual non-autistic synesthetes, for exam-
ple, found increased functional connectivity of the left inferior
parietal cortex with the left primary auditory and right primary
visual cortex (Neufeld et al., 2012), suggesting that the aberrant
synesthetic binding takes place in parietal cortex. There is also
suggestive evidence of mixed mechanisms. For example, some
forms of grapheme-color synesthesia appear to involve enhanced
visual memory associations with hyper-reinstantiation in the
visual cortex (see Brogaard, 2013 and Brogaard et al., 2013 for
reviews).
Drawingon evidence that the 5-HT2A receptormaybe involved
in generating synesthetic experience, Brang and Ramachandran
(2007) suggest that synesthesia might occur from overexpression
of the 5-HT2A receptor gene on chromosome13. Awhole-genome
linkage scan and a family-linkage analysis in a sample of 43 mul-
tiplex families with auditory-visual synesthesia did not conﬁrm
this hypothesis (Asher et al., 2009). Instead the study suggested
that synesthesia may be traceable to a region on chromosome 2
(2q24.1) that has been implicated in autism (Newbury et al., 2009),
indicating that there may be genetic link between developmental
synesthesia and autism.
Other evidence gives some credit to the hypothesis that synes-
thesia in non-autistic individuals could be related in terms of
brain structure to autism and savant syndrome and hence that
a particular brain structure may underlie all of these conditions.
Population studies suggest that there may be a higher inci-
dence of synesthesia among people with creative talent (Domino,
1989; Mulvenna and Walsh, 2005; Simner et al., 2006; Rothen
and Meier, 2010). Conversely, some synesthetes appear to have
greater cognitive and memory capacities speciﬁc to the con-
current of the individual’s synesthesia compared to the general
population (Yaro and Ward, 2007; Ward et al., 2008; Banissy
et al., 2009; Rothen et al., 2012). The possible association between
synesthesia and cognitive talent might suggest that synesthetes
without autism have serotonin-induced hyperconnected neural
networks without the down-regulated neural regions found in
people with autism. Recent neuroimaging studies further point
to enhanced functional connectivity or increased gray matter
density in synesthesia. A recent functional MRI study found
increased intrinsic network connectivity in 12 grapheme-color
synesthetes that reﬂected the strength of their synesthetic expe-
riences (Dovern et al., 2012). Wiess and Fink (2009) further
reported greater gray matter volume in the left intraparietal sulcus
and right fusiform gyrus in 18 synesthetes compared to 18 con-
trols. Several DTI studies have conﬁrmed increased white matter
connections in the superior parietal cortex, right inferior tem-
poral cortex and frontal regions in grapheme-color synesthesia
(Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Jancke et al., 2009, though at more
liberal thresholds; Hanggi et al., 2011) and sound-color synesthe-
sia (Zamm et al., 2013). Although these lines of evidence do not
provide evidence of a causal connection among developmental
synesthesia, autism and savant syndrome, results are sugges-
tive that local hyperconnectivity is a common feature of these
conditions.
However, we do not yet have enough data to draw any ﬁrm
conclusions about the role of serotonin in developmental synes-
thesia in non-autistic individuals or the connection between
developmental synesthesia and autism. More systematic popu-
lation studies as well as whole-genome linkage scans and family
linkage analyses may be able to shed more light on this connec-
tion. The extent to which serotonin is mechanistically involved
in developmental synesthesia could be tested more systematically
in pharmacological studies using drugs known to inhibit 5-HT2A
receptors, such as SSRIs (Brang and Ramachandran, 2007), and
serotonin-agonists, such as cocaine, that are only reported to
cause hallucinations with excessive use. If serotonin is functionally
implicated in synesthesia, we should expect 5-HT2A inhibitors to
block or reduce synesthesia and serotonin-agonists to augment
the experiences. A negative result would rule out that serotonin is
functionally involved in synesthesia but would leave open the pos-
sibility that the neurotransmitter is involved in the onset of devel-
opmental synesthesia by leading to an early change in structural
connectivity.
CONCLUSION
Theprimary aimhere has been todefend thehypothesis that synes-
thesia is at least sometimes a hyperserotonergic condition that
triggers synesthesia through excitatory neurotransmitter action.
The main evidence in favor of this hypothesis can be summarized
as follows:
First of all, brain injury that gives rise to acquired synesthesia
leads to necrosis and excessive release of serotonin and glutamate.
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Though this increase in excitatory neurotransmitter activity leads
to lower excitability in local areas throughnegative feedbackwithin
weeks, decreased activity in affected neural regions could lead to
a disinhibitory enhancement of neural activity and connectivity
in unaffected cortical regions. Alternatively, the early increase in
serotonin levels could lead to the formation of unusual feature
binding.
Secondly, administration of certain hallucinogenic serotonin
agonists (e.g., psilocybin) induces synesthesia. The mecha-
nism underlying drug-induced synesthesia plausibly involves
serotonergic excitatory activity in layer V pyramidal neurons
implicated in multisensory binding.
Thirdly, serotonin synthesis is typically increased unilater-
ally in individuals with autism, about 15 percent of which are
believed to experience synesthesia compared to about 4 per-
cent population-wide. In terms of a potential mechanism, one
possibility is that serotonin causes aberrant structural bind-
ing in the spared neural regions that are also responsible
for the savant skills found in 10 percent of autistic indivi-
duals.
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The neurochemical mechanisms that contribute to synaesthesia are poorly understood,
but multiple models implicate serotonin and GABA in the development of this condition.
Here we used psychophysical tasks to test the predictions that synaesthetes would
display behavioral performance consistent with reduced GABA and elevated serotonin
in primary visual cortex. Controls and synaesthetes completed the orientation-specific
surround suppression (OSSS) and tilt-after effect (TAE) tasks, previously shown to relate
to GABA and serotonin levels, respectively. Controls and synaesthetes did not differ in the
performance parameter previously associated with GABA or in the magnitude of the TAE.
However, synaesthetes did display lower contrast difference thresholds in the OSSS task
than controls when no surround (NS) was present. These results are inconsistent with
the hypothesized roles of GABA and serotonin in this condition, but provide preliminary
evidence that synaesthetes exhibit enhanced contrast discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
Grapheme-color synaesthesia is an unusual neurological con-
dition in which letters and numerals reliably elicit involuntary
color experiences (for a review, see Ward, 2013). Individuals
with this condition have been shown to display enhanced color
discrimination (Yaro and Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009, 2013)
and color working memory (Terhune et al., 2013), which may
relate to larger visual-evoked potentials for stimuli that bias
the parvocellular visual pathway in this population (Barnett
et al., 2008). The extents to which these results are reflective
of broader differences in visual processing among synaesthetes
remain unknown, but predictions regarding such differences can
be derived from competing models of this condition. Two neuro-
transmitters, γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and serotonin (5-HT),
have been proposed to contribute to synaesthesia by different
models (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001; Cohen Kadosh and
Henik, 2007; Brang and Ramachandran, 2008; Brogaard, 2013).
Both play fundamental, but differential, roles in visual processing
and are strong candidates for exploring the neurochemistry of
synaesthesia.
GABA is a major cortical inhibitory neurotransmitter, and
GABAergic interneurons comprise approximately 1/6 of neurons
in the cortex (Buzsáki et al., 2007). These cells subserve a range
of cortical processes such as the segregation of competing neu-
ronal assemblies, cortical maturation, and the shaping of network
oscillatory patterns (Möhler, 2007; Buzsáki and Wang, 2012).
Resting-state GABA levels in primary visual cortex, as measured
by magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS; Stagg et al., 2011a;
Puts and Edden, 2012), have been shown to covary with orienta-
tion discrimination (Edden et al., 2009) and orientation-specific
surround suppression (OSSS; Yoon et al., 2010). Specifically, it has
been observed that primary visual cortex GABA concentrations
are negatively correlated with orientation detection thresholds
(Edden et al., 2009) and positively associated with an orientation
suppression ratio believed to index inhibition (Yoon et al., 2010).
In addition, several studies have demonstrated that GABAA ago-
nists attenuate visual processing along with its electrophysiologi-
cal correlates (Giersch and Herzog, 2004; Watson et al., 2009; van
Loon et al., 2012). It has been argued that disinhibition theories of
synaesthesia (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001; Cohen Kadosh
and Henik, 2007), which propose that synaesthesia arises from
disinhibited feedback from higher cortical areas, predict that
synaesthesia is characterized by reduced GABA concentrations
in synaesthesia-relevant regions (Hubbard et al., 2011; Specht,
2012). That is, the diminished cortical inhibition proposed to
contribute to synaesthetic perception by these theories should be
associated with lower GABA levels. A number of studies have
provided direct or indirect evidence in support of disinhibition
models (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009; Terhune et al., 2011), but
none have directly evaluated the prediction of reduced GABA in
the synaesthetic brain.
Serotonin is a neurotransmitter that plays an instrumental
role in a wide range of functions including visual process-
ing. In particular, evidence from the psychopharmacological
literature indicates that serotonergic pathways, especially those
involving the S2a serotonin receptor, are implicated in visual
aberrations produced by amphetaminergic compounds such as
methylendioxymethamphetamine (MDMA; Brown et al., 2007;
Dickson et al., 2009; White et al., 2013) or hallucinogens such
as psilocybin (Marek and Aghajanian, 1998; Kometer et al.,
2011, 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, serotonergic neurons have
also been suggested to regulate visual-motor gating (Pum et al.,
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2008) as well as cross-modal/cortical sensory integration (Jitsuki
et al., 2011; Takahashi, 2011). To date, two hypotheses have
highlighted serotonin’s role in the development of synaesthesia
(Brang and Ramachandran, 2008; Brogaard, 2013). Brang and
Ramachandran (2008) have argued that the S2a serotonin recep-
tor may underlie hyperconnectivity between the fusiform gyrus
and area V4, which has been predicted to play an instrumen-
tal role in the development of this condition (Hubbard, 2007;
Hubbard et al., 2011). Brogaard (2013) similarly argues that ele-
vated serotonin in the striate cortex may contribute to the devel-
opment of synaesthesia and may underlie acquired and induced
synaesthesias. Perhaps the best evidence to date for these models
comes from a recent meta-analytic review, which shows that the
induction of synaesthesia-like experiences in non-synaesthetes is
most reliably observed with serotonin agonists, such as lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD), mescaline, and psilocybin (Luke and
Terhune, 2013). There is also preliminary evidence that sero-
tonin agonists enhance synaesthesia in congenital synaesthetes
(Simpson and Mckellar, 1955; Luke et al., 2012). However, these
studies suffer from a number of methodological limitations (Luke
and Terhune, 2013) and only provide preliminary support for
serotonin models. Although congenital and induced synaesthesias
may not share the same neurochemical mechanisms, these studies
do suggest that serotonin may be implicated in synaesthesia.
The aim of the present study was to test predictions derived
from disinhibition and serotonin models of synaesthesia using
proxy psychophysics measures of GABA and serotonin. Toward
this end, controls and synaesthetes completed a task measuring
OSSS (Xing and Heeger, 2001; Zenger-Landolt and Heeger, 2003;
Yoon et al., 2009, 2010). Target identification is poorest when
the surrounding region has an orientation parallel to the target
and performance is facilitated by surround suppression (Chubb
et al., 1989; Xing and Heeger, 2001; Yoon et al., 2009). The
magnitude of this suppression effect has been long believed to be
driven by inhibitory mechanisms and has recently been shown to
correlate positively with GABA concentrations in primary visual
cortex (Yoon et al., 2010). Insofar as disinhibition theories predict
reduced GABA in synaesthesia, we tested the prediction that
synaesthetes would display less surround suppression owing to a
lower inhibition-derived sharpening of the stimulus orientation.
In particular, we expected that synaesthetes would perform less
optimally than controls where inhibitory fine-tuning processes
would benefit the most such as when the parallel-oriented sur-
round obscures the target.
Measurement of serotonin-related performance relied on a
visual phenomenon known as the tilt-after effect (TAE; Paradiso
et al., 1989; Masini et al., 1990; Murray et al., 2012). When
participants are adapted to a single stimulus with a certain angular
orientation, their perception of the following stimuli’s angular
orientation tends to be biased in the direction opposite that
of the adaptive stimulus (Masini et al., 1990). This is due to
the saturation of neurons that are specific to the orientation of
the adaptive stimulus, which dampens the neurons’ sensitivities
to subsequent stimuli (He and Macleod, 2001; Murray et al.,
2012). Decreasing cortical serotonin, such as through tryptophan
depletion, hinders this inhibition, stretches the neurons’ tuning
bandwidth, and augments the magnitude of the TAE (Masini
et al., 1990; Brown et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2012). If synaesthesia
is characterized by elevated serotonin in primary visual cortex,
synaesthetes should display an attenuated TAE.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen controls (14 female, MAge = 23.1, SD = 4.3) and 15
grapheme-color synaesthetes (13 female; MAge = 25.1, SD = 4.8),
all of whom were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, provided informed consent to participate in this
study in accordance with approval from a local ethics committee.
The two groups did not differ in gender distributions, Fisher’s
exact p = 1, age, F < 1.5, or years of (post-secondary) education
(controls: 3.8± 1.9, synaesthetes, 4.5± 2.6), F < 1.
In order to compute consistency of grapheme-color associ-
ations, participants selected colors using a color picker for the
numbers 0 through 9 in random order three times in a serial
fashion (Eagleman et al., 2007; Rothen et al., 2013). On the second
and third rounds, controls were instructed to try to select the same
color that they previously selected for each respective grapheme.
Synaesthetes displayed greater consistency (lower values reflect
greater consistency) with a measure based on city block distances
in RGB color space (Eagleman et al., 2007) (controls: 1.85 ±
0.22; synaesthetes: 0.58 ± 0.04; H = 13.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.51
[CIs: 0.23, 0.66]) and a measure based on Euclidean distances in
CIELUV color space (Rothen et al., 2013) (controls: 143.91 ±
14.58; synaesthetes: 33.03 ± 15.06; H = 16.58, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.49 [CIs: 0.21, 0.65]).
MATERIALS
Orientation-specific surround suppression (OSSS)
The OSSS task measures the participant’s ability to discrimi-
nate contrast differences between targets in variously oriented
surrounds (Zenger-Landolt and Heeger, 2003). Stimuli were
roundels that contained contrast reversing (4 Hz), gray-scale
sinusoidal gratings with a spatial frequency of 2.2 cycles per degree
(see Figure 1A). Each stimulus contained an annulus that was
divided into eight sectors and the surround that was partitioned
into central and outer regions. The central region extended from
the center of the stimulus to the inner radius of the annulus (2.9◦).
The outer region extended from the outer radius of the annulus
(5.6◦) to an eccentricity of 9.2◦. The contrast of both surround
regions was kept at 100%. The central portion of the surround
included a circle of radius 1.0◦.
The OSSS task had three surround conditions: no surround
(NS), parallel surround (PS), and orthogonal surround (OS). The
PS and OS conditions contained gratings in the surround that
were parallel or perpendicular to the annulus, respectively. 50% of
the trials randomly included a target (a single randomly selected
annular sector with a lower contrast relative to the remainder of
the annulus sectors) and participants judged whether the target
was present or absent. The contrast of the target ranged from 38%
to 73% and was parametrically varied in steps of 5% depending on
performance using a 3-up, 1-down adaptive staircase procedure.
The contrast of the non-target annular regions was fixed at 75%.
Stimuli were presented for 750 ms with an interstimulus interval
of 1050 ms.
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FIGURE 1 | Task stimuli. (A) OSSS task stimuli as a function of target
presence and surround condition. (B) TAE task stimuli examples.
Tilt-after effect (TAE)
This task provides a measure of the TAE (Paradiso et al., 1989;
Masini et al., 1990). The stimuli consisted of two offset, 4-layered
circular sectors (see Figure 1B). The right-hand sector had a larger
diameter than the left, and collectively, the stimulus had a diame-
ter of 9◦. The right sector was tilted by a certain angle toward the
left (negative tilt) or the right (positive tilt) of the vertical midline.
There were three phases in this task: pre-adaptation, adaptation,
and post-adaptation. In the pre-adaptation phase, participants
were presented with stimuli that contained one of nine randomly-
selected tilt angles (−4◦ to +4◦ with 1◦ intervals), and judged
whether the tilt was negative (leftward) or positive (rightward).
During the adaptation phase, participants were exposed to a stim-
ulus with either a +15◦ or a +40◦ tilt angle for 90 s. Participants
were instructed to scan over the stimulus without fixating on
a single position in order to avoid after-images. In the post-
adaptation phase, participants judged the tilt direction of stimuli
of thirteen possible tilt angles (−4◦ to +8◦ with 1◦ intervals).
Stimuli were presented in 10-trial blocks that were interspersed
with a 5 s adaptation interval. Stimuli in the pre- and post-
adaptation phases were presented for 100 ms with interstimulus
intervals of 500 ms.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited for a research study on synaesthesia
(synaesthetes) or visual perception (controls) through advertise-
ments at the University of Oxford. Participants completed the
tasks in counterbalanced order on a Dell P190ST monitor (res-
olution: 1280 × 1024; refresh rate: 60 Hz) at a distance of 50 cm.
The OSSS was implemented using the Psychophysics Toolbox
software1 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007) for MATLAB®
(2012a, MathWorks Inc, Natwick MA), whereas stimulus presen-
tation for the TAE task was implemented using E-Prime® (2.0,
Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg PA). Responses were
recorded using a Cedrus® response pad (Cedrus Corporation, San
Diego, CA). Participants completed a practice block of 20 trials
in the OSSS task and one 150-trial block of the NS, OS, and
PS conditions with the OS and PS block order counterbalanced.
In the TAE task, participants completed 90 trials in the pre-
adaptation phase and 26 10-trial blocks of each tilt angle in the
post-adaptation phase with tilt angle conditions counterbalanced.
DATA ANALYSIS
Data in the OSSS task were modeled using the Palamedes Toolbox
(Prins and Kingdom, 2009) in MATLAB. The probabilities of a
correct response to targets at each contrast level were fitted with
a Weibull function defined by four parameters: threshold α, slope
β, guess rate γ , and lapse rate λ. Threshold and slope were set as
free parameters that were estimated using maximum likelihood
estimation, whereas guess and lapse rates were fixed at 0 and 0.1,
respectively. In addition to the loss of one synaesthete’s data due
to a technical error, nine participants’ data displayed poor model
fit (pDevs < 0.05; Kingdom and Prins, 2010) in one or more
conditions. Model fit was substantially improved through the
removal of a single outlier in seven participants (two controls, five
synaesthetes), whereas the data of two participants (one control,
one synaesthete) could not be improved and thus were excluded
from the analyses (the principal results [including the Group
differences] are the same if these participants are included). The
analyses of the OSSS data therefore included 15 controls and 13
synaesthetes. Model fit did not differ as a function of Condition
or Group, nor was there an interaction, Fs < 1, ps > 0.34. The
79% threshold of the psychometric function (contrast difference
threshold) at each condition was used as our principal dependent
measure of interest (Yoon et al., 2010). Threshold values provide a
measure of the discriminability of the stimulus with lower values
(in the present study) reflecting superior discrimination. As a
secondary measure of interest, we also analysed function slopes,
which index the steepness of the psychometric function fit to
the data. More negative slopes indicate greater steepness of the
function and thus greater deterioration in performance from one
contrast difference to the next.
The same procedure was applied to the data from the TAE
task with the following differences. One synaesthete did not
perform the task correctly and provided unusable data and a
second synaesthete’s data were lost due to a technical error. Pre-
adaptation data in the 15◦ and 40◦ conditions did not differ and
thus were combined. The probabilities of a positive (rightward)
response at each tilt angle were fitted with a logistic function
with the same parameter constraints as in the OSSS task. The
intersection of the function and the 0.5 threshold was taken as
the point of subjective equality (PSE), which corresponds to the
tilt angle that is perceived to be approximately equally likely to be
negative (leftward) and positive (rightward). Six participants’ data
displayed poor model fit (pDevs < 0.05); of these, model fit was
1http://psychtoolbox.org
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substantially improved through the exclusion of a single outlier
in three participants (two controls, one synaesthete), whereas
the data of three participants (two controls, one synaesthete)
could not be improved and thus were excluded from the analyses.
Accordingly, the analysis of the TAE data included 14 controls and
12 synaesthetes. Model fit did not differ as a function of Condition
or Group, nor was there an interaction, Fs < 2.2, ps > 0.13. PSEs
for the different conditions were used as the principal dependent
measure and function slopes were included as a secondary mea-
sure of potential interest. The TAE was quantified as the difference
between PSEs before and after adaptation for both the 15◦ and 40◦
conditions.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Statistical analyses of the data were conducted using SPSS® (21,
IBM) and MATLAB. Outliers were detected using the adjusted
boxplot rule (Pernet et al., 2013) and replaced using a near-
est neighbor correction (nearest extreme value ±1). Data were
analysed with analyses of variance (ANOVA) with Group as
the between-groups factor and Surround type (NS v. OS v. PS;
OSSS task), or Stimulus type (15◦ vs. 40◦ TAE task) as within-
groups factors, depending on the analysis. We used unequal
variance t-tests (Welch, 1947) when data violated the assump-
tion of homogeneity of variance across groups. We applied the
Greenhouse-Geisser correction when the assumption of spheric-
ity was violated. Uncorrected df s are reported for the latter two
analyses. To control for the possibility of false positives, a false
discovery rate (FDR) correction (Benjamini et al., 2001) was
applied to the entire set of p-values comprising analyses for both
tasks; only corrected p-values are reported.
RESULTS
ORIENTATION-SPECIFIC SURROUND SUPPRESSION (OSSS)
Performance on the OSSS task is illustrated in Figure 2A. The
analysis of contrast difference thresholds revealed main effects of
Surround type, F(2,52) = 26.34, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.50 (CIs: 0.29,
0.63), reflecting a linear increase in thresholds across conditions,
and Group, F(1,26) = 6.89, p = 0.039, η2p = 0.21 (CIs: 0.01, 0.44),
reflecting lower contrast difference thresholds (better discrimi-
nation) among synaesthetes, but no interaction, F(2,52) = 1.09,
p = 0.49, η2p = 0.04 (CIs: 0.00, 0.16). To determine the breadth
of group differences across conditions, particularly since the PS
condition requires greater inhibition, we conducted exploratory
analyses comparing the groups in the three surround conditions.
Synaesthetes displayed lower contrast difference thresholds in the
NS, F(1,26) = 7.07, p = 0.039, η2p = 0.21 (CIs: 0.01, 0.44), and OS,
F(1,26) = 10.64, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.29 (CIs: 0.04, 0.51), conditions,
but not in the PS condition, t(26) = 1.55, p = 0.28, η2p = 0.08 (CIs:
0.00, 0.31). The former two effects remained significant when
model fit in the respective condition was included as a covariate,
NS: F(1,25) = 6.62, p = 0.041, η2p = 0.21 (CIs: 0.01, 0.44), OS:
F(1,25) = 10.70, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.30 (CIs: 0.04, 0.52). These results
suggest that synaesthetes display superior contrast discrimination
than controls.
In the analysis of slopes, there were main effects of Surround
Type, F(2,52) = 13.34, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.34 (CIs: 0.13, 0.49),
reflecting a linear decrease in slopes across the three conditions,
no effect of Group, F(1,26) = 2.24, p = 0.28, η2p = 0.08 (CIs:
0.00, 0.30), but a significant interaction, F(2,52) = 7.07, p = 0.039,
η2p = 0.21 (CIs: 0.04, 0.37). Subsidiary analyses revealed that
synaesthetes displayed steeper slopes in the OS condition than
controls, F(1,26) = 9.73, p = 0.022, η2p = 0.27 (CIs: 0.03, 0.49),
but that the two groups did not differ in the NS, F(1,26) = 0.06,
p = 0.83, η2p < 0.01 (CIs: 0.00, 0.08), or in the PS, F(1,26) =
0.02, p = 0.89, η2p < 0.01 (CIs: 0.00, 0.03), conditions. The
results indicate that synaesthetes exhibited steeper slopes in the
OS condition than controls; this appears to have resulted from
the fact that synaesthetes exhibited superior discrimination in this
condition than controls at contrast differences of 22% and 17%,
but thereafter exhibited a greater decline in discrimination relative
to controls, resulting in numerically poorer performance at 12%
contrast difference.
Insofar as controls and synaesthetes differed in both OS thresh-
olds and slopes and these two variables were strong correlated,
r = 0.70, p< 0.001, we performed two ANCOVAs repeating these
analyses controlling for the other variable. Neither analysis was
significant, threshold (controlling for slope): F(1,25) = 2.22, p =
0.28, η2p = 0.08 (CIs: 0.00, 0.31), slope (controlling for threshold):
F(1,25) = 1.54, p = 0.38, η2p = 0.06 (CIs: 0.00, 0.28), indicating a
clear interdependence between these two variables. In contrast,
the Group difference in NS thresholds remained significant when
controlling for slopes, F(1,25) = 7.79, p = 0.039, η2p = 0.24 (CIs:
0.02, 0.47).
The contrast thresholds for the OS and PS conditions were fur-
ther evaluated by controlling for performance in the NS condition
through the computation of ratios of contrast thresholds. These
analyses were performed to examine performance in suppression
conditions (OS and PS) controlling for baseline contrast discrim-
ination. Synaesthetes displayed a lower OS/NS ratio, t(26) = 2.52,
p = 0.044, η2p = 0.19 (CIs: 0.00, 0.43), but did not differ in the
PS/NS ratio, t(26) = 0.46, p = 0.73, η2p = 0.01 (CIs: 0.00, 0.16).
The former result suggests that synaesthetes display enhanced sur-
round suppression, although this effect became non-significant
when controlling for OS slopes, F(1,25) = 0.98, p = 0.33, η2p = 0.04
(CIs: 0.00, 0.24). The most crucial analysis concerned the PS/OS
ratio, which has been associated with GABA concentrations in
primary visual cortex (Yoon et al., 2010). If this relationship holds
and synaesthetes display reduced GABA in this region, synaes-
thetes should exhibit a larger ratio. A non-significant Group
effect, F(1,26) = 0.97, p = 0.49, η2p = 0.04 (CIs: 0.00, 0.24), including
when controlling for OS slopes, F(1,26) = 0.03, p = 0.88, η2p < 0.01
(CIs: 0.00, 0.04), shows that this prediction was not supported.
Cumulatively, these results suggest that, in contrast with the
predictions of disinhibition models, synaesthetes do not display
poorer inhibition than controls, but that synaesthetes display
superior contrast discrimination when no surround is present.
TILT-AFTER EFFECT (TAE)
The results of the TAE are presented in Figure 2B. On the basis
of the finding that lower V1 serotonin levels are associated with
a more pronounced TAE (Murray et al., 2012), we expected
that synaesthetes would display an attenuated TAE relative to
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FIGURE 2 | OSSS (A) and TAE (B) task performance in controls (black)
and synaesthetes (red). (A) Accuracy in the OSSS task as a function of
target contrast difference in the different surround conditions and ratios. (B)
Proportion of right responses as a function of stimulus angle in the different
adaptation conditions and tilt magnitudes. Error bars represent 1 SE. * p <
0.05 **p < 0.01
controls. First, the two groups did not exhibit differential PSEs
in the pre-adaptation phase of the task, F(1,24) = 0.25, p = 0.73,
η2p = 0.01 (CIs: 0.00, 0.19). The analysis of PSEs in the TAE
task revealed a main effect of Stimulus type, F(1,24) = 9.07,
p = 0.028, η2p = 0.27 (CIs: 0.03, 0.50), in which adaptation to
40◦ produced a positive tilt magnitude and adaptation to 15◦
resulted in a negative tilt, but there was neither a main effect
of Group, F(1,24) = 0.49, p = 0.65, η2p = 0.02 (CIs: 0.00, 0.21),
nor an interaction, F(1,24) = 0.14, p = 0.76, η2p < 0.01 (CIs:
0.00, 0.16). Contrary to earlier findings (Paradiso et al., 1989;
Murray et al., 2012), the tilt magnitude at 15◦ suggested increased
rightward responses following adaptation, yet this was unrelated
to between-group differences. The analysis of slopes similarly
found no pre-adaptation differences as a function of Group,
F(1,24) = 0.38, p = 0.69, η2p = 0.02 (CIs: 0.00, 0.20), main effects of
Stimulus type, F(1,24) = 0.91, p = 0.49, η2p = 0.04 (CIs: 0.00, 0.25),
Group, F(1,24) = 0.24, p = 0.73, η2p = 0.01 (CIs: 0.00, 0.18), or an
interaction, F(1,24) = 1.84, p = 0.33, η2p = 0.07 (CIs: 0.00, 0.30).
Cumulatively, these results indicate that controls and synaesthetes
do not differ in tilt perception or in the magnitude of the TAE.
DISCUSSION
This study tested predictions pertaining to altered neurochem-
istry in synaesthesia derived from disinhibition and serotonin
models of this condition using proxy psychophysical measures. In
contrast to both models, the two groups did not display differen-
tial response patterns on task measures previously associated with
visual cortex GABA and serotonin levels. Exploratory analyses
revealed that synaesthetes displayed lower contrast difference
thresholds in one condition of an orientation task than controls,
suggesting superior contrast discrimination. These results are
somewhat equivocal with regard to their implications for the
involvement of GABAergic disinhibition or elevated serotonin as
chemical underpinnings of synaesthesia, but suggest that these
neurochemicals are not altered in this condition.
In contrast to the results suggesting enhanced contrast dis-
crimination in synaesthetes relative to controls (see below),
the two groups did not differ in the ratio of contrast thresh-
olds in the parallel and OS conditions (PS/OS ratio). The
between-groups factor of Group explained ∼4% (CIs: 0.00,
0.24; controlling for slope: <0.01 [CIs: 0.00, 0.04]) of the vari-
ance in this ratio and therefore, when considering the sam-
ple sizes of controls and synaesthetes, renders it unlikely that
this null result is due to low statistical power. The PS/OS
ratio has previously been shown to correlate with GABA con-
centrations in primary visual cortex (Yoon et al., 2010) and
thus was used to test the prediction, derived from disin-
hibition models (Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2007; see also
Hubbard et al., 2011), that synaesthetes would exhibit reduced
GABA. These results suggest that synaesthetes do not display
reduced inhibition in primary visual cortex, but caution should
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be exerted in the interpretation of these results for multiple
reasons.
First, the relationship between GABA and the PS/OS ratio
is correlational and this ratio may not provide a robust proxy
measure of visual cortex GABA. That is, it may be the case that
this measure does not constitute a sufficiently stringent test of
the prediction of reduced GABA in synaesthesia. For example,
one reason to doubt the link between GABA and PS/OS ratios in
the Yoon et al. (2010) study is that patients with schizophrenia
were medicated, which may represent an important confound
in the measurement of GABA levels in this population (Kegeles
et al., 2012). However, it is readily evident that the relationship
between GABA and the PS/OS ratio in Yoon et al. (2010) is
driven by controls, rather than schizophrenics. Moreover, a recent
study found that when applied to the primary visual cortex,
anodal transcranial direct current stimulation, previously shown
to reduce cortical GABA (Stagg et al., 2009), attenuated surround
suppression on a similar orientation discrimination task (Spiegel
et al., 2012). This strengthens the claim that surround suppression
is indeed related to individual differences in visual cortex GABA.
Second, the evidence for the PS/OS ratio as a proxy measure
of GABA in striate cortex comes from a study showing that
it correlates with GABA in primary visual cortex, as measured
by MRS (Yoon et al., 2010). The available evidence suggests
that MRS-derived GABA concentrations seem to reflect extra-
synaptic GABA (GABA tone) (Stagg et al., 2011a,b). Accordingly,
it is possible that disinhibition-specific differences associated
with GABAergic interneurons contributing to the expression of
synaesthesia may not be detectable with MRS-derived measures of
cortical GABA concentrations. Rather, it may be more informative
to focus on the density and distribution of various types of GABA
receptors, which are the principle foundations upon which GABA
exercises its influences on neuronal activity.
Finally, if we assume that the PS/OS ratio provides a reliable
measure of visual cortex GABA, it is plausible that differences in
GABAergic activity between controls and synaesthetes are actually
restricted to fusiform gyrus or V4 or higher cortical areas such
as parietal cortex (e.g., van Leeuwen et al., 2011), rather than
primary visual cortex. Indeed, elsewhere we have argued that
cortical hyperexcitability in primary visual cortex in synaesthetes
does not play a causal role in the online experience of synaes-
thesia; rather, it may have only contributed to the expression
of synaesthesia at an early developmental stage (Terhune et al.,
2011). At present, we are unable to discriminate between these
competing interpretations of the PS/OS results. Nevertheless, the
results clearly do not support disinhibition theories, but the extent
to which they are inconsistent with them is as yet unclear.
Controls and synaesthetes also completed the TAE task, which
provided a measure of the magnitude of the TAE. The TAE is
believed to be augmented in conditions characterized by low sero-
tonin in primary visual cortex (Paradiso et al., 1989; Brown et al.,
2007; Murray et al., 2012) and was used to test the prediction that
synaesthetes would display a reduced TAE. In contrast with this
prediction, the two groups did not differ in the magnitude of the
TAE, suggesting that synaesthesia is not characterized by elevated
serotonin in striate cortex. As was the case with the critical param-
eter in the OSSS task (PS/OS ratio), the magnitude of this effect
was very small (∼2%; CIs: 0.00, 0.21) and thus, given our sample
sizes, it is unlikely that this analysis was underpowered. As is the
case with the OSSS task, there are a number of explanations for
these null results. First, previous research used the TAE to identify
serotonin deficiencies (Masini et al., 1990; Brown et al., 2007;
Murray et al., 2012) and thus it could be argued that the TAE is not
well suited to detect elevated serotonin levels. We failed to observe
any clear evidence for ceiling effects on this task and thus this
explanation seems unlikely. A second possibility is that the TAE is
not a reliable measure of visual cortex serotonin levels. Given the
number of studies linking serotonin with the TAE, we also find
this unlikely. For example, one study found that acute tryptophan
depletion augmented the magnitude of the TAE (Masini et al.,
1990). Tryptophan is the physiological precursor to serotonin and
has been shown to produce a temporary reduction in 5-HT (2)
receptor binding (Yatham et al., 2001). Accordingly, we interpret
the current results to suggest that controls and synaesthetes do
not differ in V1 serotonin. If serotonin plays a decisive role in
the occurrence of synaesthesia, the present results suggest that
it is most likely in other (downstream) cortical regions, such as
fusiform gyrus and V4.
Recent evidence has surfaced raising concerns about the brain
region responsible for the TAE. In particular, it has been sug-
gested that the TAE is driven by retinotopic as well as cortical
mechanisms (Knapen et al., 2010; Mathot and Theeuwes, 2013).
This possibility is controversial because a retina-based mechanism
would be unable to account for differences in the TAE caused by
ecstasy consumption (Brown et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2012) or
by tryptophan depletion (Masini et al., 1990). The former studies
arguably challenge the validity of the TAE as an indirect measure
of cortical serotonin. However, the psychophysical paradigms
used to demonstrate a retinotopic component to the TAE are only
conceptually similar to the assays used in the present study (e.g.,
they employ structurally disparate stimuli). Hence, this limitation
of the TAE does not severely undermine the TAE’s capacity to
represent cortical serotonin.
Further work is required to explore whether GABA and sero-
tonin are implicated in synaesthesia. This may be achieved by
using MRS to measure GABA in fusiform gyrus and V4 or
through methods for modulating visual cortex serotonin (e.g.,
tryptophan depletion). The study of synaesthesia-like experi-
ences following the intake of serotonin agonists has especially
strong potential to inform our understanding of the role of this
neurochemical in synaesthesia (Brang and Ramachandran, 2008;
Brogaard, 2013; Luke and Terhune, 2013). There is also consid-
erable potential that disinhibition and serotonin models can be
integrated. For instance, it has been shown that elevated serotonin
shifts the balance between excitation and inhibition in favor of
excitation (Moreau et al., 2010). Accordingly, elevated serotonin
could potentially give rise to a state of cortical hyperexcitability
and attenuated inhibition (see also Terhune et al., 2011).
A novel finding of this study is that synaesthetes displayed
superior contrast difference thresholds than controls. This effect
was present both in the NS and OS conditions and thus is unlikely
to reflect a difference in surround suppression, although only
the former difference remained when controlling for condition
slopes. Synaesthetes similarly exhibited steeper slopes in the OS
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condition, which reflect the steepness of the psychometric func-
tion fit to individual participants’ data. Although synaesthetes
outperformed controls at mid-range contrast differences (17 and
22%), their performance was more greatly taxed at lower contrast
differences (12 and 7%); below we speculate as to why this might
be. Insofar as OS thresholds and slopes were inter-dependent, the
apparent superior contrast discrimination among synaesthetes in
the OS condition should be interpreted with caution. Superior
performance among synaesthetes in the NS condition is sugges-
tive of superior contrast discrimination in this population, but
further research is necessary to determine the replicability of this
effect. The observed performance difference appears to converge
nicely with those of Barnett et al. (2008) who observed that
synaesthetes display enhanced visual-evoked potentials for stimuli
that are preferentially processed by the parvocellular visual path-
way but not those that bias the magnocellular pathway. Although
the low spatial frequency of the stimuli used in the OSSS task (see
Section Methods) biases magnocellular neurons (e.g., Derrington
and Lennie, 1984), the observed group difference pertains to
the detection of contrast differences between the target and the
surrounding sectors of the annulus. That is, the target differed
in contrast from the surrounding sections, but not in spatial
frequency. The magnocellular pathway saturates at low levels of
contrast (Merigan and Maunsell, 1993; Lee, 1996) whereas the
parvocellular system is recruited for ∼10% contrast and greater
(Tootell et al., 1988). Accordingly, it is significant that the group
differences in the NS condition of the OSSS task, based on the
absence of overlap of standard error bars (see Figure 2A), are only
present at 12% and higher contrast differences. This suggests that
contrast discrimination advantages among synaesthetes emerge
at contrasts for which the parvocellular pathway is preferentially
recruited; these results are therefore consistent with the proposal
that synaesthetes exhibit enhanced responsiveness of the parvo-
cellular system (Barnett et al., 2008; see also Rothen et al., 2012).
The observations that synaesthetes displayed selectively supe-
rior contrast discrimination, but did not differ in PS/OS ratios
or the TAE (see below), are also significant for multiple reasons.
First, as has been noted elsewhere (Gross et al., 2011; Radvansky
et al., 2011; Terhune et al., 2013), the specificity of performance
advantages reduces the likelihood that superior performance is
driven by greater motivation among synaesthetes (see also Banissy
et al., 2013). Second, it is noteworthy that synaesthetes no longer
outperformed controls in the OSSS condition that most strongly
taxes cortical inhibition (PS). It is plausible that superior contrast
discrimination and deficient cortical inhibition come into conflict
with one another in this condition and that elevated contrast
discrimination among synaesthetes may mask inhibition differ-
ences. Further research is required to more precisely investigate
this possibility.
The present results should be interpreted within the context
of the limitations of this study. We have argued that the analyses
showing null results pertaining to the psychophysical parameters
putatively related to GABA and serotonin are unlikely to be
underpowered given the small effect sizes. We have also corrected
for multiple analyses to reduce the likelihood of reporting false
positive results. However, as in any study with small samples, it is
possible that the observed effects will disappear with larger sample
sizes. It is plausible that the differential performance patterns
of controls and synaesthetes are due to elevated motivation in
the latter group rather than differences in contrast discrimina-
tion, but we have argued that this is unlikely. Finally, the fits
of psychometric functions to behavioral data were poor for a
subset of participants, who displayed poor performance in one
or more contrast differences (OSSS task) or angles (TAE task).
We were able to correct most instances of poor fit with out-
lier removal, but this might reduce the generalizability of our
results. Taken together, these limitations warrant that the contrast
discrimination difference between controls and synaesthetes be
replicated before firm conclusions regarding enhanced contrast
discrimination among synaesthetes can be advanced.
CONCLUSION
This study contrasted controls and synaesthetes in two psy-
chophysical measures in order to test predictions derived from
disinhibition and serotonin models of synaesthesia. The two
groups did not differ in the performance patterns predicted by
these models, but synaesthetes displayed superior contrast dis-
crimination than controls in the absence of surround stimuli.
Although the tasks used do not constitute rigorous evidence
against these models, they suggest that synaesthetes do not exhibit
atypical GABA or serotonin levels in primary visual cortex.
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Synesthesia entails a special kind of sensory perception, where stimulation in one sensory
modality leads to an internally generated perceptual experience of another, not stimulated
sensorymodality.This phenomenon can be viewed as an abnormalmultisensory integration
process as here the synesthetic percept is aberrantly fused with the stimulated modality.
Indeed, recent synesthesia research has focused onmultimodal processing even outside of
the speciﬁc synesthesia-inducing context and has revealed changedmultimodal integration,
thus suggesting perceptual alterations at a global level. Here, we focused on audio–
visual processing in synesthesia using a semantic classiﬁcation task in combination with
visually or auditory–visually presented animated and in animated objects in an audio–
visual congruent and incongruent manner. Fourteen subjects with auditory-visual and/or
grapheme-color synesthesia and 14 control subjects participated in the experiment. During
presentation of the stimuli, event-related potentials were recorded from 32 electrodes.
The analysis of reaction times and error rates revealed no group differences with best
performance for audio-visually congruent stimulation indicating the well-known multimodal
facilitation effect. We found enhanced amplitude of the N1 component over occipital
electrode sites for synesthetes compared to controls.The differences occurred irrespective
of the experimental condition and therefore suggest a global inﬂuence on early sensory
processing in synesthetes.
Keywords: synesthesia, multimodal, EEG, N1, integration
INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia describes a speciﬁc kind of perception in which a par-
ticular stimulus in one sensory modality (“inducer”) induces a
concurrent perception in another sensory modality. Each kind
of synesthesia can be deﬁned by the speciﬁc inducer-concurrent
pairing. The main characteristics of synesthesia are its consistency
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Simner and Logie, 2007) and auto-
maticity (Mills et al., 1999): one inducer always triggers the same
concurrent sensation, which cannot be suppressed or altered vol-
untarily. Grapheme-color synesthesia (GCS), in which achromatic
letters, words or numbers are perceived in speciﬁc colors, has been
extensively investigated and is believed to be one of the most com-
mon types (Simner et al., 2006). In auditory-visual synesthesia,
sounds (e.g., music or single tones) can induce additional visual
experiences, such as colors, forms, and textures (Ward et al., 2006;
Neufeld et al., 2012a). Usually synesthetes have multiple types of
synesthesia, suggesting a more global perceptual alteration under-
lying synesthesia rather than a speciﬁc one that only affects speciﬁc
stimuli in two sensory modalities. Recent research suggests synes-
thesia to be an extreme form of multisensory processing within
a continuous spectrum of normal perceptual processes involv-
ing multiple senses (Bien et al., 2012). Following this point of
view it is not surprising that synesthetes also show differences
in multisensory processing not only restricted to the inducer-
concurrent sensory modalities (Brang et al., 2012; Neufeld et al.,
2012c; Sinke et al., 2012b) and that these differences are similar
for both grapheme-color and audio–visual synesthetes (Neufeld
et al., 2012c; Sinke et al., 2012b) indicating common sensory effects
for different synesthesia phenotypes. Synesthesia is therefore not
only characterized by speciﬁc synesthetic perception but rather
these perceptions may be a tip of the iceberg indicating more
global changes in sensory processing that are not necessary related
to a speciﬁc inducer-concurrent coupling. However, up to now
research on multimodal processing in synesthesia beyond typical
inducer-concurrent perception is scarce.
To our knowledge, so far only three studies analyzed multi-
modal integration processes in synesthetes beyond the synesthetic
perception (Brang et al., 2012; Neufeld et al., 2012c; Sinke et al.,
2012b). Two of them focused on so-called double-ﬂash illusion
as described by Shams et al. (2000), in which a short ﬂash is pre-
sented together with two short beep sounds while subjects have
to state the number of perceived ﬂashes. Subjects tend to report
the occurrence of two ﬂashes even though only one was presented.
Regarding this effect the two mentioned studies found opposite
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effects: whereas Brang et al. (2012) reported an increased number
of illusions in seven grapheme-color synesthetes, Neufeld et al.
(2012c) found a decrease in 18 synesthetic subjects with GCS
and/or auditory-visual synesthesia. The third study dedicated to
this issue focused on two different multimodal effects (Sinke et al.,
2012b). First, a reduced susceptibility to the so-called McGurk
illusion (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976) was described in 19
synesthetes. In this illusion subjects watch a video and have to
report what the person in the video says. Here the presentation of
differing visual and acoustical information (video of a speaker say-
ing “BA” dubbed with the audio track of the speaker saying “GA”)
leads to the fused perception of something new (usually “DA”).
In the second part of the study, audio–visual speech enhancement
was found to be reduced in the synesthesia group. Previously it was
shown that in a noisy environment typical subject tends to addi-
tionally rely on the visual information during speech perception
(i.e., mouth movement), depending on the quality of the acousti-
cal signal (Ross et al., 2007). Here synesthesia subjects beneﬁt less
than control subjects from viewing articulatory lip movements in
acoustically compromised situations. Therefore the study of Sinke
et al. (2012b) shows for the ﬁrst time, that subjects affected by
synesthesia have deﬁcits related to multimodal sensory processing
that are important in our everyday life, namely in the speech per-
ception. Thus these behavioral studies suggest global differences in
multimodal sensory processing in synesthesia and further – result-
ing from these differences speciﬁc deﬁcits related to basic natural
sensory functions like speech perception.
Common models related to synesthesia focus primarily on
typical inducer-concurrent couplings. Therefore they are based
on data collected within a group of synesthesia subjects charac-
terized by one speciﬁc inducer-concurrent coupling. Thus most
data stems from the most available synesthesia group – GCS –
though it is rarely reported if the investigated grapheme-color
synesthetes experience also additional synesthesia types. Within
these models proximal and distal causes of synesthesia have been
distinguished (Ward, 2013). Differences in brain connectivity have
been identiﬁed as a proximal cause. For example, the well-known
cross-activation model of GCS suggests unusual direct connec-
tions between anatomically adjacent brain areas responsible for
processing of inducer and concurrent (Ramachandran and Hub-
bard, 2001). As an alternative to this feed-forwardmechanismwith
direct connections between unimodal sensory regions, indirect
mechanisms based on feedback activity have also been discussed.
According to this model – the disinhibited-feedback theory –
synesthesia may be caused by disinhibited feedback from higher
sensory or multimodal convergence brain sites (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001). One good candidate for a synesthesia-related
convergence site is the intraparietal cortex (IPC). This region
receives mainly multimodal input (Bremmer et al., 2001) and
shows structural differences in synesthetes (Weiss and Fink, 2009).
It also shows activation differences in grapheme-color (Weiss
et al., 2005; Sinke et al., 2012a) and in auditory-visual synes-
thetes (Neufeld et al., 2012a). Furthermore inhibitory transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the IPC disrupts the synesthetic
Stroop effect (Esterman et al., 2006;Muggleton et al., 2007; Rothen
et al., 2010), which is usually observed in grapheme-color synes-
thetes (Mattingley et al., 2001; Elias et al., 2003). Recent research
shows also increased functional connectivity between this area
and the primary auditory and visual cortices in audio–visual
synesthetes (Neufeld et al., 2012b) and with the primary visual
cortex in grapheme-color synesthetes (Sinke et al., 2012a). Thus it
can be expected that synesthesia and synesthesia-related deﬁcits
in multisensory integration are related to aberrations within
sensory-speciﬁc and higher sensory convergence brain sites and
the communication among those.
As a possible distal cause of these connectivity differences and
hence synesthesia, a deﬁcit in pruning of synaptic connections
has been hypothesized (Ward, 2013). Thus, synesthesia in adults
could be a result of an altered development of the whole sensory
system by deﬁcient synaptic elimination. A very recent hypothesis
based on ﬁndings of the graph theoretical network analysis states
that synesthetes have a generally hyper-connected brain (Hanggi
et al., 2011; Jancke and Langer, 2011) whichmay lead to alterations
in multimodal integration processes at a global level within this
population (Esterman et al., 2006; Mulvenna andWalsh, 2006).
Thus recent research gives ﬁrst evidence for synesthesia as a
global problemofmultisensory processingwithperceptiondeﬁcits
that are affecting the speechprocessing andwhichmaybe related to
both global alterations in brain connectivity and speciﬁc changes
in communication between multimodal convergence brain sites
and sensory-speciﬁc areas. Very little is known about the range
of the multimodal speech-related deﬁcits in synesthesia and the
underlying mechanisms. Therefore, synesthesia research focus-
ing on speech and speech-related perception as a multimodal
phenomenon is needed.
Since synesthesia subjects show performance deﬁcits in audio–
visual speech perception under noisy environment, probably
related to deﬁcits in the integration of auditory stream with
matching visual information served by vocalisatory lip move-
ments, we decided to analyze audio–visual integratory processes
at the semantic level. Under the assumption that synesthesia
is related to global differences in brain connectivity leading to
global changes in sensory perception and resulting from develop-
ment problems of the central nervous system (pruning deﬁcit), it
should be possible to ﬁnd differences in performance and in brain
activation at diverse processing levels during cross-modal tasks.
Such differences should be independent of the type of synesthe-
sia, as deﬁned by the speciﬁc inducer-concurrent coupling, and
should have no relation to the synesthetic perception as such. To
capture these effects we decided to utilize a simple multimodal
perception task using different multi- and unimodal stimuli. It is
known that object detection is faster for semantically congruent
multimodal stimuli compared to unimodal stimuli (multimodal
facilitation effect), whereas crossmodal conﬂict impairs the perfor-
mance (Chen and Spence, 2010). Thereforewe use a categorization
task including three kinds of stimuli: semantically congruent and
incongruent combinations of line drawings and sounds of ani-
mated and in animated objects and visual only presentations of
line drawings. To capture the brain activation related to these
processes we decided to use electroencephalography (EEG). This
method allows analyzing brain activity with excellent temporal
resolution and therefore is predisposed to distinguish early and
late effects in sensory processing in an experimental setup. For
both behavioral and EEG data, we expected differences between
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synesthesia and control subjects with reduction of audio–visual
facilitation in synesthesia within the bimodal conditions and
no differences in performance pattern in the unimodal visual
condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
All study subjects gave written informed consent and the study
was approved by the ethics committee of the Hannover Medical
School. The subjects participated voluntarily and received a small
monetary recompensation for their participation.
Control subjects (n = 14) and synesthesia subjects (n = 14)
were matched for age (synesthetes: 36 ± 15 years, range 19–57,
controls: 36 ± 14 years, range 22–61), gender (nine women
per group), and general intelligence (IQ values for synesthetes:
119 ± 13 and controls: 112 ± 17) as assessed by the MWT-
B – “Mehrfach–Wortschatz Test” (Lehrl et al., 1995). Data of two
synesthesia subjects had to be excluded subsequently from the
analysis due to strong artifacts. All subjects were native speak-
ers of German with normal or corrected to normal vision and
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases or
medication.
Synesthesia was assessed during an extensive interview. After
the interview, ﬁve subjectswere assigned to the audio–visual synes-
thesia (AVS) group, six to the GCS group, and three showed
both kinds of synesthesia (Table 1 contains information regard-
ing additional synesthetic inducer-concurrent pairings within our
synesthesia population). All subjects underwent additional test-
ing with an ofﬂine MATLAB version of the synesthesia battery
(http://www.synesthete.org/). In the battery, numbers from 0 to 9
(10) and the letters from the alphabet from A to Z (26) are pre-
sented and grapheme-color synesthetes have to select a colorwhich
matches their synesthetic experience best, while controls have to
choose a color which they think ﬁts best to the item. Addition-
ally, we modiﬁed the battery for subjects with AVS using 36 tones
similar as used by Ward et al. (2006). In this test, synesthetes are
asked to choose the color which matches their experienced synes-
thetic color induced by the tone best, non-synesthetes are asked to
select the color which they think to ﬁt best to the tone. Subjects
with both kinds of synesthesia participated in both versions of the
battery. Each item of the synesthesia battery was presented three
times in randomized order. To assess consistency the geometric
distance in RGB color space between the three runs of each sound
was calculated for each subject (Eagleman et al., 2007). More con-
sistent color choices lead to a lower consistency score, as more
consistent color choices for each sound result inmore similar RGB
values and thus a smaller difference between the RGB values. For
grapheme-color synesthetes a threshold value of 1 was chosen as
suggested by Eagleman et al. (2007). All grapheme-color synes-
thetes showed consistency scores lower than 1 (synesthesia group
0.59 ± 0.18, control group 2.09 ± 0.68). Since a similar threshold
has not been deﬁned for auditory-visual synesthesia, we merely
show that the group of auditory-visual synesthetes was more con-
sistent than the control group, as suggested by Ward et al. (2006).
The group of audio–visual synesthetes showed signiﬁcantly
lower consistency scores (1.15 ± 0.45) than the control group
(2.03 ± 0.47).
STIMULI AND TASK
For visual stimulation we used line drawings of animals and
inanimate objects selected from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart
(1980) database presented centrally on a black screen (approxi-
mately 9◦ visual angle horizontally and 6◦ vertically). Complex
natural sounds from the MULTIMOST stimulus set served as
auditory stimuli (Schneider et al., 2008). Three conditions were
used (Figure 1): in the audio–visual congruent condition the
line drawing matched the presented sound (e.g., drawing of lion
accompanied by a lion’s roar). This condition should lead to cross-
modal enhancement. In the audio–visual incongruent condition
a semantic mismatch between both modalities (e.g., a drawing of
a lion accompanied by a telephone ring) was introduced. This
condition is expected to lead to cross-modal conﬂict between
visual and auditory information. The unimodal control condi-
tion comprised only visual stimulation with line drawings without
sound presentation. Each stimulus was presented for duration of
400 ms. Auditory and visual stimuli in bimodal conditions were
Table 1 | Specification of the synesthesia subjects.
Subjects
Inducer-concurrent pairing 1 2 3 4 5 6∗ 7 8∗ 9 10 11 12 13 14
Grapheme-color x x x x x x x x x
Lexical-color x x x x x x x x
Auditory-visual x x x x x x x x
Olfactory-visual x x x x
Gustatory-visual x x x
Pain-auditory x x
Tactile-auditory x x
Pain-visual x x x x
Tactile-visual x
Asterisk indicates subjects excluded from the analysis.
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FIGURE 1 | Paradigm. Line drawings of animate and inanimate objects
(Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980) were combined with congruent and
incongruent sounds from the MULTIMOST dataset (Schneider et al., 2008).
These two conditions and an additional unimodal (visual only) control
condition were presented in random order with a stimulus presentation
time of 400 ms and a variable inter stimulus interval with 100 ms steps,
ranging from 2 to 3 s. Subjects had to indicate animacy by pressing a
button.
presented concurrently without time delay between onsets. The
inter-stimulus interval, duringwhich ﬁxations cross was presented
in the center of the screen, varied between 2 and 3 s in 100ms steps.
For each experimental condition (congruent, incongruent, and
visual only) 80 stimuli were presented (20 different animate and
20 different inanimate stimuli, all stimuli were presented twice
to increase number of events). Stimuli of all experimental cat-
egories were presented in random order. The experiment lasted
about 10 min and comprised 240 stimuli in total. Participants
were required to categorize each visual stimulus as either animate
or inanimate as fast as possible by pressing the left or right mouse
button. Before the experiment each participant completed a prac-
tice run of 10 trials with visual and acoustical congruent stimuli
not presented in the main experiment to ensure that the partic-
ipant understood the task. All stimuli were presented on a 19′′
ﬂat screen with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels. Sounds were
adjusted individually to a comfortable listening level andpresented
on standard loudspeakers in binaural mono. The experiment
was implemented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Inc., Albany, CA, USA).
DATA ACQUISITION AND PRE-PROCESSING
After application of the electrodes, participants were seated in a
separate EEG recording chamber with dimmed light. Participants
rested their handsona computermouseplacedon the table in front
of them, responding with their left and right index ﬁngers. Elec-
troencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded continuously
using an Active Two head cap and the Active Two BioSemi system
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). Signals were recorded from
32 positions including all standard locations of the 10/20 system
using active electrodes in an elastic cap. Recording of additional
electrodes to record eye artifacts was not necessary, since the analy-
sis software provides estimation of eye artifacts from frontocentral
scalp electrodes (FP1, FP2). As usual for BIOSEMI, two addi-
tional electrodes (common mode sense, CMS, and driven right
leg, DRL) were used as reference and ground electrodes during
recording. Bioelectric signals were ampliﬁed with a sampling rate
of 1024 Hz and stored using ActiView software (BioSemi) with
decimation/anti-aliasing ﬁlter (5th order sinc ﬁlter, low-pass with
−3 dB at 0.2035Hz * 1024Hz) applied to the data streamed to ﬁle.
Prior to ERP analysis, EEG data were downsampled to 256 Hz and
re-referenced to common average reference.We decided to use this
reference method instead of re-referencing the signal to speciﬁc
electrodes (e.g., averaged mastoids) because we were also inter-
ested in potential stimulation effects over the auditory cortex. A
high-pass ﬁlter (1 Hz to remove low frequency drifts) and a notch
ﬁlter (peak at the line frequency of 50 Hz) were applied. In the
recent literature the use of high pass ﬁltering is discussed critically.
Some authors suggests to analyze datawithout ﬁltering (Vanrullen,
2011) while others suggest maximal ﬁlter cut off frequency of
0.1 Hz (Acunzo et al., 2012), or values higher than 0.1 Hz (Wid-
mann and Schroger, 2012) or lower than 1 Hz (Rousselet, 2012).
Thus the use of ﬁlters affects the EEG signal in the time domain
resulting in reduced precision and artifacts. We decided to use a
relative high cut off frequency of 1 Hz for the high pass ﬁlter in
our analysis. This relatively high value can result in some serious
artifacts as shown by Acunzo et al. (2012) where the ﬁltered signal
shows artiﬁcial differences between conditions within the same
experimental group. In our recent study we primary focus on dif-
ferences between groups. Therefore ﬁlter settings should have the
same impact onEEGsignal in all experimental groups and leave the
potential group difference unaffected. Indeed in studies dedicated
to analysis of the impact of high pass ﬁlter setting on group differ-
ences no effects for early EEG components were found (Ebmeier
et al., 1992; Goodin et al., 1992). We therefore believe that the
chosen ﬁlter settings should not inﬂuence our analysis focused
on group effects. Ocular contributions to the EEG were corrected
using blind component separation, SOBI (Joyce et al., 2004),which
has been shown to be superior to other artifact correction proce-
dures (Kierkels et al., 2006). Rejection of non-EOG-artifacts was
accomplished using individualized peak-to-peak-amplitude crite-
ria based on visual and semi-automatic inspection implemented in
BESA software (www.BESA.de). To remove high frequency noise,
ERPs were 30 Hz low-pass ﬁltered prior to statistical analysis
and graphical display. Grand-average ERPs were generated sep-
arately for both groups. ERPs were time-locked to the onset of the
stimulation.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavior was assessed by reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER).
The data was analyzed by means of 2 × 3 ANOVA with main
between-subjects factor synesthesia (synesthesia vs. control group)
and within-subject factor stimulation (audio–visual congruent vs.
audio–visual incongruent vs. only visual stimulation).
Electroencephalography data was analyzed in two steps. The
ﬁrst step contained exploratory inspection of all electrodes for
possible differences and relevant time windows. In the second step
early ERPeffectswere quantiﬁedby analysis of the greatest negative
peak amplitude within time window from 80 to 180 ms and late
ERP effects were quantiﬁed by amean amplitudemeasure between
200 and400ms. Since visualN1 component consist of a complexof
at least three separate subcomponents that are associated with cur-
rent ﬂows over frontal (peaking at 140 ms), parietal (150 ms), and
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occipital (170 ms) scalp areas (Luck, 1995) analysis of this com-
ponent should involve this time range of EEG signal. We decided
therefore to use a time window from 80 till 180 ms used already by
others for analysis (Johannes et al., 1995; Vogel and Luck, 2000) of
this component. The time window for analysis of the late compo-
nent was chosen to grasp possible effects on the N400 component
usually modulated by semantic mismatch of the incoming infor-
mation (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). EEG data was analyzed ﬁrst
for global group effects and effects of stimulation with localiza-
tion effects for ventro-dorsal and left-right axis. For this purpose a
2× 3× 2× 4ANOVAmodel was designed. This model contained
onemain between-subjects factor synesthesia (synesthesia vs. con-
trol group), one within-subject factor stimulation (audio–visual
congruent vs. audio–visual incongruent vs. only visual stimula-
tion) and further within-subject factors laterality (left vs. right)
and electrodes (frontal vs. central vs. parietal vs. occipital) using
electrodes along fronto-caudal and left-right axis (F3, C3, P3, O1,
F4, C4, P4, and O2). Degrees of freedom are provided uncor-
rected; whenever necessary, p-values are Greenhouse–Geisser-
corrected to account for possible violations of the sphericity
assumptions.
Since both audio–visual conditions simultaneously included
visual/auditory stimulation, both of them should show a mixed
ERP based on visual and auditory potentials. In contrast, the
visual stimulation control condition included visual potentials
only, which enables us to see group differences when confronted
with visual stimulus material only. Therefore, the visual condition
is presented independently of the audio–visual conditions in the
Figure 2.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Behavioral results are summarized in Table 2. The ANOVA synes-
thesia × stimulation on ER data revealed no signiﬁcant effects
(stimulation F2,48 < 1, group F1,24 = 2.2 p = 0.15, inter-
action F2,48 < 1). The ANOVA synesthesia × stimulation on
response time (RT) data revealed signiﬁcant effect of stimulation
(F2,48 = 3.1 p= 0.05). Both the group factor synesthesia (F1,24< 1)
and the interaction of synesthesia with stimulation (F2,48 < 1) was
not signiﬁcant. Post hoc tests revealed faster responses for audio–
visual congruent than incongruent stimuli (t25 = 2.7 p= 0.01) and
for visual only than audio–visual incongruent (t25 = 2.1 p = 0.05).
The difference between visual only and audio–visual congruent
stimuli was not signiﬁcant (t25 = 0.4 p = 0.72).
ERP RESULTS
In the overall ANOVA comparing factors synesthesia, stimulation,
laterality, and electrodes for the peak analysis (N1 compo-
nent) we found a signiﬁcant effect of synesthesia (F1,24 = 5.4,
p = 0.03) and a signiﬁcant effect of electrodes (F3,72 = 32.4,
p = 0.00) comparing signal from frontal (F3 and F4) vs. cen-
tral (C3 and C4) vs. parietal (P3 and P4) vs. occipital (O1 and
O2) electrodes. We also found a signiﬁcant interaction between
synesthesia and electrodes (F3,72 = 3.8, p = 0.04). Thus in the
next step we analyzed by means of ANOVA the effects of group
and stimulation in the frontal (F3, F4), central (C3, C4), pari-
etal (P3, P4), and occipital (O1, O2) electrodes separately. We
found no signiﬁcant effects for the frontal, central, and parietal
electrodes.
For the occipital electrodes we found a signiﬁcant stimulation
effect (F2,48 = 7.0, p = 0.08) as well as group effect (F1,24 = 5.2,
p= 0.03) but no signiﬁcant interactionbetweenboth. Post hoc tests
revealed no signiﬁcant differences in processing of audio–visual
congruency (t-test on mean data of congruent vs. incongruent
was n.s.), but congruent audio–visual vs. visual only stimulation
(t25 = 2.9, p = 0.08,−8.4± 6.0μV vs. −9.7± 5.8μV) and incon-
gruent audio–visual vs. visual only stimulation (t25 = 2.2,p= 0.04,
−8.7 ± 5.9 μV vs. −9.7 ± 5.8 μV). Thus the described stimula-
tion effect rises from the processing difference of multimodal vs.
unimodal stimulation as such, irrespective whether multimodal
stimulationwas congruent or incongruent. The group effect above
the occipital electrodes was due to a global difference in processing
of both visual only and audio–visual stimuli with stronger nega-
tivity in the synesthesia group. We decided to calculate also post
hoc tests for group differences although there was no signiﬁcant
interaction effect of both main factors. The reason for this was the
relatively small synesthesia subject population analyzed. Therefore
post hoc t-tests revealed a trend for signiﬁcance for comparison
between control and synesthesia group in audio–visual congruent
condition (t24 = 1.9, p = 0.06,−6.3± 3.6μV vs. −10.7± 7.5μV)
and virtually signiﬁcant difference for audio-visual incongruent
condition (t24 = 2.1, p = 0.05, −6.6 ± 3.6 vs. −11.1 ± 7.1 μV)
and signiﬁcant difference for visual only condition (t24 = 2.8,
p = 0.01,−7.1 ± 3.1 vs. −12.7 ± 6.7μV). Re-analysis using mean
amplitude in a time-window from 80 to 180 ms replicated those
ﬁndings.
No synesthesia (F1,24 < 1) or stimulation (F2,48 < 1) effects
were found when analyzing the late components between 200 and
400 ms. The factor laterality was also not signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 2.2,
p = 0.15) but the factor electrodes showed similar to N1 com-
ponent signiﬁcant effect (F3,72 = 4.9, p = 0.03). Post hoc t-test
revealed differences between the central and parietal electrodes
(t25 = 5.4, p = 0.00, −0.1 ± 1.7 vs. 2.6 ± 2.0 μV) and between
frontal and parietal electrodes (t25 = 3.7, p = 0.00, −0.5 ± 2.4 vs.
2.6 ± 2.0 μV).
DISCUSSION
The aimof the studywas twofold. First wewere interested in global
multisensory perception alterations in synesthesia independent of
the speciﬁc inducer-concurrent couplings. Second we focused on
neuronal activation underlying these perceptual processes. Thus,
audio–visual semantic matching was used to capture multisen-
sory processing in synesthesia at the global level.We hypothesized,
based on the idea of general hyperconnectivity in synesthesia
(Hanggi et al., 2011), that we would ﬁnd differences in multi-
sensory integration processes unrelated to synesthetic sensations
between synesthetes and controls, i.e., in an audio–visual semantic
categorization task. Particularly with regard to previous behav-
ioral data that suggested the reduction of audio–visual integration
in synesthetes as indicated by a reduced number of audio–visual
illusions (Neufeld et al., 2012c; Sinke et al., 2012b) and the reduc-
tion of multisensory facilitation in speech perception (Sinke et al.,
2012b), we expected global effects related to the behavior and the
EEG signal.
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FIGURE 2 | ERPs over 14 exemplary electrodes along the left and
right fronto-occipital axis. (A) Depicted are on the left panel ERPs for
audio–visual congruent (green, CON) and incongruent (red, INC)
stimulation for synesthesia (continuous line, SYN) and control (dotted
line, CON) subjects. On the right panel are ERPs for the unimodal
visual only stimulation for synesthesia (continuous line) and control
(dotted line) subjects. Electrodes are labeled according to the 10/20
system. Gray bars indicate signiﬁcant differences. (B) Grand-mean
isopotential ﬁeld map for the time window from 80 to 180 ms,
covering the N1 component.
On the behavioral level, we didn’t ﬁnd any effects between
groups in the experiment. Compared to controls, synesthesia sub-
jects showed similar ERs and response speeds in audio–visual
congruent and incongruent experimental events. Also, unimodal
visual processing was similar in both groups. There are differ-
ent possible explanations for the lack of behavioral group-effects
in this study. The ﬁrst one is related to the stimulation used in
our experiments, i.e., it could be possible that stimulation was
not able to evoke the expected effects. However, we observed in
our data the well known multisensory facilitation effect (Chen
and Spence, 2010) with faster responses for audio–visual congru-
ent stimuli. Therefore our stimulation was evidently sufﬁcient for
audio–visual semantic integration. Interestingly the multisensory
facilitation effect was not accompanied by signiﬁcant EEG signal
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Table 2 | Behavioral results.
Stimulation
Congruent Incongruent Visual
Error rate M(SD)
Control 1.1 (1.2) 1.3 (1.5) 1.2 (1.1)
Synesthesia 2.3 (2.4) 1.8 (1.8) 1.8 (1.6)
Reaction time M(SD) ms
Control 495 (73) 503 (77) 497 (63)
Synesthesia 478 (63) 484 (65) 474 (53)
differences between audio–visual congruent and incongruent
events. The second possibility is that previously described deﬁcits
in multisensory integration of synesthesia subjects (Neufeld et al.,
2012c; Sinke et al., 2012b) are related to early processing stages
involving a more basal stimulus analysis than the semantic inte-
gration/matching, which relies on the conceptual knowledge.
Thus it is possible that the used stimuli in form of line draw-
ings and complex sounds involve other integratory mechanisms
than those related to temporal correspondence and spatial con-
gruence of stimuli. Lastly, the lack of behavioral effects may be
resulting from compensatory mechanisms on the neuronal level
within the synesthesia group. Subjects with synesthesia might
have to spend more attention to manage their interaction with
the environment despite the often-reported confusion caused by
synesthetic sensations. Thus they may develop strategies during
their life to manage sensory input from different sensory chan-
nels separately. A good candidate for such compensatory strategy
could be the control over attentional processes related to global
sensory perception in synesthesia, which allows better separa-
tion of sensory information coming from different modalities.
As a side effect of such strategy, or in other words, as price for
successful interaction with the environment, synesthesia-speciﬁc
reduction in multimodal integration could arise. Some evidence
for this idea is provided by the ﬁnding that synesthesia subjects
show a negative relation between their susceptibility for audio–
visual illusions and their age (Neufeld et al., 2012c). This ﬁnding
suggests that subjects with synesthesia are reducing their ten-
dency to integrate multisensory information throughout their
life.
Consistent with the idea of additional neuronal mechanisms
related to multimodal sensory processing in synesthesia and our
experimental hypothesis, we observed differences in the EEG sig-
nal of synesthetes and controls. Therefore, the main ﬁnding of
this study is the global difference in the N1 negativity over occip-
ital electrodes between synesthesia subjects and controls. This
difference was unrelated to the experimental condition as synes-
thesia subjects showed amuch stronger negativity for audio–visual
congruent, incongruent as well as for unimodal visual-only stim-
uli. This not only indicates differences in multimodal but also
in unimodal processing of synesthetic non-inducing stimuli in
synesthetes and may reﬂect global alterations in sensory process-
ing. Additionally we found no speciﬁc ERP effects of audio–visual
congruency, neither within the synesthesia nor within the control
group. Such effects were expected, since semantically congruent
multimodal stimuli facilitate object detection and recognition
whereas incongruent stimuli induce multimodal conﬂict and
impair performance (Chen and Spence, 2010) and since we found
this effect in the behavioral data in this study. Semantic mis-
matches are associated with a modulation of the so-called N400
component, which has been demonstrated for language (Kutas
and Hillyard, 1980) and pictorial (Ganis and Kutas, 2003) mate-
rial. The lack of audio–visual congruency/incongruency effects
in our study might be explained by visual dominance effects
in audio–visual conﬂict situations with ambiguous auditory and
visual input (Yuval-Greenberg and Deouell, 2009). Another expla-
nation for the lack of audio–visual congruency effects in the
EEG signal in spite of the existence of behavioral multisensory
facilitation effect in our data could be based on the small dif-
ference between the RTs for congruent vs. incongruent stimuli
(about 7 ms). We consider it as possible that our experimen-
tal setting was not sufﬁcient to capture brain correlates of such
small behavioral effects. To summarize, globalN1 group difference
might rather be related to a generally altered visual process-
ing in synesthetes and not to altered multisensory integration
processes.
Alterations of early visual processing as measured by EEG in
synesthetes have already been shown previously (Barnett et al.,
2008). Barnett et al. (2008) used simple stimuli that do not elicit
synesthetic color experiences and which are either mainly pro-
cessed via the parvocellular or the magnocellular visual pathway.
Sensory-perceptual differences in synesthetes relative to non-
synesthetes in response to both types of stimuli were observed
with enhanced processing of parvocellular stimuli (high contrast,
high spatial frequency stimuli including color stimuli) reﬂected
by an enhanced C1 component at 65–85 ms and a trend of
decreased response to magnocellular stimuli (low contrast, low
spatial frequency gray scale stimuli). The authors argue that
these differences in early evoked visual potentials are a marker
of widespread connectivity differences, which might be the cause
of both, synesthesia as well as unrelated sensory processing dif-
ferences. Alternatively, differences in early sensory processing
(enhanced parvocellular and reduced magnocellular processing)
might determine synesthesia by indirectly increasing a tendency
to develop the paired associations of inducing stimuli with color
percepts (as both, graphemes as well as colors, are more parvo-
cellularly processed). In our study the visual stimuli were white
line drawings on black background, which were therefore high in
contrast and rather high in spatial frequency and therefore par-
vocellular in nature, which ﬁts to the ﬁndings of Barnett et al.
(2008). In line with the ﬁnding of enhanced ERPs evoked by
stimuli mainly recruiting the parvocellular pathway, enhanced
unimodal perception in the modality of the concurrent (which
was vision or tactile sensation) has been reported in synesthetes
(Banissy et al., 2009) which provides further evidence for the idea
of a generally altered early unimodal processing and ﬁts to the
enhanced early N1 component over visual cortex found in our
study.
Alterations of the N1 over occipitotemporal sites have been
shown in grapheme-color synesthetes when exposed to num-
bers inducing synesthetic colors, which could either be congruent
or incongruent to the meaning of a preceding sentence (Brang
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et al., 2008; Brang et al., 2011). More precisely, between 100 and
150 ms after onset of the sentence ﬁnal stimulus (which was the
number), ERPs to numbers inducing contextual congruent con-
current were more negative than ERPs to incongruent numbers
in the synesthete group only. In contrast we found increased
N1 component for different kinds of stimuli. Although both
studies focused on different perception aspects (expectancy of
content within consecutive presented sentence ending with synes-
thetic inducer vs. concurrent audio–visual stimulation), effects
related to N1 component were found. The authors of the above
mentioned study argue that their ﬁnding might indicate differ-
ences in attention shift processes dependent on the congruency
of the inducers occurring on a rather early sensory level and
that the observed N1 effects may reﬂect enhanced visual pro-
cessing of contextually appropriate graphemes in the sense that
fulﬁlled semantic expectations facilitate the grapheme discrimi-
nation as well as its synesthetic color. We go a step forward and
argue that the ﬁnding of an enhanced N1 component in the
current study might also be the result of an attention-related,
facilitated sensory processing, but in contrast to the study by
Brang et al. (2008) it occurred within the synesthesia group on
a basic visual level unaffected by context (congruent or incongru-
ent additional auditory stimuli) and without inducing synesthetic
concurrents.
Inﬂuence of attention on the visual N1 in non-synesthetic
individuals has already been reported in the context of both
multisensory integration (Talsma andWoldorff, 2005) andunisen-
sory visual processing (Vanvoorhis and Hillyard, 1977; Harter
et al., 1982; Clark and Hillyard, 1996). Following the idea that
attention already has particular impact on early stages of sen-
sory processing in synesthesia, involvement of attention-related
parietal cortex in perception could be expected. In fact, evidence
for the parietal cortices key role in synesthetic perception comes
from several neuroimaging studies with groups of grapheme-color
synesthetes (Rouw and Scholte, 2010; Van Leeuwen et al., 2010;
Sinke et al., 2012a), spatial sequence synesthetes (Tang et al., 2008)
and auditory-visual synesthetes (Neufeld et al., 2012a). Impor-
tantly, connectivity analyses identiﬁed an area in the parietal cortex
which showed stronger connections with primary sensory areas in
synesthetes (Neufeld et al., 2012b; Sinke et al., 2012a). This is con-
sistent with a model of parietal modulation of sensory processing
which has been found to explain neuroimaging data of associator
synesthetes (Van Leeuwen et al., 2011).
To summarize, in the behavioral data we found no group differ-
ences between synesthesia subjects and control subjects regarding
the ER and the response speed but rather a group independent
multisensory facilitation effect with faster responses for audio–
visual congruent stimuli. The lack of behavioral group differences
was contrasted by a global group difference in N1 for the occipital
electrodes. Here, synesthesia subjects showed a stronger negativ-
ity for different kinds of stimuli. Taken together, our results give
evidence for global early sensory processing alterations in synes-
thetes concerning a very basic level of visual processing. These
early visual processing differences might either be the result of an
altered connectivity within the visual cortex or of a modulation
of visual processing mediated by (parietal) inﬂuences related to
attention.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft:
“Open Access Publication.” This work was supported by the
German Research Foundation, SFB936/A4 (Christopher Sinke).
REFERENCES
Acunzo, D. J., MacKenzie, G., and Van Rossum, M. C. (2012). System-
atic biases in early ERP and ERF components as a result of high-pass
ﬁltering. J. Neurosci. Methods 209, 212–218. doi: 10.1016/j.jneumeth.2012.
06.011
Banissy, M. J., Walsh, V., and Ward, J. (2009). Enhanced sensory perception in
synaesthesia. Exp. Brain Res. 196, 565–571. doi: 10.1007/s00221-009-1888-0
Barnett, K. J., Foxe, J. J., Molholm, S., Kelly, S. P., Shalgi, S., Mitchell,
K. J., et al. (2008). Differences in early sensory-perceptual processing in
synesthesia: a visual evoked potential study. Neuroimage 43, 605–613. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.07.028
Baron-Cohen, S., Wyke, M. A., and Binnie, C. (1987). Hearing words and seeing
colours: an experimental investigation of a case of synaesthesia. Perception 16,
761–767. doi: 10.1068/p160761
Bien, N., Ten Oever, S., Goebel, R., and Sack, A. T. (2012). The
sound of size: crossmodal binding in pitch-size synesthesia: a com-
bined TMS, EEG and psychophysics study. Neuroimage 59, 663–672. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.06.095
Brang, D., Edwards, L., Ramachandran, V. S., and Coulson, S. (2008). Is the sky 2?
Contextual priming in grapheme-color synaesthesia. Psychol. Sci. 19, 421–428.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02103.x
Brang, D., Kanai, S., Ramachandran, V. S., and Coulson, S. (2011). Contextual
priming in grapheme-color synesthetes and yoked controls: 400 msec in the life
of a synesthete. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 1681–1696. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2010.21486
Brang, D., Williams, L. E., and Ramachandran, V. S. (2012). Grapheme-color
synesthetes show enhanced crossmodal processing between auditory and visual
modalities. Cortex 48, 630–637. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.008
Bremmer, F., Schlack, A., Shah, N. J., Zaﬁris, O., Kubischik, M., Hoffmann, K.,
et al. (2001). Polymodal motion processing in posterior parietal and premotor
cortex: a human fMRI study strongly implies equivalencies between humans and
monkeys. Neuron 29, 287–296. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(01)00198-2
Chen,Y. C., and Spence, C. (2010).When hearing the bark helps to identify the dog:
semantically-congruent sounds modulate the identiﬁcation of masked pictures.
Cognition 114, 389–404. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.10.012
Clark,V. P., and Hillyard, S. A. (1996). Spatial selective attention affects early extras-
triate but not striate components of the visual evoked potential. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
8, 387–402. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1996.8.5.387
Eagleman, D. M., Kagan, A. D., Nelson, S. S., Sagaram, D., and Sarma, A. K. (2007).
A standardized test battery for the study of synesthesia. J. Neurosci. Methods 159,
139–145. doi: 10.1016/j.jneumeth.2006.07.012
Ebmeier, K. P., Glabus, M., Potter, D. D., and Salzen, E. A. (1992). The effect of dif-
ferent high-pass ﬁlter settings on peak latencies in the event-related potentials of
schizophrenics, patientswith Parkinson’s disease and controls. Electroencephalogr.
Clin. Neurophysiol. 84, 280–287. doi: 10.1016/0168-5597(92)90009-Z
Elias, L. J., Saucier, D. M., Hardie, C., and Sarty, G. E. (2003). Dissociating
semantic and perceptual components of synaesthesia: behavioural and functional
neuroanatomical investigations. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 16, 232–237. doi:
10.1016/S0926-6410(02)00278-1
Esterman, M., Verstynen, T., Ivry, R. B., and Robertson, L. C. (2006). Coming
unbound: disrupting automatic integration of synesthetic color and graphemes
by transcranial magnetic stimulation of the right parietal lobe. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
18, 1570–1576. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.9.1570
Ganis, G., and Kutas, M. (2003). An electrophysiological study of scene effects on
object identiﬁcation. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 16, 123–144. doi: 10.1016/S0926-
6410(02)00244-6
Goodin, D. S., Aminoff, M. J., and Chequer, R. S. (1992). Effect of different high-
pass ﬁlters on the long-latency event-related auditory evoked potentials in normal
human subjects and individuals infected with the human immunodeﬁciency
virus. J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 9, 97–104. doi: 10.1097/00004691-199201000-00011
Grossenbacher, P. G., and Lovelace, C. T. (2001). Mechanisms of synesthe-
sia: cognitive and physiological constraints. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 36–41. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01571-0
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 21 | 52
Sinke et al. Cross-modal conﬂict in synesthesia
Hanggi, J., Wotruba, D., and Jancke, L. (2011). Globally altered structural brain
network topology in grapheme-color synesthesia. J. Neurosci. 31, 5816–5828. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0964-10.2011
Harter, M. R., Aine, C., and Schroeder, C. (1982). Hemispheric differences in the
neural processing of stimulus location and type: effects of selective attention
on visual evoked potentials. Neuropsychologia 20, 421–438. doi: 10.1016/0028-
3932(82)90041-0
Jancke, L., and Langer, N. (2011). A strong parietal hub in the small-world network
of coloured-hearing synaesthetes during resting state EEG. J. Neuropsychol. 5,
178–202. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-6653.2011.02004.x
Johannes, S., Munte, T. F., Heinze, H. J., and Mangun, G. R. (1995). Luminance and
spatial attention effects on early visual processing. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 2,
189–205. doi: 10.1016/0926-6410(95)90008-X
Joyce, C. A., Gorodnitsky, I. F., and Kutas, M. (2004). Automatic removal
of eye movement and blink artifacts from EEG data using blind compo-
nent separation. Psychophysiology 41, 313–325. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2003.
00141.x
Kierkels, J. J., Van Boxtel, G. J., and Vogten, L. L. (2006). A model-based objective
evaluation of eye movement correction in EEG recordings. IEEE Trans. Biomed.
Eng. 53, 246–253. doi: 10.1109/TBME.2005.862533
Kutas,M., and Federmeier, K.D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: ﬁndingmeaning
in the N400 component of the event-related brain potential (ERP). Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 62, 621–647. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131123
Kutas, M., and Hillyard, S. A. (1980). Reading senseless sentences: brain poten-
tials reﬂect semantic incongruity. Science 207, 203–205. doi: 10.1126/science.
7350657
Lehrl, S., Triebig, G., and Fischer, B. (1995). Multiple choice vocabulary test MWT
as a valid and short test to estimate premorbid intelligence. Acta Neurol. Scand.
91, 335–345. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0404.1995.tb07018.x
Luck, S. J. (1995). Multiple mechanisms of visual-spatial attention: recent evidence
fromhuman electrophysiology. Behav. Brain Res. 71, 113–123. doi: 10.1016/0166-
4328(95)00041-0
Mattingley, J. B., Rich, A. N., Yelland, G., and Bradshaw, J. L. (2001). Uncon-
scious priming eliminates automatic binding of colour and alphanumeric form
in synaesthesia. Nature 410, 580–582. doi: 10.1038/35069062
McGurk, H., and MacDonald, J. (1976). Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature 264,
746–748. doi: 10.1038/264746a0
Mills, C. B., Boteler, E. H., and Oliver, G. K. (1999). Digit synaesthesia: a
case study using a Stroop-type test. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 16, 181–191. doi:
10.1080/026432999380951
Muggleton, N., Tsakanikos, E.,Walsh,V., andWard, J. (2007). Disruption of synaes-
thesia following TMS of the right posterior parietal cortex. Neuropsychologia 45,
1582–1585. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.11.021
Mulvenna, C. M., and Walsh, V. (2006). Synaesthesia: supernormal integration?
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 350–352. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.06.004
Neufeld, J., Sinke, C., Dillo, W., Emrich, H. M., Szycik, G. R., Dima, D.,
et al. (2012a). The neural correlates of coloured music: a functional MRI
investigation of auditory-visual synaesthesia. Neuropsychologia 50, 85–89. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.11.001
Neufeld, J., Sinke, C., Zedler, M., Dillo, W., Emrich, H. M., Bleich, S., et al. (2012b).
Disinhibited feedback as a cause of synesthesia: evidence from a functional con-
nectivity study on auditory-visual synesthetes. Neuropsychologia 50, 1471–1477.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.02.032
Neufeld, J., Sinke, C., Zedler, M., Emrich, H. M., and Szycik, G. R. (2012c). Reduced
audio-visual integration in synaesthetes indicated by the double-ﬂash illusion.
Brain Res. 1473, 78–86. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2012.07.011
Ramachandran, V., and Hubbard, E. M. (2001). Synaesthesia - A window into
perception, thought and language. J. Conscious. Stud. 8, 3–34.
Ross, L. A., Saint-Amour, D., Leavitt, V. M., Javitt, D. C., and Foxe, J. J. (2007). Do
you see what i am saying? Exploring visual enhancement of speech comprehen-
sion in noisy environments. Cereb. Cortex 17, 1147–1153. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
bhl024
Rothen, N., Nyffeler, T., Von Wartburg, R., Muri, R., and Meier,
B. (2010). Parieto-occipital suppression eliminates implicit bidirectional-
ity in grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Neuropsychologia 48, 3482–3487. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.07.032
Rousselet, G. A. (2012). Does ﬁltering preclude us from studying ERP time-courses?
Front. Psychol. 3. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00131
Rouw, R., and Scholte, H. S. (2010). Neural basis of individual differences in synes-
thetic experiences. J. Neurosci. 30, 6205–6213. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3444-
09.2010
Schneider, T. R., Engel, A. K., and Debener, S. (2008). Multisensory identiﬁcation
of natural objects in a two-way crossmodal priming paradigm. Exp. Psychol. 55,
121–132. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.55.2.121
Shams, L., Kamitani, Y., and Shimojo, S. (2000). Illusions. What you see is what you
hear. Nature 408, 788. doi: 10.1038/35048669
Simner, J., and Logie, R. H. (2007). Synaesthetic consistency spans
decades in a lexical-gustatory synaesthete. Neurocase 13, 358–365. doi:
10.1080/13554790701851502
Simner, J., Mulvenna, C., Sagiv, N., Tsakanikos, E., Witherby, S. A., Fraser, C.,
et al. (2006). Synaesthesia: the prevalence of atypical cross-modal experiences.
Perception 35, 1024–1033. doi: 10.1068/p5469
Sinke, C., Neufeld, J., Emrich, H. M., Dillo, W., Bleich, S., Zedler, M.,
et al. (2012a). Inside a synesthete’s head: a functional connectivity analy-
sis with grapheme-color synesthetes. Neuropsychologia 50, 3363–3369. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.09.015
Sinke, C., Neufeld, J., Zedler, M., Emrich, H. M., Bleich, S., Munte, T. F., et al.
(2012b). Reduced audiovisual integration in synesthesia - evidence from bimodal
speech perception. J. Neuropsychol. doi: 10.1111/jnp.12006 [Epub ahead of
print].
Snodgrass, J. G., and Vanderwart, M. (1980). A standardized set of 260 pictures:
norms for name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual com-
plexity. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Learn. 6, 174–215. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.
2.174
Talsma, D., and Woldorff, M. G. (2005). Selective attention and multisensory inte-
gration: multiple phases of effects on the evoked brain activity. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
17, 1098–1114. doi: 10.1162/0898929054475172
Tang, J., Ward, J., and Butterworth, B. (2008). Number forms in the brain. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 20, 1547–1556. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2008.20120
Van Leeuwen, T. M., Den Ouden, H. E., and Hagoort, P. (2011). Effective
connectivity determines the nature of subjective experience in grapheme-
color synesthesia. J. Neurosci. 31, 9879–9884. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0569-
11.2011
Van Leeuwen, T. M., Petersson, K. M., and Hagoort, P. (2010). Synaesthetic
colour in the brain: beyond colour areas. A functional magnetic resonance
imaging study of synaesthetes and matched controls. PloS ONE 5:e12074. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0012074
Vanrullen, R. (2011). Four common conceptual fallacies in mapping the
time course of recognition. Front. Psychol. 2:365. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.
00365
Vanvoorhis, S., and Hillyard, S. A. (1977). Visual evoked-potentials and selec-
tive attention to points in space. Percept. Psychophys. 22, 54–62. doi:
10.3758/BF03206080
Vogel, E. K., and Luck, S. J. (2000). The visual N1 component as an index of a
discrimination process. Psychophysiology 37, 190–203. doi: 10.1111/1469-8986.
3720190
Ward, J. (2013). Synesthesia. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64, 49–75. doi: 10.1146/annurev-
psych-113011-143840
Ward, J., Huckstep, B., and Tsakanikos, E. (2006). Sound-colour synaesthesia: to
what extent does it use cross-modal mechanisms common to us all? Cortex 42,
264–280. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70352-6
Weiss, P. H., and Fink, G. R. (2009). Grapheme-colour synaesthetes show increased
grey matter volumes of parietal and fusiform cortex. Brain 132, 65–70. doi:
10.1093/brain/awn304
Weiss, P. H., Zilles, K., and Fink, G. R. (2005).When visual perception causes feeling:
enhanced cross-modal processing in grapheme-color synesthesia. Neuroimage 28,
859–868. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.06.052
Widmann,A., and Schroger, E. (2012). Filter effects and ﬁlter artifacts in the analysis
of electrophysiological data. Front. Psychol. 3:233. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00233
Yuval-Greenberg, S., and Deouell, L. Y. (2009). The dog’s meow: asymmetrical
interaction in cross-modal object recognition. Exp. Brain Res. 193, 603–614. doi:
10.1007/s00221-008-1664-6
Conflict of Interest Statement:The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 21 | 53
Sinke et al. Cross-modal conﬂict in synesthesia
Received: 30 July 2013; accepted: 10 January 2014; published online: 30 January 2014.
Citation: Sinke C, Neufeld J, Wiswede D, Emrich HM, Bleich S, Münte TF and Szycik
GR (2014) N1 enhancement in synesthesia during visual and audio–visual perception
in semantic cross-modal conﬂict situations: an ERP study. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:21.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00021
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Sinke, Neufeld, Wiswede, Emrich, Bleich, Münte and Szycik.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is
permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 21 | 54
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 30 October 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00717
Impaired acquisition of novel grapheme-color
correspondences in synesthesia
David Brang1,2*, Michael Ghiam2 and Vilayanur S. Ramachandran2
1 Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
2 Department of Psychology, University California San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
Edited by:
Nicolas Rothen, University of
Sussex, UK
Reviewed by:
Gregor Thut, University of Glasgow,
UK
Danko Nikolic, Max Planck Institute
for Brain Research, Germany
*Correspondence:
David Brang, Department of
Psychology, Northwestern
University, 2029 Sheridan Road,
Evanston, IL 60208-2710, USA
e-mail: david.brang@
northwestern.edu
Grapheme-color synesthesia is a neurological phenomenon in which letters and numbers
(graphemes) consistently evoke particular colors (e.g., A may be experienced as
red). These sensations are thought to arise through the cross-activation of grapheme
processing regions in the fusiform gyrus and color area V4, supported by anatomical and
functional imaging. However, the developmental onset of grapheme-color synesthesia
remains elusive as research in this area has largely relied on self-report of these
experiences in children. One possible account suggests that synesthesia is present
at or near birth and initially binds basic shapes and forms to colors, which are later
refined to grapheme-color associations through experience. Consistent with this view,
studies show that similarly shaped letters and numbers tend to elicit similar colors
in synesthesia and that some synesthetes consciously associate basic shapes with
colors; research additionally suggests that synesthetic colors can emerge for newly
learned characters with repeated presentation. This model further predicts that the
initial shape-color correspondences in synesthesia may persist as implicit associations,
driving the acquisition of colors for novel characters. To examine the presence of
latent color associations for novel characters, synesthetes and controls were trained on
pre-defined associations between colors and complex shapes, on the assumption that the
prescribed shape-color correspondences would on average differ from implicit synesthetic
associations. Results revealed synesthetes were less accurate than controls to learn
novel shape-color associations, consistent with our suggestion that implicit form-color
associations conflicted with the learned pairings.
Keywords: synesthesia, synaesthesia, language, learning, grapheme
INTRODUCTION
Synesthesia is an involuntary experience in which stimulation
of one sensory modality causes activation in a second, separate
modality. In two of the most common forms, hearing sounds or
viewing graphemes (letters and numbers) elicits the experience
of a specific color (sound-color and grapheme-color synesthe-
sias; Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009).
For example, to synesthete EA the letter C always appears a vivid
yellow, irrespective of its actual color. These sensory percepts typ-
ically begin early in childhood and remain extremely consistent
throughout one’s lifetime. Further, synesthesia runs in families
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Ward and Simner, 2005; Asher et al.,
2009; Brang and Ramachandran, 2011), suggesting it is a her-
itable trait. While research over the past decade has done well
to establish the validity of synesthetes’ subjective reports (e.g.,
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a) as well as the perceptual
reality of these experiences (Palmeri et al., 2002), the manner in
which synesthetic associations develop from infancy to adulthood
remains an active matter of debate.
The neural substrates underlying grapheme-color synesthe-
sia have been thoroughly studied using both psychophysical
tests and functional imaging (Nunn et al., 2002; Palmeri et al.,
2002; Hubbard et al., 2005). Upon viewing achromatic numbers
or letters, grapheme-color synesthetes show co-activation of
grapheme regions in the posterior temporal lobe and color area
V4, which has been suggested to give rise to the concurrent sensa-
tion of color (Hubbard et al., 2005; Sperling et al., 2006). This
pattern of activation in synesthetes is consistent with research
on crossmodal integration in the normal population revealing
the engagement of early sensory regions in multimodal processes
(Driver and Spence, 2000; Schroeder and Foxe, 2005; Kayser and
Logothetis, 2007). Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001a) pro-
posed that this cross-activation is driven by an excess of neural
connections in synesthetes, possibly due to decreases in neural
pruning between typically interconnected areas, with a recent
update of this model introduced by Brang et al. (2010). In support
of this theory, a number of studies have demonstrated anatom-
ical differences in the inferior temporal lobes of synesthetes,
near regions related to grapheme and color processing, includ-
ing increased fractional anisotropy as assessed by diffusion tensor
imaging (Rouw and Scholte, 2007), and increased graymatter vol-
ume, as assessed by voxel-basedmorphometry (Jäncke et al., 2009;
Weiss and Fink, 2009).
While the developmental onset of synesthesia is a matter of
active debate, it is well established that the specific synesthetic
pairings (such as a yellow C for synesthete EA) evolve over time
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biased by statistical properties of the environment. One strong
contributing factor is the native language of a synesthete, given
that some letters tend to take on the colors related to promi-
nent linguistic elements (e.g., R is typically red and G typically
green based on the initial letter of the color-word in English;
Simner et al., 2005) and as more frequent exposure to a partic-
ular grapheme enhances the perceived luminance of its associated
synesthetic color (i.e., more frequent letters and numbers tend
to be associated with more luminant synesthetic colors; Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2007; Smilek et al., 2007; Beeli et al., 2008).
Furthermore, some element of imprinting from early childhood
may bias grapheme-color associations, such as those from colored
refrigerator magnets (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013).
Given that synesthetic associations change throughout devel-
opment, it has been proposed that prior to learning a character set
for a particular language, synesthetic colors are initially associated
with shapes and basic forms (Maurer, 1993; Brang et al., 2010;
Wagner andDobkins, 2011). Indeed, prior to learning graphemes,
infants and toddlers associate Xs with the color black and Os
with white (Spector and Maurer, 2008). These shape-color asso-
ciations may permeate into adulthood as more similarly shaped
letters evoke more similar colors in synesthesia (Brang et al.,
2011a; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012; Watson et al., 2012) thought
to occur from latent shape-color associations. In addition, some
synesthetes report varying saturation of synesthetic colors by let-
ters of different case and font suggesting an import of letter
shape.
Contrary to this view, several studies highlight the influence
of semantic information on synesthetic colors (e.g., Mroczko
et al., 2009; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012) and instead propose that
graphemes evoke ideas which in turn elicit synesthetic colors (i.e.,
“ideaesthesia”). In this model, low-level elements of a grapheme,
such as shape, do not evoke synesthetic colors on their own.
Instead synesthetic colors are evoked only when the synesthete
extracts semantic meaning from the grapheme in isolation or in
the context of a word or sentence (Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012).
Indeed, synesthetic colors are modulated by context, such that an
ambiguous letter evokes the color corresponding to the perceived
letter (e.g., Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b).
As synesthetic associations tend to transfer to novel learned
scripts (e.g., Mroczko et al., 2009) and as synesthetes can
learn new associations (Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012; Blair and
Berryhill, 2013) the question remains of whether latent color
associations exist for the novel scripts based on their form
(such that shapes in the novel character set that are similar
to letters and numbers will take on similar colors). To test
for the presence of latent color associations for novel charac-
ters, 15 synesthetes and 15 controls were trained to learn novel
shape-color corresponances with the goal of causing conflict
with latent associations, as the proscribed shape-color corre-
spondences would on average differ from implicit synesthetic
associations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Data were collected from 15 synesthetes (mean age = 23.0;
13 females; 14 right-handed) and 15 non-synesthetic controls
(mean age = 20.2; 10 females; 15 right-handed). All partici-
pants were fluent English speakers. Synesthetes were recruited
via fliers posted on the UCSD campus, as well as similar ads
on the web. Synesthesia was confirmed by means of consistency
matching as well as reaction time testing for color congruency,
standardized by Eagleman et al. (2007). All participants gave
signed informed consent prior to the experiment, and partic-
ipated either for cash or in fulfillment of course requirement.
None of the control participants reported any known forms of
synesthesia.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Synesthetes first selected six novel graphemes from a set of 12
(Figure 1) that met the following requirements: (1) the shape
elicited no synesthetic color, (2) the shape was unfamiliar to the
subject, and (3) the shape did not evoke any strong conceptual
association. After grapheme-selection, one color (red, orange, yel-
low, green, blue, purple) was randomly paired with each one of
the six novel graphemes. Subjects were instructed to memorize
six novel grapheme-color associations, one grapheme with each
one of the six colors, but were not informed of the specific par-
ings. Each control’s stimulus set was matched to one synesthete’s
set of grapheme-color stimuli.
Subjects participated in two training tasks: a Guess-and-Check
paradigm and a Color Congruency paradigm. In the Guess-and-
Check task, subjects were presented with one of the six graphemes
on each trial and instructed to speak aloud the associated color.
Black target graphemes were presented centrally in Arial font, 6◦
vertical visual angle, against a gray background. Graphemes were
present until response, preceded by a blank screen for 250ms, and
followed immediately after response by the same grapheme in the
congruent color for 1000ms. The first six trials reflected guesses as
subjects had not been previously exposed to the associations and
were excluded from analyses. Two hundred and thirty four trials
(39 for each grapheme) followed these initial six trials. Accuracy
was scored by an experimenter present for the duration of the
study and reaction time was coded by EPrime Serial Response Box
microphone.
Immediately following the first task, subjects participated in
the Color Congruency paradigm. Subjects were presented with
the same stimuli in either a congruent or incongruent color
(50% of trials each). One incongruent color was yoked to each
grapheme to balance color and stimulus probabilities. Graphemes
were present on screen until response and subjects responded
via button presses (EPrime Serial Response Box) to indicate
whether a grapheme was congruently or incongruently colored.
After response, a feedback screen (1500ms) was provided to the
subjects. Subjects progressed through 240 trials in total.
FIGURE 1 | Grapheme set from which synesthetes selected six shapes
that elicited no synesthetic color, were unfamiliar to the subject, and
did not evoke any strong conceptual association.
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ANALYSIS
For the Guess-and-Check paradigm, synesthetes and controls
were first compared according to the total number of errors
using a paired t-test, matching synesthetes and controls based
on learned associations. To examine whether groups differed in
the length of time taken to learn shape-color associations or in
the persistence of errors following reaching criterion, we con-
ducted two additional tests. First, a learning curve and 95%
confidence interval were computed for each individual subject
using a state-space smoothing algorithm (Smith et al., 2004) to
identify the trial on which subjects reliability performed bet-
ter than chance for the remainder of the experiment (0.167
probability given the six possible colors; all default parame-
ters were used in this analysis and the toolbox can be found
at www.neurostat.mit.edu/behaviorallearning). The first trial on
which this criterion was reached was compared across the groups
using a paired t-test. In order to examine the persistence of
errors after reaching criterion, a paired t-test was used to com-
pare synesthete’s and control’s accuracy on trials following the
trial on which each subject reached criterion. In the color con-
gruency paradigm, synesthetes’ and controls’ mean accuracy
and mean response times were each compared using paired
t-tests.
RESULTS
The initial paradigm required subjects to learn the associ-
ated color for six novel graphemes through a guess-and-check
task, with feedback. Synesthete and control groups average per-
formance throughout the Guess-and-Check paradigm are dis-
played in Figure 2; also see Figure S1. In terms of the total
number of mistakes made throughout this task, synesthetes
exhibited a trend of a greater number of errors (mean 34.8)
relative to controls (mean 24.9), t(14) = 1.77, p = 0.098. In
order to examine whether this difference was due to synes-
thetes’ difficulty in the acquisition or maintenance of the novel
associations over time we conducted two additional analyses.
FIGURE 2 | Synesthetes (blue) and controls (red) performance as a
function of time. Solid colors reflect accuracy at each trial and partially
transparent colors reflect standard errors of the mean. Of note,
synesthetes continued to make errors long after controls reached a plateau.
The plot begins at trial number seven as the first six trials were guesses
and were excluded from all analyses.
First, criterion-learning thresholds were estimated by calculat-
ing the probability of a correct response on any given trial,
based on a state-space smoothing algorithm (Smith et al.,
2004). This analysis identified the trial for which all subsequent
responses exceeded chance performance (Figure 3), and compar-
ison between the groups suggested no difference in learning rate
between synesthetes (mean trials to criterion 24.7) and controls
(mean trials 29.8), t(14) = 0.72, p = 0.486. In order to exam-
ine whether synesthetes and controls differed in their ability
to maintain these associations throughout the task after reach-
ing criterion, accuracy was compared for all trials following the
criterion trial. Results identified significantly impaired perfor-
mance in synesthetes (mean accuracy 91.7%) relative to controls
(96.3%), t(14) = 3.59, p = 0.003, indicating a difficulty in main-
taining these novel grapheme-color associations for synesthetes
(Figure 4).
The second paradigm measured subjects’ ability to iden-
tify congruently colored graphemes. Synesthetes displayed a
non-significant trend of lower accuracy through this task (mean
95.6% correct) relative to controls (mean 97.8%), t(14) = 1.65,
p = 0.122. No reliable difference in response time was observed
between synesthetes (mean 834ms) and controls (806ms),
t(14) = 0.42, p = 0.679.
DISCUSSION
The present paradigm examined the ability of synesthetes
and controls to learn novel grapheme-color correspondences.
Findings across two paradigms with the same subjects indicate
that synesthetes were impaired in their ability to maintain novel,
enforced grapheme-color associations. These results suggest that
synesthetes are not simply better at maintaining arbitrary associa-
tions per se, as has been suggested previously (e.g., Ramachandran
andHubbard, 2001b), but instead argues for the presence of latent
grapheme-color associations for novel character sets.
FIGURE 3 | Learning curve for a representative subject. Solid line (dark
green) reflects the probability of a correct response on any given trial. The
light green cloud reflects the 95% confidence interval for this probability.
Learning criterion was reached when a subject’s accuracy exceeded chance
(dotted gray line) with 95% certainty (marked with the blue arrow at trial
number 28). The plot begins at trial number seven as the first six trials were
guesses and were excluded from all analyses, and only shows results for
trials up to 100 for illustrative purposes.
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FIGURE 4 | Synesthetes (blue) and controls (red) mean accuracy for
trials following reaching criterion. Error bars reflect standard error of the
mean and ∗∗ denotes significance at p < 0.01.
Described as the neonatal synesthesia hypotheses, one theory
suggests that synesthesia is present in all individuals at or
near birth and fades over time due to excessive neural prun-
ing and re-weighting of synaptic connections (Maurer, 1993).
However, as letters and number acquisition occurs relatively
late in development (on average at 3 years of age; e.g., Wynn,
1990), if synesthetic associations are present early in life they
most likely involve shape-color associations. In line with this,
young children show consistent associations between shapes
and colors (Spector and Maurer, 2008; Wagner and Dobkins,
2011) and synesthetic colors remain fluid (some letters-color
associations show large variability over time) at least until
age 10 (Simner et al., 2009). Indeed, these shape-based asso-
ciations may permeate to synesthetic associations throughout
development, as in adult synesthetes similarly shaped letters
and numbers tend to have similar synesthetic colors (Brang
et al., 2011a; Watson et al., 2012). Building on this evi-
dence, Brang et al. (2010) suggested that synesthetic associ-
ations between shapes and colors remain a vestigial relic in
adult synesthetes. Indeed, while it is relatively uncommon for
synesthetes to show conscious shape-color associations as adults,
synesthetic colors are evoked in the temporal hierarchy prior
to grapheme processing as revealed by MEG (Brang et al.,
2010).
As the particular associations in the present study were
assigned randomly, the majority of shape-color correspondences
should be in disagreement with any given synesthete’s latent
and unconscious association. Indeed, one synesthete admitted
that for one of the novel graphemes, a conscious synesthetic
color emerged partway through the task and that this color dif-
fered from the association he was attempting to learn 1. While
speculative at present, we elaborate on the neonatal synesthesia
hypothesis and suggest that synesthetic associations are present
early in infancy as basic form-color associations that are tuned
and biased over time into grapheme-color associations, even-
tually losing the initial conscious pairings between colors and
shapes. Nevertheless, while these results suggest a latent influ-
ence of shapes on synesthetic colors, research demonstrates
1Unfortunately we did not systematically ask our synesthetes whether this was
a common phenomenon, necessitating additional research on this topic.
that colors are modulated by numerous factors including con-
text (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Dixon et al., 2006;
Brang et al., 2008, 2011b), phonemic similarity (Asano and
Yokosawa, 2012) and environment (Witthoft and Winawer,
2013).
Past studies in support of the “ideaesthesia” view of synes-
thesia, that synesthetic colors are evoked by semantic concepts
as opposed to low-level stimulus properties, demonstrate that an
arbitrary synesthetic color is able to transfer to a novel grapheme
through semantic knowledge (Mroczko et al., 2009) and suggest
that novel graphemes can take on any arbitrary color. Consistent
with this finding, here synesthetes successfully learned arbitrary
shape-color correspondences. Critically, however, this process was
significantly more difficult in synesthetes compared to controls,
suggesting latent color preferences in synesthetes conflicted with
the enforced associations.
Grapheme-color synesthetes demonstrate enhanced memory
recall for word lists that evoke synesthetic colors, line draw-
ings that do not evoke synesthetic colors, and for memory of
colors themselves (Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen and Meier,
2010; Gibson et al., 2012). However, memory enhancements in
synesthesia are generally restricted to colors and visual stim-
uli and are not a generalized trait (for a review see Rothen
et al., 2012). The present results further argue against a gen-
eralized memory enhancement in grapheme-color synesthetes
suggesting they are not simply better at making arbitrary asso-
ciations between complex shapes and colors. In addition, one
possible explanation of why synesthetic colors transfer to novel
symbols according to shape similarity is that this serves as a
memory mnemonic, in that the color provides an extra cue
leading to the remembrance of the shape of the grapheme.
However, in these results synesthetes demonstrated impaired
acquisition of the associations which would have utilized this
approach.
One shortcoming of the present study is the absence of a
within-group control demonstrating the specificity of this find-
ing to confirm that grapheme-color synesthetes are not generally
impaired in making novel associations. While these data cannot
exclude such a possibility, future research may be able to rule out
this possibility by examining synesthetes’ ability to make color-
color or shape-shape associations (in which we would expect
no difference between synesthetes and controls). However, as
mentioned above, synesthetes demonstrate better color memory
in general (Yaro and Ward, 2007), which may instead facilitate
synesthetes’ ability to make color-color associations.
In sum, the current results suggest that synesthetic colors are
biased in accordance with latent shape-color associations, and
is consistent with views of this phenomenon emerging early in
infancy with colors initially being evoked by shapes and basic
forms. Future studies should seek to predict novel grapheme-
color correspondences based on a synesthete’s present set of num-
ber and letter-color associations to more directly bias subjects’
ability to acquire these novel pairings. Given research suggesting
a benefit of synesthetic colors on memory we expect that these
novel associations will be better maintained if they are paired with
synesthetic colors in line with those of their latent shape-color
associations.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fnhum.2013.
00717/abstract
Figure S1 | Individual subject plots showing synesthetes’ (blue) and
controls’ (red) data points for each of the three analyses conducted for
the Guess-and-Check paradigm (A–C) and for the Congruency paradigm.
(D) Subject numbers are labeled along the x-axis. ∗∗p < 0.01.
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Recent progress in grapheme-color synesthesia research has revealed that certain
regularities, as well as individual differences, figure into grapheme-color associations.
Although several factors are known to regulate grapheme-color associations, the
impact of factors, including their interrelationships, on synesthesia remains unclear. We
investigated determinants of synesthetic color for graphemes (characters, letters) of
Hiragana, a phonetic script in the Japanese language, and the English alphabet. Results
revealed that grapheme ordinality was the strongest predictor of synesthetic colors
for Hiragana characters, followed by character sound, and visual shape. Ordinality and
visual shapes also significantly predicted synesthetic colors for English alphabet letters,
however, sounds did not. The relative impact of grapheme properties on grapheme-color
associations and the differences between these two writing systems are accounted
for by considering the way graphemes are processed in the brain and introduced
during an individual’s development. A new model is proposed which takes into account
the developmental process of grapheme learning. The model provides comprehensive
explanation of synesthetic grapheme-color association determination processes, including
the differences across writing systems.
Keywords: grapheme-color synesthesia, grapheme acquisition, grapheme discrimination, Japanese phonetic
characters (Hiragana), language development, perceptual categorization and identification
INTRODUCTION
Grapheme-color synesthesia is a condition in which a visual
letter or character (grapheme) induces a specific color sensa-
tion (e.g., the letter “r” may induce a concurrent sensation of
“red”). Although it has been characterized as idiosyncratic, a
number of regularities in the synesthetic experience have also
been reported. Specifically, the factors that affect synesthetic
grapheme-color correspondence are systematically associated
with several grapheme properties: visual shape, sound, mean-
ing or concepts, grapheme frequency, ordinality (positions in a
grapheme sequence), and memory related to the graphemes (e.g.,
visual form: Brang et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2012; sound: Asano
and Yokosawa, 2011, 2012; meaning or concepts: Rich et al.,
2005; Asano and Yokosawa, 2012; grapheme frequency: Beeli
et al., 2007; ordinality: Watson et al., 2012; memory: Witthoft
and Winawer, 2006, 2013). What remains unclear is the relative
impact of such various factors on synesthesia.
Some studies examined simultaneous influence of multiple
grapheme properties on the same set of graphemes (Asano and
Yokosawa, 2011, 2012; Watson et al., 2012). Asano and Yokosawa
(2012) investigated the simultaneous influences of sound, visual
shape, and meanings on synesthetic colors for Kanji characters
(a logographic script used in the Japanese language) in Japanese
grapheme-color synesthesia.Watson et al. (2012) also investigated
the influence of sound (letter names), visual shape, ordinality, and
frequency on synesthetic colors for the modern English alphabet
simultaneously in English grapheme-color synesthesia. Findings
from these different studies reveal that several factors are con-
currently involved in grapheme-color associations. However, to
date the relative size of impact among the factors has not been the
subject of specific investigation.
Results of some studies suggest that themagnitude of impact of
each factor differs across writing systems, which poses a difficulty
for resolving the puzzle of how several factors work together. For
example, synesthetic colors for the English alphabet are usually
determined by graphemes, not phonemes (e.g., the “c” in “cat”
and in “cite” may both elicit the same color sensation, whereas
initial letters of “site” and “cite” appear to elicit different colors;
Simner, 2007). It is also reported that synesthetic color simi-
larity across the English alphabet does not correlate with letter
name similarity (e.g., although the name sounds of the letter
“b” and “c” are similar, they are usually associated with dissim-
ilar colors; Watson et al., 2012). In sharp contrast to English,
synesthetic colors for Japanese phonetic scripts such as Hiragana
and Katakana rely on sound quality, not on visual shapes of
graphemes (Asano and Yokosawa, 2011). Hiragana and Katakana
represent the same set of vowels or syllables (i.e., combinations
of a consonant and a vowel) although their visual forms are
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dissimilar. Asano and Yokosawa (2011) reported that synesthetic
color choices for Hiragana characters and those for their Katakana
counterparts were remarkably consistent, indicating that color
selection depended on character related sounds and not visual
form (effects of ordinality and frequency were not investigated in
this study).
Some researchers have claimed that synesthetic associations
are acquired as graphemes are learned (Rich et al., 2005; Witthoft
andWinawer, 2006, 2013; Wagner and Dobkins, 2011; Asano and
Yokosawa, 2012; Watson et al., 2012). The relative size of factor
impact may reflect the way in which graphemes were associated
with colors in the brain of a synesthete in his/her childhood,
when s/he was learning graphemes. Grapheme learning consists
of visual shape discrimination of graphemes and the association
of graphemes with phonemes (in the case of phonetic scripts
including the English alphabet) or with phonemes and mean-
ings (in the case of logographic scripts). Watson et al. (2012)
showed that letter shape and ordinality were linked to hue, and
letter frequency was linked to luminance of synesthetic colors for
the English alphabet in adult grapheme-color synesthetes. Based
on such findings, they conjectured that associating letter shapes
and identities with hue aided letter learning (categorical discrim-
ination of letters), and that letter frequency, which varies along a
continuum, mapped naturally to luminance in childhood.
Several causal factors for the association of colors with
graphemes during grapheme learning have been proposed in var-
ious studies. For instance, Rich et al. (2005) raised the possibility
that colors are linked to items forming conventional sequences
(e.g., alphabets, numbers, days of the week, months of the year)
before the acquisition of graphemes (letters, numerals); these
links then are generalized to graphemes and other items that are
not part of such sequences (e.g., words). Likewise, Asano and
Yokosawa (2012) suggested the possibility that grapheme-based
synesthesia begins as phoneme synesthesia (i.e., colors are linked
to phonemes prior to grapheme acquisition). According to the
observation that characters representing the same sounds tended
to elicit similar colors in Japanese grapheme-color synesthesia
regardless of their visual shapes, they surmised that, in some
cases, the colors linked to phonemes before grapheme acquisi-
tion are subsequently generalized to graphemes via phonology.
Some related evidence for early associations of simple visual
shapes with colors comes from an infant study by Wagner and
Dobkins (2011), in which they demonstrated that the presence of
particular shapes influences color preferences in typical 2- and
3-month-olds (but not in 8-month-olds or adults). Although
further research is required to clarify the relationships between
such “neonatal synesthesia” and grapheme-color synesthesia, this
study suggests that shape-color linkages may be formed in the
brain before grapheme acquisition. External input can also be a
source of synesthetic colors. Witthoft and Winawer showed that
some synesthetes had startlingly similar color-grapheme pairings
traceable to childhood toys containing colored letters, such as
refrigerator magnets (Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013). All
these studies suggest the importance of developmental perspec-
tives in achieving a complete understanding of grapheme-color
association process; however, the interrelationships among the
factors raised above are not still clear.
Considering previous developmental research with grapheme-
color synesthesia, in the present study we propose a model that
offers a comprehensive explanation of synesthetic grapheme-
color association determination processes, including the differ-
ences across writing systems. Five main claims of this model
are: (1) synesthetic associations are acquired as graphemes are
learned. (2) Children who are learning graphemes use infor-
mation from various feature domains to differentiate among
graphemes. (3) Linkages between color representations and
representations of features in some domains (e.g., ordinal-
ity in conventional sequences, sounds, and visual shapes) are
formed in the brain before grapheme acquisition. (4) When a
grapheme is learned, (one of the) color representations associated
with representations of the grapheme’s features is/are mapped
onto the grapheme. The color for the representation of fea-
ture which makes the largest contribution in discriminating the
grapheme from others is the color most likely to be ultimately
associated with the grapheme. (5) The resulting synesthetic
color highlights the discriminating feature(s) of the grapheme.
This facilitates grapheme discrimination and in turn grapheme
learning.
TWO EXAMPLES: ENGLISH LETTERS AND JAPANESE CHARACTERS
Schematic illustrations of the proposed model appear in Figure 1
for each of two example language systems. First, consider a
model for English alphabets, shown schematically in Figure 1A.
In the English alphabet, graphemes (letters) form a sequence.
The ordinality domain allows for identifying one grapheme
with one ordinal representation of a character because each
grapheme is assigned only one ordinal number (e.g., first, second,
third).
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustrations of the comprehensive explanatory
model of synesthetic grapheme-color association proposed in this
study. In the case of English alphabets (A) and Hiragana characters (B).
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In the visual shape domain, correspondences between
graphemes and representations are rather complex compared
to those in the ordinality domain. Assuming that visual shapes
of graphemes are processed in units of basic distinctive visual
features (cf. Gibson, 1969), one grapheme should be linked to
several basic visual feature representations, because graphemes
usually combine several basic visual features (except for very sim-
ple graphemes like “I” and “O,” which may be linked to only one
basic visual feature representation).
For phonological domains, a highly complex relationship
exists between graphemes and phonological representations in
the case of the English alphabet. There are two kinds of phono-
logical information associated with a grapheme: the name of
grapheme and its pronunciation. For instance, the letter “b”
has the grapheme name of “bee” and it is pronounced as /b/.
In short, learning an English grapheme requires acquiring two
kinds of associations of phonological information with a single
grapheme. A typical English alphabet letter has several pronun-
ciations, and the pronunciation of the letter name is usually
different from any of the letter pronunciations (e.g., pronuncia-
tion of the letter “c” can be either /s/, /k/, or “ch” in “chance”;
the pronunciation of the name of the letter “c” is /see/, which
is different from any of the letter pronunciations). In addition
to the one-to-many correspondences between graphemes and-
phonemes, some English phonemes are represented by several
graphemes; for example, the phoneme /s/ is represented by both
letters “c” and “s,” and the phoneme /z/ is represented by both “s”
and “z” (i.e., many-to-one correspondences).
To summarize, there are simple (i.e., one-to-one) ordinality-
grapheme correspondences, relatively complex shape-grapheme
correspondences, and highly complex phoneme-grapheme cor-
respondences in the English alphabet. When the corresponding
relations between grapheme and feature representations in a cer-
tain domain are simple (e.g., when one-to-one relationship exists
among graphemes and feature representations), mapping the cor-
responding representations (and the color associated with each of
the representations) to the graphemes can provide an additional
source of information available for grapheme discrimination.
Complex correspondences between graphemes and representa-
tions of a given domain, on the other hand, can reduce the influ-
ence of that feature domain on grapheme-color associations. This
is because such a feature domain is likely to contribute little to a
differentiation among graphemes. Thus, the synesthetic color that
is finally associated with a grapheme is determined. Taking these
factors into account, our model predicts that ordinality should
have the greatest impact on synesthetic colors for the English
alphabet, followed by visual shapes. The impact of phonology
on synesthesia should be very small because graphemes are arbi-
trarily associated with phonemes in the English alphabet. This
prediction is at least partly in accordance with results of previous
studies that report the influence of visual shape (e.g., Brang et al.,
2011), or of ordinality and visual shape but not of sound (Watson
et al., 2012; see also Simner, 2007) on grapheme-color synesthe-
sia for the English alphabet (This is “at least” because no previous
study examined the relative size of impact of these factors).
Consider a second example which involves Japanese Hiragana
characters (see Figure 1B). Our model is best characterized by
contrasting cases of graphemes of different writing systems with
different characteristics. As noted above, Hiragana is a phonetic
script that represents a set of vowels and syllables (see Table
S1 in Supplementary Materials). Hiragana characters are the
graphemes that most native Japanese speakers learn first (usu-
ally at around the ages of 4–6 years; see (Asano and Yokosawa,
2012), for detailed descriptions of scripts used in the Japanese
language). As in the case of the English alphabet, there are sim-
ple correspondences between graphemes (characters) and ordi-
nal representations in Hiragana characters, as each grapheme is
assigned only one ordinal number. In the domain of visual shape,
as in the case of the English alphabet, correspondences between
graphemes and representations are somewhat complex compared
to those in the ordinality domain. This is because graphemes are
made of combinations of several basic visual features.
In the phonological domain, however, Hiragana characters
are very different from English alphabet letters. In the case of
Hiragana characters, each character has only one pronuncia-
tion and it is the same as the pronunciation of the character
name (e.g., the name of the first character in the Hiragana
sequence is “a” (/a/) and the character is also pronounced as
/a/). Consequently, there is a one-to-one relationship between
graphemes and phonemes1 inHiragana characters. This reasoning
leads to the prediction that phonology and ordinality are strong
determinants of synesthetic colors and that the visual shapes of
characters should have less impact in grapheme-color synesthesia
for Hiragana characters. This prediction is partly consistent with
Asano and Yokosawa (2011). In their study synesthetic colors for
Hiragana characters were found to be elicited by sound qualities
and not by visual shapes. Thus, the proposed model has the abil-
ity to explain the differences in determinants of grapheme-color
association across writing systems.
A NEWMODEL
The present model goes beyond simply providing a theoretical
backbone to existing observations. Using this model, we can pre-
dict the relative impact of possible determinants of synesthetic
colors, such as ordinality, phonology, and visual shapes, and draw
a comprehensive picture of grapheme-color association process
in synesthesia. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of
this model by examining its predictions of the relative impacts
of several factors on synesthetic color selection. To this end, we
predicted the interrelationships of several possible determinants
of synesthetic colors in Japanese Hiragana characters; in addition
these predictions were tested in a behavioral experiment using
synesthetes whose native language is Japanese. We chose Hiragana
characters because, according to model predictions, there are
more grapheme properties that can have significant (observable)
impact on grapheme color associations than in the case of English
alphabet letters. This will enable a more efficient test of themodel.
1More precisely, one Hiragana character is linked to either one phoneme or
one pair of phonemes, becauseHiragana script is a syllabary representing vow-
els or syllables (i.e., combinations of a consonant and a vowel). Nonetheless,
we call this “one-to-one relationship between graphemes and phonemes”
in this article for convenience. The point here is that grapheme-phoneme
correspondence is transparent in Hiragana characters.
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We chose to evaluate Hiragana characters rather than Katakana
characters (which are also phonetic characters in the Japanese
language with similar properties as Hiragana characters) because
Hiragana characters are the graphemes that most native Japanese
speakers learn first (analogously, letters of the English alphabet
are graphemes learned first by most native English speakers).
Katakana characters are usually learned after Hiragana characters
(see Asano and Yokosawa, 2011, 2012).
The model leads to the following central hypothesis:
Synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters are greatly influenced
by ordinality and sounds (phonemes), whereas synesthetic colors
for the English alphabet are greatly influenced by ordinality, but
not by sounds (phonemes). In both cases the model predicts that
synesthesia is weakly affected by visual shapes.
The rationale behind this hypothesis holds that among the
three feature domains of interest (sound, ordinality, shapes),
sounds should have the weakest impact on synesthetic colors with
the English alphabet because one grapheme is usually arbitrar-
ily associated with several phoneme representations. In addition
to synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters, we also examined
those for English alphabet letters in Japanese synesthetes for a
further test of the model. Although the English alphabet is not
a writing system for their mother tongue (i.e., Japanese), most
Japanese people learn it at around the ages of 9–10 years in ele-
mentary school and have no difficulty in reading and writing
English alphabet letters. The English alphabet is first introduced
to Japanese children as a sequence (i.e., the ABC sequence) and
then they learn to represent sounds of Japanese words using the
English alphabet (referred to as Roma-ji). At that time, children
notice that the pronunciations of letter names and that of letters
are not the same in the English alphabet as well as that some letters
(e.g., L, Q, X) are not used to represent Japanese sounds because
there are no corresponding sounds in the Japanese language. All
of these considerations figured into our main prediction that
synesthetic colors for the English alphabet will be greatly influ-
enced by ordinality, and less affected by visual shapes, and least
affected by sounds even in Japanese synesthetes.
To test model predictions, we used multiple regression anal-
yses to assess the relative impact of ordinality, sound, visual
shape, and grapheme familiarity on synesthetic color choice for
Hiragana characters and English alphabet letters. We included
grapheme familiarity in addition to the other three predictors,
although familiarity is not referred in the model (cf. Figure 1).
This is because there have been a few reports of some influ-
ence of grapheme frequency on synesthetic colors (e.g., Beeli
et al., 2007; Watson et al., 2012). Grapheme familiarity is closely
related to grapheme frequency. These two factors differ in that
familiarity refers to subjective familiarity ratings of graphemes
whereas grapheme frequency refers to grapheme norms in a
defined corpus of publications, such as newspapers. We used sub-
jective familiarity instead of frequency because it should more
validly reflect processing efficiencies of the characters/letters in
the brain of young children, who have not yet been exposed to
the published literature.
We employed the idea of second-order similarity mappings
in grapheme-color synesthesia proposed by Watson et al. (2012).
Second-order mappings refer to correlations between differences
in values in one domain of grapheme features and differences
in synesthetic colors of graphemes (e.g., more visually similar
letters tend to be associated with more similar colors). This is
contrasted to the idea of first-order mappings, which are correla-
tions between absolute (non-relational) properties of a letter and
dimensions of synesthetic color (e.g., the letter “y” tends to be
yellow, because “y” is for the word “yellow”). Second-order map-
ping analysis is suitable for examining the influence of the four
grapheme properties on synesthetic colors, ordinality, phonol-
ogy, visual shapes, and grapheme familiarity, because all the four
of these properties can be described relationally (i.e., more simi-
lar/different). Examining relations involving differences between
graphemes and their assigned colors allowed us to directly com-
pare and contrast multiple influences on synesthetic grapheme-
color associations. Whereas Watson and his colleagues examined
the independent effects of grapheme properties (e.g., letter shape,
frequency, and ordinality) on grapheme-color associations in
synesthesia, in this study, we focused on the relative impact of
these properties. The aim was to test our hypothesis that synes-
thetic colors are associated with graphemes during grapheme
acquisition, and that the color for the representation of the fea-
ture which makes a relatively large contribution in discriminating
the grapheme from others is the color most likely to be ulti-
mately associated with the grapheme. We believe we can provide
a comprehensive picture of grapheme-color association in synes-
thesia by focusing on the relative impact of grapheme properties
and considering the ways in which graphemes are introduced to
children during development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen Japanese grapheme-color synesthetes (16 female, one
male, mean age = 25.0 years, SD = 7.2 years), whose first lan-
guage is Japanese, participated in this study. All reported expe-
riencing synesthetic colors when viewing Hiragana characters
and English alphabet letters, as well when viewing Katakana and
Kanji characters and Arabic numerals (i.e., digits). All reported
that auditory input of linguistic sounds does not elicit synes-
thetic experiences (unless converted to graphemes). Informed
consent was obtained from all participants of this study after the
nature and possible consequences of the studies were explained.
The rights of the participants were protected. All the experimen-
tal procedures had been approved by the Ethical Committee of
Department of Psychology, Graduate School of Humanities and
Sociology, The University of Tokyo in Japan.
To establish the genuineness of participating synesthetes, we
also recruited six female non-synesthetic control participants;
mean age was 22.3 years (SD = 2.6 years). All were undergraduate
or graduate students from universities in Japan and were native
speakers of Japanese.
APPARATUS
Characters and a color palette were displayed on a monitor
(Mitsubishi Diamondtron M2 RDF223G). One hundred and
thirty-eight HTML named colors (colors supported by major
web browsers) were in the palette (Asano and Yokosawa, 2011,
2012). We chose this color set because a palette should consist
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of common and mutually distinguishable colors. Each of the 138
colors has its own name, therefore we regard the palette as a fine
category set of colors which is used conventionally and univer-
sally. The palette incorporated a variety of colors while reducing
the requisite effort in selecting colors (compared to the use of
an extensive color palette as in Eagleman et al. (2007), which
has 256 × 256 × 256 colors). Note, however, that use of the 138-
color palette may reduce the sensitivity of the experimental results
to the real effects of various factors on color-grapheme synes-
thesia. Color coordinates in the CIE L∗a∗b∗ systems, used in
analyses of the results, were converted from the CIE xyY coor-
dinates of presented colors; all were measured using Topcon
BM-7 luminance colorimeter. We adopted the CIE L∗a∗b∗ sys-
tem because it was designed in such a way that mathematical
differences in all color ranges correspond to perceived color dif-
ferences (Kaatsch et al., 1993). We further converted the color
coordinates in the CIE L∗a∗b∗ system to coordinates in the CIE
L∗C∗h system in order to obtain hue, saturation, and luminance
values.
STIMULI
Hiragana characters: Among the entire set of 71 Hiragana char-
acters, all 46 basic characters were used as stimuli2. Five of these
were symbols for single vowels (/a/, /i/, /u/, /e/, and /o/). Of the
remaining characters, 40 were symbols for syllables that is, com-
binations of a consonant (/k/, /s/, /t/, /n/, /h/, /m/, /y/, /r/, /w/)
and one of the five vowels (no characters for syllables /yi/, /ye/,
/wi/, /wu/, /we/ exist in the Japanese language). The remaining
character represents the sound of /n/, which has no vowel.
English alphabet letters: The entire set of 26 English uppercase
alphabet letters were employed as stimuli.
PROCEDURE
While seated in a darkened room, each synesthete used a com-
puter mouse to select a palette color corresponding to one of the
stimulus characters/letters. Synesthetes were told to select a color
closest to their synesthetic colors. They were also told to select
the color black if a presented character elicited a sensation of the
color black or no synesthetic color. The Hiragana characters and
English alphabet letters were presented (for color selection) in a
randomized order in respectively, separate blocks in a session. No
characters/letters were repeated within a session.
Two temporally separated experimental sessions were pre-
sented to participants in order to test the consistency of their
color selections over time (Eagleman et al., 2007). The stimuli
were the same, but the order of character/letter appearance dif-
fered randomly between the two sessions. Sessions were separated
by intervals of at least 3 weeks (mean interval = 10.1 weeks, SD =
11.2 weeks). The averages of color distances (Euclidean distance
in the CIE L∗a∗b∗) for colors selected for a given character/letter
2The remaining 25 non-basic characters are so-called “dakuon” and “han-
dakuon” characters in the Japanese language. These characters were not used
as stimuli in this study because their positions in the Hiragana sequence are
not well established and subject to change depending on circumstances (e.g.,
the index in a dictionary, word sorting functions on a computer). The basic
and non-basic Hiragana characters are usually appear in separate tables in
educational materials.
in the first and second session, calculated and averaged sepa-
rately for the 46 Hiragana characters and the 26 English alphabet
letters, were very small; 19.7 (SE = 1.4, range = 10.3–31.3) for
Hiragana characters, and 16.3 (SE = 1.2, range = 6.8–25.3) for
English alphabet letters. These values are strikingly small given
that the average color distance for random color pairs from the
138 colors in the palette (i.e., chance level) was 67.9 (SD = 31.8)
and analogous values obtained from six non-synesthetic controls,
who engaged in the same task as synesthetic participants with 2
weeks intervals between the two sessions, were 62.4 (SE = 7.2,
range = 33.3–86.2) for Hiragana characters and 65.8 (SE = 7.7,
range = 29.2–86.1) for English alphabets. An unequal variance
t-test (Welch’s method, two-tailed) revealed that the mean color
distances across sessions for the synesthete group were signifi-
cantly smaller than those for the control group, t(5) = 5.34 for
Hiragana characters and t(5) = 5.83 for English alphabet let-
ters, both ps < 0.01, Bonferroni corrected. These results clearly
demonstrate that participants engaged in this study were genuine
synesthetes. Data from the first session was used for the following
analyses.
DATA PREPARATION
Using the method proposed by Watson et al. (2012), we explored
second-order similarity mappings. In addition to color distance
(Euclidean distance in CIE L∗a∗b∗ color space), we computed
luminance distance, saturation distance (difference of C∗ val-
ues in the CIE L∗C∗h color coordinate) and hue distance
(difference of h-values in the CIE L∗C∗h color coordinate)
between two graphemes separately as color difference measures.
Four dependent measures of grapheme difference/similarity were
compared with each of the synesthetic color difference mea-
sures: ordinality difference, phonological similarity, visual shape
similarity, and grapheme familiarity difference. Ordinality dif-
ference refers to a difference between the positions in the
Hiragana/alphabet sequence of two characters/letters, divided by
their sum. Phonological similarity refers to the number of shared
phonemes (consonants and vowels) in names of two charac-
ters/letters. Graphemes names are exactly the same as the pro-
nunciation in the case of Hiragana, but this is not in the case for
letters in the English alphabet. Visual similarity refers to subjec-
tive comparison ratings of the similarities of two characters/letters
in Hiragana (Kawakami and Tsuji, 2012) and the English alphabet
(Boles and Clifford, 1989), both rated on a five-point scale from 1
(low similarity) to 5 (high similarity). Character/letter familiarity
differences refer to differences between the subjective familiarity
ratings of two Hiragana characters/English alphabet letters, both
rated by adult native Japanese speakers in a Japanese language
environment on a seven-point scale from 1 (low familiarity) to
7 (high familiarity) (Amano and Kondo, 1999).
There were 1035 and 325 possible Hiragana character and
English alphabet letter pairs, respectively (not including doubles
of the same character/letter). We computed separate values for
color distance, luminance distance, saturation distance, and hue
distance for each of these pairs. All subsequent analyses were
performed after binning the 1035 Hiragana character pairs into
69 bins that each included 15 character pairs. For 325 English
alphabet letter pairs 65 bins were used, each included 5 letter
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pairs 3 (see Watson et al., 2012, for the original method). Bins
were determined by the mean color distance of each charac-
ter/letter pair across all 17 synesthetes, such that the first bin of the
Hiragana character pairs and English alphabet pairs, respectively,
contained pairs whose two characters/letters were, on average,
most similar in color.
3The number of pairs included in a bin differed between Hiragana characters
(15 pairs) and English alphabet letters (5 pairs). This was to match the num-
bers of items used in each multiple regression analysis between the two scripts
as closely as possible. The overall results for Hiragana characters were almost
the same between when 5 pairs were included in a bin (i.e., 207 bins were used
for multiple regression analyses. See Tables S2, S3 in Supplementary Materials
for detailed results) and when 15 pairs were included in a bin (see Table 2 in
the text).
RESULTS
HIRAGANA CHARACTERS
Correlations among variables for Hiragana characters are shown
in Table 1. To test for multicollinearity among independent vari-
ables, we examined the variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF
values were all below 1.5, indicating multi-collinearity was not an
issue. See Figure S1 in SupplementaryMaterials for a visualization
of distancematrices of each color/grapheme property measure for
Hiragana characters.
As shown in Table 2, a multiple regression model using the
four independent variables (ordinality difference, phonological
similarity, shape similarity, and familiarity difference) as predic-
tor variables for color distance in synesthetic colors for Hiragana
characters [R2 = 0.79, F(4, 64) = 59.66, p < 0.01]. This analysis
Table 1 | Correlations among the variables for Hiragana characters (N = 69).
Color dist. Lum. dist. Sat. dist. Hue dist. Ord. diff. Phono. sim. Shape sim.
Color distance
Luminance distance 0.79**
Saturation distance 0.93** 0.80**
Hue distance 0.96** 0.70** 0.82**
Ordinality difference 0.74** 0.58** 0.67** 0.71**
Phonological similarity −0.71** −0.58** −0.67** −0.74** −0.46**
Shape similarity −0.58** −0.54** −0.61** −0.54** −0.33** 0.53**
Familiarity difference 0.61** 0.34** 0.59** 0.55** 0.54** −0.38** −0.24
**p < 0.01.
Table 2 | Results of multiple regression analyses for Hiragana character pairs.
Variables Unstandardized Standardized t-value p-value
coefficient coefficient
B SE β
COLOR DISTANCE [R2 = 0.79, F (4, 64) = 59.66, p < 0.01]
Ordinality difference 45.972 8.492 0.394 5.41 <0.01
Phonological similarity −24.541 5.415 −0.333 −4.53 <0.01
Shape similarity −19.430 5.899 −0.225 −3.29 <0.01
Familiarity difference 48.743 15.902 0.213 3.07 <0.01
LUMINANCE DISTANCE [R2 = 0.51, F (4, 64) = 16.90, p < 0.01]
Ordinality difference 14.599 4.176 0.386 3.50 <0.01
Phonological similarity −6.400 2.663 −0.268 −2.40 <0.05
Shape similarity −7.706 2.901 −0.276 −2.66 <0.01
Familiarity difference −2.663 7.820 −0.036 −0.34 0.73
SATURATION DISTANCE [R2 = 0.73, F (4, 64) = 42.27, p < 0.01]
Ordinality difference 13.420 3.563 0.312 3.76 <0.01
Phonological similarity −7.283 2.272 −0.269 −3.20 <0.01
Shape similarity −9.786 2.475 −0.308 −3.95 <0.01
Familiarity difference 20.907 6.671 −0.248 3.13 <0.01
HUE DISTANCE [R2 = 0.74, F (4, 64) = 46.18, p < 0.01]
Ordinality difference 46.218 9.641 0.385 4.79 <0.01
Phonological similarity −32.336 6.147 −0.427 −5.26 <0.01
Shape similarity −13.221 6.697 −0.149 −1.97 0.05
Familiarity difference 33.233 18.053 0.141 1.84 0.07
SE, standard error.
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also revealed that ordinality difference was the strongest pre-
dictor of synesthetic color distance (Beta = 0.394, p < 0.01),
followed by phonological similarity (Beta = −0.333, p < 0.01),
shape similarity (Beta = −0.225, p < 0.01), and familiarity dif-
ference (Beta = 0.213, p < 0.01). Overall, this analysis supports
our hypothesis, which predicted a large impact of ordinality
and phonology, and a relatively small impact of visual shape on
synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters.
We also conducted multiple regression analyses to predict
luminance, saturation, and hue distances separately using the
same four independent variables (Table 2). A regression model
using the four independent variables to predict luminance dis-
tance in synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters [R2 = 0.51,
F(4, 64) = 16.90, p < 0.01] also revealed that ordinality differ-
ence was the strongest predictor (Beta = 0.386, p < 0.01),
followed by shape similarity (Beta = −0.276, p < 0.01) and
phonological similarity (Beta = −0.268, p < 0.05). Luminance
distance was not significantly predicted by familiarity difference
(Beta = −0.036, p = 0.73). A similar trend was observed in the
multiple regression analysis for saturation distance [R2 = 0.73,
F(4, 64) = 42.27, p < 0.01]; ordinality difference was the strongest
predictor (Beta = 0.312, p < 0.01), followed by shape similar-
ity (Beta = −0.308, p < 0.01) and phonological similarity (Beta
= −0.269, p < 0.01). Familiarity difference also significantly pre-
dicted saturation distance (Beta = −0.247, p < 0.01). A regres-
sion model to predict hue distance [R2 = 0.74, F(4, 64) = 46.18,
p < 0.01] showed hue distance was significantly predicted only by
phonological similarity (Beta = −0.427, p < 0.01) and ordinal-
ity difference (Beta = 0.385, p < 0.01). In addition to this, shape
similarity and familiarity difference each levied only a marginally
significant effect on predicted hue distance (Beta = −0.149, p =
0.05; Beta = 0.141, p = 0.07, respectively).
ENGLISH ALPHABET LETTERS
Correlations among variables for English alphabet letters are
shown in Table 3. The VIF values were all below 1.1, indi-
cating multicollinearity was not an issue. See Figure S2 in
Supplementary Materials for visualized distance matrices of
each color/grapheme property measures for English alphabetical
letters.
Table 4 shows the results of a multiple regression model using
the four independent variables as predictors for color distance
in synesthetic colors for English alphabets [R2 = 0.27, F(4, 60) =
5.50, p < 0.01]. It reveals that ordinality difference was the only
statistically significant predictor (Beta = 0.393, p < 0.01); shape
similarity had a marginally significant effect on predicted hue
distance (Beta = −0.201, p = 0.10).
We also conducted multiple regression analyses to predict
luminance, saturation, and hue distances of synesthetic colors
for English alphabet letters, respectively, with the four inde-
pendent variables (Table 4); however, multiple regression mod-
els to predict luminance distance and saturation distance were
not statistically significant [R2 = 0.13, F(4, 60) = 2.24, p = 0.08;
R2 = 0.11, F(4, 60) = 1.76, p = 0.15, respectively]. The regres-
sion model for hue distance was significant [R2 = 0.16, F(4, 60) =
2.76, p < 0.05], and it was shown that shape similarity signif-
icantly predicted hue distance (Beta = −0.280, p < 0.05); the
ordinality difference had only a marginally significant effect on
predicted hue distance (Beta = 0.217, p = 0.08).
DISCUSSION
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
The results for Hiragana characters, in general, supported our
predictions. As predicted, a multiple regression analysis revealed
that ordinality difference and phonological similarity were strong
predictors (Beta = 0.394, −0.333, respectively) of synesthetic
color distances for Hiragana characters. The impact of visual
shape similarity, although also statistically significant, was rel-
atively small (Beta = 0.225). The impact of both phonology
and ordinality was manifest in the dimension of hue of synes-
thetic colors, whereas the impact of visual shape and grapheme
familiarity on the hue dimension was relatively small (statisti-
cally marginally significant). Ordinality difference was not only
the strongest predictor of color distance; it was also dominant in
predicting luminance, and saturation. The impact of visual shape
similarity was comparable to that of phonological similarity in the
luminance dimension and greater than that of phonological sim-
ilarity in the saturation dimension, both of which were slightly
different from our prediction. Grapheme familiarity difference
affected color distance and saturation of synesthetic colors sig-
nificantly. Thus, we observed significant influence of visual shape
on synesthetic colors. This finding differs from that reported by
Asano and Yokosawa (2011), who found no effect of visual shape
on synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters. This inconsistency
can be explained as follows. Asano and Yokosawa (2011) con-
cluded that synesthetic color selection for Hiragana characters
Table 3 | Correlations among the variables for English alphabet letter pairs (N = 65).
Color dist. Lum. dist. Sat. dist. Hue dist. Ord. diff. Phono. sim. Shape sim.
Color distance
Luminance distance 0.58**
Saturation distance 0.57** 0.52**
Hue distance 0.88** 0.42** 0.44**
Ordinality difference 0.43** 0.19 0.27* 0.28*
Phonological similarity 0.15 0.21 −0.04 0.08 −0.05
Shape similarity −0.32* −0.25* −0.14 −0.32* −0.22 −0.03
Familiarity difference 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.01 −0.30*
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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Table 4 | Results of multiple regression analyses for English alphabet letter pairs.
Variables Unstandardized Standardized t-value p-value
coefficient coefficient
B SE β
COLOR DISTANCE [R2 = 0.27, F (4, 60) = 5.50, p < 0.01]
Ordinality difference 33.614 9.707 0.393 3.46 <0.01
Phonological similarity 7.044 4.947 0.158 1.42 0.16
Shape similarity −11.541 6.831 −0.201 −1.69 0.10
Familiarity difference 11.193 17.271 0.075 0.65 0.52
LUMINANCE DISTANCE [R2 = 0.13, F (4, 60) = 2.24, p = 0.08]
− − − −
SATURATION DISTANCE [R2 = 0.11, F (4, 60) = 1.76, p = 0.15]
− − − −
HUE DISTANCE [R2 = 0.16, F (4, 60) = 2.76, p < 0.05]
Ordinality difference 23.310 12.793 0.222 1.82 0.07
Phonological similarity 4.380 6.520 0.080 0.67 0.50
Shape similarity −19.753 9.002 −0.280 −2.19 <0.05
Familiarity difference −7.870 22.762 −0.043 −0.35 0.73
SE, standard error.
did not depend on visual shape based on the fact that synes-
thetic colors for two characters sharing the same sounds, namely
a Hiragana character and its Katakana counterpart, were found
to be remarkably consistent regardless of the differences in their
shapes. That is, Asano and Yokosawa compared visual shapes
of two characters from respectively different sets of graphemes.
The presence of visual shape effects in the present results sug-
gests that it is relative shape similarity within a set of graphemes
that affects synesthetic color similarity rather than the absolute
similarity/difference of visual images. In other words, relations
between graphemes are measured independently across different
sets of graphemes.
The results for English alphabet letters were also generally in
accordance with the predictions of the model proposed in this
study.We predicted a strong influence of ordinality for these stim-
uli and a weaker influence of visual shape. Finally, phonology
was predicted to have the weakest influence on synesthetic colors
for English alphabet letters. The results showed that statistically
the ordinality difference served as a significant predictor of color
distance and that there was also a marginally significant impact
of shape similarity; however, there was no significant impact of
phonology.Moreover, visual shape similarity proved to be a statis-
tically significant predictor of hue and there was also a marginally
significant impact of ordinality difference; again there was no sig-
nificant impact of phonology. However, the explanatory powers
of the models for English alphabet letters were generally small (at
most R2 = 0.27, in the case of color distance) compared to those
for Hiragana characters (R2 = 0.51∼0.79).
CONGRUENCE OF CATEGORICAL vs. CONTINUOUS PROPERTIES
BETWEEN GRAPHEMES AND COLORS
Watson et al. (2012) conjectured that a congruency factor
can explain certain selective effects observed in second-order
relations among grapheme-color pairs. They examined various
associations between synesthetic colors and English alphabet let-
ters (in synesthetes who were probably English speakers, although
their native language was not specified in Watson et al., 2012).
Of most interest, they proposed that grapheme properties that
are processed categorically (e.g., letter shape) are mapped to
a congruent, i.e., categorically perceived, color dimension (i.e.,
hue). Similarly, they proposed that grapheme properties that are
processed continuously (e.g., frequency) are mapped to color
dimensions that are perceived as continuums (i.e., luminance and
saturation). In their study, shape difference (calculated based on
11-dimensional distinctive letter features proposed by Gibson,
1969) was found to correlate significantly with color and hue
distance, and frequency difference significantly correlated with
luminance distance; in addition, the ordinality difference signifi-
cantly correlated with color and hue distance. They explained the
correlation between ordinality difference and hue by assuming
that ordinality may be processed categorically, although it varies
continuously, because it is used as a rough index of the order of
learning of individual letters.
AlthoughWatson et al. (2012) examined synesthesia associated
with English letters, their interpretations offer some generality
which may facilitate understanding findings with Hiragana char-
acters in the present study. In terms of congruence of categorical
vs. continuous properties, we observed a significant influence
of grapheme familiarity, which varies continuously, on color
distance and saturation distance, both of which also (at least
in some part) vary continuously, among Hiragana characters.
Phonology, which is a strictly categorical entity, was the strongest
predictor of hue distance, and it is often perceived categorically.
However, ordinality strongly affected all the dimensions of synes-
thetic colors, both categorical (i.e., hue, and color distance in
some part) and non-categorical (i.e., luminance, saturation, and
color distance in some part). The latter outcome may suggest
that, for some reasons, both categorical and continuous aspects
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of ordinality are reflected to synesthetic colors for Hiragana char-
acters. Part of the reason may be the fact that there are more
Hiragana characters (46 basic characters, 71 characters in total)
than letters in the English alphabet (26 characters). The num-
ber of Hiragana characters may be sufficiently large such that it
renders it difficult to process all the characters categorically (e.g.,
to use ordinality as a rough index of the order of learning of
each grapheme); thus continuous aspects of ordinality may be
relatively emphasized.
WHICH ASPECTS OF VISUAL SHAPE MATTER?
The results of Watson et al. (2012) and those of the present
study differ in a few respects. In particular visual shape influ-
enced hue of synesthetic colors for English alphabet letters in the
study of Watson et al. (suggesting that visual shapes are processed
categorically). By contrast, in our study visual shape affected
luminance, saturation, and color distance among synesthetic col-
ors for Hiragana characters (suggesting that visual shapes are
processed continuously), and it also had a marginally significant
effect on hue distance (suggesting that visual shapes are pro-
cessed categorically). This may be due to the differences between
the two sets of graphemes. Because the number of graphemes is
greater in the Hiragana syllabary than it is in the English alpha-
bet, and because Hiragana characters are generally visually more
complex than the English alphabet, some aspects of visual shapes
of Hiragana characters may be processed more quantitatively as
compared with processing in the English alphabet. For exam-
ple, not only the presence/absence of basic visual features (i.e.,
categorical, qualitative properties) but also properties such as
relative length of components and number of strokes (i.e., quanti-
tative properties) may have strong impact on Hiragana character
discrimination.
The results for English alphabet letters in the present study are
similar to those reported by Watson et al. (2012) using English
speakers. For example, visual shape in both studies affected hues.
However, we must acknowledge that the results differ in some
respects. As visual shape similarity/differencemeasure(s), we used
subject letter similarity ratings from Boles and Clifford (1989)
in the present study, whereas Watson et al. (2012) used sev-
eral different measures including both the letter similarity ratings
(from Boles and Clifford, 1989) and the shape difference calcu-
lated based on 11-dimensional distinctive letter features proposed
by Gibson (1969). Thus, the similarity ratings from Boles and
Clifford (1989) were used in both studies. However, for some rea-
son, this predictor significantly affected hues in the present study
but not in the Watson et al. (2012) study. Instead, in Watson
et al. (2012), as noted above, the shape difference measure, cal-
culated using the basic letter shape features from Gibson (1969)
significantly affected hues.
To assess the impact of the shape difference measure (based
on Gibson, 1969) on synesthetic colors for English alphabet let-
ters reported by Japanese synesthetes in the present study, we
conducted additional multiple regression analyses. We sought to
predict color, luminance, saturation, and hue distance in synes-
thetic colors for English alphabet letters found in present study
using ordinality difference, phonological similarity, familiarity,
and the visual shape difference (calculated based on Gibson,
1969, instead of subjective shape similarity provided by Boles and
Clifford, 1989) as predictors 4. The overall results were similar
to those of the multiple regression analyses in the present study
(see Results) in which the Boles and Clifford’s measure was used
as the visual shape similarity measure: multiple regression mod-
els to predict luminance distance and saturation distance were
not statistically significant [R2 = 0.13, F(4, 60) = 2.18, p = 0.08;
R2 = 0.12, F(4, 60) = 1.98, p = 0.11, respectively]. The regres-
sion model for hue distance and color distance were significant
[R2 = 0.28, F(4, 60) = 5.97, p < 0.01; R2 = 0.32, F(4, 60) = 7.00,
p < 0.01, respectively], and it was shown that hue distance was
significantly predicted by the shape difference (Beta = 0.462,
p < 0.01), and color distance was significantly predicted by ordi-
nality difference and the shape difference (Beta = 0.394, 0.303,
respectively, both ps < 0.01). Note that the explanatory powers
of the models are greater when the Gibson’s measure was used
than when the Boles and Clifford’s measure was used (hue dis-
tance: Boles and Cliffor’s measure R2 = 0.16, Gibson’s measure
R2 = 0.28; color distance: Boles and Cliffor’s measure R2 = 0.27,
Gibson’s measure R2 = 0.32), which may be in accordance with
Watson et al. (2012) in which significant effects of the Gibson’s
measure but not Boles and Clifford’s measure were observed.
Since Gibson (1969) considered neurophysiological and devel-
opmental observations in selecting the distinctive letter features
while the Boles and Clifford’s measure, which consists of ratings
on subjective letter similarity by adults and may reflect various
information associated to the letters such as knowledge, it may
be these types of neurophysiological processing of basic visual
properties in childhood that affect synesthetic color associations
for English alphabet letters. This is in accordance with the model
proposed in this study.
SYNESTHETIC COLORS AS “DISCRIMINATING MARKERS” OF
GRAPHEMES DURING LEARNING GRAPHEMES
The model we have proposed explains the synesthetic color for
Hiragana characters quite well (79 and 74% of the variance was
predicted by the four variables in the case of color distance
and hue distance, respectively). However, its explanatory power
declined for the English alphabet letters in this study (only 27 and
16% of the variance was predicted in the case of color distance and
hue distance, respectively). Since the number of grapheme pairs
included in a bin in the second-order mapping analyses differed
between Hiragana characters and English alphabet letters (15 and
5 pairs, respectively. See footnote 3 for more information), it may
be difficult to make direct comparisons of explanatory powers of
themodels betweenHiragana characters and English alphabet let-
ters. Even taking this into account, the model proposed in this
study still appears to explain the synesthetic color for Hiragana
characters better than it explains synesthetic color for English
alphabet letters; the results showed that the phonological similar-
ity had a strong effect in Hiragana characters but not in English
4Unfortunately, visual shape difference measures for Hiragana characters
which are analogous to the Gibson’s measure do not exist. Hiragana characters
are visually too complicated to classify based on the existence/absence of sim-
ple basic visual features. Therefore we could not conduct analogous analyses
for Hiragana characters in this study.
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alphabets, which means that the model revealed more predictors
in the case of Hiragana characters.
One possible reason for the low explanatory power for English
alphabet letters in this study is that the English alphabet is not
the writing system of the native language of our participants and
they are not very familiar with its letters. According to a cor-
pus of a major newspaper, the mean frequency of 26 English
alphabet letters is roughly 1/42 of the mean frequency of 46
basic Hiragana characters (Amano and Kondo, 2000). The lack
of influence of letter familiarity on synesthetic colors for English
alphabet letters in this study supports this idea (i.e., letter famil-
iarity was too low in general to affect synesthetic color choices).
Another possible reason for this result is that the synesthetes
who participated in this study had already acquired several sets
of graphemes (e.g., Hiragana, Katakana, and some Kanji charac-
ters) prior to acquiring letters in the English alphabet. As previous
studies have shown, synesthetic colors for graphemes acquired
early in life can transfer to those for graphemes acquired later in
life (Mills et al., 2002, 2009; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006; Asano
and Yokosawa, 2012). Since the present model omits such trans-
fer effects of synesthetic colors from other sets of graphemes,
any already-acquired mappings between Hiragana characters and
synesthetic colors might have disrupted the expected patterns of
results in English grapheme-color associations. However, we do
not think these are the only reasons for the low explanatory power
of the model for the English alphabet letters in this study. Watson
et al. (2012) conductedmultiple regression analyses to predict hue
distance with 11 predictors including shape similarity/difference
(including Gibson’s and Boles and Clifford’s measures), letter
frequency difference, ordinality difference, phonological (letter
name) similarity. He found that even with native English speak-
ers and even using as many as 11 predictors, the 11 predictors
explained at most about 32% of the variance (details of this anal-
ysis were not supplied). Given that the participants in the study
of Watson et al. (2012) were highly familiar with English alphabet
letters, the reduced explanatory power of these regression models
cannot be attributed to letter familiarity.
We propose a different explanation for the generally low
explanatory powers of the second-order measures with the
English alphabet. It hypothesizes that a synesthetic color high-
lights the most discriminating feature of each grapheme, which
people (both synesthetic and non-synesthetic) rely on when they
learn graphemes. In turn, this “marking” potential facilitates peo-
ple’s discrimination of a grapheme which then leads to their
speedier learning of that grapheme. In doing so, we assume that
not all properties of a given grapheme afford this “marking”
potential nor do these markers apply to all graphemes. For exam-
ple, ordinal numbers may provide effective discriminating cues
for certain graphemes in a sequence i.e., from the first to the
fifth, at most. However, it should be difficult to associate the
larger ordinal numbers with successive graphemes. Other than
the cases of the graphemes above (i.e., from the first to the fifth
graphemes), information provided by the domain of ordinality
may be rough, like either “early” or “later” in the sequence. This
means that ordinality can afford effective “marking” potential
only in some graphemes (e.g., the first to the fifth graphemes
in a grapheme sequence, and graphemes that appear distinctively
early or late in a sequence); furthermore, it should be difficult to
distinguish all graphemes with assistance of only ordinality infor-
mation. Similarly, it is likely that each of phonology, visual shape,
and familiarity can afford effective “marking” potential only in
some (different) graphemes. This reasoning leads us to hypoth-
esize that multiple basic grapheme properties need to be utilized
simultaneously to attach a “marker” to each of all graphemes.
We presume that certain basic grapheme properties such as
ordinality, phonology, visual shape are preferentially used (when
available) as “markers” in grapheme discrimination. The ratio-
nale of this is that they should be highly stable in the input
to children because such properties are socially shared. If some
of the basic grapheme properties are not useful in discriminat-
ing and learning graphemes (as in the case of phonology in
discriminating English alphabet letters), children need to find
other sources of information available for grapheme discrimi-
nation. Such additional sources might involve one’s memory for
properties associated with graphemes (e.g., colors of refrigerator
magnets), word meanings (e.g., “ ‘B’ is for ‘banana’ so the color of
‘b’ is yellow”), and so on. The additional sources will usually differ
across individuals because they depend on personal experiences.
Note that the basic properties are relational, while the addi-
tional sources may usually have non-relational properties. We
argue that this is the reason for the generally low explanatory
powers of the second-order measures with the English alphabet
in the present study and in Watson et al. (2012). Fewer relational
basic grapheme properties are available in English alphabet letter
discrimination due to the fact that phonology does not provide
effective discrimination cues. This suggests that synesthetic colors
for English alphabet letters may depend more on non-relational
properties such as memories associated with certain graphemes
(e.g., Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013) and word meanings
(e.g., Rich et al., 2005; Simner, 2007) than do these colors for
Japanese Hiragana characters. Since the analyses in this study and
in Watson et al. (2012) were designed to examine second-order
relationships between relational grapheme properties and synes-
thetic colors, we conjecture that the regression models in these
studies had only limited powers for explaining grapheme-color
associations in synesthesia.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a new model that provides a comprehensive
explanation of synesthetic grapheme-color association determi-
nation processes, including the differences across writing systems.
It is based upon previous studies on developmental perspec-
tive of grapheme-color synesthesia (Rich et al., 2005; Asano and
Yokosawa, 2012; Watson et al., 2012). Results of an accompa-
nying experiment on synesthetic colors for Hiragana characters
and English alphabet letters were generally consistent with the
model. Together model and results suggest that the ways in
which graphemes are introduced to children during develop-
ment and are processed in the brain are critical. Indeed, these
factors are more important in determining grapheme-color asso-
ciations than grapheme properties per se. This challenges a view
that synesthesia requires unusual hard-wired cross-associations
between certain brain areas (e.g., Brang et al., 2010, 2011). The
present model is partly consistent that of Brang et al. (2011)
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in assuming that some aspects of synesthetic colors are asso-
ciated with basic visual components of letters in some ways.
However, it differs in supporting the view that grapheme-color
synesthesia builds on normal cognitive (including language) pro-
cessingmechanisms (Simner et al., 2005; Simner, 2007; Asano and
Yokosawa, 2011, 2012; Watson et al., 2012)).
The model of the present study assumes that linkages between
color representations and representations of features in some
domains (e.g., ordinality in conventional sequences, sounds,
and visual shapes) are formed in the brain before grapheme
acquisition. We believe this is possible based on the obser-
vations reported in several previous studies (e.g., Rich et al.,
2005; Wagner and Dobkins, 2011; Asano and Yokosawa, 2012;
see Introduction), however, direct evidence for this must await
further studies.
According to the model proposed in this study, synesthetic col-
ors function as “discriminating markers” of graphemes during
learning graphemes, which are arbitrary symbols that may not
be easily acquired by children. Certain questions are left unan-
swered: why colors are used as “markers”? How this is achieved in
the brain? If the “discrimination markers” view holds true, why
are colors also associated with other cognitive entities that peo-
ple do not have to “acquire” (meaning that no special training is
required to process them), such as music sounds and tastes, in
other types of synesthesia, such as colored hearing and gustatory-
color synesthesia? Are these types of synesthesia qualitatively
different from grapheme-color synesthesia? Future studies are
required.
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Currently, little is known about how synesthesia develops and which aspects of
synesthesia can be acquired through a learning process. We review the increasing
evidence for the role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia, and
argue for the thesis that synesthetic abilities are developed and modified by semantic
mechanisms. That is, in certain people semantic mechanisms associate concepts with
perception-like experiences—and this association occurs in an extraordinary way. This
phenomenon can be referred to as “higher” synesthesia or ideasthesia. The present
analysis suggests that synesthesia develops during childhood and is being enriched further
throughout the synesthetes’ lifetime; for example, the already existing concurrents may be
adopted by novel inducers or new concurrents may be formed. For a deeper understanding
of the origin and nature of synesthesia we propose to focus future research on two
aspects: (i) the similarities between synesthesia and ordinary phenomenal experiences
based on concepts; and (ii) the tight entanglement of perception, cognition and the
conceptualization of the world. Importantly, an explanation of how biological systems get
to generate experiences, synesthetic or not, may have to involve an explanation of how
semantic networks are formed in general and what their role is in the ability to be aware
of the surrounding world.
Keywords: synesthesia, perception, cognition, concepts, learning, semantics, cognitive penetrability
INTRODUCTION
Following a long history of interdisciplinary research on synes-
thesia (see e.g., Locke, 1689; Galton, 1883/1907/1973; Mahling,
1926; Peacock, 1988; Cytowic, 1995, 2002; van Campen, 1999;
Day, 2005; Dixon and Smilek, 2005; Jewanski and Sidler, 2006;
Macpherson, 2007; Brogaard, 2013; Auvray and Deroy, 2014),
at the beginning of the 21st century an important debate has
emerged about the fundamental nature of synesthesia. Initially,
the discussion was dominated by the explanation of synesthesia in
terms of intermixed senses. It was presumed that a sensory input
in one modality directly elicits an additional sensory activation
in another sensory modality, and this was further deduced to
be based on direct connections between the respective brain
areas, known also as the cross-activation hypothesis (e.g., Baron-
Cohen and Harrison, 1997; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a;
Cytowic, 2002).
However, meanwhile, this interpretation has encountered
problems. It has become apparent that in many forms of synes-
thetic associations, only the concurrents exhibit clear sensory-
like properties, while the inducers take the form of concepts.
For example, one of the most common forms of synesthesia is
time-unit synesthesia (Smilek et al., 2007a; Jarick et al., 2008,
2009, 2011; Brang et al., 2013b) in which weekdays or months
are associated with colors, distinct spatial positions and with
other concurrents. Importantly, there are no direct sensory inputs
for time units. One cannot directly see June or Thursday in a
way one can see a car or letter “A”. Time units exclusively exist
as concepts. But time-unit synesthesia is not the only case. For
other forms of synesthesia the traditional, sensory-to-sensory
characterization has also been found unsatisfactory (Ward and
Simner, 2003; Ward, 2004; Simner, 2007; Nikolic´ et al., 2011;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012). Thus, it has been repeat-
edly suggested that a full account of the phenomenon should go
beyond the standard sensory-sensory approach (e.g., Dixon et al.,
2000, 2006; Simner and Ward, 2006; Ward et al., 2006; Ward
and Sagiv, 2007; Sagiv et al., 2011; Eagleman, 2012; Jürgens and
Nikolic´, 2012, 2014; Simner, 2012; Watson et al., 2012a, 2014;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013; Chiou and Rich, 2014;
Brogaard, 2014; Brogaard et al., 2014).
A number of different remedies to the problem of an adequate
characterization of synesthesia have been proposed. An attempt
to bridge this discrepancy between the theory and the data was
to postulate individual differences among synesthetes (Dixon
and Smilek, 2005; Hubbard et al., 2005; Cytowic and Eagleman,
2009; Rouw and Scholte, 2010; Rouw, 2011; Simner, 2013). Thus,
there would be two main groups, higher and lower synesthetes,
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depending on whether their synesthesia is triggered by the con-
ceptual or by the sensory properties of a stimulus, respectively
(Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b). Another approach was to
suggest that the phenomenon oscillates between these two types
of inducers within one and the same individual (Hubbard et al.,
2005; Ward et al., 2007).
It can be said that the last decade experienced a renewed
interest in re-conceptualizing and re-defining the phenomenon
of synesthesia (Simner, 2007, 2012; Sagiv et al., 2011; Cohen
Kadosh and Terhune, 2012; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014). Researchers have started to
question the exclusively sensory interpretation of synesthesia and
have suggested that the phenomenon also involved high-level cog-
nitive representations (Ward et al., 2006, 2007; Ward and Sagiv,
2007). This includes the proposal that synesthesia is exclusively
a semantically induced phenomenon (Nikolic´, 2009; Chiou and
Rich, 2014). This suggestion severs the traditional distinction
between perception and cognition assumed for a long time in phi-
losophy, psychology and cognitive science (Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz
and Werning, 2012; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013). Evidence for this
alternative, extended view of synesthesia is continually increasing
(Dixon et al., 2000, 2006; Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001;
Elias et al., 2003; Mroczko et al., 2009; Nikolic´ et al., 2011;
Simner, 2012; Rothen et al., 2013; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014).
The aim of the present paper is to examine these fundamen-
tal issues and the particular forms of the phenomenon for
which the hypothesis applies that semantic mechanisms create
synesthesia.
MIND-DRIVEN HIGHER SYNESTHESIA
In synesthesia, an attended and recognized stimulus leads to addi-
tional phenomenal experiences, that is, to experiential states that
normally do not occur (Rich and Mattingley, 2003; Mattingley,
2009; Nijboer and Van der Stigchel, 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz
and Nikolic´, 2013). As a result, the stimuli corresponding to
the inducer and the experiences associated with the concur-
rent form a highly integrated percept—a phenomenally unified
experience (Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012; Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz, 2013). This unified experience may cover the same
sensory modality, or different sensory modalities, or even dif-
ferent domains e.g., cognitive, sensory and motor. The resulting
conscious experiences are typically unified, meaning that all the
experiences at a given time are present simultaneously form-
ing an overall phenomenal perspective—a single encompassing
phenomenal state. The different component experiences are said
to be co-conscious parts or aspects of the subsuming state that
has a conjoint phenomenology, or a joint phenomenal content
(Shoemaker, 1996, 2003; Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Tye, 2003;
Brook and Raymont, 2013). As such, they are intimately linked
and integrated from the perspective of the self. Consequently,
a person’s perceptual and cognitive states result in a synchronic
phenomenal unity (Raymont and Brook, 2009; Bayne, 2010;
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013).
One of the most important issues in the current debate about
the phenomenon of synesthesia pertains to the putative causal
mechanisms underlying synesthetic associations. The question of
whether synesthesia is a lower or higher phenomenon translates
into a question of whether novel synesthetic associations can
be explained by direct synaptic connections between neurons
representing respectively the inducer and the concurrent—which
is a possible explanation of the low-level hypothesis. Alternatively,
synesthetic associations may occur through a high-level of system
organization, that enables associations to be formed in a more
elaborated, distributed and flexible manner than what can be
accounted for by direct synaptic connections between sensory
areas. The latter would correspond to the high-level hypothesis of
synesthesia and is closer to the level at which the semantic struc-
ture of knowledge operates: rich association systems involving
additional brain areas as opposed to direct connections between
two sensory areas of the brain (for a recent hypothesis on the
involvement of ventral IT-cortex see Chiou and Rich, 2014). At
this higher level a prominent role is played by context, attentional
mechanisms, and interpretation of the stimuli.
The two levels are often referred to as perceptual and conceptual
(or cognitive), respectively (Ward and Simner, 2003; Eagleman,
2012; Simner, 2012; see also Evans, 1982). This is because it
is typically assumed that perception is an earlier and hence,
more rudimentary stage of information processing than is the
activation and processing of semantic information. Nevertheless,
the distinction between higher and lower synesthetes responding
to respectively, high- and low-level features of inducing stimulus
has rarely been a topic of direct investigation.
Many forms of synesthesia indicate the involvement of seman-
tic processes i.e., of the meaning of the stimulus. Synesthetes often
associate the same concurrent (e.g., the same hue of a color)
with different physical representations of the stimulus, i.e., with
different sensory instantiations of the same concept (e.g., the
Arabic digit “4”, the Roman numeral “IV”, the word “four”, and
four dots on a dice; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Ward
et al., 2007). Number-color synesthesia can be induced via sensory
presentation (e.g., digits), but also conceptually via cardinality
(the quantity) or via another conceptual property of ordinality
(the position in a sequence).
There are two other common forms of synesthesia that can be
mind-driven and that are variants of the already mentioned time-
unit synesthesia: the first is known as colored sequence synesthesia
in which names of time units, such as days of the week and
months of the year, are colored differently from their graphemic
constituents (Simner et al., 2006; Tomson et al., 2013), and the
second is known as spatial sequence synesthesia in which ordinal
categories involving numbers, time and alphabet elicit experience
of spatial forms (Sagiv et al., 2006; Eagleman, 2009).
A related phenomenon observed in non-synesthetes, which
suggests a bridge between synesthesia and non-synesthetic per-
ception, is the spatial numerical association of response codes.
Here, overlearned ordinal stimuli are associated with implicit
spatial representations (Dehaene et al., 1993).
Some neuroanatomical studies have suggested that differ-
ences between higher and lower synesthetes map onto another,
more empirically grounded, distinction between associators and
projectors (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a,b; Dixon et al.,
2004; Dixon and Smilek, 2005; Hubbard et al., 2005; Rouw and
Scholte, 2010; van Leeuwen et al., 2011). The assumption is
that a semantic representation of number (relevant for higher
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synesthetes) is likely linked to a more conceptual representa-
tion of color (relevant for associators experiencing their colors
internally in their “mind’s eye”). However, recent evidence seems
to challenge this view suggesting that the two distinctions are
not the same but rather orthogonal (Ward et al., 2007). Ward
and colleagues propose that the mechanisms that give rise to
the associator-projector distinction are independent of those
that give rise to higher-lower characteristics. According to the
researchers, the former reflects an internal vs. external frame
of spatial reference related to synesthetic phenomenology, and
the latter reflects the extent to which conceptual vs. sensory
properties of the stimulus are involved in the induction of synes-
thesia. Along with the results of the behavioral tests and subjects’
phenomenological reports, they found that higher synesthetes
were not necessarily grapheme-color associators, but could also
be projectors.
As an explanation of the finding Ward et al. (2007) pro-
posed to differentiate between surface-projectors and near space-
projectors. Surface projectors evoke an externalized frame of
reference relative to the location of the stimulus, perceiving their
synesthetic color concurrents as located in the same spatial loca-
tion as the inducing graphemes, dice patterns, finger counting,
etc. In contrast, near space-projectors elicit an externalized frame
of reference relative to the location of their body. For example,
the concurrent may always be located 20 cm in front of the
perceiver. This dissociation may help explain varying results for
projectors. Projectors are shown to be faster in naming their
synesthetic colors than veridical colors, and associators exhibit the
opposite effect (Smilek et al., 2001, 2003). However, projectors
who project colors into external space but not onto the surface
of graphemes may behave more like associators on the task of
naming their concurrents. Near space-projectors may be slower
with synesthetic colors than with ink colors as a result of the need
to shift their attention from the grapheme location to the color
location. In contrast, surface-projectors place concurrents at the
same location as the attended stimuli, which may then enable
more efficient naming of synesthetic colors.
The Ward et al. (2007) study also suggests that it may well
be possible for a synesthete to demonstrate higher synesthesia
in one respect but lower in another, e.g., experiencing number
forms may be shared by two groups, associators and projectors.
The respective internal and external location of spatial forms does
not have to reflect the spatial reference of their experiences when,
for example, reading graphemes. One and the same synesthete
may be an associator in his number forms but a projector for
his grapheme-colors. In line with this, a comparable oscillation
between high and low synesthesia may occur within the same
person for the different forms of synesthetic associations the
person possesses.
This view is supported by studies on numerical cognition
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006a,b)
in which digit-color projectors showed a characteristic feature of
higher synesthesia when linking colors with the meaning of num-
bers or with information on magnitude. Similarly, both projectors
and associators showed Stroop-like effects when perceiving color
for an arithmetic sum in which the result was implied and
not visually presented and hence, had to be extracted through
semantic mechanisms (Dixon et al., 2000; Jansari et al., 2006). For
lower synesthetes, color would have to be linked to the visually
presented physical form of the digit, and not to the conceptual
aspects of a number. Hence, it is possible that for different
individuals the semantic structures that lead to synesthesia are
organized differently. Some synesthetes may be higher in the
sense of visuo-spatial properties such as the number forms and
ordinality (and spatial forms for time and the alphabet since these
concepts also possess ordinality), while other synesthetes may be
higher in the sense of numerosity (cardinal aspects of number
meaning, number concepts). And yet, there could be a group that
combines the two effects, which then results in having the same
color for “January” and “1”, “February” and “2”, etc. (Sagiv et al.,
2006).
Examples of cases of synesthetic experiences arising in the
absence of any direct impact or physical presence of the stimulus,
or occurring independently of the various physical forms that
external inducers may take, are mind-dependent or mind-driven
higher synesthesia, also known as ideasthesia. We suggest that
these experiences are driven by semantic mechanisms as a part
of mental representations whereby each synesthete’s individual
semantic network contains concurrents as a part of the meaning
of the inducing stimuli (Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2014). A similar
proposal for a conceptual contribution to synesthesia was made
by Meier (2013). Meier’s approach is based on the research on
implicit bidirectionality (Brugger et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2007;
Weiss et al., 2009), and states that processing of an inducer is
affected by a spreading of implicit activation of a concurrent.
This is in agreement with our claim that synesthetic associations
include unconventionally coupled supplementary phenomenal
features as a part of the semantic knowledge network. Therefore,
synesthetic experiences do not have to rely on external stim-
uli to be induced, i.e., cognitive or concept-dependent mental
states are reported to be sufficient to elicit synesthetic percep-
tual concurrents in the absence of any related physical stimu-
lation (Nikolic´ et al., 2011; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012).
The above-mentioned case of a digit-color synesthete stud-
ied by Dixon et al. (2000) using mental arithmetic, provided
a striking example of conceptual synesthesia. Not only viewing
digits triggered a visual experience of a specific color. Also a
mental activation of the concept of the calculated number was
fully sufficient to evoke synesthesia (e.g., even without writing
down the result of the calculation) (Figure 1). This was revealed
when the synesthete performed mathematical additions such as
“4 + 3” followed by a patch colored congruently or incongruently
to the synesthetic color associated with the result of the sum-
mation (e.g., yellow for digit 7). The result of summation was
never directly presented. The synesthete had to name the color
FIGURE 1 | An example of the stimuli used in the experiment of Dixon
et al., 2000).
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of the patch before reporting the result of the summation. The
responses were slower in the case of incongruency i.e., when the
color of the patch was different from the color associated with
the arithmetical sum. This Stroop-like test objectified the mind-
driven case of synesthesia demonstrating that the cause of this
synesthetic experience is not provided by the immediate sensory
stimulation.
Another source of evidence of mind-dependent synesthesia
has been provided in studies with letter-color synesthetes report-
ing to experience the same concurrent to different physical stimuli
representing the same type, kind or semantic category. Experi-
ences were the same for letters presented in different alphabets
(Mroczko et al., 2009), various fonts, or presented via different
sensory modalities—visual or auditory (Simner, 2007). Similarly,
number-color synesthetes show indifference to a wide range of
physical instantiations of numerosity (Dixon et al., 2000; Ward
and Sagiv, 2007).
Such sets of low-level sensory features or objects identified
as members of a familiar meaningful category are the subject of
recent philosophical discussions about object recognition and the
related high-level vs. low-level content of perception referring to
a kind property (i.e., when recognizing that something belongs to
a certain kind or type, like being a tiger, being a pine tree, etc.)
(Pylyshyn, 1999; Siegel, 2006; Bayne, 2009). The same analysis
might apply to typical synesthetic inducers such as seeing letters
“A”, “A” and “a” all as “A”, that is, recognizing an exemplar of
a certain semantic category (i.e., a token of a type). There is
no consensus on how to interpret such content, as high-level
conceptual or low-level perceptual, but an agreement is that this
content is cognitive, at least in some general sense.
A related issue is that of the mode of recognition that applies
to such a kind property (Simner, 2007; Auvray and Deroy, 2014;
see Pylyshyn, 1999 for the argument that a computation based on
perceptual principles inherent to categorical perception may lead
to low-level detection of similarities between stimuli). We propose
that at least for some forms of developmental synesthesia, if not
for all, the concurrent is activated only after semantic decoding of
the inducer is completed—i.e., the meaning of inducer must be
extracted before concurrent can be experienced. As mentioned,
a number of studies provide convincing evidence for the role of
conceptual contents in the induction of synesthesia (see Figure 2
for an illustration of that proposal).
Thus, the studies confirm that synesthetic experiences are
largely internally-driven by mental representations of objects,
higher-order types and semantic categories, cognitive states
and events, or other internal determinants such as concepts,
thoughts, moods, memories and imagery (Spiller and Jansari,
2008; Rothen et al., 2012; Meier and Rothen, 2013; Simner,
2013; Ward et al., 2013). Another form of higher synes-
thesia has been observed in two different individuals who
acquired their color/shape synesthesia for digits and mathemat-
ical formulas; interestingly the visual concurrents were gener-
ated in higher parietal and frontal brain regions (Bor et al.,
2007; Brogaard et al., 2013). Since the cognitive representa-
tions seem to be factors sufficient to elicit synesthesia they
may also play a role in explaining variations of synesthetic
experiences.
In the following section, we make the point that concep-
tual properties are shared across many forms of synesthe-
sia. This makes us consider higher (semantic) synesthesia a
separate class, which ought to have its own place in the synes-
thetic taxonomy and has to be considered accordingly in the
definitional and explanatory efforts of investigations into the
phenomenon.
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS AND SEMANTIC MECHANISMS
INVOLVED IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF SYNESTHESIA
To substantiate the importance of studying higher synesthesia,
we highlight numerous conceptual aspects and semantic mech-
anisms involved in various types of synesthesia. An account
directly addressing the influence of semantic information on the
induction of synesthetic experience is “ideasthesia” which literally
means sensing concepts, and refers to the conceptual processing
underlying synesthesia in which only concurrents are perceptual
while inducers are conceptual (Nikolic´, 2009). According to this
model, high-level semantic mechanisms assign low-level sensory
concurrents (e.g., synesthetic colors are triggered only when a
synesthete extracts the meaning of the presented grapheme; see
also Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012, 2014; Milán et al., 2013; cf. Brang
et al., 2013a).
Synesthetic associations are not just cross-modal, but they also
cross domains, i.e., besides the various modalities of senses, these
associations may involve domains of bodily, motor and emotional
states as well as domains of abstract, conceptually-represented
entities like numbers or time units. Cases of synesthetic inducers
going beyond traditionally denoted sensory modalities have been
found for activities such as reading musical notes, calculating,
imagining, or just thinking of a stimulus (Frith and Paulesu, 1997;
Grossenbacher, 1997; Dixon et al., 2000, 2006; Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b; Cytowic, 2002; Rich et al., 2005; Ward et al.,
2006; Spiller and Jansari, 2008; Nikolic´ et al., 2011).
Studies with bilingual grapheme-color synesthetes have shown
that synesthetesia can be experienced also for alphabets different
from the one used in the first language (Mills et al., 2002; Rich
et al., 2005; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006). In such a cross-
linguistic transfer synesthetic colors from a second language
are usually mapped onto the existing colors of the first lan-
guage (Simner, 2007; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013).
Often, the color is associated with a letter by its similarity to
other letters, i.e., letters of similar shapes tend to elicit sim-
ilar colors (Brang et al., 2011a; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012,
2014).
Results from our own studies suggest that synesthetic asso-
ciations to new graphemes are established quickly, and are not
created from scratch but are inherited from existing associations,
the concurrent colors being passively adopted from the origi-
nal synesthesia (Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and
Nikolic´, 2013). To demonstrate this, we conducted a study with
16 grapheme-color synesthetes in which we attempted to replicate
in the laboratory conditions the natural phenomenon of cross-
linguistic transfer. We introduced Glagolitic graphemes (novel
shapes, without any corresponding sound), which come from an
ancient Eastern European writing system that was ideal for our
study; it had the sufficient exotic appearance. Only few letters
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 509 | 75
Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´ Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the view that conceptual contents might be the inducers of idiosyncratic synesthetic experiences.
FIGURE 3 | (A) The correspondence between the graphemes of Latin and
square Glagolitic alphabets. (B) Illustration of the color experience
associated with a new grapheme after a short training. Both figures
republished with permission of ARVO, from Immediate transfer of
synesthesia to a novel inducer. Mroczko et al. (2009); permission conveyed
through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.
bore any physical resemblance to other known graphemes (see
Figure 3; Franolic´ and Žagar, 2008).
We assigned to each new grapheme a meaning by linking it to
existing Latin letters and Arabic numerals. A simple writing exer-
cise with paper and pencil sufficed to imitate the natural cross-
linguistic transfer. The exercise lasted less than 10 min during
which subjects learned how to write a Glagolitic grapheme and
then used this knowledge to write 20 words or number sequences.
The subjects substituted one familiar Latin/Arabic grapheme with
its Glagolitic counterpart (as in Figure 3B). This resulted in a
quick transfer of the original synesthetic color experiences from
their native Latin alphabet to Glagolitic graphemes never seen
before the experiment (Mroczko et al., 2009). Also, Stroop-type
tests (Stroop, 1935; Mills et al., 1999; Nikolic´ et al., 2007) indi-
cated that these new synesthetic associations were immediate and
involuntary.
The novel synesthetic associations were created within
minutes, which was too rapid a process to be accounted for by
low-level sensory cross-wiring between grapheme and color brain
areas. Low-level perceptual learning is usually not cognitively
penetrable (see below) and, as a result, it is a relatively slow
process requiring typically thousands of trials (Ahissar and
Hochstein, 1997; Goldstone, 1998; Seitz and Watanabe, 2005).
In contrast, the meaning of a new symbol can be learned quickly
(often in a single trial; Markson and Bloom, 1997; Bloom,
2000). Thus, shorter transfer times of synesthetic associations
are expected if the associations originate at the semantic level of
representation. In other words, the speed of transfer is indicative
of the type of representation (high- vs. low-level).
Additionally, the new associations generalized to the exem-
plars of different physical representation (handwritten by another
person), which is consistent with learning a semantic category
of stimuli rather than individual exemplars, or particular motor
coordinates, and is also inconsistent with perceptual learning. The
ways in which these stimuli were similar can be described only as
semantic “similarities”, i.e., they shared the same meaning and not
elementary visual features presumably processed in the grapheme
area (Brang et al., 2011a).
Therefore, a better explanation of grapheme-color synesthesia
can be provided by high-level conceptual mechanisms than by
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low-level associations: arbitrary synesthetic colors can be assigned
to novel graphemes through transfer of semantic knowledge.
This suggests the involvement of the high-level stimulus proper-
ties in eliciting synesthetic colors. The newly created synesthetic
associations to Glagolitic letters must have been induced via
existing synesthetic associations previously linked to conceptual
representations of the Latin letters. In other words, after training,
a Glagolitic letter would activate the same semantic content that
is normally activated by a Latin letter. Here, as for the other
cases of higher synesthesia, the meaning of the stimulus has to
be extracted before the concurrent phenomenal aspect can be
included into an overall unified synesthetic experience (Edquist
et al., 2006; Simner, 2007; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz, 2013). Therefore,
synesthesia seems to rely essentially on a certain conceptual rep-
resentation of the stimulus.
The significance of meaning and context in grapheme-color
synesthesia was demonstrated also in the study “Is the sky 2?”,
using electroencephalography to measure event-related potentials
(Brang et al., 2008). The authors concluded that connections
between colors and numbers are bidirectional and that concurrent
color sensations are treated by synesthetes as meaningful stimuli.
The impact of semantic activation and linguistic modulation such
as numerical magnitude or the frequency of grapheme use in a
language may also be reflected in the saturation and luminance
of the experienced colors (Beeli et al., 2007; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2007; Smilek et al., 2007b; Watson et al., 2012b; see also work by
Akins et al. on different languages’ effects upon grapheme-color
synesthesia). Moreover, synesthetic colors elicited by ambiguous
graphemes are modified by context. They depend on the inter-
pretation of the grapheme either as a letter or as a digit (e.g.,
the grapheme “V” referring to Latin letter and Roman numeral;
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001b; Dixon et al., 2006).
Another example providing support for the view that semantic
mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia, is
number-color synesthesia. Here, it is the higher cognitive numer-
ical representation, the conceptual representation of a number
(numerosity, quantity), that is responsible for eliciting synesthetic
concurrent experiences (Butterworth, 1999; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2005; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006a,b). In such a case, same
colors are elicited from physically different representations of a
number (e.g., Arabic and Roman numerals, arrays of dots, dice
patterns, finger counting or number names), provided they match
in the indicated quantity (Dixon et al., 2006; Ward and Sagiv,
2007; Ward et al., 2007).
In case of projectors, colors may be projected not only on
the surface of a page when viewing written digits, but also on
the surface of a dice or on synesthete’s fingers when counting.
The color reported for all these different physical instantiations
of number concept is the same. The cardinality is the direct
cause of the sameness of color across various notational formats
(Ward and Sagiv, 2007). During development, the synesthetic
cardinality-color associations may become generalized to other
education-based and culturally acquired symbols. Other forms of
synesthesia, described above, confirm that color concurrents may
transfer from one physical system of representation to another on
the basis of semantic correspondences, due to shared conceptual
properties (Mroczko et al., 2009; Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012).
For some synesthetes the colors of the writing system from a
second language are taken from the colors of the alphabet of their
first language (Mills et al., 2002; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006;
Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013), or
the synesthetic color experience associated with a written musical
note acquires the color of the name denoting it (Ward et al.,
2006).
Other examples might be number-forms synesthesia, time-
units or calendar synesthesia, all of which involve experiencing
numbers or time-units within a space. Thinking about sequential
concepts, such as numerical sequences in a form of days of
the week or months, elicits spatial forms and visualized mental
maps that contain arranged numbers (Sagiv et al., 2006). For
example, a subject may experience units of time as being arranged
in an ellipse, column or a spiral. Moreover, this spatial struc-
ture is usually placed at a specific spatial location within the
three-dimensional space surrounding the body of the synesthete.
Alternatively, the structure is located within a virtual space not
positioned relative to the body but within the mind’s eye (e.g.,
Smilek et al., 2007a; Jarick et al., 2008; Mann et al., 2009; Simner
et al., 2009).
Days of the week as well as months present maybe the most
apparent form of a conceptual inducer, as they do not possess any
characteristic sensory properties. There is nothing perceptually
specific that distinguishes a Monday from a Wednesday or May
from August.
Another illustrative example of how concepts have impact on
synesthetic experiences is given by lexical-gustatory synesthesia.
In this case, different flavors are experienced in response to vari-
ous words. Interestingly, such synesthetes can perceive a gustatory
sensation even before articulating a given word thus, while the
word is still on the tip of their tongue i.e., in the semantic phase
(Simner and Ward, 2006). This demonstrates that the physical
instantiation of the stimulus (i.e., the somato-sensory experience
of verbalization, the spoken expression of a thought in words)
is not necessary for eliciting synesthetic sensations of a flavor.
The activation of the concept, which is grasped mentally, is fully
sufficient.
Higher cognitive aspects of inducing synesthesia can further-
more be identified in mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia.
When seeing another person being touched or being in pain,
any person may trigger corresponding emotions and empathy. In
synesthetes however, in addition, a respective tactile or painful
experience may be produced. And this experience has the quality
of real touch and pain, even being located on the equivalent part
of synesthete’s body (Blakemore et al., 2005; Banissy and Ward,
2007, 2013; Fitzgibbon et al., 2010).
To the list of synesthesias shown to be based on semantic
interpretation of the stimulus belongs also a recently discovered
swimming-style-to-color-synesthesia in which seeing another
person swimming with a given swimming style, or even just
thinking about a certain swimming style, elicits synesthetic color
experience (Nikolic´ et al., 2011; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Werning,
2012; Rothen et al., 2013) (see Figure 4).
Collectively, all these findings impose constraints on theo-
ries of the neurophysiological origins of synesthesia. Synesthetic
experiences often involve inducers that are not strictly sensory
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Stimuli that can be used in the Stroop-type test:
example pictures of a person performing a butterfly stroke, painted
either in a subject’s synesthetic color (congruent) or in one of his
non-synesthetic colors (incongruent). Reprinted from Swimming-style
synesthesia. Nikolic´ et al. (2011) with permission from Elsevier. (B)
Pictograms of the swimming-styles: (a) butterfly, (b) breaststroke, (c)
backstroke, and (d) crawl used in Rothen et al. (2013). Reprinted
from Psychophysiological evidence for the genuineness of
swimming-style colour synaesthesia. Rothen et al. (2013) with
permission from Elsevier.
(i.e., words, letters, numbers, time units, musical notes, person-
alities, emotions, or movement styles). Conceptual components,
identified in many forms of synesthesia, transcend the tradition-
ally believed sensory nature of inducers. Synesthesia seems to rely
on a certain interpretation of the stimulus and the meaning that
it has for the subject, and this meaning may change dynamically
depending on the context (Rich and Mattingley, 2003; Dixon
et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2006).
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY AND SYNESTHESIA
These conclusions suggest that some forms of synesthesia may be
understood as cases of cognitive penetrability under the condi-
tions in which the sensory experience normally is not penetrable.
Pylyshyn (1999) introduced the concept of cognitive penetrability
and the lack thereof, to account for the fact that in some cases
visual experience of a perceived object is fully independent of how
we cognitively understand the object or what we know about that
object. For example, in the Mueller-Lyer illusion one of the two
lines continues to appear shorter irrespective of the direction of
attention, our knowledge that the lines are equally long, or of
any other form of mental effort. Thus, in this case the perceptual
experience cannot, in any known way, be affected by cognition.
In other words, the sensory property of visual experience is
cognitively impenetrable. Pylyshyn referred to these impenetrable
aspects of vision as early vision.
Synesthesia may be a case in which cognitive penetration
also takes place for early sensory processing. For example, the
perception of colors is usually considered impenetrable, i.e.,
cognitive operations cannot change the experience of the color
of a perceived object (Brogaard and Gatzia, in press; but cf.
Macpherson, 2012; Siegel, 2012; Vetter and Newen, 2014). At
least this seems to be the case for non-synesthetes. Synesthetes
are special in that they are able to penetrate this early aspect of
vision (or other sensory modalities) by certain higher cognitive
mechanisms. This means, synesthetic perceptual concurrents can
be modified by conceptual contents, contextual expectations,
linguistic modulation and cultural factors being their inducers
(Dixon et al., 2000; Simner, 2007, 2012; Mroczko et al., 2009;
Meier, 2013; Mroczko-Wa˛sowicz and Nikolic´, 2013; Brogaard
et al., 2014). Activating a concept synesthetes can produce a top-
down influence on a sensory experience. Thus, synesthetes exhibit
a specific difference from non-synesthetes in the structure of their
cognition. The ubiquity of this difference is relatively small, as
it applies to a small subset of the concepts that a given person
possesses and uses throughout the lifetime. For example, it may
apply only to certain graphemes or words. Nevertheless, the very
existence of such penetrability is important for the science of
mental phenomena. It tells us that the organization of the mind is
more flexible than usually presumed.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS
Usually, one expects to assign to any mental event or faculty a
brain region that is being considered its physiological underpin-
ning. For example, if we consider associations between auditory
inducers and visual concurrents, it is expected that there are
distinct brain areas for each and that the physiological account
solely involves those two brain areas. Similarly, if semantic rep-
resentations are included in understanding the functioning of
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synesthesia, one automatically expects that a corresponding third
brain area will be identified and will become a mediator of the
flow of activation, i.e., from auditory, through semantic, to visual
area.
In fact, this traditional one-area-for-function approach has
already been applied to the semantic processes in synesthesia.
Chiou and Rich (2014) propose that the anterior temporal lobe
(ATL) is a hub for inducing synesthesia and that a transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) can lead to a breakdown of the
coupling between inducers and concurrents. If their proposed
research agenda is executed, we will probably soon know whether
this part of the cortex plays a certain role in forming synesthetic
associations.
However, there are reasons to believe that, irrespective of the
results those future studies bring, this may not be the whole story.
Semantics may be something that is not particularly localizable,
but is instead to a high degree a distributed property of the
brain. For example, there is evidence that the motor cortex plays
an important role in the acquisition of action-related concepts
(Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Thus, the role of the motor cortex
may be particularly important when a subject needs to prepare
for a behavioral interaction with the object. Hence, the outcome
of the question of whether semantics can be localized or whether
it is a distributed function also depends on what is meant by
semantics. In a generalized form, a concept may serve an extended
function, not only to give a label to the stimulus, but also to
prepare the person to interact with the conceptualized stimulus.
If this interaction requires manual operations, the corresponding
part of the motor cortex may be as important as the part of the
infero-temporal cortex (Barsalou et al., 2003; Gallese and Lakoff,
2005).
Therefore, to fully account for the physiological underpinnings
of the semantic mechanisms in synesthesia, we propose that
future studies should not focus on a limited, pre-specified set of
brain regions. Instead, a brain-wide analysis should be conducted
with equal emphasis on all of its parts. In the past, such non-
restrictive analyses have been tremendously useful. For example,
the analysis of connectivity in grapheme-color synesthesia (Rouw
and Scholte, 2007) has shown that anatomically much more
changes than connections between grapheme area and color
areas. Anatomical differences associated with synesthesia are wide
spread across the brain. We suggest that these anatomical changes
reflect the widespread nature of semantics in the cortex. That
is, semantics may be a function of the entire cortex, and not a
function of a spatially bound module. In other words, if we accept
the premise that synesthesia is largely a semantic phenomenon,
the findings by Rouw and Scholte reveal the ensuing anatomical
changes of a global network. This global system may be serving
the various semantic aspects of graphemes and may play a role
in its entirety when synesthetic concurrents are being assigned to
those graphemes.
Meanwhile, the evidence has considerably expanded that
synesthesia is not a function of local cortical circuits but a global
phenomenon (Hänggi et al., 2011; Hupé et al., 2012), and so did
the support for the arguments that synesthesia relates to high-level
cognitive functions and abilities, including memory and creativity
(Rothen and Meier, 2010; Rothen et al., 2012; Mulvenna, 2013;
Meier, 2013). One implication is that the research on semantics
in the brain is itself incomplete. Thus, synesthesia research does
not have the luxury of building on well-established physiological
underpinnings of semantics. Rather, synesthesia research has to
coevolve with the research on semantics, helping us understand
better semantics of natural language and cognition—a feat criti-
cally important for cognitive science. Therefore, in future studies,
research on how our brain processes meanings may evolve hand-
to-hand with research on synesthesia.
In this effort, the recently proposed theory of the organization
of adaptive system, named practopoiesis, may provide valuable
guidance (Nikolic´, 2014). According to this theory, semantic
mechanisms are closely related to the mechanisms of general
knowledge stored in long-term memory on the basis of which
more specific knowledge is extracted, which is stored in work-
ing memory. The theory suggests that not only phenomenal
experiences in synesthesia, but also everyday experiences, may
be related to the process of categorization—synesthesia being a
useful trait to enhance this process (see also Jürgens and Nikolic´,
2014). Synesthesia may thus develop in childhood to assist
activation and manipulation of particularly abstract semantic
contents.
These conclusions lead to a very different set of hypothe-
ses that can be formulated about synesthesia than the tradi-
tional hypotheses on brain mechanisms known as cross-activation
hypothesis (i.e., based on neuronal excitation) (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001a; Hubbard et al., 2005) and its alterna-
tive, disinhibition hypothesis (Armel and Ramachandran, 1999;
Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). We discuss those novel pre-
dictions next.
DEVELOPMENT OF SYNESTHESIA
In case that synesthesia is a phenomenon the induction of which
is predominantly semantic, at least for some forms of synesthesia,
the development of synesthetic associations has to be related
to the development of person’s semantic knowledge base. The
process of learning, education and acquiring knowledge about
the surrounding world should in some instances give rise to
synesthetic associations. Insights into how a child’s learning is
associated with synesthesia can be identified from the charac-
teristics of the most common types of synesthesia. A pertinent
question is the following: why are the letters, numbers and the
time-units the most common inducers of synesthesia (Simner
et al., 2006; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). We propose that these
kinds of inducers are frequently the first truly abstract concepts
that a child has to learn, at least in Western civilization.
The following set of hypotheses can be formulated: until a
child begins to learn letters, numbers and days of the week, he or
she is mostly faced with very concrete objects, such as particular
toys, food, items of clothing, etc. These objects have very specific
perceptual representations, which can be memorized and hence,
are relatively easy to manipulate mentally. But then comes the
time when a child must learn abstract concepts. One cannot
see Tuesday or Sunday. There are no basic and straightforward
perceptual memories to be formed for days of the week. Similarly,
numbers (number names) are not just words but they have an
abstract meaning of quantity that can apply to any objects (Teddy
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bears, bananas or shoes). This is one step more abstract than
what the child was used to because none of the perceptually well-
supported images can be used as an identifier of numerosity (there
could be three Teddy bears, three bananas and three shoes but
nothing can explicitly visualize the meaning of number three).
Likewise, one and the same letter can stand for many different
words and thus, for many different objects.
As kids, we all have to find a way to acquire those abstract
concepts. Synesthetes may have an advantage there. They can
assign to those concepts something concrete, perceptual-like, that
will always be present irrespective of the actual objects in the
external world. They can assign a color to the concept, or a spatial
position, or both. That way, they can accelerate their mental
manipulations of those concepts: recall them quicker and more
accurately, determine the relationships between them, and so on.
Synesthesia then becomes a tool for accelerating mental oper-
ations with cognitively demanding i.e., abstract, contents. This
mostly aids the minds that have not yet been elaborated and have
not developed the advanced, adult-like, abstract mechanisms of
thinking. That is, this helps primarily the child’s mind. And this
explains why the most frequent forms of synesthesia involve let-
ters, numbers and time units. Longitudinal studies of synesthesia
starting in early childhood and reaching into the adult years will
likely be of great help as a way to shed light on these processes
(Simner and Bain, 2013; Meier et al., 2014).
DISCUSSION
Generally, perceptual experiences are richer and more fine-
grained than our conceptual apparatus, i.e., they contain more
distinct dimensions and perceptible positions on each dimen-
sion. Non-conceptual contents of perceptual states are more
concrete and specific than are general conceptual contents of
cognitive states (Evans, 1982; Heck, 2000; Peacocke, 2001a,b).
Thus, our ability to discriminate perceptually particular sensory
values exceeds the ability to conceptualize them. For example, we
can notice the difference between specific hues of blue, such as
Blue No. 37 and Blue No. 38, when presented simultaneously.
Nevertheless those hues remain ineffable nuances to most of us
(Raffman, 1995; Metzinger, 2009).
What we learn from studying the semantic aspects of synes-
thesia is that for synesthetes, unlike for non-synesthetes, even
abstract concepts receive some of these fine-grained qualities to
be specifically seen, heard, smelt, tasted, felt, or otherwise expe-
rienced. For example, digits have certain, very distinct, personal-
ities, musical notes are precisely colored, words contain specific
flavors or colors, time units may be positioned at particular
locations in space, and emotions can similarly smell and sound
distinctively (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Grossenbacher, 1997;
Steven and Blakemore, 2004; Simner et al., 2006, 2009; Ward et al.,
2006; Sinha, 2009; Amin et al., 2011; Figure 2).
An analogous ability in the general non-synesthetic population
is discussed in philosophical debates such as that of whether there
are high-level properties in the content of perception (Siegel,
2006; Bayne, 2009). Those who think that there are such prop-
erties in the content of perception hold that high-level prop-
erties enter into phenomenal contents. Another debate pertains
to cognitive phenomenology, according to which phenomenology
extends beyond the sensory domain (Pitt, 2004; Bayne and
Montague, 2011). This means that phenomenal consciousness
cannot be reduced to non-conceptual contents of perceptual
states representing sensory properties. Phenomenal experiences
also involve various cognitive states including high-level con-
ceptual contents. Apparently, not only non-conceptual attributes
determine the character of our phenomenology; conceptual
representations also affect our phenomenal experiences. Thus,
both perceptual and cognitive states are causally and explanatorily
relevant in elucidating how we experience the world because
they both exhibit their own phenomenal characters—something
it is like to be in such a state for the subject (Strawson, 1994;
Chalmers, 1996; Montague and Bayne, 2011; cf. Nagel, 1974),
e.g., both seeing an object of deep red color and understanding
a complicated mathematical formula are associated with certain
phenomenal qualities.
Here we have shown that synesthesia combines a rich diversity
of phenomenal contents—a multitude of experiential levels that
are primarily driven by: sensory, motor, bodily, emotional or
conceptual systems. Consequently, the full combined experience
of synesthesia exhibits a holistic epistemic unity—an overall
integration of experiences driven by different mental faculties,
cognitive and sensory, which are then bound into a coherently
unified conscious experience (Mroczko et al., 2009; Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz, 2013). In this way, synesthesia transgresses the bound-
aries between perception and cognition more than any other
mental phenomenon—i.e., between capacities traditionally con-
sidered as two independently operating domains (Mroczko-
Wa˛sowicz and Werning, 2012).
The cross-domain experiences should not be seen only as an
exception, as if it would only be the case for the extraordinary
phenomenon of synesthesia. Rather, they should be seen as a
general rule applicable also to non-synesthetic practices. If this
premise is accepted, synesthesia may be understood as making use
of mechanisms similar to those present in ordinary perception
and imagery (Ward et al., 2007). The reason why a synesthete
takes an extra step in creating a unique synesthetic experience
may lie in the nature of the individual semantic network of
concepts s/he is deploying. As Jürgens and Nikolic´ (2014)
proposed, the semantic structure of each inducing category (e.g.,
a letter of an alphabet) may be richer for a synesthete by one
attribute than for a non-synesthete. Thus, besides the size, shape,
or position in the alphabet, or an associated sound, a synesthete
would have one more attribute for each grapheme—its color.
In general, we propose that perception and conceptual knowl-
edge are intimately linked and should be investigated together as
a unified research problem. By doing so, more progress may be
made in understanding human cognition—both synesthetic and
non-synesthetic. Thus, lessons learned from synesthesia may be
extended into the “ordinary world” of perception and help us
develop an integrative approach. This approach would recognize
that the boundary between cognition and perception is elusive:
perception is more sophisticated than traditionally assumed, ris-
ing up to the “high-level”. And similarly, “low-level” cognitive
operations are fundamentally grounded in our perceptual capa-
bilities (Schyns et al., 1998; Goldstone et al., 2010; Goldstone and
Hendrickson, 2010).
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Much evidence exists that perception affects cognition such
as belief acquisition and formation of concepts (Prinz and
Barsalou, 2000; Goldstone et al., 2008; Barsalou, 2009, 2012).
This supports the hypothesis of concept empiricism, according
to which conceptual representations and abstract conceptual
knowledge are perceptually based. The underlying operations
involve re-activation of perceptual and motor representations
(Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998; Barsalou, 1999; Prinz, 2002,
2005). Conceptual contents affect not only the phenomenal
character of cognitive states (Montague and Bayne, 2011),
but they can equally so inform and influence the phenomenal
character of perceptual states; in other words they can cognitively
penetrate our perception (Macpherson, 2012). For example,
changes in the conceptual content of the inducing stimulus
(e.g., the mood or new knowledge about the stimulus) modify
perception of the synesthetic concurrent.
This relationship between perception and conception is an
integral part of the practopoietic theory and specifically, of the
presumed mechanisms of anapoiesis responsible for extraction of
knowledge from long-term to working memory (Nikolic´, 2014).
In this system, the process of perception and the process of
conceptualization of the stimulus rely on the same underlying
mechanisms. That is, there is little difference between perceiving
a situation or an object (e.g., a chair) and conceptualizing that
object, including the most general aspects such as the means of
interacting with that object (e.g., knowing what movements are
needed in order to sit on a given chair).
Also, our proposal, that semantic mechanisms may be respon-
sible for generating some forms of synesthesia (i.e., an ideasthesia)
is compatible with cognitive penetrability of perception, a recent
interdisciplinary approach based on the presumption that there
are various ways in which conscious perception can be modi-
fied by cognition–i.e., by thoughts, beliefs, desires, judgments,
intentions, moods, emotions, expectations, knowledge, previous
experiences and memories (Frith and Dolan, 1997; Bar, 2003;
Raftopoulos, 2005, 2009; Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007; Stokes,
2012; Wu, 2013; Vetter and Newen, 2014). In other words, con-
ceptual contents of higher cognitive states not only have causal
influence on the contents of perception, but they are explanatorily
relevant when trying to account for the processing of perceptual
systems. Similarly relevant are the semantic aspects of inducers
for explaining the induction of concurrents in synesthesia. A
full understanding of how the mind works requires considering
the tight relations holding among the cognitive and perceptual
domains and their mutual impact.
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Sequence-space synesthetes experience some sequences (e.g., numbers, calendar units)
as arranged in spatial forms, i.e., spatial patterns in their mind’s eye or even outside their
body. Various explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. Here we argue that
these spatial forms are continuous with varieties of non-synesthetic visuospatial imagery
and share their central characteristics. This includes their dynamic and elaborative nature,
their involuntary feel, and consistency over time. Drawing from literatures on mental
imagery and working memory, we suggest how the initial acquisition and subsequent
elaboration of spatial forms could be accounted for in terms of the known developmental
trajectory of visuospatial representations.This extends from the formation of image-based
representations of verbal material in childhood to the later maturation of dynamic control
of imagery. Individual differences in the development of visuospatial style also account for
variation in the character of spatial forms, e.g., in terms of distinctions such as visual versus
spatial imagery, or ego-centric versus object-based transformations.
Keywords: synesthesia, sequence-space synesthesia, spatial form, visuospatial, mental imagery, individual
difference, development, working memory
In sequence-space synesthesia, sequences members such as cal-
endar units or numerals are felt to occupy locations within an
explicit spatial layout of sequence members – a spatial form –
that resides in imaginal or extra-bodily space, and ranges from
simple 2D to intricate 3D arrangements (Cytowic and Eagle-
man, 2009; Simner, 2009; Price and Mattingley, 2013; Jonas
and Jarick, in press; Price, in press). Typically, the majority of
a synesthete’s spatial forms originate in childhood. While under-
standing the development of non-numerical sequence knowledge
is in its infancy (Berteletti et al., 2012), even less is known
about the developmental origins of sequence-space synesthe-
sia, despite a common incidence [though population estimates
vary widely from 2% (Brang et al., 2010) to 20% (Sagiv et al.,
2006)]. Some suggest unusual brain processes are involved,
perhaps mediated by exaggerated cortical connectivity (e.g., Hub-
bard et al., 2005, 2011; Tang et al., 2008; Eagleman, 2009).
This view sometimes links spatial forms to normal processes
of implicit spatial representation of magnitude (Hubbard et al.,
2005, 2011; Tang et al., 2008; Simner, 2009). Others suggest spa-
tial forms are continuous with standard varieties of visuospatial
mental imagery and best understood as a residue from child-
hood strategies for encoding abstract verbal sequences (Galton,
1880, 1881; Phillips, 1897; Seron et al., 1992; Sagiv et al., 2006;
Price, 2009, in press; Jonas et al., 2011; Price and Mattingley,
2013).
In the latter vein, we offer here a speculative summary of how
initial acquisition and subsequent elaboration of spatial forms
could be accounted for in terms of the known developmental
trajectory of visuospatial representations, drawing from the inter-
connected literatures on mental imagery and visuospatial working
memory.
SEQUENCE-SPACE SYNESTHESIA IS A VARIETY OF
VISUOSPATIAL IMAGERY
Sequence-space synesthesia is characterized by internally gen-
erated visual and/or spatial sensory experience, and has many
experiential similarities with non-synesthetic imagery. We there-
fore suggest that it is per deﬁnition a variety of visuospatial
imagery, and an example of the considerable individual differ-
ences in vividness and prevalence of mental imagery among the
general population (McKelvie, 1995; Borst and Kosslyn, 2010).
Visuospatial imagery occurs in many contexts, both normal and
clinical, but its basic neurocognitive substrates are conventionally
taken to be the same across domains. On grounds of explanatory
parsimony, we therefore also suggest that standard mechanisms
for the production and transformation of conscious visuospa-
tial representations are at very least involved in mediating spatial
forms, perhaps even sufﬁcient (Price and Mattingley, 2013; Price,
in press). Consistent with this, sequence-space synesthetes show
above-average (although not exceptional) non-synesthetic visual
imagery at a subjective level (Price, 2009; Rizza and Price, 2012;
Meier and Rothen, 2013), and possibly also above-average visu-
ospatial skill at a behavioral level (see Price, in press), including the
ability to retain other synesthetes’ formsmore accurately thannon-
synesthetes can (Brang et al., 2010). Furthermore, at least some
behavioral correlates of sequence-space synesthesia can be mim-
icked by use of controlled visuospatial imagery in non-synesthete
participants (Price, 2009).
EARLY ACQUISITION OF EXPLICIT SPATIAL FORMS
At a general level the use of spatial representations to help cat-
egorize the world is acknowledged as important in children’s
learning (e.g., Namy et al., 1997; Schwartz and Heiser, 2006)
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and the ability to construct abstract spatial representations from
verbal symbols is a cornerstone of human spatial cognition (Paz-
zaglia et al., 2012). For example, there is some evidence for an
imagery-based“mental time line” in adult participants where tem-
poral events are spatially mapped (Arzy et al., 2009). Heine et al.
(2011) have also presented EEG data from elementary school
children indicating visual imagery activity during numerical
comparisons.
More speciﬁcally, initial learning of the sequential ordering of
acquired verbal symbols such as numerals or calendar units will
beneﬁt from visuospatial representations because, prior to around
7 years, children tend to show little use of their phonological loop
to rehearse verbal sequences in working memory (Flavell et al.,
1966; Hitch et al., 1988).Whether spatial forms developmay there-
fore depend on individual differences in the ages at which a given
child learns such sequences relative to maturation of their phono-
logical rehearsal. However, even when phonological rehearsal is
available, visuospatial representations will beneﬁt learning and
long-term retention due to the documented advantages of dual
coding (Paivio, 1971; Clark and Paivio, 1991). Apparent random-
ness and irregularity in the layout of some spatial forms may
partly derive from acquisition at these early ages when execu-
tive control over image generation is underdeveloped, and when
spatial layout is less constrained by social conventions of, for
example, left to right writing or circular clockwise time represen-
tation.
Persistence of visuospatial representations into later childhood
and adulthood will be inﬂuenced by continued individual dif-
ferences in reliance on verbal versus non-verbal strategies. In
this respect it is notable that adult sequence-space synesthetes
report prevalent general visual imagery, may show above-average
visuospatial skill in some domains, and seem to adopt more visu-
ospatial strategies (e.g., during some types of mental arithmetic;
Ward et al., 2009). Seron et al. (1992) also reported below-average
scores on self-report measures of verbalizing tendency although
this was not replicated by Meier and Rothen (2013).
However it is important to acknowledge that spatial forms
probably derive from multiple developmental inﬂuences. If they
resulted solely from a developmental delay in phonological
rehearsal, we would expect sequences that are learned earliest in
life to be most prone to elicit spatial forms. But this is not the
case. Numbers 1–30 are on average acquired by children before
the calendar sequence of 12 months, and can be expressed ear-
lier in a linear spatial layout (see Table 1 in Berteletti et al., 2012).
On the other hand, number forms appear to be much less com-
mon than month forms, occurring largely in people who also have
other types of form such as months (Phillips, 1897; Price et al.,
2009). Therefore, although a minority of synesthetes may develop
all their spatial forms due to problematic rote verbal rehearsal in
childhood, additional factors must be at play among the major-
ity of synesthetes. For example, it is possible that that calendar
sequences are more difﬁcult to learn than numbers, and so are
more sensitive to deﬁciencies in verbal rehearsal. Alternatively, the
normal tendency for linear spatial coding of numbers to precede
and later generalize to other sequences such as months (Berteletti
et al., 2012) may be disrupted, perhaps again owing to deﬁcient
verbal encoding, leading to atypical visualization strategies.
FURTHER ELABORATION OF SPATIAL FORMS
Moving beyond the advantages of visuospatial representations for
initial acquisition of sequences, calendar sequences may induce
spatial forms more often than numbers because they are more
likely to be taught diagrammatically in the ﬁrst place. Although
most synesthetes forget the origins of their forms, some do claim
their calendar formswere inﬂuenced by exposure to diagrammatic
representations from school, TV, calendars, etc. In addition to such
environmental inﬂuences, continuing developmental incentives
for spatial forms may include more complex representational roles
such as depicting the cyclical nature of calendar sequences via
closed circles.
Once established, spatial forms are reported to increase in com-
plexity from childhood to adulthood (Phillips, 1897; Morton,
1936). This complexity can include creative symbolism such as
bends in number lines at decade breaks, distortions of date lines
to mark personally signiﬁcant events, and the use of spatial extent
in month or weekday forms to represent the personal importance
of some time periods (Price and Mattingley, 2013). By contrast
to earlier randomness in forms, controlled and complex imagery
of this kind, along with improved processing of spatial relations
between objects, will be more dependent on attentional executive-
basedprocesses (Pearson et al., 1996; Pearson,2007)whichdevelop
markedly from the age of six onward (Gathercole et al., 2004;
Chevalier et al., 2013).
As the ability to generate and transform spatial forms matures,
theywill evolvemany characteristics that are continuouswith stan-
dard controlled visuospatial imagery. These include elaboration
of the forms (e.g., from simple spatial trajectories of sequence
members into ribbon or tube-like structures), integration of other
associated visual imagery into the form, the continued growth
of existing forms such as personal time lines, the development
of entirely new forms, and the ability to dynamically transform
viewpoint such as zooming into the form or navigating within
or around the form (Price and Mattingley, 2013; Price, in press).
Skill in shifting one’s attentional window on the form may be
exploited by those synesthetes who claim to use their calendar
forms as associative mnemonic systems such as weekly or yearly
diaries, or use historical time lines to encode autobiographical
and biographical dates (Simner et al., 2009). In a minority of
unusual synesthetes who report a great number of forms, visu-
alization strategies appear to extend beyond classic sequences to
provide general classiﬁcation systems or mnemonics for shoes
sizes, the Lord’s Prayer, etc. Just as self-report measures reveal
a wide distribution in the vividness of the mental imagery experi-
enced by non-synesthetes, so the salience and vividness of spatial
forms seems to run in graded fashion from the most exotic
forms, via vague semi-voluntary forms, to no experience of forms
at all.
INVOLUNTARY FEELING AND CONSISTENCY ARE NOT
UNIQUE TO SYNESTHETIC IMAGERY
Although the common claim that sequence-space synesthesia
is strongly automatic has been challenged (Price and Mattin-
gley, 2013), spatial forms are nevertheless usually reported to
have an involuntary feel. Additionally, although spatial forms do
appear to evolve over time, their relative stability as long term
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 689 | 86
“fnhum-07-00689” — 2013/10/25 — 14:17 — page 3 — #3
Price and Pearson Sequence-space synesthesia as visuospatial imagery
representations is one of their notable characteristics (Jonas and
Jarick, in press). Involuntary feeling and consistency over time
have traditionally been taken as central hallmarks of synesthe-
sia. However even these properties of spatial forms are shared by
non-synesthetic visuospatial imagery.
In both healthy and clinical populations, imagery experiences
commonly result from involuntary as well as deliberate recall
processes (Pearson et al., 2013). Regular experience of recurrent
involuntary memory is widespread, and occurs for positive and
neutral memories as well as negative ones (Berntsen and Rubin,
2008). Pearson et al. (2013) argue that intrusive mental imagery
also plays an important role within clinical psychopathology and
is associated with many disorders, including post-traumatic stress
disorder and social phobia. In addition, according to the Elabo-
rated Intrusion theory of craving (Kavanagh et al., 2005), mental
imagery plays a key role during craving for addictive substances
and is a hallmark of the phenomenology associated with craving
(Andrade et al., 2012). Intrusive imagery may often seem spon-
taneous, but arises frequently and with involuntary feel merely
due to its ease of retrieval when activated by cues via the nor-
mal mechanisms of associative retrieval. These cues may be either
external (Keane et al., 1991; Carlesimo, 1994) or internal (Pear-
son, 2012; Pearson et al., 2012; Krans et al., 2013) in nature. Ease
of retrieval also accounts for easy voluntary activation of such
images. By analogy, spatial forms seem frequently activated in
an involuntary manner by relevant cues (e.g., a month name, or
thinking generally about the year calendar), as well as easily acti-
vated in a more strategic manner (e.g., strategic memorization
via associative placement of retrospective or prospective events
within a spatial form, illustrated by exceptional date memory
among synesthetes with forms for historical time; Simner et al.,
2009). Note that Price and Mattingley (2013) suggest voluntary
activation of spatial forms plays a critical role in several experi-
mental paradigms which have been claimed previously to demon-
strate the automaticity and inﬂexibility of synesthetes’ spatial
associations.
The content of recurrent intrusive imagery is usually very con-
sistent in terms of what is depicted in the image (Engelhard
et al., 2011; Schulze et al., 2013). Alongside ease of access, con-
sistency is also a characteristic of the often complex visuospatial
imagery that may develop as a mnemonic strategy among non-
synesthetes, including professional mnemonists. Importantly,
effective mnemonic imagery needs to be consistent and well-
established in long-term memory in order to provide a stable
framework for encoding of to-be-remembered material (e.g.,
Paivio, 1971; Maguire et al., 2003).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SPATIAL FORMS REFLECT
SEPARABLE SUBCOMPONENTS OF VISUOSPATIAL IMAGERY
In the attempt to establish sequence-space synesthesia as a legit-
imate and deﬁned topic within cognitive neuroscience, the het-
erogeneity of spatial forms has tended to be overlooked. Spatial
forms vary not merely in their vividness, personal importance,
complexity, and involuntariness, but also in their spatial frame of
reference, in whether they feel like static depictive visual images or
like spatial models, and in the types of spatial transformation that
can most naturally be applied to them (Price, in press). Aspects
of this rich variation can be naturally accounted for in terms of
the separable subcomponents of normal visuospatial imagery, and
individual differences in the skills mediated by those subcom-
ponents.
For example, the term “visuospatial imagery” blurs the partial
separability, at experiential, behavioral, and neural levels, between
“visual” versus “spatial” aspects of visuospatial imagery (Mazard
et al., 2004; Kosslyn et al., 2007). While incompletely understood,
this distinction refers respectively to a more holistic encoding of
the visual or“depictive”appearance of imaged entities, versusmore
explicit representation of the relative spatial positions of objects or
object parts (Hegarty, 2010). It is claimed that individuals tend to
be either object visualizers, favoring a more visual style of imagery
that is associated with vivid high resolution imagery and supe-
rior performance on visual memory tasks, or spatial visualizers,
favoring good spatial analysis and dynamic image transforma-
tions such as mental rotation (Kozhevnikov et al., 2005, 2010;
Blajenkova et al., 2006). A distinction between object visualizers,
spatial visualizers, and verbalizers is also claimed in in the devel-
opment of cognitive styles among 8- to 17-year olds (Blazhenkova
et al., 2011).
There is ongoing debate over whether the experiential charac-
ter of spatial forms and the behavioral skills of sequence-space
synesthetes correspond more closely to the traits of object or
spatial visualizers (see Price, in press). For example three stud-
ies now show that, for self-report measures, it is in the visual
rather than spatial domain that people with “spatial” forms show
above-average scores (Price,2009; Rizza andPrice,2012;Meier and
Rothen, 2013; see also Eagleman, 2009). However our observa-
tion of synesthetes’ descriptions of their experiences is that spatial
forms can reﬂect characteristics of either trait – i.e., an emphasis
on visual detail as seen from one egocentrically deﬁned external
viewpoint, or on spatial locations of sequence members in a spa-
tial map that can be navigated as an immersive mental model.
One solution to this paradox is that a subset of synesthetes with
a spatial visualizer trait have not been detected by studies with
small samples or averaged data. Another solution is that visual
versus spatial imagery are practically interdependent, even if con-
ceptually separable. For example, a spatial model may be more
complex and abstract than a visual image, but visual imagery skill
may remain important to instantiate particular views of the spatial
model (Pazzaglia et al., 2012). Alternatively, a spatial form could
start life as a visual image but develop over time into a spatial
model. There is a salient parallel here with literature on human
spatial navigation: when people construct spatial representations
from verbal input, a hierarchical developmental progression is
reported from reliance on landmarks (i.e., an initial focus on spe-
ciﬁc views), to routes (i.e., a progression through landmarks), to
a more ﬂexible survey description (i.e., a spatial model; Nori and
Guisberti, 2003). Furthermore, adults seem to show preference
for one or other of these levels of spatial representation (Pazza-
glia et al., 2000) which, like the overlapping distinction between
object/spatial-visualizers, may map onto typologies of spatial
form.
For those spatial formswhich reach the developmental sophisti-
cation of a spatial model, their dynamic transformation is another
areawhere individual differences can be informed by fractionation
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of visuospatial imagery skills. Some synesthetes report object-
centered transformation – e.g., as the months go by, their spatial
model of the calendar months rotates around or in front of
them. Others report ego-centric transformations – e.g., they feel
they navigate through, or around, their spatial model. Price (in
press) suggests that synesthetes’ preferred mode of transformation
may be related to known individual differences in object- versus
ego-centric transformation skill which rely on distinct neural pro-
cessing resources and are partly independent at a behavioral level,
as revealed by visuospatial psychometric tests (Zacks and Miche-
lon, 2005). Interestingly, a classic distinction in spatial metaphor
for time among the general non-synesthete population is between
ego-moving metaphors (observer feels they move along a time
line toward the future) and time-moving metaphors (time is felt
to move like a river past the observer; Clark, 1973; Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Gentner et al., 2002). This raises the possibility
that spatial forms and non-synesthetes’ spatial metaphors both
reﬂect similar individual differences in aptitude for one or other
mode of visuospatial image transformation.
A practical implication of these kinds of individual differences
is that visuospatial skills will differ among synesthetes. Unless
synesthetes’ individual proﬁles are carefully aligned, group com-
parisons of their behavioral skills versus control samples stand in
danger of confusion and inconsistency.
SPATIAL FORMS AND IMPLICIT SPATIAL REPRESENTATION
OF MAGNITUDE
Our approach differs from suggestions (Hubbard et al., 2005,
2011; Tang et al., 2008; Simner, 2009) that spatial forms are an
abnormally explicit expression of the analog spatial representa-
tions which represent magnitude, not just of numbers but across
many continuous perceptual dimensions (ATheory of Magnitude,
ATOM, Walsh, 2003). As argued by de Hevia et al. (2006), this use
of space as a general analog continuous representation for mag-
nitude, exempliﬁed in the concept of the implicit Mental Number
Line (MNL), can be contrasted with the ordering of discrete items
of information (e.g., symbolic labels) in representational space.
Indeed, neuropsychological data show representation of magni-
tude and ordinality to be dissociated, even though they interact
(Berteletti et al., 2012). We suggest that a fundamental problem
in attempting to align spatial forms with systems for magnitude
representation is that most spatial forms express non-magnitude
sequences, such as calendar units or the alphabet, unlike numbers
which possess cardinality as well as ordinality. Moreover, in spatial
forms, the use of spatial extension to represent personal impor-
tance rather than temporal length of certain months illustrates
that magnitude representation is not their main function. Rather,
they are easily activated, long-term, visuospatial representations
of ordinality which aid some individuals to acquire, retrieve, and
mentally navigate within abstract sequences, which can be elabo-
rated to symbolize further information, andwhichmay sometimes
provide a facilitative template for further associative memories.
CONCLUSION
Central hallmarks of sequence-space synesthesia, including invol-
untary feel, consistency over time, dynamic nature, and elaborative
imagery, are not unique to this variety of imagery, but shared by
everyday visuospatial imagery, intrusive imagery, and mnemonic
imagery. Furthermore, a visuospatial developmental perspective
illuminates why and when sequence-space synesthesia originates
in some people, and why its character varies between synesthetes.
We therefore suggest strong continuity between synesthetic spatial
forms and normal processes of visuospatial imagery.
Interest in the relationship between mental imagery and synes-
thesia is by no means conﬁned to sequence-space synesthesia, and
there is growing evidence that other varieties of synesthesia are also
associated with above-average visual imagery (Meier and Rothen,
2013; Price, in press). However evidence also suggests that pre-
disposition to experience this variety of synesthesia is separable
from other types of synesthesia (Novich et al., 2011), and that it is
associated with a different grouping of cognitive styles compared,
for example, with grapheme-color synesthesia (Meier and Rothen,
2013). The extent to which our current perspective may extend to
other varieties of synesthesia therefore remains an open question.
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Investigation of synesthesia phenomenology in adults is needed to constrain accounts
of developmental trajectories of this trait. We report an extended phenomenological
investigation of sequence-space synesthesia in a single case (AB). We used the Elicitation
Interview (EI) method to facilitate repeated exploration of AB’s synesthetic experience.
During an EI the subject’s attention is selectively guided by the interviewer in order
to reveal precise details about the experience. Detailed analysis of the resulting 9 h
of interview transcripts provided a comprehensive description of AB’s synesthetic
experience, including several novel observations. For example, we describe a specific
spatial reference frame (a “mental room”) in which AB’s concurrents occur, and which
overlays his perception of the real world (the “physical room”). AB is able to switch his
attention voluntarily between this mental room and the physical room. Exemplifying the EI
method, some of our observations were previously unknown even to AB. For example,
AB initially reported to experience concurrents following visual presentation, yet we
determined that in the majority of cases the concurrent followed an internal verbalization
of the inducer, indicating an auditory component to sequence-space synesthesia. This
finding is congruent with typical rehearsal of inducer sequences during development,
implicating cross-modal interactions between auditory and visual systems in the genesis
of this synesthetic form. To our knowledge, this paper describes the first application of
an EI to synesthesia, and the first systematic longitudinal investigation of the first-person
experience of synesthesia since the re-emergence of interest in this topic in the 1980’s.
These descriptions move beyond rudimentary graphical or spatial representations of the
synesthetic spatial form, thereby providing new targets for neurobehavioral analysis.
Keywords: sequence-space synesthesia, phenomenology, elicitation interview, conscious experience, case study
INTRODUCTION
In sequence-space synesthesia (SSS) (also known as spatial-form
synesthesia), ordinal sequences such as numbers, letters and cal-
endar months are experienced as occupying precise locations in
extended areas of space (Price, 2009; Ward, 2013). Despite affect-
ing up to 20% of the population (Sagiv et al., 2006; Mann et al.,
2009), our understanding of the visual phenomenology of this
experience is largely limited to schematic spatial representations
of concurrents spatial-forms (see for example Figure 1).
Some of the most complete introspective reports of SSS were
collected from 26 SS synesthetes, via a questionnaire with both
open-ended and “yes/no/maybe” questions (Seron et al., 1992).
This investigation of Seron et al. uncovered a number of features
afforded little attention in subsequent research. For example, one
subject indicated that certain sections of their number form had
a black background and white digits, whilst other sections had
a white background and black digits (see Figure 2). Nineteen
subjects reported that once “activated,” a concurrent could not
be moved (Seron et al., 1992, p. 174). Subjects also reported being
better able to “make use” of their representation where they had
a free “visual field,” e.g., when their eyes were closed, and that the
“vividness” of the number concurrent increases when the subjects
concentrate on it (Seron et al., 1992). One subject reported auto-
matically experiencing the concurrents immediately surrounding
the induced item, although these adjacent numbers were “a bit
less salient” (Seron et al., 1992, p. 180). Seron et al. re-ignited
interest in the exploration of SSS, but concluded that the “gen-
uineness of the number representations” remains the primary
open question (Seron et al., 1992, p. 185). Twenty years later, the
majority of published research on SSS continues to be concerned
with establishing the reliability and behavioral impact of SSS. For
example, SSS has been shown to reduce reaction times to items
presented in positions congruent to a concurrent spatial location
(e.g., Jarick et al., 2009a). However, there has been little regard for
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FIGURE 1 | AB’s number form as produced at the start of the
investigation (left) and 22 months later (right).
the phenomenal aspects which may shed light on other processes
known to be modulated by SSS, e.g., visuospatial working mem-
ory, visuospatial imagery, sequence representation and memory
for personal or historical dates (see Price and Mattingley, 2013
for a review).
The Elicitation Interview (EI, also known as the Explicitation
Interview) technique is derived from the phenomenological tra-
dition of Husserl and the study of phenomenological content of
conscious experience (Vermersch, 1994). The EI was formulated
specifically for the purposes of obtaining descriptions of pre-
reflective experience (that is, aspects of our experience which we
are not aware of, prior to active reflection upon them), whereas
a semi-structured interview is more generally applied to gather
information on the reflective experience of the subject. In per-
forming an EI, the trained interviewer guides the introspection of
the subject by directing their attention to precise aspects of their
phenomenological experience (Vermersch, 1994). This model of
pre-reflective access is based on the premise that guided intro-
spection facilitates the transformation of implicit to explicit.
Commentary has been provided elsewhere on whether EI itself
changes the experience, rather than enabling increased reporting
access to the experience (see Froese et al., 2011a). This debate is
primarily a philosophical issue of deep versus shallow concepts of
lived experience and is outside the scope of this paper.
EI has previously been applied to increase awareness of epilep-
tic prodrome features (Petitmengin et al., 2007), to understand
the adaptation strategies of elderly drivers (Cahour et al., 2010),
to provide introspective access to unconscious decision making
processes (Petitmengin et al., 2013), and to develop and iden-
tify distinct “attentional states” before the onset of a cognitive
task (Lutz et al., 2002) [see also Maurel (2009) for other appli-
cations and Froese et al. (2011a) for a review of recent research
using second-personmethods]. A full and detailedmethod for the
conduct of an EI has been presented elsewhere (e.g., Petitmengin,
FIGURE 2 | Number form for subject JB reported in Seron et al.
(1992). Note the features of defined background color, similar to the
context reported by our subject, and the high contrast between digit and
background color, which we propose to be a feature of the context,
enabling the concurrent to be readily visible. Reproduced with permission
from Seron et al. (1992), with permission from Elsevier Limited. License
Number: 3364950446639.
2006). Below we provide a brief overview of the assumptions and
priorities in EI data collection, to highlight the unique proper-
ties of this method and how it may be applied beneficially in the
investigation of synesthesia phenomenology.
During the EI, we aim for the subject to reach and main-
tain an “evocation state” through interviewer-led direction of
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attention. Evocation is a deep introspective state in which the
subject is in “direct contact” with their experience, and re-living
it as they speak. A positive evocation state is suggested by slow
and considered speech, avoidance of generalizations, a distant
or unfocused gaze and often the use of language in the present
tense (the subject may say, “I can see . . .” rather than “I remem-
ber seeing . . .”). There is some similarity between the induction
of the evocation state and that of a hypnotic state. The inter-
viewer may use “Ericksonian” language to refocus the subject
and gain access to pre-reflective experience, for example when
the participant responds, “I don’t know . . .,” the interviewer may
ask, “How do you know that you don’t know?” (Petitmengin,
2006). Although the original event may only have lasted a sec-
ond, through EI we are able to prolong and extend the experience
of that event during the evocation state, through subtle use of
language and cues. A potential risk in the collection of such
first-person data of this kind is the unintentional retrospective
transformation of events, as demonstrated by experimental false
memory induction (e.g., Loftus and Pickrell, 1995) and false
recollection (Greenberg, 2004). Petitmengin et al. (2013) have
recently demonstrated that the process of becoming aware of pre-
viously pre-reflective aspects of experience does not necessarily
lead to confabulation. The specific language used by partici-
pants in reporting false memories will, however, allow a skilled
interviewer to recognize infidelity in the report and exclude the
relevant section from analysis (Froese et al., 2011a). Other bias
effects are reduced in the normal practice of EI by monitoring
and maintaining the evocation state of the subject, to ensure they
are reliably verbalizing the experience and not their beliefs about
the experience. Active and open questioning, with rephrasing of
the subjects own statements, serves to draw attention to specific
aspects which may generally be overlooked in normal discourse.
Examples of good practice in bracketing to reduce bias effects and
maintaining evocation are provided in theMaterials andMethods
section.
We present here an extended phenomenological description
of SSS in a single case. We apply the EI technique, and demon-
strate that qualitative second-person techniques can be used
to gather first-person information about a perceptual experi-
ence of SSS, which may be used to guide future qualitative
and quantitative investigations. The assumptions of EI make it
particularly suited to dissecting processes such as SSS, which
appear to occur automatically or with little conscious effort, but
which also retain a cognitive “anchor” or event upon which to
ground the interview. Steady-state experiences such as synesthe-
sia may also engender high fidelity reports, as the event can be
reported immediately as it unfolds, rather than retrospectively.
The results of the EI were analyzed following Petitmengin (2006),
involving successive iterations of aggregation and abstraction of
themes, schemas or structures of the experience. This process
is similar to the more widely practiced Grounded Theory anal-
ysis of qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The themes
uncovered via this method have been collated and organized
into a detailed and expandable html mind map, which we
have made available to readers via the Supplementary Materials.
This paper, supported by the Supplementary Materials, presents
converging evidence on the reproducibility of the Seron et al.
phenomenological investigations. Importantly, we extend the
level of phenomenological detail acquired and describe novel
aspects of the SSS experience. We demonstrate that a more
complete understanding of SSS phenomenology may shed light
on features of the experience such as the spatial reference
frame in which the concurrents exist, along with issues relat-
ing to the apparent automaticity of concurrents and vividness
of spatial-forms, which in turn may speak to the recent re-
framing of SSS as relating to enhanced visual imagery (Price and
Mattingley, 2013). We also demonstrate that greater detail in our
understanding of the phenomenological experience of SSS can
reveal subtle idiosyncratic aspects of the SSS experience, which
may contribute to our understanding of the development of
this trait.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The subject (AB) is a 30 year old, right handedmale with nomed-
ical history of psychological or neurological trauma. AB reported
to have experienced SSS for numbers, days of the week and
months, for as long as he could remember. Prior to interview,
no facet of AB’s SSS was identified as particularly remarkable or
out of the ordinary. To test the consistency of his spatial-forms,
AB was asked to reproduce his number forms at the start of
data collection and again 22 months post interview. These two
schematics are sufficiently similar to confirm the genuineness of
AB’s synesthesia (see Figure 1).
CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted by a trained and experienced EI
practitioner. Nine hours of interview were conducted over nine
non-consecutive sessions spanning 2 months. The interviews
were conducted in a private room and recorded following the
informed consent of the subject. The interviews were exploratory
and involved a fluid examination of topics of interest as they arose.
Inducers were presented audibly, for example the interviewer
would ask “If I say, five . . . What do you see?” (20100215_79-
81)1. A visually presented inducer was used on three occasions
(20100408_3, 20100408_65, 20100415_19), with the inducer
drawn on a page of the interviewer’s notebook. The nature and
purpose of the EI method was defined for the participant at the
beginning of the first interview session. The interviewer high-
lighted the requirement for the subject to describe the experience
in detail, and reminded the participant of the interviewer’s role
in guiding and maintaining the focus of attention, suggesting
that these particular skills may develop as the series of inter-
views progress (20100215_2). EI is more commonly applied in
the exploration of past events, either naturally occurring or
triggered for the purposes of the interview. In the present investi-
gation, experiences were triggered by the interviewer, during the
interview itself, and then immediately described and re-evoked.
This deviation from the standard EI practice enabled the free
1Throughout the Materials and Methods and Results sections, we have made
use of direct quotations from interview transcripts, in order to convey the
essence of the interview conduct and mode of questioning. Quotations are
referenced with the interview date in the format YYYYMMDD and the
paragraph number in the transcript.
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exploration of the SSS experience, rather than limiting the inter-
view content to a single event. Each interview session began by
revisiting the features of interest in the previous interview, or
addressing any topics which had been raised informally between
interviews.
Maintaining the subject’s focus
The interviewer used active questioning and reformulation of
the subject’s own words in order to maintain attention on a
single instant or aspect of the experience, as exemplified in the
questioning style demonstrated below.
AB: Ahm . . . I’m looking at it . . . at the moment I’m project-
ing it onto the screen in front of me and just . . . It’s all on that
screen. INTERVIEWER: So if you look at that screen . . . (20100215_
45-46).
Here the subject refers to concepts of “projecting” and “screen,”
both of which have not been explored at this stage. In order to
gain a description of what the subject means by the use of these
words, the interviewer simply asks AB to look at the screen and
describe what he sees.
AB: So, so you can sort of see a floor underneath the five, and
then there’s kind of a wall . . . ahm (20100222_20, 20100222_22).
INTERVIEWER: And if you focus on the wall and the floor,
and try to keep your focus there, how does the periphery look?
(20100222_32).
Here the interviewer uses the terms “wall” and “floor” as the sub-
ject did. This reuse of the subjects own words serves to maintain
and focus his attention on these specific features.
Bracketing for bias reduction
“Bracketing” interpretations of events is conducted during the
interview and during analysis, to minimize the interpretive bias.
Data were removed from analysis if the interviewer’s questioning
was deemed to be leading. Examples of bracketed or excluded data
are given below for clarity (emphasis added).
1. INTERVIEWER: Can you say something of where this is being
presented to you? AB: Yeah, I think I’m projecting a mental
image in front of me. INTERVIEWER: Okay, well maybe we’ll
come back to that later (20100215_16-23).
2. INTERVIEWER: But interestingly enough, the number line,
when I asked you to have one behind you, latched onto the floor
(20100329_206).
In (1) the interviewer identified a “belief” or theory that the sub-
ject held about his experience. The subject says, “I think I’m . . .,”
demonstrating that he is trying to infer or interpret what he is
doing, rather than simply describing the experience. He interprets
this action as “projecting.” “Projecting” is a term often used in
the context of synesthesia to refer to the relative location of con-
currents, in external or peripersonal space, and as such may be
used by the participant as an analogy or “short-cut” to describe
a projector-like experience. The interviewer chose to immediately
divert from this description and return to the topic at a later time2
. In (2) the interviewer allowed their own beliefs about the experi-
ence to enter the discourse. The term “latching” is not used by the
subject himself at any point in the interview. The line of ques-
tioning suggests that the interviewer formed a belief regarding
attachment between the concurrent and another object in ear-
lier interview sessions, however, this is the only time in which the
belief is imposed upon the subject. This section of interview and
all related discourse were removed from analysis.
ANALYSIS
Interview data were transcribed and then processed through
successive rounds of coding, aggregation and abstraction, as illus-
trated in Figure 3. Data analysis was conducted blind (that is, not
by the interviewer), by a researcher trained in the EI method with
no prior theoretical knowledge of SSS, as suggested in Froese et al.
(2011b). Blind analysis enabled the independent observation of
any interviewer bias and ensured that the themes devised were
are only those which are present in the data.
Interview audio files were transcribed verbatim by contracted
professionals, including stammers and interjections. Transcribers
noted changes in pace, intonation or volume of speech, where
specific emphasis is placed on words, and significant or lengthy
pauses, to assist in the monitoring of evocation state. Transcribers
were blind to the nature and purpose of the interviews. Fidelity
of transcription was checked against a random sample of audio
files. Transcribed data were assessed for validity according to the
principles of EI, by confirming that the report related to the
experience as it happened and did not contain comments or
thoughts about the experience on the part of the participant or
interviewer. Reports were also examined for consistency over the
interview sessions. Any reports found to be incompatible with
the EI requirements or inconsistent across sessions were excluded
from analysis.
The complete set of interview transcripts were read through
by the analyst, to identify initial themes or topics. Themes were
then summarized into short statements and a code devised to
represent the theme. The code was subsequently attached to rele-
vant sections of the transcript using QSR NVivo 9 software (QSR
International, 2010). Once all data relevant to a particular theme
had been coded, the theme summary was revised and new sub-
theme codes were devised. A second round of coding was then
conducted using sub-themes.
The coded transcript was exported with paragraph refer-
ences into Freemind mind mapping software (FreeMind Project,
2010), clustered by themes and sub-themes. Individual excerpts
were systematically arranged into appropriate headings (with
further subheadings generated where necessary) to ensure all
references to a topic were collated. The tree-like representation
of the mind-mapping software enabled a systematic analysis of
the temporal development of events through vertical arrange-
ment of branches (diachronic structure), and aggregation of
simultaneously occurring aspects of the experience (synchronic
2Note that term “projecting” was also bracketed in the earlier example (1.
Maintaining the subject’s focus) as the interviewer pursued a line of ques-
tioning relating to the known object of the “screen.”
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic of data collection and analysis process.
structures) under a single heading. Ordered clusters were sum-
marized into short sections of prose describing the content and
context of the cluster. Abstractions were made for every level
of the map from the lowest to the highest level of the theme
(for example, the description of the concurrent contexts includes
4 levels of abstraction, over 77 separate sub-headings—see
Supplementary Material).
RESULTS
The EI sessions provide comprehensive descriptions of the first-
person experience of SSS for subject AB, including aspects of
which AB was previously unaware. Analysis of EI data identi-
fied several themes of potential importance to SSS research. Full
detail of each of these themes are provided in an html expandable
mindmap via the SupplementaryMaterial, with the bottom-most
level of each branch containing all transcript references which
were collated in the generation of the theme. The themes and
descriptions are not exhaustive of the SSS phenomenology for
this participant, rather they reflect the developing discourse of the
interview sessions.
DISCOURSE CONTENT
Table 1 outlines the coverage of individual codes in the tran-
scripts. Themajority of the discussion was related to AB’s number
form (55.8% of all discourse) as opposed to his calendar or alpha-
bet forms (15.5% and 10.3%, respectively). Some of the most
informative phenomena were only covered briefly during inter-
view (for example only 1.4% of the transcripts are related to
interference from the physical room, see section Mental room),
however, when these brief statements are collated and examined
in terms of their interactions in the data as a whole, we find them
to be relevant to much of the synesthetic experience.
BASIC FORM DESCRIPTIONS
The forms examined include a spatial number form, mathemat-
ical concepts such as pi, an alphabet form, a form for age, a cal-
endar form for years, a form for the months of year and multiple
forms for time. These data provide a comprehensive description
of the visual synesthetic experience and on the whole are con-
sistent with descriptions obtained by less rigorous methods. This
continuity demonstrates that in terms of basic phenomenology,
our participant’s experience may be considered “normal” for SSS.
Brief descriptions of the spatial forms are provided below, with
further detail available in the Supplementary Materials.
Number form and mathematical concepts
Number concurrents generally appear as black Arabic symbols in
an Arial-like type face. Certain numbers (notably five and fifty six)
are described as having “metallic” (20100222_247) or “velvety”
textures (20100222_321) or surface patterns such as “cross hatch-
ing” (20100408_67) or pockmarks, “as if the ink has come away
in lots of places” (20100320a_246). The texture or patterning may
move around and change although the number itself remains
static.
Both fractions and decimals are viewed in the correct posi-
tion relative to their surrounding numbers. Different notations
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Table 1 | Coding summary report.
Theme Coverage (%) No. occurrences
Forms 101.2 49
Number 55.8 32
Alphabet 10.3 6
Age 6.1 1
Calendars 15.5 6
Physical-mental room 0.02 33
Interference from physical room 1.4 29
Contexts 27.38 361
White Page 0.08 99
Corridor 0.08 122
Free Space 0.03 17
Line 0.14 156
Cave 0.02 17
Felt presence 0.02 28
Context transitions 0.02 32
Inducer-concurrent relationships 11.3 56
Multiple representations 7.7 50
Perspective 5.1 69
Stability 6.1 60
Attention 3.2 31
Knowledge 1.5 22
Voluntarily controllable acts 6.4 56
Major themes are given in bold font, with sub-themes in italics. Coverage rep-
resents the percentage of all interview data which were coded to a particular
theme or sub-theme. A reference may be coded to two or more items when
a particular section of discourse is relevant to a number of different themes,
thus the total coded coverage does not sum to 100%. Number of occurrences
gives the number of separate references to a theme or sub-theme within the
interview data, with each instance being variable in length from a single line to
an extended discussion. As the interviews were exploratory, the coverage does
not necessarily reflect the content of general SSS experience, rather it relates
to the content of the interview.
of fractions can be generated intentionally (e.g., 1.5 may be repre-
sented as 3/2 or 6/4)and appear as though superimposed on top
of each other. Large numbers (in the thousands) appear with the
comma separator.
When discussing mathematical concepts, multiple defining
equations and graphs are involuntarily experienced following a
related inducer. For example, when discussing Planck’s constant
the subject reports, “I got e equals H bar times F . . .. And just
underneath I’ve got H bar times a Greek nu as well [. . .] I’ve
got H bar equals H over 2 pi.” (20100320a_219-224). These con-
currents include visual experiences of letters and numbers to
multiple decimal places, and associated graph forms. For exam-
ple, INTERVIEWER: “What about e? AB: So I’ve got a flash of the
exponential curve and then I saw the letter e, it took a while for
the equal sign and numbers to appear but then they are there.”
(20100320a_71-72). “INTERVIEWER: If you go back to e, do you
see the two graphs that you mentioned? AB: Yeah, kind of one
over here and one over there.” (20100320a_137-138).
Numbers such as pi are experienced in their correct position
in relation to the integer on the number line. A black area or
“black hole” (20100229_200) is experienced for numbers with
infinite decimal places, with the decimal numbers trailing toward
the black hole, “sucking up all those infinite digits . . . just sort
of get them out of the way” (20100229_200). The black hole is
flat and AB can change his perspective to view it from behind
(20100229_122).
Alphabet form
AB’s synesthetic form for the alphabet appears as capital let-
ters (20100329_215), in an Arial-like type face (20100329_337-
339) with a “ghost-like” translucency (20100408_313) and a
reproducible spatial relationship between alphabet items. Specific
patterns or textures are generally not reported with the let-
ter form, however, following inspection of the letter B it is
described as though “it’s made of ribbons attached to each other”
(20100408_329).
Ages
AB experiences concurrents similar to his number form when
exploring concepts of age. AB reports, however, that the experi-
ences of age and number concurrents are differentiated because
numbers (such as 28) are more often used in the context of age
rather than mathematics (20100320b_90).
The concurrents elicited by inducer concepts of prena-
tal ages (conception to birth) are accompanied by static
visual scenes of embryonic development to a hospital scene
with a woman in labor representing birth (20100320b_
103-138). The description of the scene for birth (age zero) con-
tains doctors and nurses in a hospital room, medical implements
on a tray, storage drawers and a work surface, a woman lying
on a bed, a window which looks onto the hospital corridor and
electrical equipment over the bed (20100320b_153). AB reports
that he can hear the sound of a baby crying from somewhere
outside the scene but no other sounds from the hospital room
itself (20100320b_139-149).When AB is asked if there is anything
“before” that scene (equivalent to negative numbers) he reports a
“vague sense of something in the womb” (20100320b_110) but
with an unknown or indistinct location. When the interviewer
induces “6 months pregnancy” AB is able to identify the loca-
tion of this age and reports “a sort of fairly black womb with
a sort of like fetus in it” (20100320b_112). AB also describes
other scenes in separate spatial locations, including conception
“at the very top” as a “magnified picture of an egg with loads
of sperm” (20100320b_127), then a fertilized egg and a “clump
of cells” (20100320b_114) followed by further cell divisions in
the embryonic development. Zero and one years of age are sep-
arated in space to accommodate “all those first months in the first
year of life” (20100320b_182). When directed to the zero time
point, AB reports images of a new-born baby “wrapped up in
white blankets”, and at 6 months old AB reports hearing a baby
cry (20100320b_192).
The interviewer proposes that the first year might contain
images of a baby “crawling around on the floor, or some-
thing like that” (20100320b_195). At this stage AB remarks
that he is beginning to experience “a few more general images”
(20100320b_196), including the memory of an occasion where
he saw a friends child at one year old. AB spontaneously offers
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that these images are quite distinct from those described in rela-
tion to prenatal age, as he is positioned within the scene and
it is surrounding him (20100320b_196), where as in the pic-
torial representations of age AB was not himself a feature of
the scene.
Calendars
AB reports a spatial form for calendar aspects such as years,
months and time. His year form is similar to his number form,
but there is no comma separator. The inducer “one thousand,
nine hundred and ninety five” leads to the experience of a num-
ber concurrent, whereas the inducer “nineteen ninety five” leads
to a year concurrent (20100320a_237). AB is able to describe and
draw his spatial form for the more abstract year inducer of 4000
BC, with an inflection point between BC and AD.
AB’s spatial form for months includes the experience of digits
and a line arranged circularly, with August at the top and subse-
quent months arranged clockwise, with February at the bottom.
Within the months themselves each 10 day segment follows a spe-
cific direction on the line such that AB can identify a date not
only by the position of that month in relation to the others but
also by the direction of the numbers on the line surrounding
the date.
AB reports a clock concurrent induced by the time of day. His
synesthetic clock takes multiple forms: (1) an analog clock face
with hour and minute hands, minute markers and larger hour
markers; (2) an orange digital clock with a flashing semicolon for
seconds; (3) a separate digital clock with a different type-face. In
directing his attention to aspects of the analog clock, AB is able to
induce the experience of digits on the clock face where there were
none before. AB reports the apparent motion of a second hand as
it flashes “in and out of existence” (20100320b_16-18) each time
his attention returns to it.
THEMES WITHIN THE SSS EXPERIENCE
The themes identified in the EI go beyond basic form descriptions
of as they address precise aspects of the experience and how it
unfolds. Six main themes were identified from the interviews, as
illustrated in Figure 4.
Mental room
AB describes his synesthetic percepts as existing in a “mental
room” (20100320a_108) as opposed to the physical room, which
refers to the room in which the interview was conducted and
which supports the normal (non-synesthetic) visual experiences
(20100408_193). The percepts in the mental room are “superim-
posed” on the physical room (20100408_137); they have the same
physical location as items in the mental room, but the mental and
physical exist as if in two “different dimensions” (20100408_163,
20100408_165, 20100408_189).
I’m sort of seeing the [physical] room behind [the concurrent]. But
then I sort of feel the [concurrent] letters are in a different kind of
space as well (20100329_235).
It’s almost like you have this whole room and then there’s like a
copy of this whole room (20100408_191). And then the pen stays in
this [physical] room. But all the [synesthetic] numbers and things are
in the copy of this room [the mental room] (20100408_193).
AB reports that he can switch his attention between the phys-
ical and mental rooms by forced effort (20100320a_108) or
defocusing his eyes and “looking into space” (20100408_33).
AB retains an awareness of the physical room whilst look-
ing at the synesthetic percepts (20100320a_112) although
the physical room appears “out of focus” (20100320a_114),
similar to a normal experience of an item in peripheral
vision (20100320a_114).
Erm, well I can just alternate my attention between the physical room
and the mental room I’ve got (20100320a_108).
I guess all of the physical room is like erm, like what’s in my
periphery normally. So the focus of my eyes is somewhere about here,
because there’s nothing in the physical room here. The whole physical
room is out of focus (20100320a_114).
INTERVIEWER: So if you focus your attention on the [men-
tal room] . . . your visual awareness of the [physical] room fades
out . . .? AB: Yeah. It never leaves me completely, the physical room
(20100320a_111-112).
Concurrents tend to be located in areas of space where there is lit-
tle interference from physical objects, such as the top of an empty
table (20100329_89) or in an area of clear space (20100329_107,
20100415_238).
If my eyes are kind of focused on some point in space in which there
is no physical object, then it’s easier [for the concurrent to appear]
(20100408_31).
If there’s an object in this [physical] room, in the same place as
one of the numbers are in the other [mental] room, then I see the
object rather than the number (20100408 195).
The floor in this [physical] room is obscuring the floor in that
space [the mental room]. I can’t really see down (20100415_278).
The interference of visual percepts in the physical room upon
synesthetic percepts in the mental is also reported in the visual
presentation of an inducer, where AB reports having to look away
from the “distracting piece of paper” (20100408_13) in order to
experience the synesthetic form.
INTERVIEWER: What do you see? [Shows AB a letter H drawn
on a notepad] AB: I see the letter H on the page. INTERVIEWER:
So what do you need to do in order to see the alphabet line? AB:
Erm, have to look away from the image. I can see them here (201004
08_3-5).
When I was focused on the paper there was nothing else except
what was physically there (20100408_15). It’s almost like the actual
physical H can’t be part of the mental alphabet (20100408_23).
So I see the 4 [drawn in Interviewer’s notebook] and then there’s
nothing really stable coming into view. It’s like the number line
doesn’t know which direction to go in. It’s like there are various things
down on the table and something over here . . . Nothing very precise
came in. Just very different from when you are telling me to think of
the number 4 (20100408_65-67).
Concurrent contexts
AB’s concurrents appear in a range of “contexts” which describe
the perceptual synesthetic experience around the concurrent in
the mental room.
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FIGURE 4 | Mind map of content, themes and sub-themes
derived from the EI data with case AB. This map is
reproduced in the Supplementary Material, where summary
descriptions are provided at each level, and the collated transcript
references supporting our interpretation are provided at the
bottom-most level for each theme.
White page. The “white page” context is described as an A4
piece of paper, presented vertically in front of AB, forward and
below his eye line (see Figure 5). The area around the white page
has “a purple layer here, a green layer here and some black.”
(20100329_395). Concurrents appear centered on the page in a
font size which would fill a “good proportion of the paper . . .
as if there’s only room for that one digit [on the page] with a
good margin around the edge” (20100215_146-148). The white
page provides contrast for the concurrents to be viewed against
the background of the physical room, as AB reports that he has
difficulty identifying the concurrents when they haven’t got the
white page behind them:“It’s almost better to have the white page
there, because it helps me to see the A better” (20100329_399, see
also 20100415_43).
Corridor. When viewing a section of the number line (as
opposed to individual concurrents), concurrents appear in a
“corridor” (see Figure 6). The walls of the corridor are “quite
opaque (20100329_42) although “not like a hard surface like
the table, if you put anything behind [the wall of the corri-
dor] it would go into the fog and you wouldn’t be able to see
it” (20100408_349). These walls are described relatively con-
sistently as a “orangey, reddy, greeney color” (20100222_148)
elsewhere, “orangey, browney, greeney color” (20100222_103)
and “greenish, reddish, orangey” (20100229_108). The floor
of the corridor has similar opaque characteristic as the walls
(20100222_31, 20100222_186). The corridor has a ceiling (e.g.,
20100222_117) and on two occasions the ceiling is referred to
with a source of light, with “little circles of light going down
the corridor” (20100222_159) and opening up into a “Sun roof”
FIGURE 5 | The “white page” context. Number concurrents, when
viewed in isolation, appear against a white, A4 sized background, with the
“line” below, and a purple/green coloring surrounding the page.
(20100222_326). The corridor itself has a “kind of a yellowish
light kind of permeating it” (20100222_146).
The induced concurrent is reported to “float” in the middle of
the corridor (20100320a_47) whilst the concurrents immediately
surrounding it are against the wall or just outside the corridor.
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FIGURE 6 | The “corridor” context, which appears when concurrents
are viewed as part of a sequence. The corridor has a 3D structure, with
walls, a floor and ceiling, and red-orange coloring.
Concurrents with multiple decimal places are experienced with
the decimals trailing down the length of the corridor. The size
of the corridor appears to vary. On one occasion the corridor is
reported to be not much bigger than AB’s head (20100222_126),
on another it is as wide as AB is tall (20100229_182). The corridor
appears to expand width ways to encompass more numbers in the
form: “It’s kind of like the corridor wants to enlarge and have the
7 over here” (20100329_107).
Free space. The free space context is identified by reference to
a specific coloring of the background and a lack of white page
or corridor features. AB describes the free space background as
“unstable,” “sometimes it’s purplish and sometimes it’s greenish.”
(20100329_13). The background “doesn’t make the [physical]
room colored. It’s just like another world [mental room] that I
can focus my attention on, or I can bring my attention back to the
[physical] room” (20100415_55).
Line. AB reports a “line” feature in his number and calendar
forms. The line is not present in the alphabet form as, “[the alpha-
bet] has no continuous values” (20100329_306). The line is seen
both in the free space context, and in the corridor of the num-
ber form. The line is black and has a 3D shape like a “very long
rectangle” (20100222_58). The line is below the white page in the
vertical plane such that AB has to look down from the white page
to see the line (20100215_153). AB suggests that he can see the
page and the line at the same time, although his language use is
slightly ambiguous and may suggest that in switching his atten-
tion between the line or page contexts, his perception of the other
is diminished:
I can definitely see it being kind of located below where the page was
(20100215_155) [emphasis added].
INTERVIEWER: Can you see the number line at the same time
[as the white page]? AB: Yeah, when I see the number line it’s going
like this and below (20100229_49-51) [emphasis added].
In the corridor context, the base of the line is “resting on the
floor [of the corridor]” (20100222_58), bisecting the corridors
width, “going into the wall of the corridor” (20100229_165-166),
and follows the gradient of the number form. In the free space
context, the number concurrents “hover” just above the line
(20100215_172) or the line appears with a gap into which the
concurrent would fit if viewed in the corridor (20100222_95),
with the gap acting as a “marker for where the [number] should
go.” (20100222_109). There is a suggestion that the line functions
as a reference for directing AB’s gaze or attention to other con-
currents, as AB follows it’s gradient toward where he “knows”
another concurrent to be located (e.g., 20100320a_298).
Cave. The “cave” is the usual context of AB’s alphabet form. The
cave is described with a “dampness” (20100329_441) or “muddy”
atmosphere (20100408_315), a dark background (20100329_426)
with depth, like a “a dark hole” (20100329_365). Letter per-
cepts within the cave are described as having “translucent”
(20100408_315) or “ghost-like” qualities (20100408_315) rather
than a solid form. AB describes his head as being in one wall
of the cave, allowing him to look into the depth or toward the
entrance. When the entrance of the cave is explored, AB describes
it as positioned in the side of a mountain (20100329_459) with a
naturalistic scene outside and a “sense of an expansive landscape”
(20100329_457), “sky and clouds” (20100329_461).
Felt presence. AB occasionally reports that he can sense the pres-
ence of a concurrent but not see it directly. These percepts are
often described as “vague,” for example, “these are bit more vague
these ones. They are just kind of more like the feeling or the pres-
ence of the three there” (20100415_27), “I’ve kind of got like the
sense of the six and the seven sort of somewhere around here. Not
really quite sure where they are” (20100329_67).
Context transitions. There are dynamic transitions between the
contexts. These transitions generally occur automatically and in
a predictable manner, although AB is able to trigger them of
his own volition to a limited degree. We present the following
brief diachronic description of context transitions for a number
concurrent (for a more detailed description of each stage in the
transition, see the Supplementary Material):
Initially a new number concurrent is presented on the white
page. Surrounding the white page is a color which is similar to the
free space context. Directed by a change in AB’s focus of atten-
tion to the area below the page, the white page “melts” from the
bottom to the top. This melting is described as, “[if] the page
was made out of ice and there was fire underneath it, and it’s
kind of melting gradually and kind of in a fairly homogeneous
way” (20100329_375). The shift in focus of attention from the
page to the line causes a new concurrent to appear above the line.
Once the new concurrent is stable, the line and corridor come
into view.
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Internal and external dialog
Auditory presentation appears to be the most effective induc-
tion method for AB’s synesthetic percepts, as it is not associated
with direct physical interference of a visually presented item. The
audibly induced item is often accompanied by those items sur-
rounding it in sequence (e.g., the induced experience of a two
will be accompanied by a one and three in the correct positions).
“Thinking about” an inducer will also lead to the experience of
a concurrent (20100305_142), with the thought process often
involving inner speech (20100408_48-51). On other occasions
AB reports to visualize a concurrent to induce a synesthetic
experience (20100222_261-263).
You say 15, I’m actually seeing more digits now. I sort of see 14 and
16 and 17 (20100215_61).
So I’m saying M over and over again in my head. But I’ve got a
glimpse of an L at one point. And I’ve got a glimpse of N O P. It’s
hard to just look at the M (20100329_249).
INTERVIEWER: So if you look at the M, how many letters are
you aware of at the same time? AB: Just depends where I focus
my attention. If I focus just on the M it’s quite hard. It’s almost
like I have to utter the names of the other letters in my head in
order to see them. But as soon as I think, you know, looking at
the M and then thinking about what else I can see, need to start
utteringM or L and then they come into being (20100329_244-245).
INTERVIEWER: So what if you pick a random one, just choose it
yourself, how would you go to it? AB: Yes, then I would have to say it
in my head. So I think Q was kind of here. . . . I kind of just thought
of the letter Q by saying it in my head, then I kind of looked for it
(20100408_48-51).
Directional attention between concurrents
If AB allows his eyes to move freely along the number or
alphabet form, he can see as many or as few concurrents
as he chooses (20100329_251). Directing attention may also
involve inner speech, for example AB reports in one instance
that during this act of “looking for a concurrent” he says to
himself: “right I’m going to look for the 4 now!” (2010040
8_138).
INTERVIEWER: if you let your gaze move a little bit more freely,
how easy is it for the other letters to appear? AB: It’s pretty easy for
H I J K L M N O P Q to appear. R S T. All I have to do is move my
attention along the thing. I can kind of see the whole alphabet if I
want to (20100329_250-251).
INTERVIEWER: What about . . . the other end of the alphabet,
Z? AB: Just have to re-look where it is. INTERVIEWER: It’s just a
movement of the eyes? AB: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: You don’t have to
say anything. AB: No, I think you saying it is enough (20100408_
42-47).
AB also has a strong prior knowledge of where each concur-
rent should be located in relation to another in the same form.
Redirection of attention based on prior knowledge also involves
inner speech.
Erm, normally it’s like I said to myself, “OK, it’s a three so down to
the left of three there should be a one and two.” And then, well there
they are (20100408_93).
Single inducer leads to multiple concurrents
A single inducer may lead to the experience of multiple repre-
sentations of the same concurrent, particularly if AB is directed
to perform some act upon that concurrent. For example, when
AB is asked to view a four from a different angle, he reports to
experience two fours, one in the normal, face-on view and one
back-to-front (20100408_125-129). New or alternate representa-
tions of the same concurrent occupy different locations in the
mental room.
There’s a four and a six kind of here. . . . INTERVIEWER: If you
moved your head from side to side like this, how does your perception
of the number change? AB: Erm, sometimes it tilts a little bit so it’s
kind of bi-stable. . . . It’s like there’s two here. So there’s one where the
four is just like that, and then is another one where it’s kind of [back
to front]. INTERVIEWER: I’ve noticed that at the moment you are
actually standing still. Can you see both of the different ones even
though you are not moving? AB: Yeah, there’s kind of one like this
and there’s one kind of like that. INTERVIEWER: So you have two
different forms there? AB: Yeah (20100408_125-129).
Associations lead to involuntary inductions
Concurrents may be experienced involuntarily if they are related
to the induced concurrent through normal associative mecha-
nisms, for example when “a physical constant [. . .] like the speed
of light” (20100320a_195-196) is presented as an inducer, AB
reported the involuntary experience of five concurrents associated
with other physical constants (20100320a_195-224). Similarly,
when AB is asked to transform a letter into an italic font, a bold
font (an associated type-face) is perceived (20100329_340-345).
INTERVIEWER: What about a physical constant . . . Like the
speed of light (20100320a_195-196). AB: Yeah, what else came
into view was Planck’s constant, like the H bar. I just saw like an
H bar and then over here there’s an equals and a C squared came
up (20100320a_202). INTERVIEWER: So how come the Plank’s
constant appeared? . . . Did you think of the Plank’s constant as well?
AB: Yeah, I guess because it’s another fundamental constant of the
universe. It’s like C [the speed of light] (20100320a_211-214).
INTERVIEWER: Do you think you could get them in italics? AB:
Erm, saw the C though going to italics very briefly, the capital C. . . .
The lower case C is kind of being mixed up. It’s kind of in bold font.
<laughter>(20100329_340-345).
Concurrent experiences persist
Once induced, the experience of the concurrent was found
to persist without the need for it to be directly referred
to (20100229_329, 20100408_40-41). Similarly AB reports
that a percept may remain stable even if it is taken out
of view or attention is directed elsewhere; once attention
is returned, the concurrent is described as if it existed
independently of AB’s attention (20100305_131-132, 2010022
9_388).
60 has rooted now because we’ve been talking about it for quite a bit
(20100229_329).
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INTERVIEWER: When you look at the . . . alphabet [form], are
you aware of having to say H in order to keep it in focus? AB: No, I
think once it’s there I don’t have to say H (20100408_40-41).
INTERVIEWER: What if you . . . take them out of view com-
pletely so if you look behind you so immediately you don’t see
either of them and then you turn around again. Do they remain
exactly where they were before? AB: Yeah still five, six [56], 57
(20100305_131-132).
After several concurrents have been induced through the inter-
view process, AB’s experience contains multiple independent con-
current items, for example, INTERVIEWER: “Do you have any
number lines ready that we could do that with? AB: Erm, I’ve got
all sorts of number lines” (20100408_386-387). This persistence
in the visual representation and spatial location of a concurrent
caused experimental difficulties where AB found there were too
may concurrents present to concentrate on a single item, causing
him to feel “bogged up with loads of numbers” (20100229_384).
This experience of multiple concurrents was not explored further.
Perspective on percept
Concurrents which are directly induced are generally presented
in front of AB in the correct perspective, i.e., “facing,” although
there is one report of a concurrent being turned away slightly
(20100415_185-187).
I’m kind of seeing the five right in front of me (20100215_170).
So I’ve sort of got the number five to the right of my focus now,
and kind of in front of my focus (20100222_33).
New concurrents may also appear at some distance particularly if
they are a new representation of the original concurrent.
INTERVIEWER: So the zoomed out version of the alphabet disap-
peared when you switched your attention to the A? AB: . . . it’s kind
of in the distance. It’s probably further away from me than I can see
(20100329_280-281).
AB is able to view concurrents from different perspectives, e.g.,
if they are placed behind him or if he physically moves round or
above them.
So this one is directly facing me and that one is kind of facing that
way. So I’m kind of slightly sideways on. . . . if you were in the chair
one to your right, it would face you (20100415_185-187).
INTERVIEWER: Can you [physically move round to look at the
percept from different angles]? AB: I can see the back of the four.
Yeah I can kind of see the four backwards. Sometimes it sort of spins
around (20100408_104-105).
Stability of percept
AB often reports “instability” in his percepts, as a flashing or
brief appearance of the concurrent. This instability is reported
when AB attempts to modify a feature of the concurrent from its
preferred or “default” form. For example, attempting to change
the type-face (20100329_340-345) or perspective of the alpha-
bet form (20100415_97-113) results in an experience of a percept
flickering between the default and requested view/feature.
[From an upper case A] I can get the lower case A to flash [into an
upper case A], but then [it] doesn’t stay there (20100329_323).
[AB is asked to see what happens if he looks at a concurrent
whilst he changes his viewing angle by standing up] So it’s kind
of hard to stand up slowly enough . . . INTERVIEWER: . . . you’re
trying to stand up slowly in order to see what? AB: . . . where some
kind of change happens. . . . it seems to flicker (20100415_97-101).
It just came into view when I sort of reached there at a certain angle.
INTERVIEWER: Is it not on the table right now? AB: It’s sort of
flickering (20100415_107-109).
Where AB’s knowledge of a number sequence is limited (e.g., in
the decimal places of pi), he only experiences stable concurrents
for those numbers of which he is certain (20100229_132).
So now I’ve got 3.14159 dot dot dot eight, six, five, six, and then a
whole pool, a whole load of numbers just kind of like jumbled up, like
kind of just there, not really knowing where to go (20100229_147).
So it’s unstable after 3.141527986. Seems pretty unstable after
the third or fourth decimal point. . . . it’s not really holding still it’s
kind of changing because of other numbers trying to get in from
above. . . . So it’s 3.14 and one and a five, and that’s where I start
getting difficulties . . . there’s a nine above the two. INTERVIEWER:
How is it above the two? AB: Just directly above on the page.
INTERVIEWER: Is it stable up there? AB: I just see a jumble of
numbers (20100229_71-83).
INTERVIEWER: What do you see after the five? AB: It’s kind of
dot dot dot, and then there’s kind of some rather blurry numbers to
the right in a crowd (20100320a_14-15).
Selectively directing AB’s attention to specific features of a con-
current appears to improve the stability of the percepts and AB’s
ability to describe it, for example he often uses phrases such as, “if
I think a little bit more then I see . . .” (20100222_5) or “if I really
try and focus . . .” (20100229_398) before going on to describe a
feature which was previously “unstable.”
[AB was asked to inspect the texture of the 5 concurrent in detail]
Yeah. Erm but nothing that stays really too stable. If I really try
and focus I don’t know, I see a little white so it’s kind of mainly
black top bit of it. Erm, then I am seeing a little white circles . . .
[there is a] white circle missing from top corner as though someone
has punched a hole out of it from the top corner (20100229_398)
[emphasis added].
Voluntarily controllable acts
AB is able to perform a number of acts to modify his synesthetic
experience. These include:
1. Changing perspective on a concurrent, either by physically
moving around the room or adopting a different mental per-
ceptual position such that he can view the concurrent from
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a different angle. INTERVIEWER: . . . So how does it change
when you stand up for example? AB: . . . looks like I am kind
of above it, kind of like this. It’s kind of got some depth to it this
time (20100415_68-69).
2. Self-induce concurrents by thinking about them, looking for
them in relation to other concurrents or through the internal
recitation of the concurrent (inner speech). INTERVIEWER:
Can you create a different number line . . .Maybe over there for
example, if you say 55 over in that direction . . . AB: I just faced
this direction and then thought of 55 (20100305_135-142).
3. Overcome physical interference in the mental room through
effortful “willing” of the concurrent to appear. AB: Well it just
appears first away from the [physically presented paper] page. I
have to will an alphabet on the page in order to get it to happen
(20100408_75).
4. Report a visual memory of a concurrent without evoking the
concurrent itself. INTERVIEWER: Did you notice any numbers
when you came into this room? AB: No, ermmaybe I can remem-
ber there was something here. . . .Hard to tell if it’s just a memory
or if it’s really there. INTERVIEWER: Well have a look at the
wall. AB: I remember something being over there as well. Can’t
remember what number it was whether it was a 55 or a 56. Yes,
so there’s obviously nothing there that’s sort of firm there. Kind of
got a bit of an image of a big 55 there then a big 56 sort of stuck
on the wall there. Nothing really that stable (20100320a_2-9).
Although AB’s reports would suggest that he can in some cases
modify a concurrent itself, attempts to do so lead to the gener-
ation of a new concurrent with the desired characteristic, whilst
the original remains unchanged. AB’s ability to exert some level of
control over his synesthetic experience demonstrate the dynamic
and elaborative nature of the visual experience.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we used the EI technique to provide a detailed
phenomenological analysis of SSS in a single case. The conclu-
sions drawn are appropriate to our participant and further work
will be required to test their applicability to a wider population.
Some external validation of the themes derived can none the
less be achieved, by reference to the existing (limited) descrip-
tions of phenomenology. Where there is continuity between the
reports of our participant and those provided elsewhere, we may
assume that these particular themes are generalizable to a wider
population. As our participant reports common phenomenolog-
ical details in the basic form descriptions, it is likely that his
experience in general is also typical of a wider SSS population.
Therefore, where other more novel aspects of phenomenology are
derived for this participant, it is possible that these too may be
generalizable.
Our results show that AB’s synesthetic concurrents exist in
what he terms a “mental room” and that he is able to selectively
shift his attention to either the mental room of the concurrents
or the physical room in which the interviews were conducted.
Although the mental and physical rooms co-exist, percepts in the
physical room appear to interfere with synesthetic concurrents
in the mental room. This interference effect was also found to
be a feature of visually presented inducers such that AB had to
divert his gaze from the physical inducer in order to perceive the
concurrent. The generation of a concurrent frequently followed
auditory induction, for example AB uses internal verbilisation of
the inducer name in order to perceive the concurrent, even when
the inducer was presented visually. We also found that concur-
rents are automatically experienced by association to the inducer,
for example the discussion of the physical constant for the speed
of light causes the automatic perception of related physical con-
stants. AB’s concurrents are not limited to simple letters/numbers,
but also include equations and graph notations. The induced item
is often perceived with adjacent items on the number line, for
example the induction of a two may lead to the perception of
a one and a three. The stability of synesthetic percepts is found
to increase with focused attention on the concurrent percept.
AB is also able to voluntarily modulate the features of a con-
current, although they appear to have a default type-face and/or
perspective.
As this is a case study, it remains to be seen to what extent the
precise nature and content of all themes of AB’s SSS experience
generalize to a wider population. For example, the experience of
a “black hole” representative of infinite decimal places may be
highly idiosyncratic and unique to AB in his conceptualization
of infinity. Other idiosyncratic features may include AB’s abil-
ity to move around the spatial form whilst it remains static, and
the precise nature and content of the concurrent contexts of the
white page, corridor and cave. The unique and artificial expe-
rience of the EI may have drawn out details of AB’s experience
which are not a common feature of the every-day SSS experience.
For example, on many occasions AB only perceives the attended
concurrent, and a few surrounding items. This may be due to
the high level of focus placed on individual concurrents for the
purposes of guided exploration. Further investigation may deter-
mine whether the process of EI can reveal similar themes for
other participants. Three themes in particular may be relevant in
developing our understanding of SSS, namely, (1) the description
of the physical and mental room; (2) the effect of internal and
external dialog; (3) the apparent persistence of concurrents after
induction.
PHYSICAL-MENTAL ROOM
AB’s description of the mental-room can be considered in light
of the projector and associator distinctions in grapheme-color
synesthesia (Dixon et al., 2004). AB reported in the first inter-
view that he is “projecting a mental image” when he perceives
a synesthetic concurrent (20100215_22). AB’s description of the
mental room as “another dimension” (20100408_185) is interest-
ing, but of itself says little about the experience. More telling is the
apparent relationships between the physical and mental rooms
such that the physical can obscure or distract from the mental
andmake it difficult to visualize or fully induce a concurrent. This
effect may be informative in providing a basis for the exploration
of first-person experience of projector-associator effects, however,
the projector-associator distinction is an assumption of sequence-
color synesthesia, and not SSS; although SSS experiences have
been described as occupying “distinct loci in imaginal, periper-
sonal or extrapersonal space” (Price and Pearson, 2013, p. 1166),
projector-like and associator-like traits have not, to the best of
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our knowledge, been formalized in SSS. Any direct comparison
between the experience of our subject and the current under-
standing of the projector-associator experience may therefore
be premature. The observation that AB can readily distinguish
between the physical and mental rooms (even when they inter-
fere) underlines that his synesthetic experiences, while at times
perceptually real, are not subjectively veridical—that is, they are
not experienced as being part of the external, real world (Seth,
2014).
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIALOG
AB internally verbalized the name of the inducer each time he self-
induced a concurrent (i.e., when the inducer was not presented by
the interviewer). This included occasions when he redirected his
attention from one concurrent to another, or when he freely chose
a concurrent to explore. When he was visually presented with
an inducer, he needed to say the name of that inducer internally
before the concurrent was experienced, and repeated the name
of the inducer to stabilize his visual experience and maintain his
focus of attention. This use of inner speechmay not be surprising,
given the inter-relation of orthographic and phonemic represen-
tations in neural processing, however, it was uniquely identifiable
by the process of EI and has not been previously demonstrated
in SSS; other methods may have accepted AB’s initial descriptions
(e.g., of the redirection of spatial attention) without probing fur-
ther into the acts involved in the generation of a concurrent. This
is an example of EI enabling reflective access to an aspect of sub-
jective experience which was previously pre-reflective. This also
exemplifies the in-depth exploration of diachronic structures of
experience promoted by EI.
External auditory instruction was the most direct and effec-
tive route to induction of a concurrent for AB. The primacy of
auditory induction may account for AB’s primary use of inner
speech during all other inductions. Auditory-visual synesthesia
is commonly considered to include only more overt forms such
as the experience of colors with music (e.g., Goller et al., 2009).
As such, SSS and other forms (e.g., grapheme-color synesthesia)
have typically been assumed to result from visual-visual inter-
actions. There are, however, investigations of visual-visual types
which have used auditory presentation of inducers and found
results comparable to visually presented inducers (Paulesu et al.,
1995; Nunn et al., 2002; Steven et al., 2006). In SSS, a case
has also been described in which auditory and visual presen-
tation of an inducer lead to different perspectives of the form
being perceived (Jarick et al., 2009b). These findings suggest that
auditory induction is sufficient to cause the synesthetic experi-
ence, and the evidence here from EI suggests that it is in most
cases necessary in the case of AB, even when items are presented
visually.
Assuming there is some overlap between the neural mecha-
nisms involved in processing internal versus external speech, the
processes of concurrent induction via inner speech may be simi-
lar to the processes involved in concurrent induction via external
auditory presentation. As all methods of induction engaged inner
speech for this subject, the experience of SSS might be re-framed
as primarily auditory-visual process for AB and potentially in
other SS synesthetes. Compatible with this hypothesis, children
in most English-speaking countries learn the ordinal sequence of
the alphabet phonemically through song before they are able to
associate the visual grapheme and letter name (Ehri, 2009). Seron
et al. found that the SS synesthetes they investigated were less effi-
cient in verbal strategies according to Paivio’s degree of imagery
questionnaire (Paivio and Harshman, 1983) and suggest that
the visual spatial form may have developed as a compensatory
strategy to reinforce the ordinality of audibly presented items
(Seron et al., 1992). This suggestion may have particular impli-
cations for the development of SSS, particularly if it is framed
as an auditory-visual association, rather than a visual-visual or
visual-spatial.
This formalism of SSS as a trait relevant to the develop-
ment of visuospatial representations has been re-introduced by
Price and Pearson (2013), who argued that the apparent auto-
maticity of spatial forms may in fact represent deliberate recall
of the specific visuospatial representation. Indeed, Price and
Pearson (2013) suggest that the development of the spatial form
may be closely related to the development of the phonological
loop during rehearsal, where the dual encoding of visuospa-
tial and auditory representations may be beneficial to learning.
Our data support the central intuitions of Price and Pearson
(2013) and Price and Mattingley (2013), in the suggested involve-
ment of the phonological loop in concurrent generation and
by demonstrating that the apparent automaticity of our partic-
ipant’s experience is graded, or only has the appearance of an
involuntary feel.
VISUOSPATIAL MEMORY AND PERSISTENCE OF CONCURRENTS
Once induced, AB will continue to experience a concurrent even
when direct attention is drawn away from it. Similarly, Jarick
reported that her subject (L) experienced a persistence of induced
concurrents until they were “not needed any more” for the
purposes of mental viewpoint navigation (Jarick, 2010, p. 88).
Although this finding of persistence has also been identified via
more commonplace first-person methods (e.g., semi-structured
interviews), the level of detail made available by EI is unparalleled
thus far. Specifically, whilst Jarick refers to persistence until con-
currents “are not needed” (Jarick, 2010), our data suggest that the
development of this persistence is based on sustained exposure
and focus on the concurrent, which may have implications for
the development or encoding of spatial forms in terms of visu-
ospatial imagery and memory. We also find that AB experiences
a sense of “presence” when he cannot directly see a concurrent
but knows where it should be in relation to others. These two fea-
tures suggest involvement of visuo-spatial memory processes in
SSS, where the memory of a concurrent position is sufficient to
hold the synesthetic experience in active working memory, either
as a visual experience or as non-spatial visual content. This fea-
turemay be relevant to the development of SSS in individuals, as it
may enable the maintenance of a visual representation when ordi-
nal sequences are being taught. Brang et al. (2010) and Simner
et al. (2009) have reported superior visuo-spatial memory abil-
ities in SS synesthetes, as demonstrated in their ability to learn
new spatial forms (Brang et al., 2010) and perform above average
in assessments of visuo-spatial recall such as the Visual Patterns
Test (Della Sala, 1997; Simner et al., 2009).
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BLIND ANALYSIS EXTENDS PREVIOUS INTROSPECTIVE REPORTS
Our results extend standard introspective reports collected else-
where. For example, 19 of the Seron et al. subjects report that,
once activated, a concurrent could not be moved, supporting
our findings on the persistence of concurrents and AB’s neces-
sity to generate a new representation of the concurrent rather
than modifying an original. Subjects also reported being bet-
ter able to “make use” of their representation where they had a
free “visual field,” e.g., when their eyes were closed. This state-
ment is compatible with our findings of physical interference,
where AB’s concurrents were placed in areas of an uninterrupted
visual scene in the mental room, so as to avoid conflict with
items in the physical room which hold more salience than the
mental room percepts. As with our subject, Seron et al. also
report that for his subjects the “vividness” of the number con-
current increases when the subjects concentrate on it (Seron
et al., 1992, p. 174). Through the application and analysis of
the EI data collected here we have been able to identify that
this concentration is experienced by the subject in many cases as
internal recitation of the inducer name, highlighting the impor-
tance of inner speech in the induction process. One of the Seron
et al. subjects also reports to automatically experience the con-
currents immediately surrounding the induced item, as with
our subject.
NEW INSIGHTS MAY BE USED TO DIRECT FUTURE QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
The present findings suggest new opportunities for future inves-
tigations of SSS and associated synesthesia phenomenology. For
example, quantitative investigations should consider the interfer-
ence of physical objects in the perception of synesthetic concur-
rents and associated limitations of visually presented inducers.
Early self-reports from SS synesthetes described the expe-
rience as occurring involuntarily and automatically (Cytowic,
1989). However, our subject reports that he is not continually
“swamped” with concurrents on a daily basis, despite continually
reading and seeing numbers and letters in his external environ-
ment. Indeed, a pilot investigation with our participant, using
the Descriptive Experience Sampling method (Hurlburt, 2009;
Hurlburt et al., 2009), captured a moment when AB was actively
engaged with letters and numbers on a computer screen, but he
reported no awareness of any synesthetic experience. As such, the
perception of a concurrent is not entirely automatic for AB, in
line with evidence that automaticity of concurrents can vary in
grapheme-color synesthesia (Rothen et al., 2013). We have also
noted specific instances of where AB does retain voluntary con-
trol over his synesthetic experience. These examples support the
challenge to the assumption of automaticity in SSS, as suggested
by Price and Pearson (2013), and the issue of automaticity in SSS
may be a topic usefully explored with EI across multiple subjects.
For our subject, the concurrent was generated through internal
verbalization; it remains to be seen, with the further applica-
tion of EI or other procedures, how much detail can be obtained
regarding the apparent automaticity of concurrent perception.
The role of visual imagery in SSS could also be investigated further
(Price and Pearson, 2013). Specifically, the experience of “unsta-
ble” concurrents could be investigated in synesthetic participants,
and compared qualitatively with descriptions of “unstable” visual
imagery in non-synesthetic participants3.
The phenomenology presented here is by no means exhaus-
tive. A number of unresolved issues are immediately identifiable,
such as the role of inner speech and focused attention in stabiliz-
ing a concurrent. We may ask how inner speech impacts mental
imagery, and whether non-synesthetes employ similar methods
of inner speech as observed here. We also demonstrate that the
apparent automaticity of SSS can be investigated with this method
in terms of phenomenological experience. Price and Mattingley
(2013) have recently argued that SSS does not meet the neces-
sary behavioral criteria to be termed truly automatic. Indeed,
we have determined here that although synesthetic concurrents
were initially described to arise automatically, in the majority of
cases, our subject went through a process of internal verbalization
of the inducer name before the concurrent was perceived. This
may relate to the task-specific strategies suggested by Price and
Mattingley (2013) to mediate the cueing effects of SSS. Further
exploration of the diachronic and synchronic structure of the
spatial cueing effect may help determine the causal relationship
between the appearance of the concurrent and the shift in spatial
attention.
CONCLUSIONS
Phenomenological descriptions of SSS have so far been largely
confined to descriptions of spatial locations pertaining to spe-
cific inducers (e.g., numbers, letters, calendar date). Here,
employing a second-person method designed to increase the
reporting access to pre-reflective aspects of experience, we have
provided a comprehensive description of our subject’s spa-
tial form for a range of ordinal sequences including num-
ber, calendars, alphabets and ages, and extend the depth and
breadth of relevant phenomenological information which has
been acquired for SSS, or indeed any other form of visual
synesthesia. We also introduced new associated synesthetic expe-
riences such as concurrents for graphs, equations and math-
ematical concepts. Using the formalism of Grounded Theory
analysis, we identified seven main themes in AB’s SSS experience,
as below.
1. Form descriptions
2. Physical and mental rooms
3. Concurrent contexts
4. Inducer-concurrent relationships
5. Perspective taking on the concurrent
6. Stability of the percept
7. Voluntarily controllable acts
Some of these themes have been described elsewhere (e.g., Seron
et al., 1992; Jarick, 2010), however, these sources provide only
limited information the first-person experience of the subject. As
such, the present results provide a unique level of detail which
may be beneficial in devising future investigations.
3EI could also be usefully applied in elaborating the phenomenological expe-
rience of “vividness” of visual imagery, which is central in ratings of visual
imagery, e.g., VVIQ (Marks, 1973).
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We report the first application of the EI method to SSS, and
indeed to synesthesia more widely. We demonstrate that it is
possible to gain informative second-person descriptions of synes-
thetic phenomenology from a naïve subject, through rigorous
data collection and analysis, and demonstrate the value of the
EI method in enabling access to subtle aspects of the experience.
We gained unprecedented detail regarding the precise synesthetic
phenomenology of this subject, which may be generalizable to
a wider population. We also provide access to interview data as
raw transcripts, alongside the structured and analyzed form in
the Supplementary Material. This is a rich data source and we
invite the interested reader to explore avenues for further con-
nections between the themes uncovered here and other aspects
of SSS, or synesthesia more generally. Appreciation for the pre-
cise phenomenological experience in synesthesia should focus
future research endeavors, as we seek to understand the extent
and limitations of the experience from the perspective of the
participant. Such work may transform consciousness science by
bringing objectivity to experiential phenomenology.
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Gould et al. (2014) refreshingly devote an
entire paper to investigating the detailed
experience of a synaesthete (AB), using
a rigorous qualitative method. Their
paper addresses sequence-space synaes-
thesia, in which people associate members
of sequences such as months or num-
bers with specific spatial locations that
together create an overall spatial pat-
tern or “form” for each sequence. I have
previously argued that sequence-space
synaesthesia shows strong continuity with
normal voluntary visuospatial imagery
(Price, 2009, 2013), and may be an exten-
sion of normal childhood development
of visuospatial skills (Price and Pearson,
2013). Additionally I have suggested that
behavioral evidence for the automaticity
of this synaesthesia is less robust than often
claimed (Price and Mattingley, 2013).
Gould et al.’s data provide striking support
for these claims.
Take continuity with normal visuospa-
tial imagery:
(1) Some spatial forms seem indistinguish-
able from normal imagery: e.g., AB’s
multiple and dynamic “spatial forms”
for clock-time constitute a vivid visual
imagery of clocks that would unlikely
be considered synaesthetic if reported
by a non-synaesthete.
(2) Spatial relationships of sequence items
are only a subset of AB’s total visu-
alization experience: e.g., Equations
and graphs are visualized together
with numerals on his number line;
scenes of embryonic development are
associated with his autobiographical
timeline; his alphabet form resides
within the dark, muddy atmosphere
of a cave, itself part of an expansive
landscape.
(3) Imagery when attending single
sequence items is similar to normal
alphanumeric imagery: e.g., Individual
numerals/letters are often imaged in
isolation from the rest of AB’s num-
ber or alphabet form, and although
these images contain salient color,
texture, and font, they do not seem
so far removed from non-synaesthetic
ability to visualize graphemes.
(4) Like normal imagery, aspects of the
synaesthetic imagery can be somewhat
modulated voluntarily: e.g., AB can
effortfully but unstably modify the
font of single letters or numerals in a
form.
(5) Like normal visual imagery, spatial
forms can be mentally scanned: e.g., AB
appears to intentionally shift atten-
tion from one sequence member to
another, progressively reconstructing
his spatial form by activating long
term memory of the relative locations
of sequence members.
Next consider how voluntary attention
mediates AB’s experiences:
(1) Attentional movement is required to
activate parts of AB’s number line that
were not previously in focus.
(2) Focal attention increases stability of
AB’s synaesthetic experience (just as
maintenance of normal visual imagery
is considered an effortful process,
drawing on executive capacity).
(3) AB superimposes his spatial forms
flexibly on physical space, avoiding
crowded parts of the external
environment or choosing to place
the form on a particular surface.
(4) Without attention, spatial forms may
not be induced at all. AB sometimes
engages with letters and numbers
without triggering any synaesthetic
experience. Synaesthetic induction is
not obligatory, but context dependent
and susceptible to task interference.
Gould et al.’s data go beyond merely exem-
plifying previous claims. AB’s distinction
between physical space and the “men-
tal room” in which his synaesthesia is
experienced is perhaps not so novel as
suggested by the authors, because it is
pre-empted by earlier self-report surveys
(Phillips, 1897; Sagiv et al., 2006) and
autobiographical accounts (Tyler, 2005,
pp. 34–35), but descriptions of complex
interaction between AB’s physical and
mental spaces seem more detailed than
previous accounts. They also challenge
simplistic dichotomy between projector
and associator synaesthesia. Moreover, the
reliance of AB’s synaesthesia on inter-
nally verbalizing the name of the inducer
does seem a novel contribution to our
knowledge (and is consistent with sug-
gestions that spatial forms arise when
visuospatial codes are adopted to help
retention of sequences whose individ-
ual members are primarily learned via
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auditory exposure). Gould et al. stress that
aspects of these experiences were previ-
ously unknown even to the synaesthete,
and that the formal qualitative method
of the Elicitation Interview (EI), adopted
in their study, can uncover such previ-
ously hidden phenomenology. It should
nevertheless be noted that more informal
introspection can also reveal novel aspects
of synaesthetic experience. For example,
Tyler (2005, p. 36) describes how he first
thought his synaesthetic color associations
were limited to numbers, “but then I
started running through the letters of the
alphabet and realized that, indeed, they
did evoke particular colors when I paid
attention to this modality.” Whether the EI
method is necessary for some kinds of dis-
covery, or merely corroborates what can be
revealed by more informal introspection,
is therefore open to question.
In any case, it follows that introspective
studies can transform synaesthetes’ experi-
ences rather than merely articulating them
in neutral fashion. This violates the def-
initional synaesthetic criterion of consis-
tency over time, convergent with other
recent claims that synaesthetic concur-
rents can change over shorter and longer
time scales (Simner, 2012; Meier et al.,
2014). So how do the contents of synaes-
thetic experience change during detailed
introspective exploration? Are the new
experiences de novo creations, or shifts
from preconscious to conscious represen-
tations. Alternatively, some synaesthetic
experience may initially color what James
(1890; Mangan, 1993) referred to as the
unattended “fringe” of sensory aware-
ness, but be brought into focal aware-
ness via introspective dialog. Future work
needs to empirically distinguish these
possibilities.
An obvious question with single-case
studies is the extent to which the partici-
pant is representative. Gould et al. consider
AB a “normal” sequence-space synaes-
thete as his experiences are consistent with
previous reports in the literature (although
they also acknowledge that AB’s introspec-
tive dialog may have modified his expe-
riences beyond what is typical). However,
normality is a questionable concept here
because the character of this variety of
synaesthesia seems to vary among indi-
viduals along many dimensions. These
include automaticity, complexity, visual vs.
spatial quality, projector-associator gradi-
ent, spatial reference frame and types of
spatial transformation that can be applied
(Price, 2009, 2013). For example, AB
reports his spatial forms are flexibly placed
into an environmental reference frame. By
contrast, other synaesthetes report spatial
forms that aremore egocentrically defined.
A thorough taxonomy for spatial forms is
still missing from the field, but the type of
research provided by Gould et al. helps us
map the territory that needs to be included
in such a taxonomy.
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Learning and synesthesia are profoundly interconnected. On the one hand, the develop-
ment of synesthesia is clearly inﬂuenced by learning. Synesthetic inducers – the stimuli
that evoke these unusual experiences – often involve the perception of complex properties
learned in early childhood, e.g., letters, musical notes, numbers, months of the year, and
even swimming strokes. Further, recent research has shown that the associations individual
synesthetes make with these learned inducers are not arbitrary, but are strongly inﬂuenced
by the structure of the learned domain. For instance, the synesthetic colors of letters are
partially determined by letter frequency and the relative positions of letters in the alphabet.
On the other hand, there is also a small, but growing, body of literature which shows that
synesthesia can inﬂuence or be helpful in learning. For instance, synesthetes appear to
be able to use their unusual experiences as mnemonic devices and can even exploit them
while learning novel abstract categories. Here we review these two directions of inﬂuence
and argue that they are interconnected. We propose that synesthesia arises, at least in
part, because of the cognitive demands of learning in childhood, and that it is used to
aid perception and understanding of a variety of learned categories. Our thesis is that the
structural similarities between synesthetic triggering stimuli and synesthetic experiences
are the remnants, the fossilized traces, of past learning challenges for which synsethesia
was helpful.
Keywords: synesthesia, learning and memory, plasticity and learning, perceptual development, cognitive
development, multisensory processing
INTRODUCTION
When synesthesia ﬁrst came under scientiﬁc scrutiny in the 1800s,
a fairly common view was that synesthetic experiences were
learned, and moreover served to help synesthetes with tasks such
as mathematics, remembering sequences, and many other learn-
ing challenges (e.g., Galton, 1881; Calkins, 1893; Jewanski et al.,
2011). After being largely ignored for much of the twentieth
century, synesthesia returned to the scientiﬁc mainstream about
25 years ago but learning was largely rejected as either a cause
or function of synesthesia. For example, Cytowic (1989), who
virtually single-handedly re-introduced synesthesia to the mod-
ern research community, originally argued that “synesthesia is not
learned” and many other researchers were similarly at pains to
distinguish learned or remembered associations from“real” synes-
thesia (cf. Harrison and Baron-Cohen, 1996; Elias et al., 2003;
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2003).
In recent years, however, it has become clear that the earlier
viewpoint needs to be taken seriously. There has been a ﬂurry
of research on the profound impact of learning on synesthesia,
and several prominent researchers now argue that learning and
conceptual factors are critical components of synesthetic develop-
ment (cf. Simner et al., 2009a; Jürgens and Nikolic, 2012; Deroy
and Spence, 2013a; Witthoft and Winawer, 2013). And some of
those who formerly denied the role of learning appear to have
reversed their stance (cf., Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). There
has also been a smaller body of literature dealing with inﬂuences
in the other direction: the utility of synesthesia for learning new
material.
These two streams of research are the focus of the ﬁrst two
sections of this review. In the ﬁnal section, we present a theory
of synesthetic development that is motivated by our interpreta-
tion and integration of the literature in both streams. Here we
argue that synesthesia may develop in part as a strategy for coping
with the learning demands of childhood, and that the successful
application of this strategymolds synesthetic associations to reﬂect
what has been learned. At the outset, we wish to note that this need
not be in conﬂict with genetic or nativist accounts of synesthe-
sia. There may be a particular genetic inheritance or neurological
proﬁle that is required for the development of synesthesia, but
learning is also a crucial component of this development, as is
explicitly acknowledged by researchers with a strongly nativist
approach (e.g., Spector and Maurer, 2009). The theory presented
here goes further by stating that synesthetic associations are not
merely learned, but learned for strategic purposes. But strategic
purposes do not rule out an equally important role for genetic or
neurological factors.
In what follows, we use the standard terminology of “inducer”
to refer to the stimuli that trigger synesthetic experiences, and
“concurrent” to refer to these experiences themselves, and we
generally refer to types of synesthesia by the common formula
inducer–concurrent (e.g., time–space synesthesia refers to time
being perceived by the synesthete in a spatial form).
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HOW LEARNING INFLUENCES SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesia typically develops during a period in which children
are engaged in the explicit learning of new skills. This often
occurs in a formal setting, and involves learning to recognize,
discriminate, name, and use the elements of highly structured
categories. These may be the letters of the alphabet, the months of
the year, the keys of music – the synesthetic inducers themselves.
This learning phase is often very slow and deliberate, continu-
ing into the teenage years. As the child learns more about the
inducer domain, their synesthetic experiences change. Not only
are individual concurrents determined on the basis of this learn-
ing, but so too are the relations between concurrents. Indeed
synesthetic concurrents can be said to encode a wide range of
information about the inducers, albeit in a highly idiosyncratic
manner unique to each synesthete. We justify each of these claims
below.
SYNESTHETIC INDUCERS ARE LEARNED CATEGORIES
A striking feature of almost all cases of synesthesia is that they
presuppose complex categorical learning. They involve a consis-
tent, one-to-one mapping of members of the inducer class onto
members of the concurrent class, which requires the ability to
identify and discriminate the members of the inducer class and,
more generally, to understand the nature of that class. A synes-
thete who sees each L as lime green can visually identify that
letter by means of its shape. But the synesthete also sees L as
a letter: a symbol that represents speciﬁc phonemes in the con-
text of words, and a member of an ordered sequence, among
other things. If an instrument–color synesthete “hears” a pic-
colo and a ﬂute as two distinct shades of blue, the synesthete
must be able to discriminate between the characteristic tim-
bres of the two instruments, but also to classify and recognize
them as distinctive timbres. Such understanding does not come
easily.
The development of literacy and letter recognition is a noto-
rious example. Even 11 year olds, who have had a minimum of
6 years of literacy training, are affected by letter crowding over
larger expanses of text (7.13 threshold keystrokes) than are adults
(2.83 keystrokes). In fact, crowding distance is roughly the same
for 11 year olds as it is for 8 and 5 year olds (Jeon et al., 2010).
Sequential and cyclical systems for marking the passage of time,
both natural (e.g., day and night, seasons) and conventional (e.g.,
days of the week, months) present their own conceptual hurdles.
For example, while the child’s understanding of sequential order
and mistakes in sequential order improves progressively from ages
4 to 11, only at age 10 do children begin to form an integrated
understanding of two distinct cyclical orders of events, allow-
ing them to order the months of the year and recognize when
standard holidays are located (Friedman, 1977). Similarly, musi-
cal categories and relations such as absolute and relative pitch,
scales, modes and tunings, and the timbre of speciﬁc instru-
ments, all require either extended listening experience and/or
explicit musical instruction. These three classes, graphemes, time
units, and aspects of music, make up most reported cases of
synesthetic inducers in all large-scale studies to date (cf. Day,
2005; Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2006), and, like less com-
mon inducers such as swimming styles (Nikolic et al., 2011) are
typically learned only with considerable effort over long peri-
ods of time as a result of explicit instruction from teachers or
parents.
What about the rarer types of synesthesia that involve “natural”
inducers such as odors, sounds, or pains (cf. Day, 2005)? Neona-
tal behavior such as crying presumably reﬂects the experiences
of the newborn, such as states of hunger, pain, thermal discom-
fort, or agitation. But despite the presence of such experiences,
the perceptual and conceptual skills that undergird developmen-
tal synesthesia, that make possible mappings between inducer
and concurrent domains, are arguably not present at birth.
In fact, what uniﬁes many of these inducers is that (a) they
are notoriously difﬁcult to identify and name, (b) their iden-
tiﬁcation and naming is aided by contextual cues and hence
these senses are highly multimodal, and (c) discrimination is
affected by the naming. To use the example of odor, both odor
naming and discrimination have an inverted U-shaped func-
tion across age, with young children and the elderly least able
to name and discriminate familiar odors (de Wijk and Cain,
1994a,b). Even for young adults, odor naming is very difﬁcult.
In blind testing without visual or other cues, adults recog-
nized only 50% of common household odors. The percentage
is much lower when less common odors are tested. However,
in a phenomenon called “tip of the nose” effect, Jönsson et al.
(2005) have shown that providing the name immediately serves
to “clarify” the odor for the perceiver. Similarly, when four
names are offered in conjunction with the odor sample, if
one name matches the sample, correct identiﬁcation of odor
increases from 30% to 80% (again in young participants; de
Wijk and Cain, 1994b). Finally, what people smell is strongly
inﬂuenced by color, and these associations between color and
odor are at least partly culturally determined. For instance,
Shankar et al. (2010) found that when presented with the same
brown colored liquid, 70% of the British participants identiﬁed
the drink as a cola while none of the Taiwanese participants
did so. Instead, 49% of the Taiwanese identiﬁed that drink as
grape.
Now consider the example of pain–color synesthesia. The few
studies that exist suggest that categories or types of pain are the
inducers, e.g., headaches and cramps reliably induce very differ-
ent concurrents (Coriat, 1913; Dudycha and Dudycha, 1935). But
reliably categorizing pain requires learning. At birth, a cold and
hungry baby will cry. But electrophysiological recordings suggest
that young infants cannot distinguish a soft touch on the heel from
a noxious lancing (Fabrizi et al., 2011). Even older children (age
4–11) with a great deal of experience with pain often identify loss
of appetite or nausea as pain (Kortesluoma and Nikkonen, 2004).
The number and type of pains reported by children is inﬂuenced
by their own past experience with pain, and by the pains they have
observed their parents and siblings experiencing (Harbeck and
Peterson, 1992; Franck et al., 2010), and the terms used to describe
different types of pain become increasingly more speciﬁc through
childhood (e.g., Gaffney and Dunne, 1986; Harbeck and Peterson,
1992; Crow, 1997). Moreover, children’s judgments of the sever-
ity of pain are mediated by cues such as syringes, or their own
crying or sweating (Kortesluoma and Nikkonen, 2004). All this
evidence suggests that a large part of the ability to categorize the
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quality, magnitude, and location of pains is improved and reﬁned
throughout childhood.
These examples suggest that the apparent dichotomy between
“innate” and “learned” varieties of synesthesia needs closer
scrutiny. Certainly, nothing logically precludes innate sensory rep-
resentations or categorizations. But learning may inﬂuence the
categorization of all synesthetic inducers, not merely the large
majority of cases that clearly involve extensive explicit category
learning.
In summary, synesthesia normally develops as part of a difﬁcult,
formal process of learning to recognize and categorize perceptually
and conceptually complex inducers. Even in cases of more unusual
inducers, learning – especially perceptually and/or conceptually
challenging forms of learning – seems to be at the heart of synesthesia.
THE SLOW COURSE OF SYNESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT
Only two published papers directly investigate the development
of synesthesia, both derived from the same longitudinal database
on grapheme–color associations (Simner et al., 2009a; Simner and
Bain, 2013). These show that synesthetic associations coalesce very
slowly: 6- to 7-year-old synesthetes have consistent color asso-
ciations with approximately 35% of letters, which increases to
approximately 70% by ages 10–11. Thus there is a period of at
least 4 years during which these synesthetic associations are in
ﬂux. Unfortunately the published accounts do not tell us about
those letters that do not have stable associations with colors. Do
they have weak associations, unstable associations, or no associa-
tions at all? We anticipate that future child studies will attempt to
grapple with this issue.
Interestingly, not a single one of Simner et al. (2009a), Simner
and Bain (2013) 615 participants had perfectly stable letter–color
associations, a fact that should make us question the common
claim of synesthetes that letter colors are ﬁxed “from infancy” or
“as long as I can remember” (e.g., Rich et al., 2005). It appears
that the color evoked by a letter in adulthood is experienced as the
color that L has “always been,” but these memories are not always
accurate.
Synesthesia often develops slowly, into late childhood.
LEARNED FIRST-ORDER INFLUENCES ON SYNESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT
While Simner et al. (2009a) have provided the only studies of
childhood synesthetes, the settled associations of adult synesthetes
provide insight into the multi-year process of gradual synes-
thetic stabilization. Just as paleontologists can infer a great deal
about long-extinct species by examining their remains, synesthesia
researchers can learn about various inﬂuences on the development
of synesthesia by examining the stable associations that persist into
adulthood, making these associations like perceptual/cognitive
fossils. We divide these associations into two broad groups: ﬁrst-
order and second-order mappings. In principle there could be
learned or innate inﬂuences of both types, but as we illustrate
below, in most cases these inﬂuences are clearly learned, and the
evidence for the innateness of some cases is debatable.
A ﬁrst-order mapping is one in which single elements in one
domain (e.g., the domain of letters) are mapped to single elements
in another (e.g., the domain of colors). Cases in which particu-
lar letters tend to be associated with the same color categories
for many synesthetes, then, would be ﬁrst-order mappings. For
example, a common ﬁnding is that the ﬁrst letters of common
color names tend to be associated with the corresponding color,
for example purple is often associated with P for English synes-
thetes (Simner et al., 2005). Similarly, color words are generally
the color that they refer to (e.g., the English word blue is often
blue), and the words for objects with prototypical colors are often
colored accordingly (e.g., banana is yellow) in both English and
Japanese (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Rich et al., 2005; Asano and
Yokosawa, 2012). All of these associations are clearly learned, i.e.,
based upon semantic or orthographic associations.
More idiosyncratic cases of learned ﬁrst-order synesthetic asso-
ciations exist. Some adult grapheme–color synesthetes have colors
that derive almost entirely from childhood toys (Hancock, 2006;
Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013) or colored letters displayed in
kindergarten classrooms (Colizoli et al., 2012). Similar childhood
determinants of synesthetic associations have been noted for well
over a century (Calkins, 1893). The origins of these associations
can be complex and subtle, and can only be unearthed by careful
case studies. As an example, Melanie Ahrling gives this account
of some of the childhood origins of the colors and form of her
synesthetic calendar:
My entire week is composed of elongated rectangles strung together in
a slightly irregular fashion – jutting out a little, either at the top or the
bottom. The blue Monday and the yellow-red Tuesday are rounded off
at the top – similar to an inverted awning. Work-days have more indi-
vidual characteristics than the weekends. I’m pretty sure that’s because
as a child, I had a different lesson plan for every day and also varying
lesson times in the afternoons. Even then, I never really liked Thursdays
which for me are dark-green with black stripes due to years of having
to go to children’s ballet lessons with an ancient and rather “strict”
teacher, which wasn’t exactly my idea of fun. My Wednesday however,
is always light-blue with little white clouds. This is possibly because
throughout my entire childhood we always had Wednesday afternoons
off – in comparison to the other weekdays, on which there was always
some kind of schedule that had to be adhered to [...]
For the most part, the weekend was ﬁlled with enjoyable outings and
for as long as I can remember, has been composed of a large block of
two rectangles – namely the dark violet-blue Saturday and the violet
Sunday. These rectangles were always somewhat bigger than the rest of
the weekdays – and still are – to this day. The more rigidly structured
the weekend – irrespective of whether the activities are fun or not –
the closer these two rectangles are pushed together (Dittmar, 2009,
pp. 139–140).
Such recollections are very difﬁcult to conﬁrm, of course, but
they are common in self-reports by synesthetes.
Rarer forms of synesthesia, such as the lexical–gustatory variety,
also exhibit learned ﬁrst-order inﬂuences on synesthetic concur-
rents. Thus the ﬂavor of a word is often inﬂuenced by shared
phonology between the word and the name of the ﬂavor, so
Cincinatti might taste of cinammon, or by semantic associations
between the word and the ﬂavor, so blue might taste inky (Ward
and Simner, 2003;Ward et al., 2005). Even without formal instruc-
tion in ﬂavor recognition, semantic associations with tastes still
develop.
For grapheme–color synesthetes, O, I, X, and Z are typically
associatedwith achromatic colors, in particularO and I withwhite
andX andZ with black, andC is often associatedwith yellow (Rich
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et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2005). Spector and Maurer (2008, 2009,
2011) investigated these associations with two-alternative forced-
choice tasks in which participants searched for plastic shapes in
containers that were divided into two differently colored halves.
They found that non-synesthetic adults, children, and pre-literate
toddlers reliably chose to look into the white half of containers
when searching for O or I shapes, the black half of containers
when searching forX orZ shapes, and the yellow half of containers
when searching for C shapes. These age groups differed, however,
in other cases: older children and adults looked into the blue half
of containers to ﬁnd B shapes, the yellow half of containers to
ﬁnd Y shapes, and the green half of containers to ﬁnd G shapes,
but toddlers did not. These results demonstrate that certain shape–
color associations in toddlers are not the result of learned semantic
associations between letter names and color names. It is contro-
versial, however, whether stronger conclusions about innateness
are warranted. First, several environmental sources of these asso-
ciations have been proposed (cf. Spector and Maurer, 2011).
Second, the relationship between these shape–color associations
and grapheme–color synesthesia is unclear. Graphemes are not
shapes per se, but simply the smallest contrastive unit in an orthog-
raphy that is capable of distinguishing meaning. Thus the same
letter can take on many different shapes and a grapheme–color
synesthete will generally see all these shapes as having the same
color, e.g., A and a would be seen as the same shade of crimson
(for a rare report of an exception to this rule, see Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001a), and identical shapes that are contextually
determined to be different graphemes will be perceived as differ-
ent colors (Dixon et al., 2006). Furthermore, for adult synesthetes
graphemes induce highly speciﬁc colors (approximately as speciﬁc
as color memory Arnold et al., 2012), not simply color categories
or any nearby colors irrespective of color category boundaries.
Thus further experimentation is required to resolve several ques-
tions. What is the precise nature of the toddler associations – what
aspect of shape is associated with what aspect of color? Are these
associations learned or innate? And are they the basis of the later
associations between graphemes and highly speciﬁc colors in adult
synesthetes?
It is important to note that despite all these ﬁrst-order inﬂu-
ences, any two synesthetes’ sets of inducer–concurrent pairings
are likely to appear entirely unrelated to each other. Even the most
powerful ﬁrst-order effects, such as O being white for grapheme–
color synesthetes, have many exceptions, and most of these effects
are only apparent after careful statistical analyses of large popula-
tions. However, the vast majority of synesthetes we have had the
opportunity to study appear to be inﬂuenced by at least some of
these factors.
The synesthetic concurrent that is associated with a particular
inducer is often determined by what the synesthete has learned about
that inducer or experiences they have had with the inducer.
SECOND-ORDER INFLUENCES ON SYNESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT
Second-order mappings can be thought of as “relations between
relations.” Unlike ﬁrst-order mappings, in which single elements
in one domain are mapped to single elements in another domain
(e.g., the letter A is mapped to the color red), in second-order
mappings, patterns, or relations within one domain are mapped to
patterns or relations within another domain. On reﬂection this is
not surprising, given that human perception often deals with rela-
tionships rather than absolute stimulus values: for instance we can
identify a tune such as Happy Birthday (a pattern of relationships
between notes) better than we can individual notes.
Anumber of second-ordermappings inﬂuence synesthetic con-
currents. For instance, letters that have similar shapes (e.g., E and
F) tend to have similar colors among grapheme–color synesthetes
whose native language is English (Brang et al., 2011b;Watson et al.,
2012a), German (Jürgens and Nikolic, 2012), or Japanese (Asano
andYokosawa, 2013). In these cases, similarity relationshipswithin
the letter–shape domain are mapped onto similarity relationships
within the color domain. Second-ordermappings such as these can
be entirely independent of ﬁrst-order mappings, and thus would
not show up using ﬁrst-order analyses. Thus E might have com-
pletely different colors for synesthetes John and Jane, but if John’s
color for E is similar to his color for F, and Jane’s color for E is
similar to her color for F, then the two have the same second-order
mapping of shape to color.
Similarity in terms of shape is not the only type of letter
similarity that affects synesthetic color. The relative frequency
of letters also matters: there is a tendency for letters and num-
bers that are more frequently seen in print to be associated with
brighter colors (Beeli et al., 2007; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007;
Smilek et al., 2007; Simner and Ward, 2008; Watson et al., 2012a),
with more saturated colors (Beeli et al., 2007), and with colors
whose names are more commonly spoken or written (Rich et al.,
2005; Simner et al., 2005). Thus there is a second-order map-
ping between similarity in terms of letter/digit frequency and
similarity in terms of luminance, saturation, and color word
frequency.
The phonological similarity of letters also affects their synes-
thetic colors, although this may be a language-speciﬁc effect.
Japanese hiragana and katakana characters with the same pro-
nunciations tend to have the same colors, despite large dif-
ferences in shape (Asano and Yokosawa, 2011), and hiragana
characters with similar pronunciations tend to have simi-
lar colors (Asano and Yokosawa, 2013). However phonology
may not be able to inﬂuence synesthetic color in opaque
orthographies, where letters have multiple pronunciations. In
English, for example, similarity between the sounds of let-
ter names does not correlate with synesthetic color similarity
(Watson et al., 2012a).
Another important formof letter similarity is in terms of alpha-
betical order, which has a somewhat curious relationship with
synesthetic color: letters that are earlier in an alphabet tend to
have less similar colors than later letters, at least among native
speakers of English (Eagleman, 2010; Watson et al., 2012a) and
Japanese (Asano and Yokosawa, 2013). The original explanation
of this ﬁnding treats alphabetical order as a kind of proxy for
the learning order of letters, as letters are generally learned in
roughly alphabetical order (Justice et al., 2006). The idea is that as
synesthetic children begin learning letters, they assign each letter a
distinctive color, but as they learn more and more letters they run
out of colors and are forced to use colors that are similar to those
they had already assigned to previously learned letters (Eagleman,
2010; Watson et al., 2012a).
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This interpretation, however, is hard to reconcile with the
lengthy developmental trajectory of synesthesia. By age 7, the
majority of children will have learned all their letters, but
the synesthetes among them will have consistent color associ-
ations for only a third of these letters (Simner et al., 2009a),
and will not develop color associations for many of them until
their teenage years. It seems unlikely that these associations
develop in alphabetical order, given that all the letters are well-
known by this point. Thus most letter–color associations are
not developed in anything like the order of learning of let-
ters, which casts doubt on the theory that synesthetic alphabetic
ordinality–color effects come from the order of acquisition of
letters. An alternative possibility is that ordinal position is itself
an important aspect of how alphabetic letters are conceptual-
ized and encoded in the brain, and that any such important
aspects will inevitably have an impact on synesthetic color (cf.
Asano and Yokosawa, 2013).
Music–color synesthesia also displays second-order inﬂuences,
although it is less clear that these inﬂuences are due to learn-
ing. Higher pitches tend to be associated with brighter colors
(Marks, 1975), and quartertones tend to be associated with colors
that are closer to the midpoint of the colors of the two adjacent
semitones (Head, 2006). This pitch–brightness correspondence
is not a unique feature of synesthesia: it is ubiquitous among
non-synesthetic humans and even chimpanzees (Ludwig et al.,
2011).
These second-order effects are independent of each other, at
least in the case of grapheme–color synesthesia. Thus synesthetes
who display a strong ordinality–color effect are no more or less
likely to display a strong shape–color effect, and so forth (Watson
et al., 2012a). And, as with the ﬁrst-order effects, any synesthete
might showno signs of a given second-order effect: these are statis-
tical tendencies, not ﬁrm rules. Nevertheless, they can be powerful
indeed, as shown by the fact that fully 79% of the variance in
synesthetic color difference for Japanese hiragana is explained
by a model that includes ordinality, shape, phonological, and
familiarity differences (Asano and Yokosawa, 2013).
Not all second-order effects need to be learned, and several have
been interpreted as arising from general developmental processes
independent of experience (Maurer et al., 2012). These include
mappings between visually perceived angle, height, lightness, size
and auditory pitch, and sounds and shapes. One might also argue
that, e.g., shape–color and sound–color similarity mappings in
grapheme–color synesthesia are due to an innate tendency to map
similarity to similarity. However the identiﬁcation and discrimi-
nation of the individual elements in many of these mappings will
require extensive learning aswell (the difﬁculties in learning to reli-
ably discriminate letter shapes, for instance, were discussed in the
previous section), and learned contingencies could also account
for some of these mappings (as is noted by Maurer et al., 2012).
Furthermore, there is strong opposition from Deroy and Spence
to the notion that any of these associations are unlearned, and
several methods by which they could arise from environmental
learning have been proposed (Spence and Deroy, 2012; Deroy
and Spence, 2013a,b). As with the discussion of ﬁrst-order rela-
tions, we do not intend to deny the possibility of unlearned
inﬂuences on second-order relations, but we do suggest that
learning will be an important inﬂuence on most, if not all, of
them.
Finally, we note a rare example of how explicitly understood
similarity relations can be used to create synesthetic mappings. In
order to be able to sing in foreign languages, a problem for opera
singers, Jasmin Sinha uses a synesthetic version of the international
phonetic alphabet (IPA) chart of vowel phonemes. She explains
how she sings vowels correctly:
When I need to identify a vowel accurately in order to sing it, I always
make mental use of the (IPA) vowel chart that I ﬁrst encountered as
a tool while studying linguistics at university. I can assign the vowel
that I need to sing to a precise location on the chart and it hardly ever
coincides exactly with one of the spots that are marked. I almost always
need to move the position of the desired sound on the chart a little bit.
Synesthesia does not come into it until the next stage, when I start to
make conceptual use of what I learned in my linguistic studies [...] I
see the layout of a vowel chart on my internal monitor, which is set
up about 20–30 centimeters in front of me like a cinema screen. This
screen is not ﬂat; it curves in a wide arc in front of my face, but does
not encircle my head. It looks like a large, under-exposed and grainy
old black and white photograph, in which nothing can be made out
except the grainy texture; the edges are rather faded. The basic color
tends towards what is almost a very dark sepia; it is not simply black.
With a conscious act of will I project a horizontal vowel chart onto this
screen. The chart’s bottom line is quite close tomy chin and it then turns
away from me with a slight lean to the left (this means that the open“a”
is closest to my chin). In addition to the fact that my subjective vowel
chart does not correspond exactly with the ofﬁcial one, I have given
it an extra personal and synesthetic dimension, resulting in a three-
dimensional structure. The non-synesthetic grid, which is based on the
ofﬁcial vowel chart, forms the upper part; it “ﬂoats” above a colored
layer which depicts my vowel colorings (Dittmar, 2009, p. 199).
In summary, the relations between synesthetic concurrents often
preserve many of the important learned relations between their
inducers.
CAN SYNESTHESIA BE LEARNED BY ADULTS?
A number of studies have tried training adult non-synesthetes
to make synesthetic–style associations. These studies have all
employed different training paradigms, such as trial-and-error
learning in which participants choose from among several colored
patches when presented with a black grapheme and are given feed-
back on each choice (Brang et al., 2011a), having participants read
novels with colored letters at their own pace (Colizoli et al., 2012),
speeded visual search tasks with colored letters (Kusnir and Thut,
2012), or even post-hypnotic instructions to associate particular
numbers and colors (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). Training times
range from 15 minutes or less (Brang et al., 2011b) to 20 days
(MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988), although most are well under an
hour. This heterogeneity makes cross-study comparisons difﬁcult,
but there are several points worth considering.
These studies show that non-synesthetes can behave like synes-
thetes on the “synesthetic Stroop task.” In this task, inducers
are presented in colors that are either congruent or incongru-
ent with their associations and the subject must name the color
as quickly as possible. Response times are slower when the
color is incongruent with their association (Mills et al., 1999;
Dixon et al., 2000). Several training studies ﬁnd a similar effect
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among non-synesthetes with trained associations (Elias et al.,
2003; Colizoli et al., 2012; experiments 2 and 3 in MacLeod and
Dunbar, 1988; Meier and Rothen, 2009), although others do not
(Kusnir and Thut, 2012; experiment 1 in MacLeod and Dun-
bar, 1988), which may be due to insufﬁcient training time (cf.
MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988).
Phenomenological reports from participants in these studies
are particularly interesting, although only one study collected
these in a formal manner (Colizoli et al., 2012), and several give
no account of phenomenology at all (Calkins, 1894; Nunn et al.,
2002; Elias et al., 2003; Brang et al., 2011b; Brang et al., 2013).
Participants in 3 studies reported not having color experiences
(Kelly, 1934; Meier and Rothen, 2009; Kusnir and Thut, 2012),
but other studies have more promising results. Several partic-
ipants in the colored novel-reading study reported that they
began experiencing colors when thinking about certain letters,
and the degree to which they endorsed having such experiences
was correlated with the strength of their synaesthetic Stroop
effects (Colizoli et al., 2012). One participant in a shape-color
training study reported that “the shapes began to take on the
color of the names assigned them even on training days, when
they appeared in white” (MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988). Par-
ticipants in the post-hypnotic suggestion study reported that
numbers on license plates or street signs took on their associ-
ated colors (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). Finally, participants in
a tone-color training study reported seeing a color when its cor-
responding tone was played, even if the actual visual stimulus
was faintly colored with a different hue (Howells, 1944). Impor-
tantly, then, subjects in one training paradigm (Colizoli et al.,
2012) report experiences that are not unlike reports made by
“associator” synaesthetes, who do not experience their concur-
rents located in external space (Dixon et al., 2004), particularly
“know-associators,” who do not experience their concurrents in a
strong perceptual manner at all (Ward et al., 2007), while subjects
in others (Howells, 1944; MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988; Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2009) report experiences that resemble reports of
“projector” synaesthesia, in which participants experience con-
currents in the external world (Dixon et al., 2004), speciﬁcally
the “surface-projector” variety, in which these concurrents appear
on the inducers themselves (Ward et al., 2007). It is also inter-
esting to note that three studies which had participants who
reported synaesthesia-like experiences were among the longest
studies (Howells, 1944; MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988; Colizoli et al.,
2012), and one showed that an identical training regimen used for
a shorter length of time did not lead to such reports (MacLeod
and Dunbar, 1988). No doubt there are important differences
between the experiences of participants in training studies and
long-term synaesthetes, but the weight of the evidence from self-
reports certainly seems to suggest that there are equally important
similarities.
Phenomenal experiences aside, trained participants in these
studies differ from developmental synesthetes. Participants in the
novel-reading study had poor recall of their letter–color associa-
tions, remembering less than half of their associations 6 months
after training had stopped, whereas synesthetes typically have
close to perfect consistency in their reported associations over
much longer periods of time (Colizoli et al., 2012). Participants
who had been trained with letter–color associations and subse-
quently learned conditioned responses to colors did not transfer
these responses to their associated letters, unlike synesthetes given
the conditioning task (Meier and Rothen, 2009). Nor did par-
ticipants trained with word–color associations show increased
activation in visual cortexwhen listening towords, unlikematched
synesthetes (Nunn et al., 2002). However given that the synes-
thetes in such studies have had decades of experience with their
associations, the short time spent in training (respectively, long
enough to read a single novel, 70 min, and possibly less than
10 min) is hardly sufﬁcient to draw any strong conclusions (as
is noted by Meier and Rothen, 2009). One neurophysiologi-
cal study did test an individual with much more training: a
cross-stitcher with 8 years of experience viewed numbers that
she associated with thread colors (Elias et al., 2003). Unlike a
grapheme–color synesthete performing the same task, she showed
no activation of visual cortex. Note, however, that this is a sin-
gle null result from a single subject. Given that only two studies
have compared the neurophysiological correlates of trained and
synesthetic associations (Nunn et al., 2002; Elias et al., 2003), and
given that neurophysiological results in developmental synes-
thetes are notoriously hard to replicate (see Rouw et al., 2011
for a review), a pair of null results using different training
paradigms and different types of synesthesia is impossible to
interpret.
In summary, non-synesthetic participants in a number of train-
ing studies report experiences that sound quite similar to genuine
synesthetic experiences. There are important differences between the
effects of short-term training in adults and the long-term associations
of synesthetes, but these are not enough to conclude that the two are
qualitatively distinct.
HOW SYNESTHESIA INFLUENCES LEARNING
Above we reviewed the studies that have examined how learning
affects synesthetic experience. Inﬂuences in the other direction –
from synesthetic experience to its use in learning – have received
less attention. In this literature researchers have focused primarily
on enhanced memory. There have been very few studies on the
complex forms of learning that synesthetes commonly report their
synesthesia helps with, such as learning to speak foreign languages,
how to score music, to hear musical intervals and musical key
changes, and to understand correct musical phrasing, or even to
hear the phonemes of vowels for bothnative and foreign languages.
“Pure”memorization is clearly necessary but not sufﬁcient for such
tasks, meaning that there is a lack of evidence about potentially
important aspects of synesthesia.
In a nutshell, the studies summarized below suggest that synes-
thesia can enable both implicit and explicit forms of learning. That
is, synesthetes can exploit their concurrents as a means of obtain-
ing and retaining information about their inducers. In some cases
they do this deliberately, even to the extent of planning or training
themselves to use their concurrents in this manner, while in other
cases they learn spontaneously and without apparent awareness.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF STUDYING SYNESTHETIC LEARNING
There are a number of reasons why this area of research is under-
developed. In part, the problem lies in delineating a number of
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speciﬁc claims and ﬁnding the appropriate experimental meth-
ods to test them. Here we list some of the complications facing
experimenters in this ﬁeld.
First, we need to ask whether synesthesia helps synesthetes to
learn and/or organize their thoughts or whether it merely seems to
do so. It is possible that despite their rich experiences, synesthetes
use the same cognitive resources as non-synesthetes to remember
their appointments throughout the week, sing the proper vowels
and so on. Is their phenomenology actually connected to how
synesthetes learn? Seron et al. (1992), for example, report that
theywere unable to determinewhether their participants’number-
forms are actually used in calculation.
Second, synesthesia might provide an alternative way to master
a skill, but not necessarily a superior way. Certainly the superiority
claimed by many synesthetes could result from a failure to imagine
how non-synesthetes get about the world without these experi-
ences. As Melanie Ahrling remarked: “I don’t understand how
anyone can orientate themselves in time without such schemata
in their heads, but obviously it does work and for many people it
functions just as well for them as it does for me – except without
the colors and little boxes.” (Dittmar, 2009, p. 147). In this case,
studies that merely look for advantages on certain tasks might be
missing important differences.
Third, synesthetic styles of learning might even prove a hin-
drance. An example of this comes from a synesthete who reports
that when she tried to learn the piano, she discovered that she had
three different and inconsistent sets of colors: one for each of her
ﬁngers, one for each of the musical pitches, and another for the
letter names of the musical notes. These inconsistencies proved
insurmountable, and so she gave up trying to learn the piano and
switched to the Theremin (Pautzke, 2010)! A recent study has also
shown that grapheme–color synesthetes are impaired when trying
to memorize randomly chosen associations between colors and
graphemes for which they do not consciously experience synes-
thetic colors (Brang et al., 2013). In general, any advantages might
be counterbalanced by limitations.
Finally, synesthesia often involves complex, multimodal expe-
riences. For example, a grapheme–color synesthete might expe-
rience the letter P as a speciﬁc stable color. But P might also
have any number of other properties (Eagleman and Goodale,
2009): it could emit light or glow, be composed of a mix of col-
ors, have a certain level of specular reﬂectance (shiny or dull), a
texture (silk or sandpaper), a personality (boring or overbearing),
or a taste (salty or sour). Any or all of these properties might
be relevant to the role that P plays in the individual’s system of
learning.
A recent documentary illustrates this complexity nicely
(Kirschner and Söfﬁg, 2012). In it, a number of synesthetic mem-
bers of a boys choir discuss how they use their synesthesia to“code”
a heard song in order to reproduce it. For example, one boy sees
each note as a colored square; volume affects the size of the square
and its color represents pitch. Another boy represents the song as
a series of colored dots that form a line stretching out to the left of
the child; each note within a phrase receives the same color, and
pitch is represented by a line of dots that dips and rises. A third
represents the same song with elaborately colored, personiﬁed,
hopping numbers, shapes and stick persons.
What the boys are learning, namely rote-singing, is a com-
plex set of skills that allow one to reproduce long passages of
music from a single hearing. They must learn to hear the music,
to discriminate changes in pitch and discern the melodic con-
tour; to commit the melodic phrase to memory; and ﬁnally to
reproduce the melody, matching the voice to each remembered
note while monitoring and correcting vocal errors. Like chess
masters who perceive structure and relations between pieces in
a few glances (cf. Reingold and Charness, 2005), skilled rote
singers have learned to perceive musical relations rather than
collections of notes. This is true even for musicians with per-
fect pitch and for musical savants (Halpern and Bower, 1982;
Sloboda et al., 1985; Young and Nettelbeck, 1995; Miller, 1999).
Children who are explicitly taught pitch relations and the melodic
contours of tonal music through explicit explanations of musi-
cal concepts are able to learn melodies more quickly, understand
melodic contours better, make fewer mistakes in memory, and
sing more accurately, results that are in line with adult perfor-
mance (Petzold, 1963; Apfelstadt, 1984; Oura and Hatano, 1988;
Hedden, 2012).
One can imagine several ways in which each of the boys’ synes-
thesias might help with any of these skills, but conﬁrming that
this is what actually happens would be difﬁcult indeed. Recall
the boy who experienced melody as an undulating line of colored
notes. An obvious interpretation is that he represents pitch con-
tour spatially and note identity with color. Even so, his perception
of pitch contour might be no better than average. He may have
substituted his synesthetic representations of relational pitch for
whatever representational methods are used by non-synesthetes,
in much the same way that children who are taught alternative
multimodal forms of representation may use those types of rep-
resentation. Then again, despite his own reports, his synesthetic
experiences may play no role in his memory of pitch sequences.
Finally, even if his memory for pitch contour is exemplary, there
is no guarantee that his singing will be more accurate than that
of other choir members. Vocal production of a song requires
more than accurate memory, such that relational encoding fails
to enhance vocal matching. In this particular case, the choir-
master reports that the synesthetic boys are not especially skilled
in comparison to the other choir members (Kirschner, personal
communication).
For many reasons, then, understanding and testing how synes-
thesia affects learning is truly difﬁcult, andwill often require a deep
understanding of the speciﬁcs of each individual synesthete’s expe-
riences in order to develop appropriate experiments (cf. Smilek
and Dixon, 2002). Despite these challenges, there has been some
success in verifying that synesthesia can and does affect certain
forms of learning, and we now turn to these cases.
IS THERE A SYNESTHETIC ADVANTAGE FOR MEMORY?
Probably the single most common anecdotally reported beneﬁt of
synesthesia is that it helps with memory. This example is typical:
My most crucial guide to orientation is my colored numbers. Above all,
they help me to remember telephone numbers and birthdays.
I have two uncles whose birthdays are very close together: an uncle
August – whose birthday is on the 28th of November – and an uncle
Berthold – who celebrates his birthday on November 30th.
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Because the nameAugust is a violet-dark blue and the name“Berthold”
is a yellow–brown, I have never in my entire life got these birthdays
muddled up – as my number 8 is dark-blue and my 3 is yellow. . . ..In
this instance, the colors of the names and the colors of the birthday–
dates match up so well that they serve as an excellent memory aid
(Dittmar, 2009, p. 140).
Grapheme–color synesthetes often describe how their col-
ors assist with remembering names, telephone numbers, or the
spellings of words (cf. Chapter 2 inCytowic, 2002), and they gener-
ally report above-average memory abilities (Yaro andWard, 2007).
Several recent studies have formally investigated the relationship
between synesthesia and memory, using both case and group stud-
ies. Readers interested in a more detailed account of this research
should consult the review by Rothen et al. (2012).
Single case studies usually focus on synesthetes with extraor-
dinary memory abilities. These include synesthetes who explicitly
claim to have exploited their synesthesia to aid them in memoriz-
ingpi to over 20,000decimal places (Bor et al., 2007), remembering
long lists of names for many weeks (Mills et al., 2006), perfectly
recalling a list of random words on a surprise test 20 years after ini-
tial exposure (Luria, 1968), or perfectly recalling several 50-digit
matrices several months after studying them for a few minutes
(Smilek et al., 2002). In the latter case, researchers veriﬁed the
synesthete’s claim that she was exploiting her synesthetic colors
on this task by presenting her with matrices of numbers that were
colored incongruently with her concurrents, which caused her
performance to plummet well below the level of non-synesthetes
(Smilek et al., 2002).
Group studies, on the other hand, have focused mainly on
grapheme–color synesthesia, with one study examining time–
space synesthetes (Simner et al., 2009b). In all cases, they have
shown either no general memory differences between synesthetes
andnon-synesthetes, or synesthetic advantages that are impressive,
but not near savant levels (cf. Rothen and Meier, 2010a).
What are these advantages? Synesthetes tend to have superior
memories for the speciﬁc stimuli of their concurrent domain(s),
e.g., grapheme–color synesthetes have advantages on various
tests of color memory (Cohen’s d or Glass’  ranging from
0.54 to 1.20; Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen and Meier, 2010a;
Pritchard et al., 2013; Terhune et al., 2013), and calendar–form
synesthetes have visual short term memory advantages (Cohen’s
d = 0.35, Simner et al., 2009b). Furthermore, they often show
memory advantages for stimuli from their inducer domain, thus
grapheme–color synesthetes have advantages for various memory
tasks involving lists of words (Cohen’s d ranging from 0.75 to
1.38; Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen and Meier, 2010a; Gross
et al., 2011; Radvansky et al., 2011). They are also better at
implicitly learning artiﬁcial grammars, but only if these gram-
mars are composed of the letters that trigger their synesthesia
(Cohen’s d = 0.62; Rothen et al., 2013). Calendar–form synes-
thetes have much better autobiographical and somewhat better
historical memories (Cohen’s d of 1.95 and 0.87, respectively;
Simner et al., 2009b).
However synesthetes show no advantages for some other mem-
ory tasks involving their inducers. Grapheme–color synesthetes do
not appear to have a group advantage for remembering matrices
of numbers (Yaro and Ward, 2007; Green and Goswami, 2008;
Rothen and Meier, 2009), nor for retaining graphemes in working
memory (Rothen and Meier, 2010a; Gross et al., 2011; Terhune
et al., 2013). Furthermore they have advantages in the reproduc-
tion and recognition of simple visual ﬁgures that are not associated
with their synesthetic inducers or concurrents at all (Rothen and
Meier, 2010a). Thus not all synesthetic memory advantages can be
tied to synesthetic experiences.
IS THERE A SYNESTHETIC STYLE OF MEMORY?
Clearly, the research on synesthesia and memory has ambigu-
ous results. We suggest that this is because this is a relatively
new area of research and the appropriate experimental meth-
ods have not yet been determined. Most studies have concerned
themselves primarily with determining whether synesthesia is
associated with memory advantages, which is an interesting
question in its own right, but may be irrelevant to determin-
ing whether synesthesia is exploited for memory. As discussed
above, the question is not whether synesthetes perform better
than non-synesthetes on memory tasks, but whether they perform
differently.
What is known about such differences comes either from self-
reports or from a single experimental technique that has been
employed in a handful of studies: using incongruently colored
stimuli in an attempt to impair synesthetes’ performance (Smilek
et al., 2002; Yaro and Ward, 2007; Green and Goswami, 2008;
Rothen and Meier, 2009; Radvansky et al., 2011). At present two of
these studies have found no evidence of interference from incon-
gruent colors among groups of synesthetes (Yaro and Ward, 2007;
Rothen and Meier, 2009), while two group studies and one case
study have found interference (Smilek et al., 2002; Green and
Goswami, 2008; Radvansky et al., 2011).
One possible explanation for these inconsistencies is the choice
of tasks. The stimuli used in most group studies are not ones
that synesthetes have reported using their concurrents to help
remember. Names have been used in one only study, which did
ﬁnd a strong beneﬁt for the (single) synesthetic participant (Mills
et al., 2006), and to our knowledge no one has formally tested
synesthetic recall of phone numbers. Group studies where adult
synesthetes were tasked with remembering large matrices of num-
bers showed no synesthetic advantage (Yaro and Ward, 2007;
Rothen and Meier, 2009), but the synesthetes in these studies
had not previously claimed to have unusual memories for such
matrices. On the other hand, in every case where synesthetes
have been tested on the class of stimuli for which they actually
claim to use synesthesia as a memory aid, they have shown advan-
tages (Luria, 1968; Smilek et al., 2002; Mills et al., 2006; Bor et al.,
2007; Yaro and Ward, 2007; Simner et al., 2009b; Rothen and
Meier, 2010a; Gross et al., 2011; Radvansky et al., 2011). Note
that in the two cases where such advantages have been demon-
strated and incongruently colored stimuli were employed to
interfere with synesthetic experiences, synesthetic memory advan-
tagesweremitigated (Radvansky et al., 2011) or eliminated entirely
(Smilek et al., 2002).
Clearly more research is necessary, hopefully involving novel
ways of testing for speciﬁcally synesthetic styles of performance
on memory tasks. Nevertheless, two key points have now been
well established. First, synesthetes tend to have memory advantages
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of about 0.5–1 standard deviations over non-synesthetes for spe-
ciﬁc types of stimuli, particularly those from their inducer and
concurrent domains. Second, in at least some cases, they can
exploit their concurrents in the encoding or retrieval process, and
this use of synesthesia as a deliberate mnemonic can be powerful
indeed.
SYNESTHESIA ENABLES NON-DECLARATIVE LEARNING
With only one exception (Rothen et al., 2013), the memory
studies from the previous sections all tested explicit memory,
and did so by asking participants to consciously study stimuli
for later recall. One study examined whether synesthesia can
also enable more implicit forms of learning, speciﬁcally classi-
cal conditioning (Meier and Rothen, 2007). Participants passively
viewed a stream of slides that were either pure color patches,
the colors of which changed from trial to trial, or were white
with graphemes on them. During a conditioning phase, slides
of one color, e.g., blue, were presented simultaneously with a
startling sound. Synesthetes began displaying heightened skin
conductance responses to both blue slides and white slides with
graphemes that triggered blue concurrents, but not to other
colors or graphemes, despite the fact that the graphemes had
never been presented together with the sound. Thus condi-
tioned responses to colors transferred to graphemes, indicating
an unusual form of non-declarative learning. Synesthetic associa-
tions, then, can be the basis of implicit learning about environmental
regularities.
SYNESTHESIA ENABLES EXPLICIT CATEGORY LEARNING
Only one study to date has sought to verify that synesthesia can be
exploited for more complex learning (Watson et al., 2012b). In this
study, grapheme–color synesthetes performed a difﬁcult category
learning task where stimuli (pairs of letters) were custom-chosen
for each synesthete such that the simplest rules that deﬁned each
category were based on their synesthetic colors, e.g., “a pair of red
and green letters belongs in Category 1.” Crucially, each synes-
thete’s stimulus set contained several letters with highly similar
colors. If B and R were both red, they could be used interchange-
ably. Synesthetes were very successful at learning this category
structure, and results show that they exploited their colors to do
so.
Synesthetes viewing black letters reported that they learned to
consciously use their colors to categorize stimuli, though they had
not been instructed to do so, and their pattern of results was con-
sistent with this report. Speciﬁcally, they learned to categorize
training stimuli accurately and after training they could correctly
generalize their performance to novel stimuli that followed the
same color rules. Furthermore, on a memory task in which they
were asked if they had seen a stimulus before, they were unable to
correctly reject novel stimuli that followed the same color rules,
indicating that they had been attending to the synesthetic colors
of letters, rather than to the speciﬁc letter identities. On all three
tasks (training, transfer, and memory) their performance was sim-
ilar to that of non-synesthetes viewing colored letters, and unlike
that of non-synesthetes viewing black letters. The non-synesthetes
viewing black letters were less accurate at categorizing training
stimuli, unable to categorize novel stimuli correctly, and much
more accurate at correctly rejecting novel stimuli that followed the
color rules. These differences all make sense, given that they had
no knowledge of the letters’ colors and could only attend to letter
identity: their initial learning was poor because they could not
utilize the simpler color rules, they could not use color rules to
transfer to novel stimuli, and they could not be misled by memory
foils that were similarly colored to stimuli they had seen before.
Again, more research is clearly needed into the use of synes-
thesia for more complex learning tasks. Nevertheless this single
study demonstrates quite clearly that synesthetes can consciously
use their concurrents to make novel and difﬁcult abstractions and
categorizations.
A LEARNING HYPOTHESIS OF SYNESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT
This paper has so far consisted of a review of research on how
learning inﬂuences synesthesia and how synesthesia inﬂuences
learning. We have tried to present results as objectively as possible.
Now, however, we switch to a completely speculative mode, and
present a novel theory of synesthetic development that brings both
streams of research together. As with most research on synesthesia,
this theory is most fully developed in regards to grapheme–color
synesthesia, but it is meant to apply to most known varieties
or synesthesia, and certainly to all those varieties with explicitly
learned inducers (which, as we noted previously, constitute the
vast majority of known cases). We outline its relationship to other
theories of synesthetic development and try to anticipate objec-
tions. An earlier version of this theory has already been published
(Watson et al., 2010), and we have outlined aspects of it in discus-
sions of our experimental work (Watson et al., 2012a,b), however
this is the most complete and up-to-date presentation of these
ideas.
SYNESTHESIA DEVELOPS BECAUSE IT IS USEFUL FOR LEARNING
The theory states that synesthesia develops, at least in part, as
a response to the challenges involved in learning to recognize,
discriminate, and understand the relations between the members
of the inducer class. That is, grapheme–color synesthesia develops
because it helps the child learn various things about letters, time–
space synesthesia develops as a means of learning about units of
time, and so on. Similar claims were advanced well over a century
ago (Galton, 1881; Calkins, 1893), but this line of thinking has not
been prominent in modern research (with some exceptions, e.g.,
Seron et al., 1992).
Almost all synesthetic inducers, as we saw above, are category
structures that are learned with much difﬁculty over a lengthy
period of time, including rare inducers such as olfaction, taste, and
audition. How might synesthesia help with this learning? We have
reviewed evidence that synesthetic associations can be exploited
for a variety of learning purposes. Most of this research focuses
on synesthesia as a conscious memory aid or mnemonic device,
and one of the initial problems that faces any child learning to
use letters (or other common categories of inducers) is simply to
learn to identify which letter is which. This is a far more difﬁcult
problem than is typically acknowledged, and the potential utility
of a memory aid should not be underestimated. Thus for some
grapheme–color synesthetes, synesthesia might arise when they
are learning their letters.
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However children learn a great deal more about letters than
how to recognize and identify them. And while there is a paucity
of research on synesthesia’s utility for other forms of learning,
we have seen that synesthetic associations enable the unconscious
learning of environmental regularities (Meier and Rothen, 2007;
Rothen et al., 2013), and can also be consciously exploited on dif-
ﬁcult rule-based category learning tasks (Watson et al., 2012b).
In both cases, the extent and limitations of these abilities have
not yet been established, but we suggest that any ability to pick
up on statistical regularities of printed letters or to learn com-
plex rules for combining letters could be highly useful at many
stages during the development of literacy. More generally, such
abilities could be useful when a child is faced with any of the chal-
lenges involved in learning any of the categories of synesthetic
inducers.
Synesthesia in adults is generally accepted to be automatic,
although there is debate over this claim (cf. Mattingley, 2009;
Price and Mattingley, 2013). If it begins as a strategy, it seems
unlikely that it would be straightforwardly automatic in its early
stages, but with extensive rehearsal synesthetic associations could
become more and more automatic as time went on, as has been
demonstrated in non-synesthetes trained with synesthesia-like
associations for 20 hours over the course of a month (MacLeod
and Dunbar, 1988). Of course all the synesthetes tested for auto-
maticity using Stroop or other tasks in the laboratory have had a
decade ormore to rehearse their associations,whichwould conceal
any slower, strategic origins.
MODIFYING CONCURRENTS AS A LEARNING AID
The potential utility of synesthesia as a learning strategy is mag-
niﬁed by the fact that synesthetic concurrents encode information
about their inducers. As we saw, concurrents reﬂect both the
ﬁrst-order properties of individual inducers (e.g., the semantic
associations of particular letters) and the second-order relation-
ships between inducers (e.g., the relative positions of letters in the
alphabet). Thus not only can synesthetic concurrents be a basis of
learning about inducers, but they are also “chosen” and even mod-
iﬁed on the basis of what has been learned. Given the multi-year
period in which synesthetic associations are in ﬂux, there is the
potential for a lengthy period of reciprocal interactions between
learning about inducers and tweaking the particular associations
triggered by these inducers. This type of reciprocal relationship
may enable further learning.
We have seen, however, that a wide range of inducer properties
are mapped to concurrents. It is not possible for all these prop-
erties to determine the concurrents associated with each inducer,
since they are not all consistent. For instance, B and D have highly
similar shapes (particularly in their lowercase forms), and are also
both early letters in the alphabet. Thus according to a mapping of
shape similarity to color similarity, they ought to be quite close to
each other, but according to a mapping in which letters earlier in
the alphabet have less similar colors, they ought to be far apart.
The semantic associations with these letters might provide a fur-
ther reason for them to be far apart, as B might, for example, be
associated with blue as its ﬁrst letter, but D might be brown as
a result of being associated with “dog,” which are stereotypically
brown. Alternatively, such semantic associationsmight bring them
close together, as B could instead be associated with brown as its
ﬁrst letter. Add into this mix their high degree of phonological
similarity, differences in their frequency of usage, and the idiosyn-
cratic personal experiences of the individual synesthete with these
letters. It is obviously not possible for any two colors for B and D
to simultaneously satisfy all these constraints.
What determines which constraint gets satisﬁed in any partic-
ular case? Asano and Yokosawa (2013) suggest that the feature
making the greatest contribution to differentiating the letter from
otherswill be the one that ismost likely to have the largest inﬂuence
on its color. For Japanese hiragana and katakana scripts, which are
almost perfectly orthographically transparent (each character rep-
resents only one phoneme, and each phoneme is represented by
only one character), one might expect that phonology would be a
particularly important determinant of synesthetic color, while in
an orthographically opaque language such as English, phonology
would have far less utility.
This analysis resembles the application of optimal integration
theory to multisensory perception (Ernst and Banks, 2002). This
theory proposes that participants, when required to combine sen-
sory signals from multiple sources, tend to weight the signals
according to their relative reliability. Speciﬁcally, the weight of
a sensory cue in a multisensory decision is directly proportional
to the cue’s reliability. For example, in a study by Helbig and Ernst
(2007), participants made shape judgments of elliptical objects
presented simultaneously by touch and vision, but varied slightly
in their shape in each modality. The results showed that when
noise in the visual signal was low, decisions were dominated by
vision, but as the visual noise increased, decisions were increas-
ingly inﬂuenced by the signals received through touch. Consistent
with this theory, we argue here that the utility of a synesthetic color
for discriminating among letters is likely one of the factors deter-
mining its selection, but there could be many other such factors.
Stated more generally, synesthetic concurrents are likely determined
by whatever aspect of the inducers is most relevant to the resolution
of the learning challenge confronting the child.
WHAT WOULD MAKE SOMEONE MORE LIKELY TO EMPLOY
SYNESTHETIC ASSOCIATIONS AS A LEARNING STRATEGY?
Recently it has become clear that synesthetes, as a group, have a
number of unusual cognitive, perceptual, and personality traits. As
notedpreviously, synesthetes haveunusually strongperceptual and
cognitive abilities related to their inducer and concurrent domains
(e.g., Yaro and Ward, 2007; Simner et al., 2009b), but there are sev-
eral other elements of this proﬁle, including a strong connection
to creativity and artistic expression (Dailey et al., 1997; Rich et al.,
2005; Ward et al., 2008; Rothen and Meier, 2010b), skill at mak-
ing associations between typically disparate elements (Ward et al.,
2008), high rates of positive schizotypal experiences (Banissy et al.,
2012), stronger verbal and vivid imagery cognitive styles (Meier
and Rothen, 2013), enhanced visual imagery abilities (Barnett and
Newell, 2008; Spiller and Jansari, 2008; Price, 2009), and greater
openness to experience and tendency to fantasize (Banissy et al.,
2013).
Consider a child who is open to novel experiences, highly
skilled with visual imagery, unusually creative, skilled at mak-
ing strange associations, prone to fantasizing, and possessed of
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a highly developed ability to discriminate and remember colors.
Such a child could well be far more likely to employ an unusual
visual-imagery-based strategy such as associating letters with col-
ors when faced with the multiple challenges involved in learning
to read. We suggest, then, that the “synesthetic personality” may
be the personality of someone who is more likely to“stumble” into
synesthesia – although of course some of this personality (which
has always been measured in adults) could also be the result of
living with synesthesia for many years.
Are children deliberately choosing to use synesthesia as a learn-
ing strategy, or consciously aware of doing so? Itmight be that such
associations are spontaneously made at a relatively sub-personal
or unconscious level, and that they are strengthened and main-
tained because they prove useful for certain tasks (cf. Galton, 1881;
Calkins, 1893). But in some cases the original impetus for mak-
ing these associations could be conscious deliberation about the
difﬁcult learning problem facing the child, which she will be con-
sciously aware of in almost all cases, since, as we saw earlier, almost
all synesthetic inducers are learned in a formal setting. However
awareness of a learning problem that one has successfully solved
does not always entail awareness of the solution one actually used,
and so we remain agnostic about the degree of deliberation or
consciousness involved in the strategic development of synesthetic
associations.
WHAT LINKS MULTIPLE FORMS OF SYNESTHESIA?
Different forms of synesthesia appear to be interrelated. That is,
if you have one form of synesthesia you are far more likely to
have other forms (Sagiv et al., 2006; Brang and Ramachandran,
2011), and there are several “clusters” of synesthetic types that
are more strongly related than others (Novich et al., 2011). This
interrelatedness is generally explained as stemming from a genetic
predisposition to develop synesthesia that manifests itself in dif-
ferent forms; but we suggest another possibility, namely, that if
one has successfully employed a certain learning strategy, one (or
one’s brain) might be more likely to use similar strategies when
faced with similar problems in the future.
WHY ISN’T EVERYONE A SYNESTHETE?
Virtually everyone in modern industrialized societies has learned
to use letters and calendars, but most do not have colors for each
letter, or convoluted spatial forms for calendars. If synesthesia
develops as part of a strategy for learning about such things,
then why do we not see more synesthetes? There are a number
of plausible answers to this question.
First, the development of synesthesia may be possible only
during critical periods of development, when the systems respon-
sible for processing and representing inducers and concurrents are
plastic enough to allow such unusual connections to form. Our
review of the adult training literature found some evidence that
non-synesthetic adults can have experiences that resemble certain
aspects of synesthesia after training for a long enough period of
time. However the highly structured and long-lasting inducer–
concurrent relationships of full-blown synesthesia may require
early plasticity.
Second, a speciﬁc neurological proﬁle that goes beyond mere
plasticity may be required for the development of synesthesia.
Numerous researchers have suggested, for instance, that synes-
thesia is caused by unusual connectivity between brain areas
responsible for processing stimuli from the inducer domain
and areas responsible for concurrent experiences. Such con-
nectivity could take the form of structural differences, such
as more axonal projections or more heavily myelinated pro-
jections between these areas (cf. Ramachandran and Hubbard,
2001b), or functional differences such as less inhibitory activa-
tion from other areas (cf. Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001),
or some combination of these factors (Brang et al., 2010). A
large number of studies have now conﬁrmed that adult synes-
thetic brains differ in various ways from those of non-synesthetes
(for recent reviews, see Hubbard et al., 2011; Rouw et al., 2011),
including unusual connectivity in brain areas associated with
inducer and concurrent representation, although there is still
debate about whether these differences cause or are caused
by the constant conjunction of inducers and concurrents (cf.
Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, 2008).
Third, a speciﬁc genetic proﬁle might be a prerequisite for the
development of synesthesia. For instance, it is commonly sug-
gested that the unusual connectivity associated with synesthesia
stems from genetic mutation (e.g., Maurer, 1993; Ramachan-
dran and Hubbard, 2001b), possibly to a gene (or genes) involved
in the modulation of neural pruning during development (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Bailey and Johnson, 1997; Hubbard and
Ramachandran, 2005). Until quite recently, a relatively simple
genetic trigger for synesthesia seemed quite plausible. Synesthe-
sia was thought to be rare, with rates as low as one in 2000 in
the general population, yet almost 50% of ﬁrst-degree relatives
of synesthetes were reported to be synesthetes, representing a
thousand-fold increase (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Barnett et al.,
2008). Evidence suggesting a strong link between synesthesia and
gender bolstered this genetic interpretation. The ratio of female
to male synesthetes was reported to be as high as 6:1, and one
well-cited study found an 8:1 ratio of female to male family mem-
bers (synesthetic or not) of synesthetes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996;
Ward and Simner, 2005; Barnett et al., 2008). Moreover, in almost
all reported cases of familial synesthesia, the trait was passed along
the maternal line (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Ward and Simner,
2005; Barnett et al., 2008). Such ﬁndings were consistent with a
simple (i.e., single-gene) X-linked pattern of inheritance, possi-
bly one that was lethal to males in utero (Bailey and Johnson,
1997). However later research increased sample sizes and avoided
several methodological ﬂaws, and overturned most of these ﬁnd-
ings. While there is clearly a strong tendency for synesthesia to
run in families, as has been known for over a century (Galton,
1883), synesthesia is far more common in the general population
than was thought, with rates of grapheme–color synesthesia alone
being placed at about 1% (Simner et al., 2006). Furthermore, there
is no difference in the number of males and females in the families
of synesthetes, ending speculation about X-linked lethality (Ward
and Simner, 2005; Barnett et al., 2008). There is also likely little
or no difference in the actual rates of female and male synesthesia
(Simner et al., 2006, 2009a), previously reported differences likely
stemming from differences in response biases between the sexes.
Finally twodirect genetic studies of synesthetes foundmultiple loci
of interest for synesthetic inheritance that differed between the two
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studies, and were consistent with multiple modes of inheritance
being involved in synesthesia (Asher et al., 2009; Tomson et al.,
2011).
So there is almost certainly no simple genetic story to tell, no
single gene or group of genes that “turns on” synesthesia. Still,
there is clearly a genetic inﬂuence on synesthetic development,
or more accurately a range of genetic inﬂuences. These could
take the form of inﬂuences on neural pruning or inhibition, as
is favored by many researchers, but they could equally be inﬂu-
ences of another kind, such as a multi-factor genetic inﬂuence on
the“synesthetic personality”described above.Whatever the nature
of the genetic inﬂuences, they contribute to the relative rarity of
synesthesia.
All neurological and genetic accounts, however, have the same
shortcoming: they do not explain why almost all synesthetic
inducers are explicitly taught, culturally dependent, categories
(Day, 2005; Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2006). If synesthe-
sia is simply the result of a hyperconnected brain, then why do
almost all the connections begin with objects of formal instruc-
tion? If grapheme–color synesthesia develops from an innate link
between shapes and colors (Maurer et al., 2012), why do adult
grapheme–color synesthetes not report colors for all shapes? At
the very least, genetic and neurological accounts need to be able
to answer these questions, and we see no way of doing so with-
out a theory that places learning at the forefront of synesthetic
development.
CONCLUSION
We hope that this article provides a comprehensive resource for
those researchers interested in the two-way inﬂuences between
synesthesia and learning. With the wide range of evidence we have
summarized for the inﬂuence of learning on synesthesia, we hope
to have shown that far frombeing unlearned,“learning is the deﬁn-
ing characteristic of synesthesia” (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013).
The growing body of work on synesthesia’s utility for learning
demonstrates, in addition, that it can be exploited in both implicit
and explicit learning of many different kinds.
We do not expect to have convinced all our readers of the valid-
ity of our learning hypothesis of synesthetic development, but
we do hope to have sparked some interest in it. We also hope
that by reviewing the two-way inﬂuences between synesthesia and
learning, we have contributed to the growing recognition of the
importance of learning in synesthesia.
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Synaesthesia denotes a condition of remarkable individual differences in experience
characterized by specific additional experiences in response to normal sensory input.
Synaesthesia seems to (i) run in families which suggests a genetic component, (ii) is
associated with marked structural and functional neural differences, and (iii) is usually
reported to exist from early childhood. Hence, synaesthesia is generally regarded
as a congenital phenomenon. However, most synaesthetic experiences are triggered
by cultural artifacts (e.g., letters, musical sounds). Evidence exists to suggest that
synaesthetic experiences are triggered by the conceptual representation of their inducer
stimuli. Cases were identified for which the specific synaesthetic associations are related
to prior experiences and large scale studies show that grapheme-color associations in
synaesthesia are not completely random. Hence, a learning component is inherently
involved in the development of specific synaesthetic associations. Researchers have
hypothesized that associative learning is the critical mechanism. Recently, it has become
of scientific and public interest if synaesthetic experiences may be acquired by means of
associative training procedures and whether the gains of these trainings are associated
with similar cognitive benefits as genuine synaesthetic experiences. In order to shed
light on these issues and inform synaesthesia researchers and the general interested
public alike, we provide a comprehensive literature review on developmental aspects of
synaesthesia and specific training procedures in non-synaesthetes. Under the light of a
clear working definition of synaesthesia, we come to the conclusion that synaesthesia
can potentially be learned by the appropriate training.
Keywords: synaesthesia, definition, development, training, learning, acquiring, control
INTRODUCTION
Synaesthesia denotes a condition of remarkable individual differ-
ences in experience characterized by specific additional experi-
ences in response to normal sensory input. For instance, the letter
A printed in black (i.e., an inducer) may elicit a red color experi-
ence (i.e., a concurrent). Already more than 100 years ago, Bleuler
and Lehmann suggested that “the disposition to secondary sen-
sations [synaesthetic experiences] is highly hereditary” (Bleuler
and Lehmann, 1881, p. 49 translated fromGerman). However, the
associative nature of the phenomenon has also led researchers to
ask the question whether synaesthesia or the specific associations,
respectively, may be acquired through associative learning (Kelly,
1934; Howells, 1944). Despite this longstanding interest into the
developmental aspects of synaesthetic experiences the exact cau-
sation is still subject to debate and it is still not clear if synaesthesia
can be acquired through training inducer-concurrent associa-
tions. In this review, we first consider developmental aspects of
synaesthesia and link these to the possibility that synaesthesia can
be trained. Next, we review in depth the available literature explic-
itly concerned with the trainability of synaesthetic experiences in
order to shed light on these issues.
WHEN TO SPEAK OF TRAINED SYNAESTHESIA?
The question whether or not synaesthesia may be acquired
through training requires a clear definition of synaesthesia which
can be used to assess whether any potential training procedure
was successful in inducing synaesthetic experiences. Currently,
there is general agreement on the following constitutive charac-
teristics of synaesthesia. Synaesthetic experiences are involuntarily
and automatically triggered by a stimulus (i.e., the inducer).
Although idiosyncratic, synaesthetic experiences are consistent
over time within the same individual. That is, while A may elicit
a red color experience for one synaesthete, it may elicit a blue
color experience for another synaesthete, but it will always elicit
the same color experience for a specific individual (Grossenbacher
and Lovelace, 2001; Ward and Mattingley, 2006; Ward, 2013; but
see Meier et al., 2014). For most synaesthetic individuals, synaes-
thetic experiences have perceptual qualities that go beyond mere
associations (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). For instance,
grapheme-color synaesthesia entails the subjective phenomeno-
logical experience of seeing internally or externally represented
colors (i.e., color photisms). Synaesthetic experiences are uni-
directional on an explicit representational level but bidirectional
on an implicit level. That is, in grapheme-color synaesthesia, a
grapheme may elicit a color experience, but the color does not
elicit the experience of the respective grapheme (Brugger et al.,
2004; Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006; Meier and Rothen, 2007;
Rothen et al., 2010; but see Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007 for the
report of an exceptional case with explicit bidirectional synaes-
thesia). Hence, to confirm the hypothesis, that synaesthesia can
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be induced via training, would require the trained inducers to
(i) consistently and (ii) automatically elicit (iii) the associated
concurrent experience with perceptual qualities on a subjective
phenomenological basis (iv) for the great majority of the induc-
ers’ occurrences (v) over an extended time period. Herewith,
we suggest a rather conservative approach to prevent the poten-
tially premature conclusion that synaesthesia can be acquired
by means of training. Specifically, according to these criteria,
know-associator synaesthetes, who do not report subjective phe-
nomenological color experiences (as opposed to see-associator
synaesthetes and projector synaesthetes), but simply know their
synaesthetic associations, would not be considered as genuine
synaesthetes (cf., Ward et al., 2007).
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS
As noted above, a genetic predisposition seems to be constitu-
tive of synaesthesia (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Ward and Simner,
2005; Tomson et al., 2011). That is, synaesthesia tends to run in
families (Asher et al., 2009), although individual members of a
family may experience different forms of synaesthesia (Barnett
et al., 2008). For instance, while one family member may experi-
ence colors for letters and numbers (i.e., grapheme-color synaes-
thesia), another family member may experience spatial arrange-
ments in response to sequence based concepts such as the days
of the week (i.e., sequence-space synaesthesia). However, even
when synaesthesia occurs within a family, typically not all mem-
bers are concerned. The presence of one form of synaesthesia
in an individual tends to increase the likelihood that the same
individual also experiences another form of synaesthesia (Sagiv
et al., 2006b). On a neural basis, synaesthesia is associated with
functional and structural changes. Grapheme-color synaesthesia,
which is currently the best studied form of synaesthesia, is associ-
ated with increased structural connectivity in occipito-temporal
and parietal regions (Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Rouw et al., 2011;
Banissy et al., 2012; Specht, 2012). The structural changes seem
to be associated with functional changes during the perception of
synaesthetic color experiences (Hubbard et al., 2005; Weiss et al.,
2005; but see, Hupé et al., 2012). Increased activation in hV4 (i.e.,
involved in human color perception) is hypothesized to reflect
the perception of synaesthetic color experiences (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001a,b). Increased activation in parietal regions
around the sulcus intraparietalis and gyrus angularis are thought
to reflect binding processes between the synaesthetic inducer
and the synaesthetic concurrent experience (Esterman et al.,
2006; Muggleton et al., 2007; Rothen et al., 2010). Moreover,
some researchers suggested that synaesthetic experiences have real
perceptual qualities which may lead to a performance advan-
tage in perceptual tasks (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001a;
Hubbard et al., 2005; Sagiv et al., 2006a; Ward et al., 2010;
but see, Mattingley et al., 2001; Edquist et al., 2006; Rothen
and Meier, 2009). Others have argued that synaesthetic experi-
ences are represented as nodes in a semantic network and that
synaesthesia is not a pure perceptual condition (Meier, in press).
Synaesthesia is generally regarded as a congenital condition and,
as such, sometimes also termed “developmental synaesthesia”
to distinguish from “metaphorical synaesthesia” (e.g., screaming
colors).
However, a genetic predisposition does not necessarily mean
that the respective condition will indeed develop. Even in the case
where a genetic predisposition for synaesthesia eventually results
in synaesthetic experiences, it is rather unlikely that the specific
synaesthetic associations are determined by genes. This is espe-
cially the case because most synaesthetic experiences are triggered
by cultural artifacts, as for instance in grapheme-color synaes-
thesia (Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2009), sequence-space
synaesthesia (Eagleman, 2009), and lexical-gustatory synaesthe-
sia (i.e., words elicit taste experiences; Ward and Simner, 2003).
Crucially, synaesthetic consistency is only achieved after concep-
tual knowledge about the synaesthetic inducer has been acquired
(Simner et al., 2009). In line with this notion, it has been sug-
gested that it is the conceptual representation of the synaesthetic
inducer which triggers the specific concurrent experience (Nikolic´
et al., 2011; Rothen et al., 2013), or at least that the concep-
tual representation of a synaesthetic inducer is sufficient to elicit
the concurrent experience (Dixon et al., 2000, 2006). Moreover,
there are cases for which the specific synaesthetic associations
are related to prior experiences (for example colored alphabet
toys; Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013). Similarly, large scale
studies show that grapheme-color associations in synaesthesia are
not completely random (Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2005).
However, these studies failed to find correlations with colors
for letters and numbers in children’s books (Rich et al., 2005).
Crucially, also the structural neural basis of synaesthesia may
be a consequence rather than a precondition for synaesthetic
experiences. In line with this notion, synaesthetic experiences
can be induced post-hypnotically in non-synaesthetic individu-
als who do not possess the structural neural basis of synaesthesia.
Hence, synaesthetic experiences may be a result of functional dis-
inhibition between relevant brain areas, but structural changes
are not necessary for conscious synaesthetic experiences (Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2009). Similarly, developmental synaesthetes can
acquire synaesthetic experiences for novel inducers within min-
utes (Mroczko et al., 2009). Furthermore, the early onset of
synaesthesia does not categorically exclude the possibility that
synaesthetic experiences can be acquired later in life. For instance,
there is evidence for a higher prevalence of synaesthesia among
artists and meditators which suggests that synaesthesia may be
cultivated (e.g., Walsh, 2005; Rothen and Meier, 2010b).
To summarize, a learning component is inherently involved in
the development of specific synaesthetic associations, in particu-
lar when the inducers are cultural artifacts (as in grapheme-color
synaesthesia). Some researchers have hypothesized that associa-
tive learning is the critical learning mechanism, where the recall
event consists of implicit imagery of the synaesthetic concur-
rent (Albright, 2012). Hence, it seems plausible that synaesthetic
experiences may be acquired, and there is already clear evi-
dence that at least some aspects of synaesthesia can be acquired
through training. Training studies may provide further insights
into the mechanisms which are at play during the development of
synaesthesia.
TWO RESEARCH TRENDS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
Over the last 10–20 years there was an increase in scientific pub-
lications about synaesthesia (Figure 1). Earlier publications were
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FIGURE 1 | Number of publications per year in the field of
synaesthesia research. The figure represents the hits for the search terms
“synaesthesia OR synaesthesia” in the title, abstract, or keywords. Source:
Scopus (17/09/2013).
mainly concerned with documenting specific types of synaesthe-
sia and demonstrating their genuineness (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987). Besides this, later publications were also concerned with
documenting the characteristics associated with synaesthesia.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that synaesthesia is asso-
ciated with a specific profile of enhanced memory performance
(Yaro and Ward, 2007; Rothen and Meier, 2010a; Radvansky
et al., 2011; Rothen et al., 2012; Meier and Rothen, 2013b),
increased creativity (Rich et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2008; Rothen
andMeier, 2010b), and increased self-rated imagery (e.g., Barnett
and Newell, 2008; Meier and Rothen, 2013a). The increase in
scientific publications led to documentary films (e.g., BBC) and
articles in popular science magazines (e.g., Ramachandran and
Hubbard, 2003; Lehrer, 2007; Bouska, 2013). Consequently, pub-
lic awareness and interest in this—to the public—seemingly
peculiar condition was rising. Possibly due to the positive effects
associated with synaesthesia, it became a question of more general
interest to what extent synaesthesia can be learned or trained. This
is reflected on websites and blogs on the internet which discuss
the issue and relevant findings from research studies. Moreover,
a “market” exists to promote synaesthesia related products. For
example, synaesthetic training courses are offered to improve cre-
ativity and memory (Samarajiwa, 2014; Söffing, 2014; cf. also,
Preiser, 2011). Synaesthesia training has also been suggested as
a form of psychotherapy (Synästhetische Gedanken [Synaesthetic
Thoughts], 2014; cf. also, Lewis, 2012). Interestingly, even synaes-
thetes seem to ask how they can enhance their experiences, for
example in order to increase their creative artistic output (Kann
ich meine Synesthäsie weitertrainieren, damit ich sie nutzen
kann? [Is it possible to trainmy synaesthesia for further benefits?],
2014). However, there is no scientific basis for the claims that
synaesthesia training can actually provide for the cognitive pro-
file associated with synaesthesia and its advantages (and potential
disadvantages). Therefore, the question, whether synaesthesia can
actually be acquired via training, is important for synaesthesia
researchers and to inform the public.
Independent from synaesthesia research, cognitive training has
also gained a lot of interest over the last two decades (Figure 2).
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cognitive training. The figure represents the hits for the search term
“cognitive training” in the title, abstract, or keywords. Source: Scopus
(17/09/2013).
The correspondent scientific publications even outnumber those
about synaesthesia. Cognitive training studies are mainly con-
cerned with transfer effects. That is, whether training one cogni-
tive process affects other cognitive processes that were not trained.
For instance, recent findings suggest that working memory train-
ing can also enhance performance in intelligence tests (e.g., Jaeggi
et al., 2008, 2011). Accordingly, there is great public interest in
cognitive training, resulting in similar effects as the interest in
synaesthesia. That is, there are numerous blogs and internet pages
on cognitive training, as well as articles in popular science mag-
azines (e.g., Sinha, 2005; Robertson, 2010). Moreover, cognitive
training programmes are sold in form of computer games (e.g.,
Nintendo’s “Dr. Kawashima’s Brain Training: How Old is Your
Brain?”).
From this point of view, synaesthesia training studies are
important to understand the plasticity of the cognitive system
more generally. As there is evidence that synaesthesia is associated
with cognitive benefits, and cognitive training can lead to transfer
effects, it is a promising avenue for future research to investigate
transfer effects of synaesthesia training.
ACQUIRING SYNAESTHESIA: STATE OF RESEARCH
TRAINING STUDIES
So far, seven synaesthesia training studies have been published.
All were explicitly concerned with the question whether consistent
and automatic concurrent experienceswith perceptual qualities on
a subjective phenomenological basis can be induced. These stud-
ies will be reviewed in depth. They are thematically and roughly
chronologically ordered (see Table 1 for a summary).
Early attempts: sound-color synaesthesia via conditioning
In a first study, it was tested whether sound-color synaesthe-
sia can be induced artificially by means of associative learn-
ing/conditioning (Kelly, 1934). The following introspective cri-
terion was applied to test the success of the study: “If the tones
became capable of arousing spontaneous sensations or images
of color in the subjects, then and only then, could it be said
that a true conditioned response had been established.” (Kelly,
1934). Eight different accordion tones of a complete octave and
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seven different projected color squares were used to create tone-
color pairs (C and C1 were both white). Eighteen participants, all
non-synaesthetes but one sequence-space synaesthete, attended
a passive training procedure including multiple sessions during
which the pairs were presented (tone and color simultaneously)
for a duration of ∼9 s. The interval between two pairs was
1.5 s, and the scale was always presented in ascending and then
descending order several times per experimental session. Over
the duration of the experiment, six participants were presented
with at least 2000 repetitions per stimulus pair. For the remain-
ing participants, the minimum was 280 repetitions per pair. Once
a week, participants were presented with 40 tones alone (each
tone five times) and were asked to indicate the color associated
with the tone, and whether they had a sensation of color for
the tone. None of the participants reported any color sensations.
The results showed no evidence at all that synaesthesia may be
induced artificially. Interestingly, Kelly (1934) pointed out that
“It has been argued by some that a purely physiological theory
is sufficient without including the assumption that conditioning
occurs. A crucial test of whether conditioning does supplement a
physiological factor in the production of chromaesthesia [synaes-
thesia] could be made by attempting to destroy and change the
color-tone associations in bona fide cases of colored hearing
[sound-color synaesthesia]. If it could be shown that it is possi-
ble to experimentally destroy the linkages reported, it would offer
almost incontrovertible evidence that conditioning had played a
role in the production of synaesthesia.”
Ten years later, another study was conducted with the aim to
establish sound-color synaesthesia in a group of eight partici-
pants (Howells, 1944). Using a conditioning paradigm, two tones
(middle C and G above) and two colors (red and green) served
as stimuli. Participants were required to keep their eyes closed
until the onset of the tone, to open their eyes, and to report the
color which had its onset immediately after the tone. The tone
was presented for the duration of 2 s, and its offset was simul-
taneous with that of the color. Next, participants were required
to close their eyes again for the next trial. Middle C was paired
with red and G was paired with green for 95% of the trials. The
pairings were reversed for the remaining 5% of the trials. These
stimulus pairs were presented in different predetermined random
orders. Participants were informed about the correctness of the
response after every trial. After 5000 trials of presenting the colors
at maximum saturation, the hue was reduced for 50% of the trials
(including 50% of the reversed tone-color pairings). As depen-
dent variable, error rates were assessed for reversed tone-color
pairings in sets of 50 trials. After the first 5000 trials for which
almost no errors occurred, the error rates increased almost lin-
early to ∼17 over the course of the study. Each participant was
presented with∼30,000 trials in total. The explanation, offered by
the participants for the observed effect, was that “The habitual set,
or expectancy of seeing a given hue after hearing the paired tone,
became so strong that it overpowered the conflicting perceptual
influence of the hue actually supplied, with the result that pale
green was actually seen as pale red, or vice versa” (Howells, 1944,
p. 96). In order to determine whether the participants indeed
experienced colors two of the participants were also tested with
additional behavioral tasks (100 trials per participant and task).
During one task, the participants were presented with the same
stimuli as during the conditioning paradigm. However, instead of
pale colors the participants were presented with a white stimu-
lus in 50% of the cases, the other 50% of the cases consisted of
saturated colors. One participant suspected that the “pale” stim-
uli were actually white, but reported that they still appeared in
color to him. The other participant did not realize that the stim-
uli were white. During the other task, the participants were again
presented with the original tones and the original colors. Tones
and colors were presented simultaneously, one pair at a time, in
random order. The two colors were presented by means of two
light beams which could also be mixed via the adjustment of a
slide. The task was to adjust the presented color to appear white.
Suggesting an associated color experience (i.e., perceptual effect),
it was found that for the lower (red) tone an over-adjustment
toward green occurred, and for the higher (green) tone an over-
adjustment toward red occurred. Howells (1944) concluded that
cumulative conditioning had led to synaesthetic experiences.
Grapheme-color synaesthesia via associative learning
It was not until more than half a century later before the next
training study was conducted. The study was realized to inves-
tigate whether synaesthetic Stroop effects are a valid diagnostic
criterion for synaesthesia, and whether psychophysiological con-
sequences of grapheme-color synaesthesia can be established
by training specific letter-color associations (Meier and Rothen,
2009). Twenty non-synaesthetes were trained to learn four differ-
ent letter-color associations; A—red, B—green, C—yellow, and
D—blue. Participants had to press one of two designated keys as
quickly and accurately as possible if, at the center of the com-
puter screen, a letter was presented in its correct color, and the
other of two designated keys if a letter was presented in its incor-
rect color. Each session consisted of 480 trials. Each letter was
presented 60 times in its correct color and 20 times in each of
the other three incorrect colors in random order. Feedback about
mean reaction time and proportion correct was given after every
session to enhance motivation. There was one training session per
day on 7 consecutive days. Every participant was presented with a
total of 3360 trials, half of which were correct letter-color pairings.
Mean accuracy over all training sessions was 98%.
After the training, participants were tested with a synaes-
thetic Stroop task and a synaesthetic conditioning task (Meier
and Rothen, 2007). During the Stroop task, participants were
presented with two letters. For half of the trials, the letters were
presented in their congruent colors (i.e., according the trained
association). For the other half of the trials, the letters were pre-
sented in an incongruent color (i.e., color associated with the
other letter). A significant Stroop effect was found for the 20
trained participants. This was not the case for 20 untrained non-
synaesthetic controls. During the synaesthetic conditioning task
participants were required to attend to colored squares. One of
the squares was white and contained a letter associated with the
color of another square by means of the training. This specific
color was followed several times by a loud sound to provoke a
conditioned startle reaction to that color (i.e., CS color). Neither
the letter (CS letter) nor the other colors (neutral) were followed
by the startling sound (Figure 3). Conditioning was measured
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 109 | 128
Rothen and Meier Training synaesthesia
by means of event-related skin conductance responses (SCRs),
with higher SCRs indicating higher autonomic arousal. For CS
color trials (but not for CS letter trials and neutral filler trials),
SCRs were significantly increased during conditioning in com-
parison to a preceding habituation phase without the startling
sound (Figure 4). That is, in contrast to genuine synaesthetes
(Meier and Rothen, 2007; Rothen et al., 2010), non-synaesthetes,
trained on letter-color associations, did not show a significant
increase for the CS letter during conditioning. Moreover, none of
the participants reported having color experiences for the trained
letters. To summarize, the training was successful in creating auto-
matic letter-color associations, as measured by the Stroop task,
but not in creating synaesthetic experiences, as indicated by the
absence of a synaesthetic conditioning effect and the subjective
D
neutral CS color neutral
neutralneutral CS leer
FIGURE 3 | Synaesthetic conditioning. In this particular example, the
letter D was associated with blue during the training. That is, blue squares
not followed by the startling sound acted as CS color and the letters as CS
letter. The remaining colors were neutral. Each square represents one trial
with the first trial in the upper left corner and the last trial in the lower right
corner (moving from left to right). Adopted from Meier and Rothen (2009).
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FIGURE 4 | Results from the synaesthetic conditioning paradigm
showing a conditioning response for the CS color, but not the CS
letter and neutral color stimuli for trained non-synaesthetes. Error bars
represent standard errors. Adopted from Meier and Rothen (2009).
phenomenological reports. Thus, this cannot be regarded as
synaesthesia and hence, synaesthetic Stroop effects are not a valid
diagnostic criterion for synaesthesia.
Grapheme-color synaesthesia via adaptive/non-adaptive training
In a follow-up study, the same training (i.e., non-adaptive) was
compared with an adaptive training procedure (Rothen et al.,
2011) to test for associative learning of automatic number-color
associations, as they exist in grapheme-color synaesthesia. Forty
non-synaesthetic participants were trained with either the non-
adaptive or the adaptive version of the training on 10 consecutive
days (N = 20 per training procedure). They were instructed to
learn the following associations: 3—red, 4—green, 5—yellow,
and 6—blue. Apart from these different grapheme-color associ-
ations, the non-adaptive training paradigm was identical to the
previously introduced training (Meier and Rothen, 2009). That
is, in the non-adaptive training, participants were presented with
a total of 2400 match and 2400 non-match trials over the dura-
tion of the training. In the adaptive training, participants had to
indicate as quickly and accurately as possible, by pressing one of
four distinct keys, which color was associated with a black digit,
presented centrally at the computer monitor. The color-key map-
ping changed on a trial-to-trial basis. Participants were provided
with feedback after every trial and presented with a square in the
correct color if their response was wrong. Next, they were pre-
sented with the digit in its correct hue but wrong brightness and
had to indicate if the presented color was lighter or darker than
the correct color. The brightness manipulation followed a stair-
case procedure depending on the previous response of a given
color. Participants received also feedback for this response, and
the digit was presented in its correct color if their response was
wrong (Figure 5). Each of the daily sessions consisted of 248 trials.
Hence, participants were presented with a total of 2480 trials over
the duration of the training. For both versions of the training,
mean accuracy was 96%.
Before and after the training, participants were tested with two
synaesthetic priming tasks (cf., Gebuis et al., 2009). In one ver-
sion of the task, participants were required to indicate a target
color by pressing one of four specified keys. The target color was
preceded by digits to which the associated color was either con-
gruent or incongruent to the target. In the other version of the
task, participants were required to indicate a target digit by press-
ing one of four specified keys. In this version, the colors were used
as primes. After the training, the results revealed priming effects
for both versions of the task in the adaptive training group. In the
non-adaptive training group, priming was restricted to the digit-
decision task. On average, the adaptive training group showed
larger priming effects. However, none of the participants reported
synaesthetic experiences after the training. Hence, adaptive train-
ing seems to be generally more effective in creating automatic
digit-color associations than non-adaptive training, but it seems
not sufficient enough in order to create synaesthetic experiences
when applied for a short duration of 10 consecutive days.
Swimming-style color synaesthesia via associative learning
Using the non-adaptive training with pictograms of
swimming-styles on 20 consecutive days (i.e., 4800 match-
ing and 4800 non-matching trials), Rothen et al. (2013) tested
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whether swimming-style color synaesthesia can be acquired.
According to the associations of a genuine swimming-style color
synaesthete, a non-synaesthete learned the following associa-
tions: butterfly—red, breaststroke—blue, backstroke—white,
and crawl—pale yellow. As it was the case for the synaesthete,
the trained control showed priming effects in a color decision
task when primed with pictograms of swimming styles and
also in a swimming-style decision task when primed with
colors (cf., Rothen et al., 2011). However, only the synaesthete
showed a generalized conditioned response for pictograms of a
swimming-style associated with the color that was coupled with
a loud startling sound (i.e., synaesthetic conditioning; Meier and
Rothen, 2007, 2009; Rothen et al., 2010). Crucially, the trained
control did not report phenomenological color experiences in
association with swimming-styles.
Grapheme-color synaesthesia via reading books with colored
letters
In a related study, Colizoli et al. (2012) asked 15 non-synaesthetic
controls to read books with colored letters. That is, each partic-
ipant learnt a distinct set of associations between the letters a,
e, s, t and the colors red, orange, green, blue. Moreover, partic-
ipants were asked to use a web applet that colored the letters
on internet pages. They were instructed to use it whenever they
were reading for a significant amount of time. On average, par-
ticipants read 105,660 words over the course of 2–4 weeks. A
Stroop task was conducted before and after the reading-training
as in the study of Meier and Rothen (2009). After the reading-
training, but not before, participants showed a significant Stroop
effect. The effect was stronger in its magnitude for lower case
letters, which appeared more often during the course of the
training than upper case letters. Moreover, a near significant cor-
relation was found between the rating of the statement “I am
experiencing color when thinking about certain letters” and the
magnitude of the Stroop effect. However, this was not the case
for the statement “I am experiencing color when I see certain
letters.” The authors also tested whether the learned associations
would enhance performance in a perceptual crowding task. The
task was adapted from a study in which a performance advan-
tage was found for genuine grapheme-color synaesthetes over
non-synaesthetic controls (Hubbard et al., 2005).
During a trial of this task, a unique black target letter sur-
rounded by four identical black flanking letters was presented
for a brief duration, randomly, either on the left or right side of
a fixation-cross at the center of a computer screen. Participants
were required to identify the target letter. There were two condi-
tions, a set of trials for which the trained letters served as target
letters, with one of the other trained letters as flankers, and a base-
line condition with the letters d, f, g, and o. To test for inherent
differences between the letters of the two conditions, a non-
trained group of controls (N = 30) was tested with the same task.
However, no performance advantage was found for the trained
letter condition in the training group in comparison to the base-
line condition and the untrained control group. Participants were
asked in a surprise retest 6 months after the training to report
the colors when given the letters. On average they were 98%
correct at identifying the colors overall and 40% correct at actu-
ally remembering the specific associations. Similarly to previous
training studies, the findings suggest that the training was suc-
cessful in inducing automatic letter-color associations, but not in
inducing the perceptual aspects of synaesthesia (i.e., synaesthetic
experience).
Grapheme-color synaesthesia via incidental associative learning
In another study, Kusnir and Thut (2012) tested to what
extent synaesthesia-like letter-color associations may be implic-
itly learned by non-synaesthetes. A visual search task with trials
containing circular arrays of six colored letters around a fixation
cross at the center of the computer monitor was used as a train-
ing paradigm (Figure 6). Participants were instructed to indicate
by keypress whether the target letter (one of three pre-specified
target letters, i.e., H, U, and S) was presented left or right of the
fixation cross. The distractor letters were A, B, C, F, L, O, and
F O
U L
C B
A C
B P
O H+ +
FIGURE 6 | Visual search task. Two exemplary trials. The two target
letters of interest (i.e., H and U) appeared more often in a specific
associated color. The other letters appeared in each color equally often.
Adopted from Kusnir and Thut (2012).
3 3
color decision feedback
with correcon if wrong
brightness decision feedback
with correcon if wrong
FIGURE 5 | Adaptive training. Exemplary depiction of a trial. Adopted from Rothen et al. (2011).
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P. Target and distractors were selected randomly on each trial.
Each of the letters was presented in a different color (red, blue,
cyan, yellow, green, and magenta). Learning of letter-color associ-
ations was established to occur incidentally via manipulating the
frequency at which letters occurred in a specific color. That is,
two of the target letters (i.e., H and U) were biased to appear 5
out of 6 times in a respective target color and 1 out of 6 times in
any other color. The likelihood of the two color-biased target let-
ters together, to be observed in their respective biased color (i.e.,
congruent), was 55.6%. The likelihood of the two target letters
together to be observed in the respective color of the other color-
biased target (i.e., incongruent) was 2.2%. The remaining target
letter was not color-biased and appeared in every color with equal
likelihood (5.6%). However, when considered on their own, any
of the target letters or target colors occurred with equally high
likelihood across trials. In a first experiment, 28 non-synaesthetes
were tested. To manipulate the depth of color processing, 14 par-
ticipants were informed about the letter-color manipulation and
14 were kept naïve. The training consisted of a total of 1620 trials
and was conducted on 2 consecutive days. In a second exper-
iment, 22 non-synaesthetes participated and all were informed
about the likelihood of the letter-color pairings. Moreover, for
half the participants the two target colors of interest were oppo-
nent colors, but not for the remaining half of the participants.
Notably, greater interference for opponent colors, in comparison
to non-opponent colors, was reported as evidence for early stages
in the visual processing of genuine synaesthetic colors (Nikolic´
et al., 2007). The training consisted of a total of 2430 trials, and
the task was performed over three sessions within 1 working week.
A significant difference in search performance between
congruent and incongruent letter-color pairings was found
in both experiments. That is, congruent letter-color pairings
facilitated target detection. Incongruent letter-color pairings
impaired target detection. Crucially, color information per se
would not have enhanced target detection in the congruent,
relative to the incongruent, condition but equally across these
conditions. Greater interference for incongruent targets was
found in the opponent color condition than the non-opponent
color condition in Experiment 2. After each of the two training
sessions, participants of Experiment 1 were tested with two
additional Stroop paradigms similar to those used in previous
studies (Meier and Rothen, 2009; Colizoli et al., 2012). One ver-
sion was conducted with saturated colors, the other version was
conducted with unsaturated colors to account for the possibility
of weak acquired synaesthetic color experiences. Generally, on a
group level no Stroop effects were found. Further explorations
revealed a Stroop effect in the deep color processing group for
the faint version of the task. Crucially, however, none of the
trained participants reported color experiences for (the trained)
letters at the end of the experiments. Because of this and the weak
evidence for Stroop effects in the faint version of the task, the
authors concluded that the learned associations were qualitatively
different to synaesthesia.
Related studies
The following four studies are important to the aim of this review
because non-synaesthetes, trained on grapheme-color associa-
tions, were included. However, the participants were not explicitly
asked about their phenomenological experiences. That is, the
trained associations were regarded as purely semantic. The stud-
ies shall be summarized each very briefly in one paragraph. An
overview and additional information can be found in Table 1.
Cohen Kadosh et al. (2005) tested whether training digit-
color associations in non-synaesthetes (N = 6) can result in
implicit numerical magnitude representation for colors. At the
beginning of the session, participants were presented with the
specific associations. In the next task, they had to indicate as
quickly and accurately as possible if the background color of
the computer screen matched the color associated with a cen-
trally presented gray digit (1–9) by pressing one of two distinct
keys. Incorrect responses were followed by auditory feedback.
Each digit-color combination was presented equally often. That
is, the ratio between matching and non-matching conditions was
1:8. The task consisted of 20 blocks, including 81 trials each.
This procedure was repeated on 5 consecutive days. The train-
ing consisted of a total of 8100 trials. Moreover, the trained
participants and two grapheme-color synaesthetes completed a
color congruity task (Figure 7), during which they had to decide
Exemplary digit-color associaons
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Facilitaon: numerical distance of virtual digits 
(right) is larger than numerical distance of 
veridical digits (le)
Interference: numerical distance of virtual digits 
(right) is smaller than numerical distance of 
veridical digits (le)
FIGURE 7 | Implicit numerical magnitudes. Exemplary depiction of
experimental conditions: Facilitation and interference effects due to
activation of implicit numerical magnitudes via color information. The red
horizontal arrows represent the virtual numerical magnitude as indicated by
the colors. Adopted from Cohen Kadosh et al. (2005).
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which of two colored digits represented the larger magnitude.
Only the two synaesthetes showed the anticipated facilitation
effect. That is, they responded faster when the actual colors (of
the digits) on the screen represented a larger numerical distance
in comparison to a smaller numerical distance (Figure 7; upper
right compared to upper left). No interference effects were found
(Figure 7; lower right compared to lower left). The results suggest
that only genuine synaesthesia provides for implicit bidirectional
representations.
One of the first studies designed to test for the perceptual real-
ity of synaesthetic color experiences included a control group of
ten non-synaesthetic participants with trained word-color asso-
ciations (Nunn et al., 2002). The stimulus material consisted
of eight different word-color associations that were similar to
those of the synaesthetes. The learning procedure consisted of
a 2 × 4 grid with the different colors presented on a computer
monitor. Upon clicking on a color, the corresponding word was
presented via headphones, the computer monitor filled with the
color and remained on the monitor until another color was
selected. Learning was tested by the presentation of a word via
headphones for which the corresponding color had to be selected.
Word presentation during testing was random. No feedback was
given. Learning and testing cycles were continued until the crite-
rion of 100% accuracy on five consecutive trials was reached. In
contrast to synaesthetic experiences of word-color synaesthetes,
who underwent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
in the same study, imagined colors in trained controls did not
activate color selective brain regions (i.e., V4 and V8). The find-
ings suggest that the training did not lead to color associations of
similar perceptual quality as synaesthetic experiences.
In order to assess conceptual and perceptual aspects of
synaesthetic experiences, Brang et al. (2011) conducted an
electroencephalogram (EEG) study with genuine grapheme-color
synaesthetes (N = 12) and trained controls (N = 24). During
the training, achromatic graphemes were presented at the cen-
ter of the screen, surrounded by ten distinct colored blocks (i.e.,
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, black, brown, white, and
pink) whose position was randomized on each trial. By click-
ing on the colors, participants had to learn ten grapheme-color
pairings in a guess-and-check fashion. Participants were trained,
until they were able to correctly identify the color of each of the
ten graphemes two times in a row without any errors. The dura-
tion of the training was ∼15min on average. The synaesthetes,
the trained controls, and an additional non-trained control group
(N = 12) were tested with a contextual priming paradigm. That
is, participants were presented with sentences like “The Coca-
Cola logo is white and X.” On a given trial, “X” was either a color
patch, color word, or a grapheme, which was either congruent or
incongruent with the representation of “X” (i.e., red in our exam-
ple). That is, the presented graphemes were associated to either
congruent or incongruent colors (relative to the semantic con-
text) for synaesthetes and trained controls. For the non-trained
control groups, the graphemes were presented in actual colors.
For all groups, half of the sentences of each type ended with
a congruent stimulus and half with an incongruent stimulus.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were measured for the repre-
sentation of “X.” Representing perceptual processes, early ERPs
to graphemes were significantly affected by congruency in the
synaesthete group only but not in the control groups (unless they
were presented with colored graphemes). Representing seman-
tic processes, late ERPs to graphemes were significantly affected
by congruency in all groups. The groups were not differentially
affected by congruency in the other conditions. Thus, the findings
suggest that the training procedure in this study was not sufficient
to induce synaesthetic color experiences to graphemes beyond the
level of semantic associations.
The main goal of a related EEG study (Niccolai et al., 2012)
was to compare the neural processes associated with synaes-
thetic priming (similar to previous studies; e.g., Rothen et al.,
2011) for congruent and incongruent trials between seven gen-
uine grapheme-color synaesthetes and seven trained controls. The
controls were required to learn specific grapheme-color associa-
tions (letters and digits; average N = 30) with a computer based
training at home on 6 consecutive days. The training consisted
of (1) selecting the color patch corresponding to a grapheme in
a three-alternative forced choice paradigm, (2) assigning “cor-
rectly” four different color-patches to four different graphemes,
(3) reporting the grapheme associated with a presented color
patch. The training was not further specified. It lasted 18min on
average. The error rate declined significantly from start to end
with an average rate of 4.3%. Synaesthetes and trained controls
showed similar synaesthetic priming effects (i.e., faster responses
to congruent than incongruent trials). In line with Brang et al.
(2011), congruency was more likely to affect early ERP compo-
nents in the synaesthete group and late components in the trained
control group. Hence, the results suggest that controls did not
experience synaesthetic colors after the training.
DISCUSSION
To summarize, none of the studies outlined above provided direct
evidence that synaesthesia was induced by means of the specific
training procedure (see Deroy and Spence, 2013 for similar con-
clusions). Nevertheless, the findings are promising and clearly
demonstrate that certain aspects of synaesthesia can be mim-
icked in non-synaesthetes. Especially the differences in subjective
phenomenological reports between synaesthetes and trained non-
synaesthetes and the respectively associated cognitive, behavioral,
and neural profile may provide further insights into cognitive
science.
The most compelling evidence that synaesthesia can be
acquired later in life by means of training comes from one of
the earliest studies. As described by the author, the explana-
tion offered by the participants indeed points to consistently
and automatically elicited concurrent experiences with percep-
tual qualities on a subjective phenomenological basis (Howells,
1944). Also more recent studies provide hints that synaesthesia
can be acquired by means of training. For example, the finding of
greater interference for incongruent targets in the opponent color
condition than the non-opponent color condition may reflect a
perceptual effect as documented in developmental synaesthesia
(Kusnir and Thut, 2012 Experiment 2). However, an alternative
interpretation, namely that opponent colors may be more eas-
ily conceptualized needs to be ruled-out in future research (cf.,
Deroy and Spence, 2013). Another promising result concerns the
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correlational findings between the magnitude of Stroop effects
and the participants’ rating of the statement “I am experienc-
ing color when thinking about certain letters” in the study by
Colizoli et al. (2012). However, the finding needs to be interpreted
with caution as Stroop interference indicates that an association
occurs automatically but allows no conclusions about the per-
ceptual nature of the association. Moreover, the statement “I am
experiencing color when I see certain letters” did not correlate
with Stroop interference. Future studies should also include items
such as “I do not experience colors when thinking about or seeing
certain letters, but I automatically associate them with colors” to
prevent suggestive questioning.
Interestingly, these studies which reported that synaesthetic
experiences may be, at least in part, acquired later in life are also
those which included the largest numbers of inducer-concurrent
pairings. Howells (1944) presented his participants with ∼30,000
trials of which 95% corresponded to the to-be-learnt associations.
The participants in the study of Colizoli et al. (2012) read on
average over 100,000 words containing consistently colored let-
ters (i.e., no incongruent letter-color pairs). The success of these
training studies follows logically from the fact that every train-
ing procedure needs to act against lifelong normal experiences.
None of the other studies included more than 10,000 training tri-
als. Moreover, it seems that explicit training procedures (Howells,
1944) lead to stronger effects over shorter time periods than
implicit training procedures (Colizoli et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it
seems that also implicit training procedures are fruitful to result
in potential perceptual effects (Colizoli et al., 2012; Kusnir and
Thut, 2012). However, future studies will need to rule out the
alternative explanations in the previous paragraph before firm
conclusions can be drawn.
The ratio between to-be-learned and not-to-be-learned associ-
ations seems to be another crucial factor of the training procedure
(cf., Table 1). Generally, there is broad agreement between the
different studies that even a relatively short period of training
is sufficient to mimic certain aspects (but not the experience) of
synaesthesia such as Stroop interference for congruent and incon-
gruent inducer stimuli (e.g., Meier and Rothen, 2009; Brang et al.,
2011; Rothen et al., 2011). The only exception to this is a study
in which all potential combinations of inducers and concurrents
were presented equally often. Consequently, the ratio was to the
disadvantage of the to-be-learned associations (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2005).
Despite the promising results, even very extensive training
durations do not necessarily guarantee to result in phenomeno-
logical synaesthetic experiences. Probably the strongest over-
learned digit-color associations, reported for a non-synaesthetic
control, evolved over an extensive period of 8 years through the
use of cross-stitch patterns (Elias et al., 2003). In a synaesthetic
consistency test the trained control was 100% consistent and
the synaesthete was 98% consistent. The control and the synaes-
thete were also tested using fMRI. Naming colored single-digit
numbers revealed a behavioral Stroop effect and similar brain
activations for congruently and incongruently colored numbers
in the control and the synaesthete. As the control was not inter-
viewed about her subjective phenomenological experiences for
numbers, it is open to debate to what extent these resembled those
of the synaesthete. However, brain activation in the control and
the synaesthete differed in two other tasks. These tasks consisted
of simple arithmetic problems, which were either created from
dice patterns or presented auditorily, and had to be solved silently.
It is open to debate whether this was due to different strategies
in solving the specific tasks or due to different phenomenologi-
cal experiences related to the colors associated with the numbers
presented during the tasks.
“Training” during childhood seems more promising and can
result, but does by no means guarantee to result, in phe-
nomenological synaesthetic experiences. There is evidence from
grapheme-color synaesthesia that repeated exposure to colored
childhood toys (e.g., letter refrigerator magnets) early in life leads
to synaesthetic experiences (Witthoft and Winawer, 2006, 2013)
as the following statement indicates: “this insistence on the per-
ceptual nature of synesthesia in at least some cases [including
two of those reported here (with synaesthesia acquired from let-
ter refrigerator magnets)] has been invaluable in demonstrating
that the color associated with a grapheme can have a great deal
more specific content than just associating a letter with a color
name” (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013, p. 6). In contrast, a case of
monozygotic twins, who both acquired digit-color associations
very early in life from a number jigsaw puzzle, does not fulfill
our conservative criteria for acquired synaesthesia.When tested at
the age of 12, they exhibited a behavioral Stroop effect in a color
naming task with colored-digits. However, “they do not report
photisms or any sense of perceiving a color, they simply know that
zero is pink.” (Hancock, 2006, p. 149). These cases suggest that
the development of phenomenological synaesthetic experiences
may be more dependent on internal contingencies. In contrast,
the nature of the exact association may be more dependent on
external contingencies. For instance, training may only influence
the exact pairings (i.e., which color is paired to which letter) and
may only be effective given certain internal circumstances (e.g.,
genetic predisposition).
There are other potential candidates for internal contingen-
cies besides a genetic predisposition. As already mentioned in
the introduction, synaesthesia is associated with a specific pro-
file of enhanced memory performance (Yaro and Ward, 2007;
Rothen and Meier, 2010a; Radvansky et al., 2011; Rothen et al.,
2012; Meier and Rothen, 2013b), increased creativity (Rich et al.,
2005; Ward et al., 2008; Rothen and Meier, 2010b), and increased
self-rated imagery (e.g., Barnett and Newell, 2008; Meier and
Rothen, 2013a). Each of these factors alone or in combination
may contribute to the emergence of synaesthesia. For example,
if in a particular situation, a person is more likely to assign
colors to letters, enhanced imagery may result in vivid color
experiences and good memory will eventually give rise to the
subsequent retrieval of these vivid color experiences during let-
ter processing. This is also in line with the notion that child
synaesthetes become more consistent over time or lose the con-
dition entirely (Simner et al., 2009; Simner and Bain, 2013).
Moreover, it may be the reason for why no single genetic fac-
tor has been identified to cause synaesthesia. The genetic fac-
tors to determine the phenotype of synaesthesia may be those
which determine the upper limits of creativity, imagery, and
memory.
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Hence, future training studies may want to account for factors
such as creativity, imagery, and memory to further our under-
standing about the development of synaesthesia. Similarly, it may
be worth investigating potential transfer effects of aspects which
can be mimicked in training studies. For instance, consistent and
automatic associations between graphemes and colors enrich the
semantic network and hence, may provide for a richer world of
experiences which, in turn, might be one of the features at the
core of the benefits of synaesthesia (Meier, in press). Moreover,
as some associations may be more easily acquired than others,
future training studies should attempt to train other forms than
grapheme-color synaesthesia (cf., Deroy and Spence, 2013). Even
if it may not be possible at all to acquire synaesthetic expe-
riences, the relevant studies are still informative for cognitive
science. For instance, training studies, in combination with neu-
roimaging and psychophysiological techniques, proved useful to
gain insights about phenomenological differences reported by
developmental synaesthetes and trained controls. In ERP (Brang
et al., 2011; Niccolai et al., 2012) and fMRI (Nunn et al., 2002)
studies, synaesthetic experiences were associated with early sen-
sory processes/brain regions in contrast to trained associations
in non-synaesthetic controls. Similarly, SCR studies proved use-
ful to contrast synaesthetic experiences and semantic associations
(Meier and Rothen, 2009; Rothen et al., 2013). Related to this,
future studies could aim at increasing the effect of the training by
providing bio-feedback.
Before we conclude, we would like to point out that, by con-
sidering the very same empirical evidence, a more negativistic
view could be adopted which has led others to conclude that
“synaesthesia training” and similar terms are not justified (Deroy
and Spence, 2013). However, we regard exactly this term as most
appropriate because it reflects the ultimate goal of the studies
in question to train specific inducers-concurrent pairings with
perceptual qualities on a subjective phenomenological basis.
CONCLUSION
The message for synaesthesia researchers and the interested gen-
eral public is that there is no solid evidence that synaesthesia
can be acquired by training. However, this does not exclude the
possibility that synaesthesia can be learned by the appropriate
training. Future research is necessary to develop more efficient
training procedures. Nevertheless, previous research has clearly
shown that some typical aspects of synaesthesia can be learned
easily. Future studies will also need to address whether synaesthe-
sia trainingmay lead to transfer effects, such as enhancedmemory
performance, more vivid imagery, or more creative ideas.
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There is a current debate over the pos-
sibility and validity of synesthesia train-
ing experiments (Deroy and Spence, 2013;
Rothen and Meier, 2014). In order to test
whether a trainee should be considered to
have acquired a trained form of synesthe-
sia, a precise definition and specific diag-
nostic criteria of synesthesia are necessary.
There is currently not one specific check-
list available including all specific diag-
nostic methods and criteria, exacerbating
the determination and interpretation of
differences between (potentially) trained
and genuine synesthesia. In order to facil-
itate communication surrounding these
issues, we propose a practical guideline
for diagnosing the specific characteristics
that are typical of grapheme-color synesthe-
sia (GCS). These guidelines can be applied
to developmental cases of GCS, cases of
trainees who may show synesthetic traits,
and other types of acquired forms of GCS
at the level of a single individual.
Researchers have tried to train synes-
thesia since at least 1934 (Kelly, 1934),
and several studies have been done in
recent years (for reviews see: Deroy and
Spence, 2013; Rothen and Meier, 2014).
Leaving trained, acquired, or induced
types of synesthesia aside, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge the extent of inter-
individual differences between synesthetes
(even within one sub-type), making a
generally accepted definition difficult to
reach. For example, an individual may
report that letters automatically induced
the conscious experience of color since
childhood, however, these colors may not
be consistently mapped to each letter.
Such an individual would fail the “test of
genuineness,” while he or she may still
meet the other defining characteristics of
synesthesia, such as the conscious expe-
rience of color in the absence of phys-
ical color. This is one example of why
the definition of developmental synesthesia
is a topic of active debate in the litera-
ture (Cohen Kadosh and Terhune, 2012;
Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012). The need
for a consensus on the specific defining
characteristics of synesthesia becomes only
more prominent when trying to compare
trainees to synesthetes.
Characteristics of GCS at the individ-
ual vs. group level must be distinguished.
Group-level effects related to synesthesia
cannot (yet) be used as diagnostic tools.
If two groups differ relatively from each
other on a certain score or measurement,
this does not tell us at an absolute level
whether “score X on task A” or “mea-
surement Y in trait B” of an individ-
ual implies that he or she is necessarily
a synesthete. The nature of such studies
does not allow one to assume that a cer-
tain measurement is unique to synesthe-
sia. For example, it has been shown that
GCS is associated with increased structural
connectivity compared to controls in the
temporal cortex at the group-level (Rouw
and Scholte, 2007). However, the absolute
value measured for white-matter connec-
tivity in a particular individual could be
influenced by different unknown causes.
Although measurements can made at the
individual level (see Table 1), experiments
designed to test group-level characteris-
tics related to GCS by definition cannot
be used as diagnostic criteria, such as
memory benefits (Yaro and Ward, 2007;
Rothen and Meier, 2010; Rothen et al.,
2012; Pritchard et al., 2013; Terhune et al.,
2013), differences in visual processing
(Terhune et al., 2011; Brang et al., 2012;
Banissy et al., 2013), the reported vivid-
ness of visual mental imagery (Barnett
and Newell, 2008), distinct cognitive styles
(Meier and Rothen, 2013) or differences
in neuroanatomy (for a review see: Rouw
et al., 2011). Similarly, idiosyncrasy (the
fact that grapheme-color mappings differ
between individuals) cannot be used as a
marker at the individual level; if two synes-
thetes have nearly identical mappings, they
are not excluded from being considered
synesthetes (Witthoft andWinawer, 2013).
Additionally, the low prevalence of synes-
thesia is a group-level characteristic that
is not diagnostic at the individual level.
Most neurobiological markers related to
GCS (Rouw et al., 2011) and the presence
of certain genetic markers (Asher et al.,
2009; Tomson et al., 2011) are related to
the group-level. Individual-level traits are
sometimes confused with inclusive crite-
ria for GCS. For example, GCS tends to
be unidirectional at a conscious level (i.e.,
graphemes elicit color experiences, but
color experiences do not elicit conscious
grapheme experiences) and bidirectional
at an unconscious level (Knoch et al., 2005;
Cohen Kadosh and Henik, 2006; Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2007; Gebuis et al., 2009;
Weiss et al., 2009; Rothen et al., 2010).
Still, an instance of conscious bidirectional
GCS does not exclude an individual from
being considered a synesthete when the
other defining characteristics are met (e.g.,
Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007).
Diagnosing synesthesia in a sin-
gle individual is based on a variety of
characteristics. Concerning diagnosing
“trained” forms of synesthesia, Rothen
and Meier (2014) state: “Hence, to con-
firm the hypothesis, that synesthesia can
be induced via training, would require
the trained inducers to (i) consistently
and (ii) automatically elicit (iii) the associ-
ated concurrent experiencewith perceptual
qualities on a subjective phenomenologi-
cal basis (iv) for the great majority of the
inducers’ occurrences (v) over an extended
time period” (italics are the authors’ own).
We propose to extend their definition with
a diagnostic criteria checklist.
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Table 1 | Proposed diagnostic criteria for grapheme-color synesthesia at the level of a single individual.
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Major axis
grapheme-color
synesthesia
Consistent Percentage within a
duration: Test–retest
paradigm using the
Cambridge Synesthesia
Charts (TOG:
(Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987); TOG-R: Asher
et al., 2006)
Percentage within a duration:
70–100% after at least 3 months
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Asher
et al., 2006)
We suggest that especially for trained or acquired
forms of synesthesia that the online color-picker
consistency tests be repeated with more than 3
months in between testing sessions in order to
exclude possible memory strategies that could be
facilitated by training or temporary mental states
such as can be induced under hypnosis. We note
that there is open discussion on the criteria of
consistency in the field (Cohen Kadosh and
Terhune, 2012; Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012)
Color-distance level:
Online color pickers
(Eagleman et al., 2007;
Rothen et al., 2013a)
Color-distance level: Cut-off at 135
in CIELUV color space (Eagleman
et al., 2007; Rothen et al., 2013a)
The Eagleman et al. (2007) test for consistency is
completed within a single testing session, and the
original criteria in RGB space (cut-off at 1) is also an
acceptable level of consistency, although it has
been shown to be too conservative (Rothen et al.,
2013a). Euclidean distance in CIELUV color space
was shown to have the best discriminatory power,
because this space is perceptually uniform (Rothen
et al., 2013a). Conversion software may be
downloaded here:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/synesthesia/links
Automatic Synesthetic Stroop test Using a within-subjects design, a
significant difference in
performance for incongruent
compared to congruent stimuli
should be found (Wollen and
Ruggiero, 1983; Mills, 1999;
Odgaard et al., 1999; Dixon et al.,
2000; Smilek et al., 2001). For
interpretation of
synesthesia-related behavior, it is
important to include a
within-subject baseline measure,
such as digit or letter naming in
addition to (synesthetic) color
naming (Mills, 1999), and
especially when the case cannot
be compared to a group of
matched controls
Automaticity refers to the involuntary nature of the
experience of the synesthetic concurrent, which
elicits interference with task demands. It is
important to note that the presence of a Stroop
effect does not necessarily imply that the
association is at a perceptual level
Conditioned response A conditioned response to the
unconditioned grapheme stimulus
should be found after the
corresponding color of the
grapheme, but should not be
present in a control condition or
group (Meier and Rothen, 2007;
Rothen et al., 2010)
It has been argued that the synesthetic
conditioned-response effect may alternatively
reflect the conscious experience instead of the
automatic nature of the synesthetic color, because
it is only present in developmental synesthetes
and not trainees who show reliable Stroop effects
(Meier and Rothen, 2007, 2009; Rothen et al.,
2010)
Pupil diameter The average pupil diameter
measured when viewing
incongruent graphemes is
significantly larger compared to
viewing congruent and black
graphemes (Paulsen and Laeng,
2006)
Pupil diameter is a physiological measure of the
autonomic nervous system (e.g., Weiskrantz,
1998). Reliable differences related to synesthetic
congruency in pupil diameter were found at the
individual and group levels (Paulsen and Laeng,
2006) It remains to be shown whether this
difference in pupil diameter can be used as an
index of conscious vs. unconscious processes
related to grapheme-color synesthesia
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Validated questionnaire:
CLaN (Rothen et al.,
2013b)
A score >3 on questions
pertaining to the automaticity of
colors (note that some questions
need to be reversed for the final
scoring; Rothen et al., 2013b)
The degree of automaticity can vary between
synesthetes and was shown to be correlated with
levels of interference in a synesthetic-color naming
Stroop task (Rothen et al., 2013b). The CLaN
questionnaire can be downloaded here:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/synaesthesia/links
Conscious Interview/questionnaires The individual should report
conscious experiences of color at
a perceptual level
An example questionnaire designed for
trainees can be found in Colizoli et al. (2012);
Colizoli et al. (2014). We follow Rothen and Meier
(2014) that if an individual reports knowing that the
letter has a color, but does not report a
phenomenological experience of the color itself,
this individual should not be considered to be a
synesthete
Perceptual Crowding (Hubbard et al.,
2005), Visual-Search
(Palmeri et al., 2002),
Opponent Color Effects
(Nikolic´ et al., 2007),
Binocularly Defined
Stimuli (Palmeri et al.,
2002; Kim et al., 2006),
Motion-Defined Stimuli
(Palmeri et al., 2002; Kim
et al., 2006)
The individual should show
significant low-level perceptual
effects of color, in the absence of
physical color. Evidence for the
presence of perceptual effects of
synesthesia in an individual is
strongest when a group of
matched controls does not show
the effects tested
Due to the individual differences within
synesthesia, it is not always the case that every
“synesthete” will show significant low-level
perceptual effects of color. For example, it was
believed that grapheme-color synesthesia
involved pre-attentive pop-out of color in the
presence of inducing graphemes, however, this
has been shown not to be the case for all
synesthetes tested (e.g., Hubbard et al., 2005;
Rothen and Meier, 2009; Ward et al., 2010; Rich
and Karstoft, 2013)
Case vs. control
neuroimaging study
(Elias et al., 2003; Steven
et al., 2006)
The individual (case) but not the
control group, should show
differential neural activation or
patterns of activation related to
the concurrent sense when only
the inducing sense is triggered.
The control group should not
show activation related to the
concurrent sense when the
inducing sense is triggered
We note that within grapheme-color synesthesia,
dissociating the inducer (grapheme) and
concurrent (color) modalities is challenging due to
their physical proximity in the brain and the fact
that both modalities are in the visual sense. For
this reason, it is not always clear whether color
activation is reliably found in the presence of
inducing black graphemes (Rouw et al., 2011).
Using auditory linguistic stimuli in contrast to visual
stimuli may help to dissociate brain activation
related to the inducer vs. the concurrent sense in
grapheme-color synesthesia (given that the
auditory mode elicits the visual synesthetic
experience)
Bandwidth Inducer-Bandwidth:
# Inducers/# Possible
Inducers (Asher et al.,
2006; Rothen and Meier,
2013);
Concurrent-Bandwidth:
# Concurrents/# Possible
Concurrents
Inducer-Bandwidth: > 5 inducers
for 36 letters and numbers; (e.g.,
Rothen et al., 2013a);
Concurrent-Bandwidth: > 5
concurrents for 36 letters and
numbers
We are in favor of using this low cut-off for the
Inducer-Bandwidth, as it would include
synesthetes who experience only vowels and/or
numerals as having synesthetic colors. By
definition, trainees with only four letter-color
mappings would be excluded. The relationship
between Inducer- and Concurrent-Bandwidth is
unclear. We feel that Concurrent-Bandwidth should
be addressed directly in future research in order to
reach a consensus on the criterion. Using color
charts can help differentiate, for example, whether
two “reds” are actually the same color or only
have the same category name
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Dimension Method Criteria Remarks
Not
“perceptually
present”
Question the participant The individual should not consider
synesthetic concurrents to be “in
the world” in the same way as
the experience of the inducer
(Rouw et al., 2013; Rouw and
Ridderinkhof, 2014; Seth, 2014),
although they do often feel as
though they belong to the
inducer. Synesthetic concurrent
experiences are not confused
with hallucinations, which are
more complex, irregular, and
unpredictable (Cytowic, 2002;
Sagiv et al., 2011)
This does not exclude the possibility that the
knowledge about the relationship of synesthetic
concurrents to features of the real or external
world may be learned, however, synesthetes do
not consider their concurrent experiences to feel
like hallucinations even though they do commonly
describe them as real or an integral part of the
experience. Importantly, visual hallucinations
replace the visual field in which they “exist” rather
than superimposing themselves or co-existing with
the veridical percepts (Cytowic, 2002)
Above criteria
is not fake,
made up, or
due to “the
expectancy
effect”
The experimental goals
should be kept as
discrete as possible.
Experimenters should be
blind to the subject
groups and true purpose
of the experiment
whenever possible. After
testing, ask participants
to openly report possible
strategy use and their
interpretation of the
experiment
Prevented and verified post-hoc:
Effects found in the other
dimensions listed above should
not be due to the participants
consciously or unconsciously
fulfilling the expectations of the
experimenter. Exclude
participants who admit to
pretending to have subjective
traits or trying to adjust their
behavior in an unnatural way in
accordance with what they
believe the desired experimental
goals are
We note that in practice, this is challenging to
completely exclude, however, it is an important
concern that we feel needs to be addressed
Major axis
developmental
grapheme-color
synesthesia
Early age of
onset
Question the participant
(include family members
and friends of the family
if possible)
The synesthetic experiences have
been or are reported to have been
present since early childhood (age
3–10) or as far back as the
individual can remember
(Cytowic, 2002)
Developmental synesthetes can often report the
first time they realized their experiences were
different from the experiences of others
Longitudinal research
(Simner and Bain, 2013)
A developmental synesthete will
show higher levels of consistency
(compared to controls of the
same demographic group)
beginning in childhood and
continuing into adulthood (Simner
and Bain, 2013)
The percentage of fixed grapheme-color
associations has been shown to increase with age
(Simner et al., 2009; Simner and Bain, 2013)
Not caused by
pathology
Family history, medical
records, questionnaires
(e.g., Baron-Cohen and
Harrison, 1997; Cytowic,
2002)
No history of disease, drug use,
pathology or neuropathology
If synesthetic behavior and experiences persist
following brain damage or drug use, then an
individual may be considered to have acquired
synesthesia, but not developmental synesthesia. It
is not clear whether cases that may co-occur with
psychological and cognitive phenomenon such as
autism, schizophrenia, or other pathologies such as
multiple sclerosis share the same underlying
neuro-developmental trajectory as developmental
synesthesia
Methods, criteria, and references (when available) are listed for testing the necessary dimensions related to diagnosing synesthesia along the major axes: grapheme-
color synesthesia (seven dimensions) and developmental grapheme-color synesthesia (nine dimensions). Some of the dimensions have multiple methodologies for
testing the criteria. More research is needed to test whether different methodologies used within one dimension provide corresponding results. We propose at
least one criterion per dimension should be met for an individual to be considered to have grapheme-color synesthesia.
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We propose a guideline for diagnos-
ing GCS based on dimensions along major
axes for GCS (Table 1). Such a check-
list can aid in the diagnosis of GCS
(whether trained, acquired or develop-
mental in nature). In this checklist, we
present methods, criteria and references
for the measurement of each dimension
whenever possible. We propose that the
presence of at least one result within each
of the dimensions in Table 1 to be the nec-
essary criteria for a diagnosis of GCS at the
individual level. Several dimensions have
multiple methodologies for testing the cri-
teria. An important question that cannot
yet be answered is whether the different
methodologies give congruent patterns of
results. For example, do individuals who
report having stronger perceptual experi-
ences also show larger perceptual crowding
effects? Such issues are particularly rele-
vant when testing trainees, where differ-
ences between measurements may emerge,
such as the presence of a Stroop effect
in the absence of conditioned response
(Rothen and Meier, 2009).
The Consistent nature of the map-
pings involves the Percentage of mappings
that do not change over a Duration of
time (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1987;
Asher et al., 2006), or the Level of con-
sistency as measured in color distance
between repetitions of identical trials of a
test (Eagleman et al., 2007; Rothen et al.,
2013a). Although the consistency criterion
is debated, the percentage and duration of
consistency have traditionally been con-
sidered the “test of genuineness,” because
of the inability of control participants to
perform at the same level as synesthetes
when all task demands are in their favor
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Asher
et al., 2006). If the presence of synesthesia-
like behavior or experience is temporary
(e.g., drug use or hypnosis), the indi-
vidual will be excluded over time by the
consistency criterion.
The Automatic nature of synesthesia
refers to the involuntary nature of the
experience; it cannot willfully be “turned
on or off.” (This involuntary nature does
not necessarily imply that GCS is pre-
attentional or unconsciously evoked, e.g.,
see Mattingley, 2009). Automaticity can be
verified in behavior, with the commonly
used “synesthetic Stroop task,” (Wollen
and Ruggiero, 1983) or with a validated
questionnaire (Rothen et al., 2013b),
and in physiology as measured with
pupil diameter (Paulsen and Laeng, 2006)
or a color-sound conditioning paradigm
(Meier and Rothen, 2009).
The Conscious nature of the experi-
ence of a percept in the absence of its
external stimulation is perhaps the hall-
mark of synesthesia. Perception can be
conscious or unconscious in neurobiolog-
ical terms (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema,
2000). Verifying the conscious percep-
tion of a synesthetic experience is typ-
ically the starting point of recruiting
synesthetes to participate in a study.
Synesthetic experiences are verified to be
conscious by interview with the individual.
Conscious experiences have been found
related to consistent experiences (Simner
et al., 2006). Trainees can be assessed
with specifically designed questionnaires
(Colizoli et al., 2012, 2014).
The Perceptual nature of the synes-
thetic experience can be objectively
verified by using a variety of psychophys-
ical visual tasks (e.g., Palmeri et al., 2002;
Hubbard et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006;
Nikolic´ et al., 2007). Confirmatory find-
ings where obtained with neuroimaging
techniques (e.g., Nunn et al., 2002; Elias
et al., 2003; Steven et al., 2006). Not all
sub-types of synesthetes consistently show
perceptual effects of synesthetic color
when measured objectively (e.g., Hubbard
et al., 2005; Rothen and Meier, 2009; Ward
et al., 2010; Rich and Karstoft, 2013), and
this is a point of discussion in diagnosing
GCS (Rothen and Meier, 2014).
Bandwidth refers to the extent of
the mappings between modalities and
this variability leads to the idiosyncratic
nature of GCS at the group level (Asher
et al., 2006; Rothen and Meier, 2013).
Inducer-Bandwidth refers to the propor-
tion of synesthetic inducers compared
to the number of possible inducers.
Concurrent-Bandwidth, which has received
relatively less attention in the field, refers
to the proportion of synesthetic concur-
rents compared to the number of possible
concurrents.
Perceptual Presence, which is the feel-
ing that an experience is “real” in the same
way that an event or object in the outside
world is real, is characteristically lacking
for synesthetes (Rouw et al., 2013; Rouw
and Ridderinkhof, 2014; Seth, 2014). A
synesthete typically does not get confused
between sensations reflecting events in the
outside world, and sensations caused by
their synesthesia. Thus, for a synesthete,
an inducer has perceptual presence, but
the concurrent does not. This distinction
is similar to the distinction drawn between
synesthetic experiences and hallucinations
(e.g., Cytowic, 2002; Sagiv et al., 2011);
synesthetic experiences are notably sim-
pler, more regular and more predictable
than hallucinations.
Lastly, an important factor to consider
that is often neglected is the “Expectancy
Effect,” which is the reactivity on the
participants part when they behave (con-
sciously or unconsciously) in the way they
believe they are expected to behave based
on the characteristics of the study. This
is an important and possibly confound-
ing factor for any study where synesthesia
is evoked (e.g., through learning, sugges-
tion, or hypnosis). It may be the case
that participants have guessed the purpose
of training paradigms and then behave
accordingly. Therefore, none of the effects
related to “synesthesia” in the dimensions
listed in Table 1 may be caused by the
expectancy effect to be considered GCS.
Experiencing synesthesia since early
childhood would be necessary for inclu-
sion as Developmental GCS, but by
definition would not be necessary for
inclusion as trained or acquired GCS.
Developmental GCS occurs in the absence
of pathology, such as disease, drug
use or mental disorders (Baron-Cohen
and Harrison, 1997; Cytowic, 2002).
Synesthetes differ from non-synesthetes
in biological aspects such as functional
and structural brain differences and the
presence of certain genetic markers (Asher
et al., 2009; Tomson et al., 2011). As pre-
viously mentioned, two main issues make
the use of these markers unreliable for
diagnosing synesthesia at the individual
level. First, the group-level nature of such
studies does not allow for inference at the
individual level. Second, differences found
at the neural and genetic levels may arise
due to unknown causes in addition to
causes that may be unique to synesthe-
sia. Perceptual training paradigms may be
suited to probe these underlying neural
and genetic mechanisms.
Paradigms directed at training synes-
thesia can help to answer some open
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questions pertaining to the development
of synesthesia, learning and memory, such
as: Is there a critical period for the per-
ceptual development of synesthesia? As far
as we know, there are no developmen-
tal neuroimaging studies on synesthesia
or training studies in children in poten-
tial critical periods of development. The
brains of children show high levels of neu-
roplasticity, meaning high sensitivity to
forming structural changes (Schlaug et al.,
2009). It has been shown that specific
synesthetic colors stem directly from child-
hood toys (Witthoft and Winawer, 2013),
but this seems to be the exception, not
the rule (Rich et al., 2005). Understanding
the developmental pattern in synesthe-
sia will help characterize the interaction
between genes and environment in percep-
tual development.
In sum, we feel that trying to train
“synesthesia” is a win-win situation. If
GCS can be trained, we will have gained
an understanding about who is more likely
to become a synesthete and how. If GCS
cannot be trained, we will still have gained
an understanding about what the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions must be in
order to develop it. Our opinion is that
trainees should not be considered to have
acquired GCS per se unless the proposed
criteria are met and should always be con-
sidered to be distinct from developmental
synesthetes. We ask for and welcome the
expansion and improvement of this diag-
nostic checklist. A commonly used model
that can be both diagnostic and flexible is
necessary for reaching a consensus in the
field on the definition of (trained?) GCS.
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Grapheme-color synesthesia is a perceptual experience where graphemes, letters or
words evoke a specific color, which are experienced either as spatially coincident with the
grapheme inducer (projector sub-type) or elsewhere, perhaps without a definite spatial
location (associator sub-type). Here, we address the question of whether synesthesia
can be rapidly produced using a hypnotic color suggestion to examine the possibility of
“hypnotic synesthesia”, i.e., subjectively experienced color hallucinations similar to those
experienced by projector synesthetes. We assess the efficacy of this intervention using
an “embedded figures” test, in which participants are required to detect a shape (e.g., a
square) composed of local graphemic elements. For grapheme-color synesthetes, better
performance on the task has been linked to a higher proportion of graphemes perceived as
colored. We found no performance benefits on this test when using a hypnotic suggestion,
as compared to a no-suggestion control condition. The same result was found when
participants were separated according to the degree to which they were susceptible to
the suggestion (number of colored trials perceived). However, we found a relationship
between accuracy and subjective reports of color in those participants who reported a
large proportion of colored trials: trials in which the embedded figure was accurately
recognized (relative to trials in which it was not) were associated with reports of more
intense colors occupying a greater spatial extent. Collectively, this implies that hypnotic
color was only perceived after shape detection rather than aiding in shape detection via
color-based perceptual grouping. The results suggest that hypnotically induced colors are
not directly comparable to synesthetic ones.
Keywords: hypnosis, synaesthesia/synesthesia, colour/color, embedded figures test, consciousness, mental
imagery
INTRODUCTION
Individuals with grapheme-color synesthesia experience a color
(concurrent) when viewing particular letters, numbers or gram-
matical symbol (inducer). The triggered color experience is
automatic (Mattingley et al., 2001) and the concurrent color is
consistent over time (Simner et al., 2005). The developmental
form of synesthesia emerges early in life (Simner et al., 2006), is
associated with genetic differences (Tomson et al., 2011), and also
structural and functional differences within the brain (Hubbard
et al., 2005; Rich et al., 2006; Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Weiss and
Fink, 2009). Early development may not be the only pathway for
the emergence of synesthetic experiences (unless, of course, one
chooses a priori to limit the term “synesthesia” to particular causal
mechanisms). It has long been known that synesthesia can be
acquired as a result of sensory loss (Armel and Ramachandran,
1999) or temporarily after taking hallucinogenic drugs (Sinke
et al., 2012; Luke and Terhune, 2013). More recently, synesthe-
sia has been reported to arise after brain damage (Ro et al.,
2007) and it has also been suggested that synesthesia may arise,
in blind individuals, after expertise with sensory substitution
technology (Ward and Wright, 2012; see also Ward and Meijer,
2010; Farina, 2013). Finally, it has been claimed that synesthesia
can be induced by hypnosis in hypnotically suggestible individ-
uals (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). In the present study we re-
examine this claim using an “embedded figures” test that has
been widely used in grapheme-color synesthetes. The benefit of
this task is that evidence for synesthesia type behavior would
be measured through task improvement, rather than through
deficits, which are easier to produce through task compliance. The
issue is of theoretical importance because positive findings would
suggest that synesthesia can (at least in some circumstances) arise
from purely functional—rather than structural—brain changes
(Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001) and, moreover, that hypnosis
can create novel perceptual abilities.
Hypnosis is able to alter the phenomenological properties of
participants’ subjective experience (Kihlstrom, 2013; Oakley and
Halligan, 2013). The process of hypnosis can be divided into
induction and suggestion stages. In the induction stage, a putative
“hypnotic state” is induced, or expectations for experiences are
heightened, or the subject is simply alerted that the context
is appropriate for a certain sort of response (e.g., Oakley and
Halligan, 2009; Kirsch, 2011); in the second stage, suggestions are
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given to the participant to experience a (potentially) wide range
of physical and perceptual experiences. There is considerable
variability both in individual hypnotic susceptibility (Bowers,
1998) and in the range of experiences that can be induced.
Importantly, perceptual hallucinations (e.g., hearing music) can
be induced in many participants (Bowers, 1998), providing a
potential link to synesthesia.
Although there is general consensus that hypnosis can alter a
participant’s subjective experience and this can then cause behav-
ioral changes (Kihlstrom, 2013), the neural processes underlying
the functional changes corresponding to hypnotically induced
perception remain poorly understood. One class of theories pos-
tulates that highly hypnotizable people can perform tasks when
hypnotized that they could not do otherwise; for example, distort
perception so that they actually can see non-existent objects in a
way they could not imagine (e.g., Brown and Oakley, 2004) or
fail to perceive stimuli that would otherwise impinge on their
awareness (e.g., pain, Hilgard, 1986). Another class of theories
postulates that highly hypnotizable people cannot do anything
hypnotically that they could not do anyway (e.g., Sarbin and
Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986). One way of characterizing the latter
class of theory is in terms of “cold control” (Dienes, 2012),
which postulates that the defining feature of acting hypnotically is
simply the incorrect meta-cognition that one is not intending the
(motor or cognitive) action. For example, hypnotic hallucination
of an object on this account is imagining the object, but without
realizing that one is deliberately creating a visual representation: It
appears to occur from other causes and thus appears as perception
(Dienes and Perner, 2007). That is, according to cold control,
hypnotic responding involves no new abilities, just the sense that
an action is happening by itself. The two classes of theory can be
tested by using suggestions for abilities not already possessed by
subjects: If the subject gains abilities they did not have, the second
class of theory is refuted. As we will argue, suggestions for synes-
thetic experiences can serve this function. Synesthetic experience
has some perception-like qualities that may enable enhanced
performance on some tasks (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001)
so the question arises whether hypnotically-induced synesthetic
experience is more perception-like than imagined synesthetic
experience.
The generation of synesthetic experience appears automatic,
and automatic processes are partially defined by the difficulty
in controlling them. So the question is raised whether control
of synesthetic experience might be greater hypnotically rather
than non-hypnotically. One developmental form of grapheme-
color synesthesia has been temporarily reduced through hypnotic
suggestion. Terhune et al. (2010) abolished phenomenological
synesthetic experiences in a participant AR, a synesthete who
experiences colors when viewing faces. She had to name the
colors of face stimuli which were presented in either congruent or
incongruent colors. Stroop-like interference effects were evident
in comparison to controls in both reaction times (RTs) and
event related potentials (ERPs) at baseline, however, after a post
hypnotic suggestion these were no longer evident. This indicates
the relevance of synesthesia to testing theories of hypnosis, as well
as for hypnosis for testing theories of synesthesia. We will consider
the converse case to that of Terhune et al., namely, of hypnotically
suggesting a type of synesthesia in people who did not previously
experience it.
To create a “hypnotic synesthesia” one can use the sugges-
tion that when seeing (for example) the letter A the partici-
pant will see a special red color on the page. Supporting this
idea, the phenomenological perception of color (or no color)
has been manipulated using suggestion to add or drain color
from patterned stimuli (Kosslyn et al., 2000). High but not low
susceptible participants all reported being able to see gray-scale
stimuli as colored, and colored stimuli as gray-scale when given
hypnotic suggestion to do so. Further, positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) indicated changes in cerebral blood flow for left
and right fusiform areas (perhaps corresponding to human V4)
when hypnotic induction was used; however, non-hypnotically
imagining the color changes produced significant changes only
in right fusiform cortex. Hypnosis appeared to influence activity
in color-sensitive areas of the brain in a way imagination alone
could not.
The Kosslyn et al. (2000) study highlights the issue of demand
characteristics in hypnosis research, and the tendency of subjects
to either “hold back” or try harder in different conditions to pro-
duce the pattern of results they perceive as desired (Orne, 1962;
Spanos, 1986). Specifically, the suggestion was more strongly
worded in the hypnosis rather than the imagination condition in
order that subjects would not confuse the two conditions and “slip
into trance” in the imagination condition. Kirsch et al. (2008)
presented the identical color adding or draining suggestions with
or without hypnotic induction, and obtained substantial and
near equivalent changes in color perception in both conditions.
(Further, subjects rated themselves as clearly not hypnotized
in the non-hypnotic condition, indicating that slipping into
trance was not a problem.) Thus, when demand characteristics
were more nearly equalized the difference between hypnosis
and non-hypnosis in subjective experience greatly diminished.
Further, McGeown et al. (2012) showed that similar activation
in visual areas was produced in both the hypnotic and non-
hypnotic conditions. That is, as cold control theory predicts,
hypnotic hallucination with the suggestions used by Kosslyn
et al. (2000) may involve the same visual abilities as imagina-
tion, with the difference being purely metacognitive (Dienes,
2012).
There has been one previous attempt to hypnotically induce
grapheme-color synesthesia (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). Cohen
Kadosh et al. assigned colors to digits either through post-
hypnotic suggestion or learnt association (e.g., 5 = green). Partici-
pants were required to search for an achromatic (black) grapheme
against a colored background. The results showed that search
was impaired when the suggested color was congruent with
the background. However, this result reflects a deterioration in
performance which is easier to simulate (explicitly or implicitly)
than an improvement. Cohen Kadosh et al. requested control
groups to associate the colors with the digits in non-hypnotic
contexts; the non-hypnotic request had no effect on the search
task. However, a non-hypnotic request carries different demand
characteristics from a hypnotic or post-hypnotic suggestion. It
is also unclear from this study whether the performance on
the task does indeed resemble that found in developmental
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grapheme-color synesthesia. To our knowledge only one devel-
opmental grapheme-color synesthete has been tested on a version
of this task (Smilek et al., 2001). While performance of this synes-
thete showed the same trend as the “hypnotic synesthetes” (i.e.,
worse performance on congruent trials, about 20%, compared to
incongruent trials, about 90%), they were far from equivalent in
other respects. Perhaps surprisingly, the manipulation had only a
mild effect on the synesthete (88% correct for congruent and 96%
for incongruent conditions) but a drastic effect on the hypnotized
non-synesthetes. Although direct comparison of proportion cor-
rect trials is difficult due to differences in the task, the comparison
is striking as the synesthete completed a more difficult task than
the non-synesthetes, being required to provide a specific grid
location for the target grapheme amongst distracters. Further-
more, although behavioral similarities between developmental
and hypnotic synesthetes are informative of cognitive processes,
they don’t provide detail of the phenomenological experience
of the participant, an aspect which requires more attention in
hypnotic synesthesia research as well as more generally in neu-
roscience (Lifshitz et al., 2013).
In the present study, we re-examine whether hypnotically
induced synesthetic colors can lead to facilitated performance
on the Embedded Figures Test. Although the test itself (and
the interpretation of the results) is not without controversy, it
has the advantage of predicting that synesthetic (or hypnotically
hallucinated) colors should facilitate rather than impair perfor-
mance on a difficult task, as in the previous study. Moreover,
the test has been utilized in several previous studies involving
grapheme-color synesthetes providing useful benchmark com-
parisons. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) showed synes-
thetes arrays comprising of different graphemes (e.g., 5 s and 2 s)
such that one of the graphemes could be grouped together to form
a shape (e.g., a triangle made of 2 s).1 The task was to identify
the global shape, from four alternatives, given a limited viewing
time of 1 s. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) found their two
synesthetes to be significantly more accurate in identifying the
embedded shape than controls. They later called this effect “pop-
out” (Hubbard et al., 2006).
The effect was partially replicated by Hubbard et al. (2005)
who noted that the “pop out” effect was not as great as would
be expected for true color. Rothen and Meier (2009) however
did not find an accuracy advantage for synesthetes in compar-
ison to controls for the same task. Ward et al. (2010) partially
supported the original findings with their larger scale replication
study involving a sample of 36 synesthetes. Synesthetes’ accu-
racy at detecting embedded shapes was significantly higher than
controls, though detection rates (41% for synesthetes) remained
significantly below that corresponding to true “pop out”. In this
study, participants were also required to rate the phenomenal
vividness of the synesthetic color and to indicate what percent-
age of the digits appeared as colored. Importantly, the great-
est performance benefits were found for those synesthetes who
experienced a large proportion of the array as colored. This was
interpreted by proposing that synesthetic colors may facilitate
1In their original study there were always three kinds of graphemes presented,
but the test is commonly illustrated by the example of 5 s and 2 s.
local grouping within a spatial window of attention but that
synesthetic colors do not enable pre-attentive pop-out. The latter
interpretation may explain why other studies, based on more
standard visual search paradigms, have often failed to find any
benefit of synesthetic colors in detecting a target achromatic
singleton grapheme (Edquist et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2006). That
is, synesthesia may assist local grouping of elements on the basis
of color (facilitating the embedded-figures test) but synesthetic
color may not enable pre-attentive pop-out (on more standard
visual search).
As noted by Ward et al. (2010), grapheme-color synesthetes
differ in the extent to which they perceive (or notice) their
synesthetic colors during this task. Synesthetes classed as “pro-
jectors”, i.e., who report their colors in the spatial loca-
tion of the grapheme, were more likely to report colors
(and showed a trend to do better overall on the task).
The reasons for this are not completely understood (Ward
et al., 2007, 2010). Nevertheless, for the present purposes we
decided to optimize the chances of obtaining a significant
result by instructing our highly hypnotizable participants to
project colors onto the array of graphemes. If hypnotic sug-
gestions can create grapheme-color synesthesia then hypnot-
ically hallucinated colors will facilitate performance on this
task (relative to a no-suggestion control condition). We also
ask, if hypnotic grapheme-color synesthesia can be induced,
are the perceptual reports similar to those of natural synes-
thetes in regards to the vividness and percentage of colored
digits?
METHOD
A counterbalanced two (condition; hypnotic suggestion vs. no-
suggestion) by four (duration; 1, 2, 3 and 4 s) within subjects
design was used.
PARTICIPANTS
Fourteen participants aged 18–42 (M = 23.2, SD = 6.3) were
recruited through the University of Sussex Hypnotic Suscep-
tibility Register. Each had previously been screened using the
Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Susceptibility, form C (Bowers,
1998) with a score of 8 or higher being used to classify them
as highly susceptible. This corresponds to the upper 10% of
people screened. Scores ranged from 8–11 (M = 9, SD = 1.04).
Each was paid £5 for participation, the whole experiment lasting
approximately 1 h. No participant reported having any type of
synesthesia, this was asked prior to testing. The study was granted
clearance from the University of Sussex ethics committee.
MATERIALS
The embedded figures stimuli consisted of four shapes (squares,
rectangles, triangles and diamonds) of number 2 s embedded in
an array of 5 s taken from the Ward et al. (2010) study. Each shape
was made from 6 to 10 target 2 s surrounded by 41 distracter 5 s,
all of which were in black font. Participants sat approximately 85
cm from a 15′′ LCD monitor with 60 Hz refresh rate. The shape
location differed across trials, not always appearing in the center.
E-prime 2.0 software was used to run the experiment.
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FIGURE 1 | An example stimulus (A) as presented (in black font), (B) a
schematic assuming presentation in color, and (C) a partially colored
version in line with the phenomenological reports of projector
synesthetes. Note that stimuli were never presented in color during the
experiment.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was repeated twice within each session, coun-
terbalanced so that half of the subjects completed the hypnosis
condition first, and the other half the control. Participants were
not informed that the study would include hypnosis until just
prior to the hypnosis condition to avoid “hold back” (Stam and
Spanos, 1980) where participants may unconsciously perform
poorer in the baseline condition than they were capable of.
The experiment consisted of four blocks. For half of the
participants the block order was ascending (1 to 4 s duration), for
the other it was descending (4 to 1 s). In the hypnosis condition,
participants received a brief induction (where the participant
was asked to become relaxed and counted down into a deep
hypnotic state) before a hypnotic suggestion to see green for 2
and red for 5 on the monitor where the digit was, very much
like a projector synesthete. Prior to each hypnosis block, the
suggestion was reinforced by requiring the participant to focus
on an individual stimulus digit and attempt to enhance the color.
This was done for both the 2 and 5. If they did not see any
color, they were asked to attempt to visualize it as colored as best
they could. Figure 1 shows how the stimulus would be colored if
color experiences phenomenologically similar to those of natural
projector synesthetes were evoked using hypnotic suggestion.
When completing the control block, no specific instructions were
given on how to complete the task.
SUGGESTION FOR HYPNOTIC GRAPHEME-COLOR
SYNESTHESIA
“Now you will see on the computer screen many 2 s and 5 s.
Whenever you see the digit five you will experience it as having
a special red color. Similarly, whenever you see the digit two you
will experience it as having a special green color. I want you to
make the special color as vivid as possible, actually see the color
FIGURE 2 | Experiment trial sequence. For response 1, shapes (square,
rectangle, diamond and triangle) were presented with response keys
underneath (keys 1–4). Response 2, was measured using a six point scale
(1 = no color, 6 = very vivid color) followed by response 3, the percentage
of digits within the array which were colored which was typed by the
participant.
there. Soon you will be presented with a screen containing both 5’s
and 2’s. You will be able to see the 5’s as vividly red and the 2’s as
vividly green. On each trial there will be a green shape made up of
2’s. You must select the shape you see. The trials will be presented
for 1, 2, 3 or 4 s. Is that clear? Ok we can start”.
An example trial was given at the start of each block where they
were reminded to find the shape made of 2 s, and the responses
required. Each trial was preceded by a central fixation cross for
1 s. The stimulus was then displayed for 1, 2, 3 or 4 s depending
on the block, followed by a blank screen containing instructions
to respond using a four-alternative forced choice to indicate the
shape (square, rectangle, diamond or triangle). Following this,
they were asked to rate their subjective experience of color during
the trial display on two scales. Specifically, they were asked to
rate the vividness of any perceived colors (1 = no color, 6 =
very vivid color) followed by the percentage of digits within the
array which were colored. The fixation cross then appeared to
signal the start of the next trial, see Figure 2 for trial sequence.
Accuracy was emphasized and participants were aware that the
proceeding trial did not begin until a response had been made
for the current trial. On completing the hypnosis condition, the
suggestion was removed (by stating that numbers no longer had
any special colors, and appear as they did before any suggestion
was given) then the participant was counted out of hypnosis.
RESULTS
ACCURACY OF TARGET DETECTION
The accuracy data were measured using percentage accuracy
and were analyzed as a 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA con-
trasting condition (presence/absence of hypnotic suggestion) and
duration of stimulus (1–4 s). The main effect of duration was
significant (F(1.78, 22.13) = 45.16, p< 0.001) with pairwise compar-
isons using Bonferroni adjustment showing significant differences
between all durations (p < 0.001) other than between 3 and
4 s (p = 0.13) due to accuracy improving when the arrays were
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FIGURE 3 | Shape detection accuracy for control and hypnosis
conditions across stimulus durations (1–4 s). Error bars represent 1 SEM.
presented for longer durations (1 s M = 46.6%, MSE = 3.0; s
M = 61.1%, MSE = 4.8; 3 s M = 74.0%, MSE = 4.5; 4 s
M = 79.1%, MSE = 5.3). The main effect of condition was not
significant (F(1, 13) = 0.62, p = 0.45): accuracy for the control
condition (M = 67.2%, MSE = 5.5) was similar to that in the
hypnosis condition (M = 63.2%, MSE = 3.9). The interaction
was also not significant, with accuracy being similar between
control and hypnosis conditions for each duration (F(3, 39) =
0.88, p = 0.46). This data is depicted in Figure 3. To determine
whether the lack of main effect of condition reflected insensitive
data, or supported a null hypothesis, we used a Bayes factor
analysis (Dienes, 2011). Whereas significance testing only allows
the null hypothesis to be rejected, Bayes factor analysis also
allows the null hypothesis to be supported (Kass and Raftery,
1995). If the Bayes factor is less than 1/3 there is substantial
evidence for the null over the specified alternative; if greater
than 3, substantial evidence for the alternative; otherwise the
data are insensitive in distinguishing the two hypotheses. Ward
et al. (2010) found that synesthetes were better than normal on
this task by 10%; thus this was used as the standard deviation
of a half-normal to represent an alternative hypothesis that the
hypnosis suggestion created a genuine synesthesia (as per the
guidelines in Dienes, 2011 Appendix). With an actual mean
difference of −4% (SE = 5.1%), the Bayes factor is 0.28, i.e.,
there was substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, that there
is no difference between percentage accuracy for the hypnosis vs.
control condition.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REPORTS
We next considered the extent to which the participants expe-
rienced colors during the task. Table 1 shows the number of
trials in which color was perceived, the average vividness of colors
reported by each participant, and the percentage of graphemes in
the array that were perceived as colored. These data are reported
only for the hypnotic suggestion condition. Twelve out of the 14
participants experienced some color during the hypnosis con-
dition. For those who did experience color, the proportion of
digits and intensity in which they saw color was extremely variable
across participants.
A one-way ANOVA comparing intensity ratings across stim-
ulus duration was not significant (F(1.45, 18.87) = 0.19, p = 0.76):
that is, intensity ratings were similar across all durations (1 s
M = 2.29, MSE = 0.33; 2 s M = 2.41, MSE = 0.39; 3 s M =
2.38, MSE = 0.40; 4 s M = 2.38, MSE = 0.42). (Note that Ward
et al., 2010 reported a similar average vividness rating, 3, for
genuine synesthetes.) Similarly, a one-way ANOVA comparing
percentage of graphemes perceived as colored across stimulus
duration was not significant (F(1.52, 19.73) = 0.11, p = 0.84) with
comparable percentage of grapheme appearing as colored across
all durations (1 s M = 25.72%, MSE = 7.64; 2 s M = 26.25%,
MSE = 7.68; 3 s M = 24.99%, MSE = 7.72; 4 s M = 24.75%, MSE =
7.57) (Ward et al., 2010 reported a similar percentage, 30%,
for genuine synesthetes). The duration of stimulus presentation
did not substantially affect the phenomenological experience of
color.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCURACY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
REPORTS OF COLOR
In order to better understand the role, if any, that color experience
played in shape detection the relationship between accuracy and
the phenomenological color reports was explored.
For these analyses, the participants were divided by a median
split according to the number of trials in which they reported
color experiences thereby creating two groups: many or few color
responses to the color suggestion.
There is evidence for a relationship between accuracy and
phenomenological report when trials are grouped by accuracy.
Participant 10 who never experienced colors had 100% accuracy
for the 4 s duration block preventing comparison between cor-
rect and incorrect trials; after excluding this participant there
remained six participants in the group who experienced few
colors and seven in the group who experienced many colors.
Using phenomenological ratings (mean intensity, mean number
of graphemes perceived as colored) as the dependent variables
a 2 × 2 × 4 ANOVA was conducted contrasting group (many
vs. few color-responses), accuracy (correct vs. incorrect trials)
and duration (4 levels). The data are summarized in Figure 3.
For intensity, there was a significant interaction of group X
accuracy (F(1, 11) = 5.09, p = 0.045). All other main effects and
interactions were not significant. The interaction was analyzed
further by simple effects of accuracy for each group. For the
group who experienced few colors, the effect of accuracy was
not significant (F(1, 5) = 0.016, p = 0.71) however for the group
who experienced many colors this main effect was significant
(F(1, 6) = 6.32, p = 0.046) as more vivid colors were reported for
accurate compared to inaccurate trials. This is summarized in
Figure 4.
For the percentage of graphemes perceived as colored, there
was again a significant interaction of group X accuracy (F(1, 11) =
5.80, p = 0.035). The other main effects and interactions were not
significant. A simple effects analysis indicated that for the group
who experienced few colors, the effect of accuracy was not signif-
icant (F(1, 5) = 0.51, p = 0.51) whereas for the group who experi-
enced many colors it was significant (F(1, 6) = 6.51, p = 0.043) with
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Table 1 | Summary of subjective color experiences for each participant for the hypnosis condition only in descending order from the
participant who experienced color for the most trials to least.
Part. number % Colored trials % of Graphemes perceived as colored (all trials) Average intensity (all trials)
1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s
11 100 52 57 49 41 3.96 3.96 3.68 3.79
2 99 63 80 81 81 3.75 5.04 5.04 5.46
8 97 24 37 39 41 2.64 3.57 3.89 4.25
17 97 90 60 56 58 4.32 3.89 3.00 3.07
6 96 37 34 38 42 3.07 3.29 3.32 3.89
12 83 47 61 67 61 3.50 3.89 4.61 3.64
7 81 7 3 6 5 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.50
1 51 29 27 10 1 2.61 2.32 1.54 1.14
16 29 3 7 3 5 1.21 1.39 1.25 1.32
15 14 1 0 2 10 1.11 1.04 1.11 1.29
3 12 7 0 0 0 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00
14 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.00
9 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The table shows the percentage of trials where a color was reported, average intensity (1 = no color, 6 = vivid color) and percentage of graphemes within the array
perceived as colored.
more colors being reported for accurate opposed to inaccurate
trials. The data are summarized in Figure 5. Together, the results
from Figures 4 and 5 show that participants who saw many colors
had more intense and widespread phenomenological color expe-
riences for trials in which they correctly compared to incorrectly
identified the embedded shape.
Although the different groups report different levels of color
intensity and disparity on correct vs. incorrect trials, the overall
number of correct trials didn’t differ according to these groups.
A 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA with percentage correct as
the dependent variable contrasting group (experiencing few vs.
many colors) and duration of stimulus (1–4 s) was conducted,
considering only the hypnotic-suggestion condition. This data is
summarized in Figure 6. The main effect of duration was signif-
icant (F(1.67, 20.09) = 18.88, p < 0.001) with accuracy improving
as stimulus duration increased. The interaction between group
and stimulus durations was not significant (F(1.67, 20.09) = 0.31, p
= 0.70). Importantly, the difference in accuracy for the hypnosis
block between those who experienced many (M = 61.7%, MSE
= 5.7) and few (M = 64.7%, MSE = 5.7) color responses to
the synesthesia suggestion was not significant (F(1, 12) = 0.13, p
= 0.72). To interpret the non-significant result, a Bayes Factor
analysis was conducted. Again a half-normal distribution was
chosen to test the alternative hypothesis that the group who
experienced many vs. few colors performed better, representing
a real synesthesia like behavioral advantage in those who had
phenomenological experience of the colors. As Ward et al. (2010)
measured a 10% accuracy advantage for synesthetes, this was used
as the SD. With a mean difference of −3, and MSE of 9.5 the
resulting Bayes Factor was 0.58 which is between 1/3 and 3 and
therefore indicates insensitive data.
DISCUSSION
We aimed to determine whether hypnotic synesthesia was simi-
lar either behaviorally or phenomenologically to developmental
synesthesia through measuring accuracy and color experience
during an embedded figures task with and without hypnotic
suggestion. Under the hypnotic suggestion the phenomenology
of the participants was similar to that documented for synes-
thetes. Specifically, they tended not to perceive the entire array
of graphemes as colored and the subjective intensity ratings were
similar to those reported by synesthetes. However, the behavioral
advantage previously found for synesthetes was not found under
hypnotic suggestions, even when one only considers those sub-
jects who responded strongly to the specific suggestions. Further
analyses (using Bayes factors) suggested that this was not merely
due to a lack of sensitivity. As such, our conclusion is that hyp-
notically induced grapheme-color experiences are not equivalent
to those in developmental synesthesia.
On first impressions, this result seems at odds with Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2009), who found that hypnotically suggested
synesthesia results in similar performance to developmental
synesthetes, showing a deterioration in the ability to detect an
achromatic grapheme when the concurrent matched the back-
ground color. However, because this study predicted an impair-
ment (as opposed to an enhancement), their task is potentially
more susceptible to demand characteristics. We note that the
experimenter in the present study was not blind to the experi-
mental condition. However, the principal effect (if any) of lack of
blindness would be to amplify demand characteristics, which we
have argued are less likely to apply in our study than in Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2009). The combination of a strong behavioral
effect in Cohen Kadosh et al., and none at all in our study, is most
simply explained by subjects responding according to how they
believe they should, without hypnotically-induced alterations in
perceptual abilities. This claim is entirely consistent with subjects
in both studies having subjectively compelling experiences.
It is important to note that the ability to respond to the synes-
thesia suggestion was very variable across our participants. This
is perhaps not surprising since perceptual hallucinations are diffi-
cult to evoke even in highly hypnotizable subjects (Bowers, 1998).
It should also be noted that many developmental grapheme-color
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FIGURE 4 | The mean intensity of colors (1 = no color, 6 = vivid color)
reported for trials in which the embedded figure was correctly or
incorrectly detected dependent on whether the participant saw many
colors or few colors. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
FIGURE 5 | The percentage of graphemes within the array being
reported as colored for trials in which the embedded figure was
correctly or incorrectly perceived. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
synesthetes fail to report colors during this task, at least during
brief (1 s) presentations of the array (Ward et al., 2010). The
strength of subjective experience of the colors was comparable
to that of synesthetes. Anecdotally, some of our participants
noted that the hypnotically suggested colors appeared to diminish
over time. To reduce the impact of this, the suggestion was
reinforced between blocks to sustain the colors but several partic-
ipants struggled to maintain the suggestion all the same. Future
research should combine extensive training of grapheme-color
pairings (e.g., Rothen et al., 2011) with subsequent hypnotic
suggestion.
If (at least some) of our hypnotized participants reported
color experiences then why didn’t this help them to detect the
embedded figure? One possibility suggested by our results is
that the color hallucinations are primarily added after grapheme
(and global figure) identification or, relatedly, that the “task” of
adding color visualizations competes with the primary task of
finding the embedded figure. This is supported by the analysis in
which participants were divided (by median split) according to
FIGURE 6 | Shape detection accuracy for lots and little color
responders during the hypnosis condition across stimulus durations
(1–4 s). Error bars represent 1 SEM.
whether they reported many or few color visualizations. For the
half of participants who experienced many colors, significantly
more vivid colors were reported for accurate compared to inac-
curate trials. This difference was not evident in the group who
did not experience much color, perhaps due to a floor effect
given that so little color was reported by these participants. The
enhanced color experience for correct compared to incorrect trials
for those who did experience color may reflect the ease with
which the colors could be projected onto the graphemes by the
participant. In this view, once the shape has been detected, the
identity of digits within the array can more easily be inferred,
potentially allowing easier visualization of the spatial localiza-
tion of the red and green colors. In trials in which the shape
has not been detected, the participant is performing two tasks
at once; the conscious task of identifying the shape and the
“unconscious” task of projecting colors onto black graphemes.
The process of binding the grapheme with the concurrent color
does not seem to occur as automatically in hypnotically sug-
gested synesthesia, as compared to developmental synesthesia.
Indeed, there is evidence that many hypnotic responses take up
capacity by virtue of being hypnotic (Hilgard, 1986; Tobis and
Kihlstrom, 2010; Wyzenbeek and Bryant, 2012; contrast Woody
and Bowers, 1994). Developmental and artificially induced vari-
ants of synesthesia (i.e., hypnotic or drug induced) may be
different. Auvray and Farina (in press) have explored this issue,
and using their characterization of developmental synesthesia (as
satisfying the criteria of the pairing of an inducer with a con-
scious concurrent, the idiosyncratic nature of the concurrent, and
the concurrent being produced automatically and consistently)
they have suggested hypnotic synesthesia satisfies the require-
ments of having a concurrent paired with an inducer, in an
idiosyncratic and automatic way, but that consistency requires
further investigation. Further, they suggest that the concurrent
may be produced by imagery. Our results support a limited
similarity between developmental and hypnotic synesthesia, and
showing that despite the phenomenology, the concurrent may
not be automatically produced (as shown by a lack of behavioral
improvement).
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How is it possible that our participants were able to generate
color experiences at all (assuming, that is, that their subjective
reports had some basis)? One possibility is that it relies on
mechanisms normally used to support visual imagery. How-
ever, we did not assess this directly in our research. Other
research suggests that there are individual differences between
high and low hypnotizable subjects in the tendency to employ
imagery in suitable contexts (e.g., Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974;
Hilgard, 1979; Wilson and Barber, 1982; Roche and McConkey,
1990; Lynn and Green, 2011). However, the tendency to employ
imagery in certain contexts may reflect strategic differences
rather than ability differences given that high susceptible partic-
ipants are not especially quick at visual information processing
(Acosta and Crawford, 1985; Friedman et al., 1987) and are
not especially high in rated imagery vividness (Jamieson and
Sheehan, 2002; though compare the feats of imagery achieved
by high but not low susceptible subjects in Mazzoni et al.,
2009). These suggestions are tentative given that we did not
run low hypnotizable subjects. Further, measuring the men-
tal imagery abilities of participants would help clarify to what
extent participants are able to use mental imagery to complete
the tasks and how this relates to the individual profiles of
hypnotic suggestibility (Cardeña, 2005; Terhune and Cardeña,
2010).
The lack of behavioral advantage for hypnotic synesthetes
can be taken as evidence against functional similarity between
hypnotic and natural synesthesia, but by the same token it
provides support for the Cold Control theory of hypnosis (Dienes
and Perner, 2007), and the class of theories which postulate no
special ability is gained when an action is performed hypnotically
(e.g., Kirsch and Lynn, 1999). Cold Control theory states that the
subjective lack of volition in hypnosis is due to not forming the
higher order thought (HOT) linked to the intention. In this sense,
someone who responds to the suggestion “lift your arm” could
lift their arm but not have the HOT “I am lifting my arm”. If this
theory holds, then participants should not be able to perform
better in the hypnosis block then they do in the control block.
Our data indeed support this inference. Theories that postulate
that hypnotic hallucination is perception-like in a way that goes
beyond normal imagery (e.g., Brown and Oakley, 2004) are
challenged by the current results.
In summary, hypnosis can induce verbal reports of phe-
nomenological experience of grapheme-color synesthesia similar
to those provided by developmental grapheme-color synesthetes,
when applied in high susceptible participants. However, even
though there are strong similarities in the subjective reports of
natural and hypnotic synesthetes, this in not reflected in behav-
ioral similarities. Highly hypnotizable subjects do not gain any
perpetual abilities with a hypnotic suggestion that they did not
have prior to hypnotic induction (Dienes and Perner, 2007).
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Grapheme-color synesthesia is a condition characterized by enduring and consistent
associations between letter/digits and colors. This study is the continuation of longitudinal
research begun by Simner et al. (2009) which aimed to explore the development of this
condition in real time within a childhood population. In that earlier study we randomly
sampled over 600 children and tested them aged 6/7 and 7/8 years. We identified
the child synesthetes within that cohort and measured their development over 1 year,
in comparison to a group of non-synesthetic children with both average and superior
memories. We were able to show the beginnings of a developmental progression in
which synesthetic associations (e.g., A = red) mature over time from relatively chaotic
pairings into a system of fixed consistent associations. In the current study we return
to this same population three years later when participants are now 10/11 years. We
used the same paired-association memory task to determine the synesthetic status
of our participants and to also establish synesthetes’ inventories of grapheme-color
associations. We compared their inventories to those from age 6/7 and 7/8 years to
examine how synesthesia matures over time. Together with earlier findings, our study
shows that grapheme-color synesthesia emerges with a protracted trajectory, with 34%
of letters/digits fixed at age 6/7 years, 48% fixed at 7/8 years and 71% fixed at 10/11
years. We also show several cases where synesthesia is not developing in the same
time-frame as peers, either because it has died out at an older age, or because it was
slower to develop than other cases. Our study paints the first picture of the emergence
of synesthesia in real-time over four years within a randomly sampled population of child
synesthetes.
Keywords: grapheme-color synesthesia, development, consistency, children, longitudinal, childhood
INTRODUCTION
For people with grapheme-color synesthesia, letters or digits
have fixed enduring conscious color associations. For example,
the letter A might be red, B might be blue, C might be yel-
low and so on. In the terminology of the literature, letters and
digits are the “inducers” of grapheme-color synesthesia, and the
color itself (i.e., the synesthetic experience) is the “concurrent”
(Grossenbacher, 1997). Synesthetes report that concurrent colors
are either experienced in the mind’s eye, or can be projected out
into space onto objects such as the written typeface (Dixon et al.,
2004). Studies have established that grapheme-color associations
have a likely genetic aetiology (Asher et al., 2009; Tomson et al.,
2011), that they are neurologically driven (e.g., Hubbard et al.,
2005; Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Weiss et al., 2009) and that they
tend to be automatically triggered without conscious effort on
the part of the synesthete (e.g., Dixon et al., 2000). Despite a rel-
ative wealth of contemporary findings on synesthesia produced
in recent years, questions about the development of synesthe-
sia have been largely overlooked in empirical terms. This study
aims to address this by examining how these unusual associations
are acquired throughout childhood in a random sample of child
grapheme-color synesthetes.
Within the field of synesthesia research, the study of develop-
ment in childhood has been hindered by a difficulty in recruiting
child synesthetes. Other neurodevelopmental child cohorts (e.g.,
children with autism) can be readily found following their refer-
rals to clinics, but these routes are not available for researchers
of synesthesia since the condition is not classified as pathology.
Options for recruitment are therefore limited to inviting partici-
pation from the synesthetic children of known adult synesthetes
(Green and Goswami, 2008), or to the time-intensive scanning
of large random populations to detect the comparatively small
number of child synesthetes within them (Simner et al., 2009).
The former approach raises questions of scientific validity because
the children of known adult synesthetes, often study partici-
pants themselves, are unlikely to represent the population of
child-synesthetes at large. Instead they are the children of fam-
ily environments led by motivated parents with an interest in
scientific research and the engagement in science, and in par-
ticular with an interest in synesthesia (Simner et al., 2009). For
all these reasons both the children themselves and the children’s
synesthesia may be non-representative of what we might expect
from the average synesthete child, randomly sampled. The only
study to have attempted the latter screening approach in order
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 603 |
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
153
Simner and Bain Grapheme-color synesthesia: a longitudinal study
to find randomly sampled child synesthetes (Simner et al., 2009)
was considerably time-intensive because the rarity of synesthesia
requires screening large samples for comparatively small numbers
of synesthetes (e.g., 8 grapheme-color synesthetes found in 615
children screened by Simner et al., 2009). However, once found,
those child synesthetes were, and remain, an extremely valuable
population, and we know of no other similar cohort anywhere in
the world. For this reason, we continue to explore the develop-
ment of these children in the current paper, showing how their
condition has matured now they are four years older than when
first tested.
The requirements of our current study—and those of Simner
et al. (2009)—were first to have an objective means of identifying
child synesthetes from a large sample of children, and second to
have a way to evaluate how their synesthesia is developing over
time. The test to identify synesthetes used by Simner et al. (2009),
and again here, is based on the behavioral “gold standard” task
(Rich et al., 2005): a test of consistency over time. In this test,
synesthetes are identified by the fact that people with synesthesia
tend to have consistent and enduring inducer-concurrent rela-
tionships. In other words, for any given synesthete, each inducer
(e.g., a letter) will tend to elicit the same concurrent color over
time (e.g., if the letter A is red, it tends to always be red for that
particular synesthete, in repeated testing). This consistency was
first demonstrated by Baron-Cohen et al. (1987) who showed
that a grapheme-color synesthete reported the same colors for
over 100 letters and words in two different testing sessions sepa-
rated bymore than twomonths. This consistency effect is perhaps
the most replicated finding in the synesthesia literature: studies
have replicated it in grapheme-color synesthesia (Dixon et al.,
2000; Edquist et al., 2006; Eagleman et al., 2007), sound-color
synesthesia (Ward et al., 2006), word-taste synesthesia (Ward and
Simner, 2003), and so on—indeed, within virtually every study
of synesthesia within the last decade. Across these studies, synes-
thetes tend to be between 80 and 100% internally consistent over
time (e.g., Ward et al., 2005); in contrast, a non-synesthete con-
trol tends to be around 25% internally consistent when asked
to generate and then recall analogous associations (e.g., to free-
associate colors to letters and then recall these associations in
a retest). Indeed, controls score poorly even when tested over
a considerably shorter time interval (e.g., 17% consistent when
retested after just 2 weeks; Baron-Cohen et al., 1987). Given this,
the test of consistency has been adopted as the primary means
for identifying genuine synesthesia (but see Simner, 2012 for
discussion): synesthetes are required to be significantly more con-
sistent in recalling their associations compared to a group of
non-synesthete controls.
The consistency test used to identify child synesthetes in
Simner et al. (2009) will be used again in the current study.
Simner et al. tested 615 children aged either 6 or 7 years (which
we henceforth refer to as “aged 6/7 years”). Each child took part in
an on-screen test in which they viewed the letters of the alphabet
and the digits 0–9, one by one, in a random order. Accompanying
each grapheme was an on-screen palette of 13 colors, and chil-
dren were required to pair each grapheme with a color as they
saw fit. When all graphemes had been shown, the test paused
for approximately 10 s, then participants repeated the test again.
Simner et al. compared the grapheme-color choices made before
vs. after the 10-s pause, to establish for each child how consis-
tent his/her color choices had been across that short interval.
On average, children selected the same color for only 3.5 out of
the 36 graphemes. However, 47 children had consistency scores
significantly higher than the mean and these were classified as
“potential synesthetes”—in that their high consistency may have
been indicating they were synesthetes. To further clarify this,
Simner et al. returned one year later, when the children were
now aged 7/8 years. Simner et al. presented the same test again,
but this time compared the grapheme-color associations made
by each “potential synesthete” across the entire year that had
passed. By doing this they found eight children who continued
to be highly consistent even across this extensive time interval.
These eight children were therefore categorized as genuine synes-
thetes on the assumption that maintaining this consistency would
be a hugely challenging task for non-synesthetes. Indeed, Simner
et al. required that their synesthetes had consistent colors both
across 12 months (compared to their entire peer group over just
10 s, in Session 1) and also across 10 s at age 7/8 years (and here
they were compared to 40 orthogonally age/sex-matched controls
who were also selected for retesting at age 7/8, because they had
been representative of perfectly average non-synesthete children
in Session 1). After removing these eight “genuine synesthetes,”
Simner et al. classified the remaining 39 “potential synesthetes” as
“high-memory non-synesthetes,” since these children had likely
performed well when first tested (i.e., over 10-s) based solely on a
high memory span.
In the current study we aimed to repeat this process with
the same cohort of children, now that they are aged 10/11
years (i.e., 8 synesthetes, 39 high-memory non-synesthetes and
40 average-memory non-synesthetes). Our first intention was
to establish whether the child synesthetes identified previously
are still exhibiting the behavior of synesthetes after three more
years have passed. It is possible that synesthesia may die out in
some individuals, and there are three reasons to suspect this.
First, there are anecdotal reports from adults suggesting they
had synesthesia in childhood which they no longer have. Second,
Simner et al. (2009) found a numeric trend toward finding more
synesthetes in their younger (originally aged 6) vs. older (orig-
inally aged 7) age group, although the small numbers in that
study gave insufficient power to test this statistically. Finally, a
decline in synesthesia through childhood is also predicted by
the most widely accepted developmental model of synesthesia:
the Neonatal Synesthesia Hypothesis (Maurer, 1997). This model
proposes that all neonates and young infants experience sen-
sory/perceptual stimuli in a synesthetic manner (Spector and
Maurer, 2009). However, children are thought to gradually lose
these exaggerated abilities through selective pruning of synap-
tic connections in childhood because these connections may no
longer be adaptive to development and general cognition (Spector
and Maurer, 2009). Synesthetes, on the other hand, are thought
to maintain these connections into adulthood, either via absent
or delayed synaptic pruning. These proposals are backed up by
infant neuroimaging studies: verbal stimuli can activate both ver-
bal and visual cortex in a way that is not observed in the adult
population (Neville, 1995) thereby suggesting a less modularized
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processing in infants. Additionally, sound and color associations
have also been found in infants that mirror those observed later in
older sound-color synesthetes (Mondloch and Maurer, 2004). If
the neonatal synesthesia hypothesis is correct, this would suggest
that synesthesia may die out in some children as the normal prun-
ing processes in development run their course (see Huttenlocher
and Dabholkar, 1997 for a discussion on the time-course of this
pruning). Our study will test whether any children previously
identified as synesthetes fall below that classification now that
more time has passed.
As well as identifying child synesthetes, Simner et al. were able
to evaluate how these children’s synesthesia had developed over
the one year that had passed between their two testing sessions
(i.e., between Session 1 when children were 6/7 years, and Session
2 when the children were 7/8 years). Simner et al. found that on
average, genuine synesthetes acquired 6.4 new fixed grapheme-
color associations over that year: at age 6/7 years synesthetes were
consistent over 10 s in the coloring of 10.5 graphemes on average
(out of 36 letters and numbers), while at age 7/8 years they were
consistent on 16.9 graphemes over 10 s. In other words, synes-
thetes were moving from a state where their colors were largely
in flux, to a state where almost half of graphemes were fixed to a
consistent color, at least over a 10-s retest. In the current study we
will test how this pattern of acquisition has continued to develop
now the children are aged 10/11 years. Since adults have consis-
tent colors for around 80–100% of their graphemes, we anticipate
a higher proportion of fixed colors in older vs. younger children.
We will assess this by comparing how consistently our synesthetes
pair graphemes with colors over a 10 s retest at 10/11 years to how
they did when they were younger (at age 6/7 and /7/8 years).
In summary, Simner et al. (2009) tested children aged 6/7 years
(Session 1) and again aged 7/8 years (Session 2). Children made
grapheme-color selections twice in each session and we label these
Selections 1a/b and Selections 2a/b. In the current study, we will
test the children again in a Session 3, using the same task where
they will again make grapheme-color selections twice across a 10-
s gap (Selections 3a/b). We will again identify synesthetes as those
children who show consistent color choices both in immediate
retest (Selection 3a vs. 3b; i.e., a 10 s gap) and in a delayed retest
(Selection 3 vs. Selection 1; i.e., a 4-year gap1). As before synes-
thetes will need to significantly outperform their peers on both
criteria. Once synesthetes are identified here we will next evalu-
ate how many of their graphemes now have fixed colors at age
10/11 years (Selection 3a vs. 3b) and compare this to how many
were fixed at age 7/8 years (Selection 2a vs. 2b) and at age 6/7
years (Selection 1a vs. 1b). We predict that synesthetes will show
an incremental increase in the number of fixed colors from the
younger to the older testing age.
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
The eight previously identified synesthetes and their high and
average memory controls will be given the same consistency task
administered in previous testing sessions by Simner et al. (2009)
1See methods for how delayed consistency is calculated with respect to the
four different comparisons possible here (Selections 3a vs. 1a; 3b vs. 1b; 3a vs.
1b; 3b vs. 1a).
and will be assessed using similar criteria. The synesthetes that
continue to consistently associate graphemes and colors to a
significant degree, in both immediate and delayed retests, shall
be re-confirmed as genuine synesthetes at 10/11 years old. The
development of grapheme-color synesthesia shall then be inves-
tigated by assessing the acquisition of synesthetic associations
from ages 6/7 to 10/11 in comparison to the development of
non-synesthetic children with both high and average memories.
METHODS
Participants
We tested 80 of the 87 children previously tested by Simner
et al. (2009). In that earlier study, children had been identified
as either synesthete, high-memory non-synesthete or average-
memory non-synesthete (see above). Seven high-memory and
10 average-memory non-synesthetes were untraceable for the
current study, although we were able to replace all 10 average-
memory non-synesthetes with children from the same population
(i.e., children whose immediate consistency score in Session 1 fell
within the average range: either 3 or 4, out of 36 graphemes). The
original 40 average-memory non-synesthetes tested by Simner
et al. had been orthogonally crossed for age (6 vs. 7 years in
Session 1) and sex; our replacements allowed us to fully main-
tain this for age, and virtually maintain this for sex (19 males; 21
females). We also tested the eight children previously classified as
synesthetes (five female) and the remaining 32 classified as high-
memory non-synesthetes (22 females). All participants were 6/7
years when first tested by Simner et al. (2009), and are described
here as aged 10/11 years for conciseness, although five children
were still 9 at the time of our testing here, and ten children had
just turned 12 (due to the particular timings and duration of our
testing). Our study was approved by the local ethics board and
written consent was given by head teachers and parents.
Materials and procedure
Our consistency task was a computerized test taken from Simner
et al. (2009; and previously, from Simner et al., 2006) which
individually presents the 26 letters and the digits 0–9 (i.e., 36
graphemes) alongside an electronic palette of 13 colors (black,
dark blue, brown, dark green, gray, pink, purple, orange, red,
white, light blue, light green and yellow). These colors are based
on Berlin and Kay’s (1969) irreducible color terms, with the addi-
tion of dark and light variants of blue and green2. Both the order
of graphemes and the trial-by-trial configuration of colors were
randomized for each participant. Graphemes were displayed in
black Ariel font against a white background on the left side of
the screen, taking up approximately 40% of the screen-height.
As in Simner et al. (2009) participants were told they would
2Simner et al. (2009; p. 59) point out “[a]lthough synesthetes” colors are
highly specific (e.g. Ward et al., 2005) and could be closely approximated with
sufficient time and effort using an extensive palette comprising many thou-
sands of colors (as we have done elsewhere; e.g., Simner et al., 2006), prior
studies have shown that a presentation of our condensed palette allows for a
successful assessment of synesthesia that is practical for large numbers of par-
ticipants, or for those with limited attention (Day, 2005; Simner et al., 2006).
When faced with the core palette, synesthetes are systematic in their choices,
while non-synesthetes are significantly more random (Simner et al., 2006).”
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be playing a short computer “game” and would be required to
select with a computer mouse the “best” color for each grapheme
as promptly as possible. They were also told that there was no
right or wrong answer but that they should avoid selecting the
same color repeatedly. A paper print-out of a screen-shot was
used to illustrate what the task entailed. Approximately 10 s after
completing all 36 graphemes, participants performed an imme-
diate surprise retest, in which the order of graphemes and color
configurations were re-randomized. (Specifically, our program
presented all 36 graphemes in a random order, then paused for
10 s, then began again, showing the same, but re-randomized,
graphemes. During the pause, children were told to wait a few
moments and then to “carry on as before.”) The task took ∼5min
to complete.
RESULTS
Synesthete status
We remind the reader that our participants have now been tested
in three sessions, and that within each session they made two
color selections for each grapheme, either side of a 10-s pause.
We have termed these: Session 1 (age 6/7 years; Selections 1a and
1b), Session 2 (age 7/8 years; Selections 2a and 2b) and Session
3 (age 10/11 years; Selections 3a and 3b). Sessions 1 and 2 were
conducted by Simner et al. (2009) and Session 3 is added here.
Below, we identify children who are “Session 3 synesthetes
(aged 10/11 years)” by comparing how consistently our par-
ticipants paired graphemes to colors both within and across
testing sessions. Following Simner et al. (2009), for a child to
qualify as a synesthete he/she must satisfy both of the follow-
ing requirements: be significantly more consistent in immediate
consistency (Selections 3a vs. 3b) compared to average-memory
non-synesthetes AND be significantly more consistent in delayed
consistency over four years (Selections 1a vs. 3a or Selections 1b
vs. 3b 3) compared to the mean consistency of their peer-group
(n = 615) over 10 s in Session 1. (To rephrase this, delayed consis-
tency requires that the associations made by synesthetes at age 6/7
years remain significantly more consistent over four years, than
their peers’ associations remained over 10 s only).
We shall assess all 80 children for synesthesia, notwithstand-
ing the fact that only eight were recognized as synesthetes at an
earlier age by Simner et al. (2009). This is because some true
synesthetes may have evaded identification in Sessions 1 and 2,
perhaps because their development was slower than their synes-
thetic peers. (Equally, we may also find that some cases of verified
synesthesia may now have declined with age).
3Following Simner et al. (2009), we point out that children gave four colors
for each grapheme in total in Sessions 1 and 3. Therefore, delayed consis-
tency could, in theory, be calculated by any of four different comparisons
(Selections 1a vs. 3a; 1b vs. 3b; 1a vs. 3b; 1b vs. 3a). As in Simner et al. (2009),
we conservatively discounted matches across first and second presentations
(e.g., Selections 1a vs. 2b), and conservatively disallowed high consistency to
be achieved by a mix of consistency from within first presentations and within
second presentations (e.g., four consistently cultured graphemes in Selections
1a vs. 2a, and three consistently cultured graphemes in Selections 1b vs. 2b
does not equal a score of seven). For further conservativeness, we discounted
anymatches across light and dark versions of the same color (e.g., “light green”
vs. “dark green” was considered a mismatch).
Immediate consistency
To achieve the status of a genuine synesthete at 10/11 years, a
child must first significantly outperform average memory non-
synesthetes (n = 40) tested for immediate consistency in Session
3. Participants’ scores were collapsed across both age and sex since
Session 3 average-memory controls showed no significant effect
for either factor (although there was a trend for girls to perform
better) [age: Fage(1, 36) < 1; Fsex(1, 36) = 3.31, p = 0.08] and there
was no interaction [Fage∗sex(1, 36) > 1]. We calculated a cut-off
value at 1.96 standard deviations above the control mean, both
for letters (mean = 4.1; SD = 2.9; cut-off = 9.8) and numbers
(mean= 1.7; SD = 1.6; cut-off= 4.9). As such, synesthetes had to
achieve a consistency of at least 10/26 for letters or 5/10 for num-
bers. We describe how participants satisfied these criteria further
below.
Delayed consistency
The delayed consistency criterion required synesthetes to score
significantly higher over a four years gap than their peer group
(n = 615) had scored over 10 s in Session 1. In Session 1, girls had
performed similarly to boys although 7 year olds (n = 275) signif-
icantly outperformed 6 year olds (n = 332). As such our delayed
consistency analysis in Session 3 requires us to assess the two age
groups separately. Table 1 summarizes the means, standard devi-
ations and synesthetic criteria (1.96 SD above the mean) for each
age group, from Simner et al. (2009); synesthetes who were 6
when first tested now require a 4-year delayed consistency of at
least 6/26 for letters or 3/10 for numbers, while those who were 7
years require 8/26 or 4/10.
Six children indeed satisfied both immediate and delayed con-
sistency criteria, and on this basis can be recognized as Session 3
synesthetes (aged 10/11 years). These were five of the eight synes-
thetes from Simner et al. (2009; HM, JC, DJ, GT, MA) and one
child previously categorized as a high-memory non-synesthete
(CM; female; aged 6 when first tested). All children who contin-
ued to be classified as such from in Simner et al. (2009) remained
within the same variant(s) (i.e., either letter-color and/or digit-
color) apart from DJ who moved from letter/digit-color synes-
thesia to just letter-color synesthesia.
We also identified six additional children who were very
close to achieving our rigorous standards, three of whom were
previously identified by Simner et al. (2009) as synesthetes
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics for children (n = 615) aged 6 and 7
years from Simner et al. (2009).
Age (years) Letters (/26) Digits (/10)
Mean SD Cut-offs Mean SD Cut-offs
6 2.3 1.7 5.5 0.9 0.9 2.7
7 2.8 2.3 7.2 1.1 1.1 3.2
Table shows means and standard deviations (SDs) from immediate consistency
over 10 s in Session 1 (i.e., Selection 1a vs. 1b) for letters and digits. It also shows
the values of the “cut-offs” by which we identified synesthetes (mean plus
1.96*SD; i.e., synesthetes must perform significantly higher than the mean).
Session 3 synesthetes must score at or above this cut-off in a four-year retest.
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Table 2 | Session 3 synesthetes and “near-misses,” indicated by
checks and question marks respectively.
ID Sex Age Session 3 Synesthete status
Session1 immediate after Session 3
consistency ( =confirmed;
? = near-miss)
Letters Digits Letters Digits
DJs m 6 21 8 
GTs f 7 24 8 
HMs m 6 15 6  ?
JCs f 6 18 7  
MAs m 7 16 8  
CM f 6 16 7  
CDs f 6 12 4 ?
MWh f 7 11 4 ?
MHa M 7 10 5 ?
CCs f 6 5 6 ?
DMs f 6 7 4 ?
ETh m 7 4 4 ?
Columns 1–3 show ID (with previous status in sub-script; s, synesthete, h, high-
memory non-synesthete, a, average-memory non-synesthete), sex (m, male; f,
female), and age in years when first tested by Simner et al. (2009). Columns
4–5 show immediate consistency in Session 3 (Selections 3a vs. 3b), out of
26 for letters, and 10 for digits. Gray highlighting indicates that this immediate
consistency satisfied the synesthetic criterion.
(CC, CD, DM), two as high memory non-synesthetes (MW, ET),
and one as an average memory control (MH; whom we recruited
as a replacement so did not test in Session 2). These six children
achieved the required consistency either for immediate or delayed
consistency, andmissed the other criterion by only one point (i.e.,
fell short on only one letter or digit). In all cases, we verified
that high consistency had not been achieved by using only a lim-
ited color palette (e.g., choosing the color red throughout) and
indeed, on this basis, we eliminated a further child who had also
approached significance.
In Table 2 above we summaries our findings from Session 3 for
all children of interest described above. Our six confirmed Session
3 synesthetes are above the triple line, and our “near-misses” (i.e.,
those who satisfied one criterion and almost satisfied the other)
are below the line. Their statuses are shown by checks or question
marks, respectively, in the final two columns. The previous sta-
tus of all children at a younger age (from Simner et al., 2009) is
shown by sub-script next to their ID. The table also shows imme-
diate consistency scores for letters and digits in Session 3, with
gray shading indicating cells where immediate consistency was
within the synesthetic range. Note therefore, that any children
considered “near misses” who do not have gray shading (i.e., DM
and ET) satisfied synesthetic consistency in delayed, rather than
immediate consistency.
An example of the striking consistency of synesthetes across
all three testing sessions can be seen in Figure 1. This shows the
colored digits of synesthete JC when she was 6 years old, and then
FIGURE 1 | Color choices in the first presentation of digits (0–9) in
Sessions 1–3 for synesthete JC (i.e., over 4 years) and those from an
aged matched control SB (over 10 s; in Session 1).
again one, and four years later. It is clear that the selections she
made in Session 1 remain considerably more consistent over four
years than those made by an age-matched average control (SB)
over just 10-s.
Synesthetic development
Above we have identified six Session 3 synesthetes (age 10/11
years). Here we now consider the development of their synesthe-
sia over time. By examining their immediate consistency scores
in Session 3 (i.e., Selections 3a vs. 3b) we can estimate how
many graphemes had their own single fixed color at this age,
at least to the extent that this color remained consistent in a
10-s retest. Our approach shows that on average, 10/11 years
old synesthetes had fixed colors for 25.7 out of 36 graphemes
(SD 4.1), while high memory non-synesthetes had 7.4 (SD 4.4),
and average non-synesthetes had 5.8 (SD 4.2). To evaluate these
group differences we have remained agnostic about the status
of the six “near-miss” children who fell just short of synesthesia
(see above). Instead, we have left these six within their origi-
nal groups (i.e., either high or average memory non-synesthetes)
apart from CC, CD, and DM whom we have moved from the
synesthete to high memory group (since they had superior imme-
diate consistency in session 1 but are not currently considered
synesthetes).
Figure 2 shows our Session 3 data combined with earlier ses-
sions from Simner et al. (2009), to illustrate how synesthetes have
developed fixed colors over time. Figure 2 shows the immedi-
ate consistency for 36 colored graphemes (over 10-s) at ages of
6/7 years (Selections 1a vs. 1b) and 7/8 years (Selections 2a vs.
2b) and 10/11 years (Selections 3a vs. 3b). We have converted
these consistencies to percentages to better illustrate the rate of
development.
Figure 2 shows that synesthetes have a sharper rate of acquisi-
tion of colored graphemes, compared to what might be expected
from other children with average or high-memories. Over the
4-year testing period, synesthetes acquired on average 13.3 new
fixed colored graphemes (9.2 letters, and 4.0 digits, within
each variant), while high and average memory non-synesthetes
improved across sessions by less than 3 graphemes.
We point out that that a subset of our synesthetes achieved
synesthetic status for letters only (rather than for all graphemes)
meaning that they should not be expected to achieve 36 fixed col-
ored graphemes even in a fully-formed adult state. However, we
can report that the pattern of acquisition shown in Figure 2 is a
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of consistent colors selected by the three
participant groups (see legend) in their immediate consistency of 36
graphemes within Sessions 1, 2 and 3 (ages 6/7, 7/8, 10/11
respectively). Intervening years have no data because no testing took
place at these ages.
FIGURE 3 | Number of consistent colors selected within Sessions 1, 2
and 3 (ages 6/7, 7/8, 10/11 respectively) for letter-color synesthetes
(out of 26; left panel) and digit-color synesthetes (out of 10; right
panel). Black lines indicate Session 3 and 2 synesthetes; gray lines indicate
Session 3 (only) synesthetes; dotted lines indicate Session 2 (only)
synesthetes; dash/dotted lines with diamond data-markers indicate the
means of average memory controls.
good approximation for the pattern when synesthetes are broken
down by type. For example, Figure 2 shows approximately 71.3%
of the 36 graphemes were fixed in color for all synesthetes at aged
10/11 years, and indeed this figure is very similar for those with
the letter-color variant (70.5%) or the digit-color variant (73.5%).
Nonetheless, for further clarification on how synesthesia develops
within each variant, Figure 3 below shows the case-by-case devel-
opment of letter-color synesthetes (left panel) and digit-color
synesthetes (right panel) separately. We have included not only
children classified as synesthetes in both Session 3 and Session 2
(indicated by solid lines), but also those classified in Session 2
only (indicated by dotted lines) and those classified in Session
3 only (indicated by gray, rather than black, lines). These lat-
ter two groups can be thought of as children having synesthesia
that is, respectively, either dying out, or developing more slowly
than their peers. Finally, we also show in Figure 3 the progres-
sion of average memory controls (dash/dotted line with diamond
data-markers).
DISCUSSION
Our study re-assessed the synesthetic status of children aged 10/11
years who had previously been identified as synesthetes by Simner
et al. (2009) when they were aged 6/7 and 7/8 years. We again
identified synesthetes using the gold standard behavioral measure
assessing how consistently graphemes are paired with colors over
time. In our test, children aged 10/11 years paired graphemes with
colors, and their selections were compared across a 10-s retest
(immediate consistency), and also to selections they had made
four years earlier (delayed consistency). Like Simner et al. (2009)
we required synesthetes to outperform controls in both types of
measure.We also assessed the synesthetic status of a group of chil-
dren who had previously been classified as being non-synesthetes
with high memories, on the assumption that some may in fact be
more-slowly developing synesthetes. Finally, we also tested here
a group of average memory non-synesthetes to serve in a con-
trol condition. Once we had identified who were synesthetes from
among our total sample, we compared their inventories of colored
graphemes at different ages to observe how their synesthesia had
developed over time (from age 6/7 to 7/8 to 10/11 years).
We found that five of the eight children previously identi-
fied as grapheme-color synesthetes at a younger age continued to
satisfy synesthetic criteria in our current study. In other words,
these children have now shown hallmarks of synesthesia across
four years. We also found a sixth synesthete, not previously clas-
sified as such in earlier testing. Her case is unusual: her colors
were consistent over 10 s when she was 6, then over one year, and
again over 4 years, and they were also highly consistent over 10-
s within this final test session (aged 10/11). However, in Session
2 there was a lot of variation in her colors when immediately
retested, and for this reason she was classified by Simner et al.
(2009) as a high-memory non-synesthete. If our current assump-
tion is correct, and she is indeed a genuine synesthete, we have
two possible interpretations: either there was a period of par-
ticular flux in her synesthetic colors when she was 7 years old
(in Session 2) or she was tired/distracted during that test. The
latter is at least plausible, since her first selection of colors in
Session 2 (i.e., Selection 2a) were significantly consistent with
those from a younger age, while her second selection (Selection
2b) was not (0%match). It is possible therefore that her attention
to the task waned during the second testing session conducted by
Simner et al. (2009).
Our study might also lend support to the notion that synes-
thetic ability can die out over time, because three children who
were previously classified as synesthetes at an earlier age no longer
satisfied these requirements in our most recent test. Since each
evaluation of synesthesia is made against age-matched controls,
we can assume these children were synesthetes at an earlier testing
session, and hence, we might therefore have empirical evidence of
what could be considered “synesthetic demise” (i.e., the decline of
synesthesia within an individual such that it is no longer appar-
ent at a recognized level at a later age). This seems to fit with
previous anecdotal evidence from adults who have given sub-
jective accounts of synesthetic ability in childhood that they no
longer possess as adults. This is also evidenced by the fact that
one of our Session 3 synesthetes has gone through a transition
from being a letter and digit synesthete at age 7/8 to only a letter
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synesthete at age 10/11. Nonetheless, it is possible too that the
synesthesia of these three children is merely different in character-
istic to those of their peers. Two of these cases in particular were
highly consistent over 10 s when tested here, but failed to show
high enough consistency compared to the colors they provided
four years ago. It is therefore possible that they remain synes-
thetes but that their colors have simply developed away from those
first experienced when they were much younger. If this is true, we
would predict that a future test of consistency will show high con-
sistency between their current inventories (age 10/11), and those
generated at a future date.
For our unequivocal synesthetes, we also examined their devel-
opment across four years and found that grapheme-color synes-
thesia appears to moves from a more chaotic to less chaotic
system. When synesthetes were 6/7 years old, only around a third
of graphemes on average had colors fixed enough to endure in
a 10-s retest. By the age of 7/8 this had risen to almost 50%,
and at age 10/11 this is now over 70%. This development far
exceeds the type of normal age-related changes we might expect
from non-synesthetic children in the same task, as evidenced
by the performance of our average- and high-memory controls
(see Figure 2). Our study also allows us to confirm that the rate
of acquiring fixed colors for letters slows down as synesthetic
children age (see Figure 2). Synesthetes acquired on average 6.4
graphemes over the 12 months between Sessions 1 and 2, but
only another 4.2 graphemes across the entire three years that
followed. A more linear acquisition would have predicted that
synesthetes would have acquired all 36 grapheme-color associ-
ations by age 10/11 years. Instead, we found that synesthetes
are still below the 100% consistency that can characterize fully
mature grapheme-color synesthesia, although our children are
developing at different rates. Despite a the group-mean of ∼70%,
synestheteMA already has 80% of his digits fixed with color, while
GT has 92% of her letters. Hence although it may take several
more years before these children achieve their full complement
of grapheme-color associations, some are likely to achieve this
sooner than others. It remains a point of investigation to track
these children into stable adult-like profiles before we can appre-
ciate the complete picture of the development of grapheme-color
synesthesia.
This third installment of findings on the development of
grapheme-color synesthesia provides valuable insights because
it shows how synesthesia unfolds over time. Another recent
study has also provided compatible data on development, this
time in a far younger population. Spector and Maurer (unpub-
lished, reported in Maurer et al., 2013) conducted a longitudinal
study testing three pre-school children who were aged 3.5–4.5
years when the test began. These children had synesthetic moth-
ers and so were reasonably likely to be synesthetes themselves,
given familial inheritance patterns (e.g., Ward and Simner, 2005).
Spector and Maurer provided 96 colored crayons, and children
colored up to one grapheme per day and then immediately
repeated the cycle, between three and six times. These three
putative synesthetes were far more consistent on their choice of
colors across cycles than age-matched controls (who were not
at all consistent), and their consistency increased as the cycles
advanced; children were 40% consistent in the first two cycles,
aged 3.75–4.75, but were around 75% consistent in the final two
cycles, age 4.5–5.5. This very high consistency score at age only 5.5
years, in the face of our own data, suggests thesemay be somewhat
special synesthetes. Our own study here of randomly sampled
child synesthetes predicts that consistency around age 5 should
be less than 30%. We see two possible interpretations: either this
study happened to sample particularly synesthetic children, or the
task itself—with its repetitive coloring of graphemes performed
on between 78 and 156 different days depending on the child—
may have reinforced colors earlier than otherwise expected. A
final possible interpretation is that the children self-referred by
research-interested synesthetic parents may be non-representative
of more randomly sampled children per se. What is interesting,
however, is that both this study and our own shows the devel-
opment of synesthesia from more fluctuating to less fluctuating
colors.
The issue of self-referral is an important one, on which we
will therefore dwell a little longer. Other studies have also inves-
tigated childhood synesthesia, but again used samples of children
likely to have been brought forward for testing by their synesthetic
parents. Green and Goswami (2008) showed that a synesthetic
population of children show cognitive benefits (e.g., in vocabu-
lary and mathematics). Although Green and Goswami provided
valuable information about the cognitive abilities of these chil-
dren, it is not clear how much their findings can be extended to
child synesthetes in general. It is likely that the children of parents
with an interest in science, and the engagement in science, and
in synesthesia in general, may have children who naturally score
higher in the types of tests used in this study in any case. Hence,
we are currently testing our own population, of randomly sam-
pled synesthetes, on a range of test of cognitive tests in the hope
this will reveal the true abilities of child synesthetes randomly
sampled.
Although we have successfully identified a number of child
synesthetes and tracked their development, we must acknowl-
edge the shortfalls of our methodology based on the same reasons
identified by Simner et al. (2009). In particular, we point out
that our methods will necessarily underestimate the prevalence
of childhood synesthesia, and this is because it relies on the
test of consistency over time. Although this is a reliable test
for adult synesthetes, who are generally highly consistent (e.g.,
100%) in their synesthetic associations, our study itself shows
that child synesthetes only acquire this consistency with time.
Hence any study aiming to identify child synesthetes by their
consistency is using a necessarily weak metric (see Simner et al.,
2009 for full discussion). Furthermore, recent papers (Cohen
Kadosh and Terhune, 2012; Eagleman, 2012; Simner, 2012) have
asked whether high consistency is a true hallmark of synesthe-
sia at all, or whether instead it characterizes only a subset of
synesthetes. In other words, although all contemporary studies
identify synesthetes by their consistency over time there may yet
be some synesthetes overlooked by these studies who have vary-
ing and fluctuating colors, even into adulthood. Given both of
these considerations, our study may have identified only a subset
of child synesthetes with particularly early-developing synesthe-
sia, or with particularly consistent synesthesia. Nonetheless, our
study remains informative about this particular population per se.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 603 | 159
Simner and Bain Grapheme-color synesthesia: a longitudinal study
Our study might be considered alongside theories about neu-
rodevelopment in synesthesia. We have seen that grapheme-color
synesthesia already exists in a nascent state at age 6 years, and that
it develops slowly through childhood. Studies of adult grapheme-
color synesthetes suggests it arises through “cross-activation”
between adjacent brain regions involved, on the one hand, in
the recognition of graphemes and words (the “visual word form
area”; VWFA) and on the other, in color processing (e.g., V4;
Hubbard et al., 2005; Rouw and Scholte, 2007). Importantly,
since grapheme-color synesthesia relies on knowledge of cultur-
ally acquired symbols, it could not exist as such in in infancy.
Hence, although the left-hemisphere language areas are already
well-organized for the perception of spoken language in infants
(Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006a,b) it is only later, when learning
letters and numerals, that the types of representations required
to drive grapheme-color synesthesia can be established. Here we
see grapheme-color synesthesia developing in behavioral terms,
alongside these children’s growing familiarity with letters and
digits.
In summary, we have identified child synesthetes, and
observed their development longitudinally over three testing ses-
sions spanning four years. We have seen that their synesthesia
develops from relatively fluid pairings of graphemes to colors,
which form more fixed associations at later ages. We have seen
cases of synesthesia perhaps dying out over time, or developing
more slowly in some individuals over others. We have been able
to say with relative certainty that six children in our sample are
synesthetes, and that a further six may be potential cases to be
observed in future studies. Indeed, a number of questions raised
here can be addressed by future testing, and we have one such
study in preparation. Our participants were 10/11 years old at the
time of testing for the current paper but are now 14/15 years of
age. We therefore anticipate that their status as synesthetes might
now be further informed by their own meta-awareness. Older
synesthetes are able to self-report whether they have synesthetic
experiences in a way that is far less tractable in younger chil-
dren (and hence self-disclosure of synesthesia was not used as
part of the methodology in the current study). Future observa-
tions of these synesthetes into adulthood might therefore rely on
both objective and subjective reporting. Moreover, future studies
might ask whether or to what extent similar developmental trajec-
tories also characterize other forms of synesthesia, such as colors
triggered by sound/music for example. Sound-color synesthesia
relies on different “cultural artifacts,” such as cultural dictates
for musical meter and pitch structure, characteristics which are
learned even in infancy (Soley and Hannon, 2010). Such differ-
ences in development with respect to inducers might therefore
be expected to cause different developmental trajectories in the
synesthesia itself. We hope that future studies might find ways
to overcome existing obstacles in recruiting of child synesthetes,
which have thus far hindered developmental research in the field.
We also anticipate that future studies could provide informa-
tion about the implications of synesthesia on other aspects of
cognitive development. Green and Goswami (2008) suggest that
young synesthetes might have a particular cognitive profile dif-
ferent from their peers. In addition, Simner et al. (2009) showed
that synesthesia is relatively common in schools, with on average
two to five grapheme-color synesthetes in every primary schools
in the United Kingdom and United States respectively. If synes-
thesia can be linked to a particular cognitive profile (i.e., assets
or deficits), as current adult studies also suggest (e.g., Meier and
Rothen, 2013) then it will become more important to identify
and understand synesthesia in childhood, and to address the
particular educational needs of synesthetic children.
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In synaesthesia, stimuli such as sounds, words or letters trigger experiences of colors,
shapes or tastes and the consistency of these experiences is a hallmark of this condition.
In this study we investigate for the ﬁrst time whether there are age-related changes in the
consistency of synaesthetic experiences.We tested a sample of more than 400 grapheme-
color synaesthetes who have color experiences when they see letters and/or digits with
a well-established test of consistency. Our results showed a decline in the number
of consistent grapheme-color associations across the adult lifespan. We also assessed
age-related changes in the breadth of the color spectrum. The results showed that the
appearance of primary colors (i.e., red, blue, and green) was mainly age-invariant. However,
there was a decline in the occurrence of lurid colors while brown and achromatic tones
occurred more often as concurrents in older age.These shifts in the color spectrum suggest
that synaesthesia does not simply fade, but rather undergoes more comprehensive
changes.We propose that these changes are the result of a combination of both age-related
perceptual and memory processing shifts.
Keywords: consistency, color perception, age-related changes, synaesthesia attrition
INTRODUCTION
Synaesthesia is a relative rare variation of human experience which
involves the automatic activation of an unusual concurrent sen-
sation in response to an inducing stimulus, for example a color
experience in response to a letter printed in black. The condition
runs in families, thus suggesting a genetic basis, and it emerges
early in development (Asher et al., 2009; Simner et al., 2009).
The particular associations (i.e., inducer-concurrent pairs such
as grapheme-color) are typically idiosyncratic at the individual
level and stable across time. In fact, the consistency of the synaes-
thetic associations has been proposed as a deﬁning characteristic
of synaesthesia (Baron-Cohen et al., 1987; Cytowic and Eagleman,
2002; Rich et al., 2005; Asher et al., 2006; Simner et al., 2006).
Despite this, so far no study has investigated whether consistency
changes across the adult lifespan and the goal of the present study
was to ﬁll this gap.
The question whether consistency may change across the
lifespan is particularly relevant for those types of synaesthe-
sia which involve color as a concurrent, because there is clear
evidence for a decrease of chromatic sensitivity in older age
(Knoblauch et al., 2001; Kinnear and Sahraie, 2002; Paramei,
2012). In contrast, as synaesthesia is not a purely perceptual
phenomenon, it is possible that color-associations are habitu-
ally retrieved from memory. As automatic retrieval from memory
seems to be age-invariant (Meier et al., 2013) the consistency of
synaesthetic perception may not be prone to age-related decline.
Moreover, there is evidence that late-blind synaesthetes maintain
their synaesthetic visual percepts for years after blindness, thus,
synaesthesia can even persist with little or no natural sensory
experience and independent from continuous associative learning
(Steven and Blakemore, 2004).
In this study, we will ﬁrst provide an outline that there is indeed
evidence for plasticity of synaesthesia (i.e., the neonatal synaesthe-
sia hypothesis, evidence for the development of grapheme-color
synaesthesia in school age, reports of synaesthesia attrition in ado-
lescence, variation and loss of synaesthetic experiences related to
stress and brain damage). These ﬁndings motivate the present
study in which we investigate changes in synaesthetic experi-
ences over the adult lifespan, despite many studies emphasizing
its stability in adult age.
According to the neonatal hypothesis of synaesthesia
(Maurer and Maurer, 1988), we all may have been synaesthetes
as young infants due to the increased functional connectivity in
the infant brain. Synaesthesia in adults may than be viewed as
a result of incomplete pruning or decreased inhibition of feed-
back projections in early development. While there is evidence for
exuberant anatomical connectivity and for arbitrary sensory cross-
activations in young infants (Huttenlocher et al., 1982;Wagner and
Dobkins, 2011), andwhile there are early sensory cross-activations
which may survive in the form of crossmodal correspondences
(Spector and Maurer, 2011), the neonatal hypothesis of synaes-
thesia has been questioned recently (see Deroy and Spence, 2013,
for a critical discussion).
In order to investigate the development of grapheme-color
synaesthesia in real time within a childhood population over an
extended period, Simner et al. (2009) sampledmore than 600 chil-
dren between 6 and 7 years. To assess consistency, the children
were presented with the letters of the alphabet and the digits 0–9,
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one by one, in a random order on a computer screen together
with an on-screen palette of 13 colors. They were required to pair
each grapheme with the “best” color. After the presentation of all
the graphemes, there was a short break and then the same test
was repeated again. By comparing the choices of the two tests
a consistency score was calculated for each child as the number
of identical grapheme-color choices. On average this consistency
score was 3.5 out of 36 graphemes. Next, 47 children who had
scores signiﬁcantly higher than this mean score were identiﬁed
as potential synaesthetes and were retested in a second session
1 year later (i.e., at the age of 7/8 years). Using the same test pro-
cedure, Simner et al. (2009) identiﬁed eight children who scored
highly consistent both within and across the two test sessions.
These were considered as genuine synaesthetes. The other 39 chil-
dren were considered as high-memory non-synaesthetes. More-
over, Simner et al. (2009) found that the number of graphemes
that triggered consistent synaesthetic experiences – the band-
width of synaesthesia (Asher et al., 2006) – increased with age.
On average, the genuine synaesthetes had acquired 6.4 new
grapheme-color associations over the 1-year period (i.e., they
had a mean consistency score of 10.5 in Session 1 and of 16.9 in
Session 2).
In a follow-up study, Simner and Bain (2013) tested these
children again at age 10/11 with the same procedure as before
in order to establish whether the synaesthetes performed still
consistently after another 3 years – or whether synaesthesia
would “die out” in some individuals which may be consistent
with the neonatal hypothesis – and whether the number of
consistent grapheme-color associations would further increase.
Most important, the results showed that ﬁve of the eight
synaesthetes identiﬁed in Simner et al. (2009) still conformed
to the synaesthesia criteria. Moreover, the number of consis-
tent graphemes for the genuine synaesthetes increased again,
to 25.7 out of 36. Overall, the results of the two studies sug-
gest that grapheme-color synaesthesia can be assesses already in
6-year old children and that the number of consistent inducer-
concurrent pairs increases with development. The latter result
shows that the bandwidth of the synaesthesia also increases
during development (cf., Asher et al., 2006). Moreover, the
results also suggest that synaesthesia can disappear during child-
hood, which would be consistent with the neonatal synaesthesia
hypothesis.
Besides this empirical indication for the disappearance of
synaesthesia in childhood, there is also evidence for synaesthe-
sia attrition later in development. For example, there are several
anecdotal reports of cases that seem to have had synaesthesia as
children, but who have lost them during adolescence (Flournoy,
1893; Riggs and Karwoski, 1934; Cytowic, 1997; Emrich et al.,
2000). In line with these reports, one of the authors of the
present article was approached by a 25-year old student, who
claimed to have had synaesthetic grapheme-color experiences as
a child but had lost them during adolescence. Interestingly, she
reported that she still remembered the color associations with
high certainty. When tested with a synaesthetic Stroop test, she
showed a reliable interference effect. The synaesthetic Stroop test
involves the presentation of colored graphemes that are either
congruent or incongruent to the grapheme-color association of
a particular synaesthete and the participant is required to name
the color of the grapheme as quickly as possible. This test has
often been used to demonstrate the genuineness of synaesthe-
sia, because synaesthetes show slower responses to incongruent
compared to congruent colors, while non-synaesthetes do not
show this effect (e.g., Mills et al., 1999; Odgaard et al., 1999;
Dixon et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2007). However, it has been
demonstrated that this effect can be induced through train-
ing grapheme-color associations in non-synaesthetes (Elias et al.,
2003; Meier and Rothen, 2009; Rothen et al., 2013a; Rothen and
Meier, 2014).
Further evidence for the variability of synaesthetic experiences
comes from studies with adults. Rich et al. (2005) noted that
“although some synaesthetes reported that the frequency or inten-
sity of their synaesthetic experiences had diminished with age,
most reported no change in their synaesthesia since childhood”
(p. 67). Moreover, 28% reported that stress, alcohol, and other
drugs inﬂuenced synaesthesia (either attenuating or enhancing
the experience). Consistently, in a large sample of grapheme-
color synaesthetes, Eagleman found similar results (in Cytowic
and Eagleman, 2002, p. 139).
In an autobiographical review, Day (2013) reported that he had
lost his synaesthetic experiences due to post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), that is, after getting into an earthquake while being
trapped in the 17th ﬂoor of a shaking building with cracks run-
ning through the ceiling and the walls. He reported that although
he realized this loss immediately, due to PTSD it did not start to
concern him until about 2 months later. In order to revive the
synaesthesia, he tried to “produce some by listening to music” (p.
918). After about 3 months, he started to worry about whether the
synaesthetic experiences would come back at all, and soon later the
experiences began to return very slowly, starting off very faintly
and “all washed out.” It took him at least another 3 months until
the synaesthetic experiences were back as before the traumatic
event.
In Dittmar (2007), a woman reported the loss of her synaes-
thesia due to a seizure. After the incidence, she was half-sided
paralyzed and also suffered fromdisorientation due to the changed
world of experiences without synaesthesia. For her, this was partic-
ularly disturbing because she had used her synaesthesia to support
her memory and planning. With rehabilitation, she was able to
regain her cognitive capacity, concentration, and endurance. Con-
currently, her synaesthesia came back, but not exactly as before.
For example, someof her grapheme-color associations had shifted.
Moreover, she reported that the intensity of the synaesthetic expe-
rience was more variable and that the experiences faded when she
was under stress.
Spalding and Zangwill (1950) reported the case of a 24 year
old man who was shot in the head. Besides having a large deﬁcit
in his visual memory, he reported the loss of his sequenced order
of numerals and, as a consequence, innumeracy. Spalding and
Zangwill supposed that the patient had lost his sequence-space
synaesthesia and assumed that this was the primary cause for his
disturbance.
Sacks (1997) reported the case of a painter who lost his ability
to see colors after a car accident. This also resulted in a loss of his
sound-color synaesthesia and he reported that listening to music
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had become ﬂat and atrophied. Thus, synaesthetic experiences are
variable in adult age and can even disappear forever after a brain
injury.
Unfortunately, these reports did not provide detailed infor-
mation about the particular brain areas that were damaged and
caused the loss of synaesthesia. However, there are modern and
safe techniques in neuroscience that allow the temporal suppres-
sion of speciﬁc brain areas with transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS). For example, Esterman et al. (2006) used repetitive TMS
over the posterior parietal lobes and showed that the synaesthetic
Stroop effect was eliminated when applied over the right hemi-
sphere. In contrast, TMS to the visual area V1 did not affect
the synaesthetic Stroop effect. Similarly, Muggleton et al. (2007)
found that single-pulse TMS over the right parieto-occipital cor-
tex disrupted synaesthetic Stroop interference and there was also a
marginally signiﬁcant effect for the left parieto-occipital site, while
TMS over other parietal areas showed only minimal performance
disruption. Moreover, Rothen et al. (2010) showed that TMS over
the parietal-occipital cortex is also effective at suppressing implicit
bidirectional effects of synaesthesia.
In a recent study, we investigated whether the application
of rTMS over right parietal cortex would eliminate synaesthetic
experiences (Meier et al., in preparation). This question was
motivated by a grapheme-color synaesthete who had explicitly
expressed the wish to experience the world temporally with-
out her synaesthesia. In order to ensure that the TMS protocol
affected synaesthesia as planned we also administered the synaes-
thetic Stroop task before and after TMS application. We were also
interested whether TMS would affect the speciﬁc grapheme-color
associations and for this purpose, we administered a consistency
test that required grapheme-color matches on a continuous color
palette 1 week before, immediately after the TMS application
and 1 week later (cf., Meier and Rothen, 2013). As expected,
the results showed a synaesthetic Stroop effect before but not
immediately after TMS application. However, to a big disappoint-
ment of the synaesthete, she did not experience any change in
her own experience. Although she did not experience a change
of her synaesthetic experiences, the consistency of the speciﬁc
color experiences was reduced. That is, consistency was higher
across the 2 weeks interval (i.e., 1 week before and 1 week after
the TMS application) than both scores with a 1 week interval
(i.e., involving the TMS application). Thus, in the latter sit-
uation, TMS seems to have inﬂuenced the synaesthetic color
experiences such that she had to retrieve the speciﬁc colors
from memory. Overall, the results of the TMS studies suggest
that grapheme-color synaesthesia relies speciﬁcally on parieto-
occipital pathways similar to normal color perception and that
these regions are not only involved in explicit but also in implicit
synaesthetic binding (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001; Hub-
bard andRamachandran,2005; Esterman et al., 2006; Rothen et al.,
2010).
To summarize, there is evidence from multiple sources that
the synaesthetic experiences can vary during adulthood and there
are even conditions under which synaesthesia can disappear com-
pletely, either transiently or forever. There is also converging
evidence from TMS-studies, as well as from functional and struc-
tural imaging studies that the occipito-parietal lobes are critically
involved in grapheme-color synaesthesia (Hubbard et al., 2011;
Rouw et al., 2011; Specht, 2012). To our knowledge no study
has yet addressed the developmental trajectory of synaesthesia in
adult age. As many cognitive functions are subject to age-related
changes, it is possible that synaesthetic experiences and their con-
sistency decline with age. However, although the occipito-parietal
lobes are subject to age-related decline, this is much smaller than
the decline in frontal or temporal brain areas (e.g., Brickman
et al., 2006). Moreover, there is also evidence that synaesthesia
can spread to novel inducers and thus it is possible that over
the lifetime these opportunities accumulate (Rich et al., 2005;
Mroczko et al., 2009; Blair and Berryhill, 2013; Brang et al., 2013).
If so, it is possible that the bandwidth of synaesthesia may even
increase across the adult lifespan. These questions are addressed
in the present study. Speciﬁcally, using the method introduced
by Simner et al. (2006, 2009), Rothen and Meier (2010), and
Simner and Bain (2013), we investigated in a sample of more
than 400 grapheme-color synaesthetes whether the number of
consistent grapheme-color associations changes across the adult
lifespan.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample was recruited from our Synaesthesia-Check database.
The Synaesthesia-Check is a short questionnaire used to estab-
lish contact with the general public interested in our research
(www.synaesthesie.unibe.ch). It involves questions about poten-
tial forms of synaesthesia, the nature of synaesthetic experiences,
and it provides the opportunity to leave contact information for
those willing to take part in future studies. From those who had
left an email address, we contacted a total of 1233 persons, who
had indicated in the Synaesthesia-Check that they had consistent
and involuntary synaesthetic experiences. From these, 631 persons
responded to our invitation to participate in the present study. As
we will focus on grapheme-color synaesthesia, we report the data
of those 439 participants who indicated they had grapheme-color
synaesthesia, that is, either color experiences in response to digits
only (N = 17), letters only (N = 48) or both digits and letters
(N = 374). The mean age was 38.03 years (SD = 13.8, range
18–91), 89.7% of them were females, and 88.4% of them were
right-handed.
PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS
Participants were invited to click on a link in an email message
to participate in this study which was announced as an investiga-
tion of their synaesthetic experiences. After giving consent, they
were asked which forms of synaesthesia they had. Speciﬁcally, they
had to indicate, separately, whether they had color experiences
in response to letters, digits, words, music, and sounds. Those
who had indicated color experiences to letters and digits were
forwarded to a grapheme-color consistency test. The method for
the consistency test was adopted from Simner et al. (2006, 2009),
Rothen and Meier (2010), and Simner and Bain (2013). A com-
puterized test individually presented 36 graphemes (A–Z; 0–9),
in black on a white background, in a random order, with each
presentation accompanied by a palette of 13 colors (black, dark
blue, brown, dark green, gray, pink, purple, orange, red, white,
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light blue, light green, and yellow) and a “no color” option. The
arrangement of the colors within the palette was randomized on
every trial, and participants were required to select the match-
ing color for each grapheme. An example trial is presented in
Figure 1.
Participants were instructed to choose the color that ﬁts best
to the speciﬁc letter or digit. They were informed that if no color
of the palette exactly matched their synaesthetic experience they
should select the color that came closest. In the case that they had
no synaesthetic color experience for a particular grapheme, they
could use the“no color”option. After the presentation of all the 36
letters and digits, an immediate retest was administered in which
the order of the graphemes was re-randomized.
ANALYSIS
Digits and letters were analysed separately. As the graphemes were
presented in black color on the screen, we did not consider “black”
responses as synaesthetic experiences. First, the number of con-
sistent color choices in the test and re-test were counted and a
correlational analysis was performed to assess the potential rela-
tionship between age and the number of consistent colors. Next,
we split the sample into three different age groups and we used
analyses of variance to gain more ﬁne-grained insights into the
trajectory of the consistency scores.
In a second set of analyses, we investigated changes in the
breadth of the color spectrum, separately for digits and letters.
Speciﬁcally, we investigated age-related changes in the frequency
in which each of the 12 colors occurred as a concurrent in each of
the three age groups.
RESULTS
CONSISTENCY OF COLOR EXPERIENCES
Scatterplots of the relationship between age and the number
of consistent color experiences (consistency score, CS) are pre-
sented in Figure 2, separately for digits (Figure 2A) and for
letters (Figure 2B). For statistical analyses alpha was set to 0.05.
FIGURE 1 | Example trial of the consistency test.
Correlational analyses revealed a signiﬁcant negative relationship
between age and the number of consistent color associations
with r = −0.15, p < 0.01 for digits and r = −0.18, p < 0.01
for letters. Thus, for both digits and color there was a decrease
in the number of consistent synaesthetic experiences across the
lifespan.
In order to further investigate this decrease in consistency, we
created three age groups (i.e., younger group aged 18–28 years,
a middle group aged 29–42, and older group aged 43–91) with
approximately equal sample sizes (i.e., N = 135, 135, and 152 for
the digit-color associations and N = 132, 122, and 137 for letter-
color associations). We considered this as a conservative approach
that should eliminate spurious results due to outliers, particularly
in older age.
The mean CS across the three age groups are presented in
Figure 3, separately for digits and letters. The results of two sepa-
rate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) showed signiﬁcant age
effects for both digits and letters, with F(2,421) = 5.80, p < 0.01,
and F(2,390) = 4.26, p < 0.05. For digits, post hoc tests revealed
that the consistency scores of the younger adults were higher than
both the middle and older adult groups (ps< 0.01), while the lat-
ter two groups were not statistically different (p = 0.64). Similarly,
for letters, post hoc tests revealed that the age effect was due to the
higher consistency scores of the younger adults compared to the
older adults (p < 0.01). No other effect was signiﬁcant (ps = 0.13
and 0.18, respectively).
Next, we analysed the number of graphemes without colors
(GWC), that is, those for which participants consistently chose
“no color” or consistently chose the “black” color option. The
GWC was M = 0.81 for digits (0.63, 0.98, and 1.01 for young,
middle and older adults) and M = 3.81 for letters (2.72, 3.99,
and 4.72). ANOVAs revealed an age-effect, F(2,421) = 6.421, and
F(2,390) = 5.52, both ps< 0.01, for digits and letters, respectively.
Compared to younger adults, the number of GWC was higher in
older participants. For digits, post hoc tests showed that the young
group differed from both themiddle and older groups (ps< 0.01),
while the latter did not. Similarly, for letters, post hoc tests showed
that the young group differed from both the middle and older
groups (ps< 0.05), and no other effect.
These ﬁndings suggest that rather than consistency per se, it
is the bandwidth of synaesthesia that declines across the adult
lifespan. Synaesthetic attrition is expressed as a reduction in the
number of graphemes which trigger color experiences. To further
test this interpretation, we calculated a corrected consistency score
(CCS) for each participant that takes into account the number
of GWC: CCS = CS/(number of possible graphemes – GWC).
The number of possible graphemes is 10 for digits and 26 for
letters. If our interpretation holds, then no age-effects would
be expected for the CCS. The results showed that for digits,
the CCS were 87.1, 82.9, and 84.3 for the young, middle, and
older group. For letters, these were 78.5, 78.6, and 76.9% for
the young, middle, and older group. ANOVAs failed to reach
signiﬁcance, F(2,421) = 1.83, p = 0.17, and F(2,390) < 1,
p = 0.70, for digits and letters, respectively. Thus, these results
corroborate our hypothesis that synaesthetic attrition is mainly
driven by a decrease in the number of graphemes that trig-
ger a synaesthetic color experience. If a particular grapheme
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FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots of the relationship between age and the number of consistent color experiences: (A) digits, (B) letters. *p < 0.05, # = number.
triggers a synaesthetic experience, this experience is still con-
sistent, suggesting that attrition is not due to a reduction in
consistency but rather due to reduced bandwidth, thus mirror-
ing the developmental trajectory observed in childhood (Simner
and Bain, 2013).
Overall, the results from the correlational analyses and from
the age-group comparisons suggest that there is a decrease in the
bandwidth of synaesthetic experiences across the adult lifespan.
We hypothesized that, if this interpretation is true, it is highly
likely that this decrease is also reﬂected in the pattern of colors
that constitute grapheme-color synaesthesia.
FREQUENCY OF CONSISTENT COLORS
In a next set of analyses, we analysed how often a particular
color had been chosen as a concurrent. Although this analysis was
mainly exploratory, based on anecdotal reports of decreased inten-
sity of synaesthetic color experiences and on the empirical results
of age-related decline in color perception and color discrimination
(Fiorentini et al., 1996; Paramei, 2012), we expected that lurid
colors such as yellow, pink, or orange might be mostly
affected.
In order to test whether the age-related trajectory of the 12
colors differed at all, we calculated a two-factorialANOVAwith age
cohort (young, middle, older) and color (red, blue, green, yellow,
orange, violet, light blue, light green, magenta, brown, silver-gray,
white), separately for digits and for letters. The interaction was
highly signiﬁcant with F(22,4609) = 3.638, p < 0.001, for digits
and with F(22,4268) = 3.627, p < 0.001, for letters, respectively,
which demonstrates that the age-related trajectory differed across
colors.
FIGURE 3 | Mean consistency scores across young (18–28 years), middle (29–42 years) and older adult age groups (43–91 years): (A) digits, (B) letters.
*p < 0.05, # = number.
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FIGURE 4 | Number of consistent colors for digits across the adult lifespan, separately for each color (red, blue, green, yellow, orange, violet,
light-blue, light-green, magenta, brown, gray, and white from top left to bottom right). *p < 0.05, # = number.
Themean number of consistent color associations for digits are
presented in Figure 4. An ANOVA of the number of consistent
red color experiences suggested a signiﬁcant group difference,
F(2,421) = 4.95, p = 0.008, and post hoc t-tests indicated that
the consistency scores of the younger adults were higher than
the scores of the middle adult group, p = 0.002; no other effect
reached signiﬁcance. The same kind of ANOVA for the number
of consistent blue color experiences suggested a signiﬁcant group
difference, F(2,421) = 3.41, p = 0.034, and post hoc tests indicated
that the consistency scores of themiddle adults were lower than the
scores of the other two groups, p = 0.014 compared to the young,
and p = 0.044 compared to the older group, but no other effect
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reached signiﬁcance, that is, no age-speciﬁc decline. The number
of consistent green color experiences did not differ across groups,
F(2,421) = 0.31, p = 0.73.
AnANOVAof thenumber of consistent yellow color experiences
suggested an age-effect F(2,421) = 5.12, p = 0.006, and post hoc
tests indicated that the consistency scores of the young group
were higher than the scores of the middle and older group,
p = 0.012 and 0.003, respectively, but no other difference. For
orange color experiences, the ANOVA also suggested a group dif-
ference, F(2,421) = 4.96, p = 0.007, and post hoc tests indicated
that the consistency scores of the older adults were lower than
those of the two younger groups, both ps = 0.001, while the lat-
ter groups did not differ, p = 0.93. For violet color experiences,
the ANOVA also suggested an age-related effect, F(2,421) = 7.73,
p = 0.001, with post hoc tests indicating that the consistency scores
of the young adults were higher than those of the other two groups,
with p = 0.009 and 0.005, respectively, while the latter groups did
not differ, p = 0.88.
Neither for light-blue nor for light-green did the ANOVA sug-
gest a group difference, with F(2,421) = 0.47, p = 0.62, and
F(2,421) = 0.26, p = 0.77. In contrast, for magenta the ANOVA
suggested a group difference, F(2,421) = 3.61, p = 0.03, and post
hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores of the young adults
were higher than those of the older groups, p = 0.008, but no other
difference.
In contrast, theANOVAof thenumber of consistent brown color
experiences suggested an age-related increase, F(2,421) = 6.94,
p = 0.001, and post hoc tests indicated that the older group
scored higher than the young and the middle group, p < 0.001
and 0.031, respectively, but no other difference. For silver-gray
color experiences, the same pattern emerged, F(2,421) = 5.98,
p = 0.003, and again post hoc tests indicated that the consistency
scores of the older adults were higher than those of the younger
group, p < 0.001, but no other difference. For white color experi-
ences, theANOVA suggested no group difference, F(2,421)= 0.28,
p = 0.76.
We performed the same kind of analyses for letters. The mean
number of consistent color associations for letters are presented
in Figure 5. ANOVAs of the number of consistent red color expe-
riences, blue color experiences, and green color experiences did
not suggest any group differences, F(2,390) = 0.44, p = 0.64,
F(2,390) = 0.05, p = 0.95, F(2,390) = 0.64, p = 0.53, respectively.
The ANOVA of the number of consistent yellow color experi-
ences suggested an age-effect F(2,390)= 13.85, p< 0.001, and post
hoc tests indicated that the young group differed from the middle
and older group, p = 0.001 and p < 0.001, respectively, while the
latter two groups did not, p = 0.077. For orange color experiences,
the ANOVA did not suggest a group difference, F(2,390) = 1.63,
p = 0.197. However, for violet color experiences, the ANOVA
suggested a group difference, F(2,390) = 6.81, p = 0.001, and post
hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores of the young adults
were higher than those of the other two groups, with p = 0.03
and p < 0.001, respectively, while the latter groups did not differ,
p = 0.16.
For light-blue, the ANOVA suggested a group difference,
F(2,390) = 4.51, p = 0.012, and post hoc tests denoted that the
consistency scores of the young adults were higher than those of
the older group, p = 0.003, but no other effect. For light-green, the
ANOVA also suggested a group difference, with F(2,390) = 3.72,
p = 0.025, and post hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores
of the young adults were higher than those of the other two groups,
with p = 0.05 and 0.009, respectively, while the latter groups did
not differ, p = 0.56. For magenta, the ANOVA also suggested
a group difference, F(2,390) = 4.16, p = 0.016, and post hoc
tests denoted that the consistency scores of the young adults were
higher than those of the middle and older groups, with p = 0.03
and 0.007, respectively, while the latter groups did not differ,
p = 0.64.
Neither for light-blue nor for light-green did the ANOVA sug-
gest a group difference, with F(2,421) = 0.47, p = 0.62, and
F(2,421) = 0.26, p = 0.77. In contrast, for magenta the ANOVA
suggested a group difference, F(2,421) = 3.61, p = 0.03, and post
hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores of the young adults
were higher than those of the older groups, p = 0.008, but no other
difference.
In contrast, theANOVAof thenumber of consistent brown color
experiences suggested an age-related increase, F(2,421) = 6.94,
p = 0.001, and post hoc tests indicated that the older group scored
higher than the young and the middle group, p < 0.001, and
p = 0.031, respectively, but no other difference. For silver-gray
color experiences, the same pattern emerged, F(2,421) = 5.98,
p = 0.003, and again post hoc tests indicated that the consistency
scores of the older adults were higher than those of the younger
group, p < 0.001, but no other difference. For white color experi-
ences, theANOVA suggested no group difference, F(2,421)= 0.28,
p = 0.76.
We performed the same kind of analyses for letters. The mean
number of consistent color associations for letters are presented
in Figure 5. ANOVAs of the number of consistent red color expe-
riences, blue color experiences, and green color experiences did
not suggest any group differences, F(2,390) = 0.44, p = 0.64,
F(2,390) = 0.05, p = 0.95, F(2,390) = 0.64, p = 0.53, respectively.
The ANOVA of the number of consistent yellow color experi-
ences suggested an age-effect F(2,390)= 13.85, p< 0.001, and post
hoc tests indicated that the young group differed from the middle
and older group, p = 0.001, and p < 0.001, respectively, while the
latter two groups did not, p = 0.077. For orange color experiences,
the ANOVA did not suggest a group difference, F(2,390) = 1.63,
p = 0.197. However, for violet color experiences, the ANOVA sug-
gested a group difference, F(2,390) = 6.81, p = 0.001, and post
hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores of the young adults
were higher than those of the other two groups, with p = 0.03
and p < 0.001, respectively, while the latter groups did not differ,
p = 0.16.
For light-blue, the ANOVA suggested a group difference,
F(2,390) = 4.51, p = 0.012, and post hoc tests denoted that the
consistency scores of the young adults were higher than those of
the older group, p = 0.003, but no other effect. For light-green, the
ANOVA also suggested a group difference, with F(2,390) = 3.72,
p = 0.025, and post hoc tests indicated that the consistency scores
of the young adults were higher than those of the other two groups,
with p = 0.05 and 0.009, respectively, while the latter groups did
not differ, p = 0.56. For magenta, the ANOVA also suggested a
group difference, F(2,390) = 4.16, p = 0.016, and post hoc tests
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FIGURE 5 | Number of consistent colors for letters across the adult lifespan, separately for each color (red, blue, green, yellow, orange, violet,
light-blue, light-green, magenta, brown, gray, and white, from top left to bottom right). *p < 0.05, # = number.
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denoted that the consistency scores of the young adultswere higher
than those of themiddle andolder groups,with p= 0.03 and 0.007,
respectively, while the latter groups did not differ, p = 0.64.
The ANOVA of the number of consistent brown color experi-
ences suggested no age-related effect, F(2,390) = 0.32, p = 0.73.
Similarly, the ANOVA of the number of consistent silver-gray
color experiences suggested no group difference, F(2,390) = 1.15,
p = 0.32. In contrast, for white color experiences, the ANOVA
suggested an age-related increase, F(2,390) = 4.979, p = 0.007,
and post hoc tests denoted that the consistency scores of the older
adults were higher than those of the young group, p = 0.002, but
no other effect (ps> 0.11).
In order to summarize the results of the age-related trajectory
for individual colors, we would like to order the ﬁndings accord-
ing to three distinct patterns. First, several colors seem to show
an age-related decrease, such as yellow, orange, violet, light-blue
or magenta. Second, there are colors that do not seem to show
consistent signs of age-related changes such as red, blue or green.
Finally, there seem to be several colors that rather show an increase
than a decrease such as brown and white (and eventually gray, at
least for digits). This pattern of results would suggest that the
most frequent color terms such red, green or blue are not subject
to age-related changes. In contrast, less frequent color terms such
as yellow, orange, violet or magenta, whichmay also be considered
as more intensive, seem to occur less often as synaesthetic concur-
rents with increasing age. Finally, white, gray, and brown, typically
considered as less jaunty (or achromatic) rather seem to increase
across adult age.
DISCUSSION
This is the ﬁrst study that investigated the developmental trajec-
tory of the consistency of synaesthetic grapheme-color experiences
across the adult lifespan. Speciﬁcally, using the method intro-
duced by Simner et al. (2006), we tested a sample of more than
400 grapheme-color synaesthetes by asking them to choose the
matching color for each digit and each letter of the alphabet in
two separate test runs. We measured the number of consistent
grapheme-color associations and assessed the relationship with
age using both a correlational and a quasi-experimental approach.
Our results showed a small but consistent age-related decline in the
number of consistent grapheme-color associations. Together with
previous results on the development of grapheme-color synaesthe-
sia in children and adolescents in which an increase in the number
of consistent grapheme color associationswas found (Simner et al.,
2009; Simner and Bain, 2013), the results of the present study sug-
gest that the bandwidth of grapheme-color experiences is subject
to a similar inverted u-shaped curve as many other cognitive func-
tions (Craik and Bialystok, 2006; Zimmermann and Meier, 2006,
2010; Shing and Lindenberger, 2011;Weiermann andMeier, 2012;
Meier et al., 2013).
We also assessed age-related changes in the breadth of the
color spectrum. The results showed that the appearance of the
most frequent color terms (i.e., red, blue, and green) was mainly
age-invariant. However, lurid colors such as yellow, orange, and
magenta occurred less often as synaesthetic concurrents with
increasing age. In contrast, disimpassionated colors such as brown,
gray, and white were chosen more often. These results underline
that the age-related decline in the consistency of grapheme-color
associations is not simply a chance result. They seem to be con-
nected with systematic age-related changes in color perception
and discrimination (Fiorentini et al., 1996; Knoblauch et al., 2001;
Kinnear and Sahraie, 2002; Paramei, 2012).
However, the question remains why the probability declines
that certain inducers trigger synaesthetic concurrents with older
age. Onepossibility is that the graphemes donot trigger the synaes-
thetic experiences anymore because color perception underlies an
age-related decline. However, even so, due to the lifelong asso-
ciations between the inducers and the concurrent, one would
expect that there are strong semantic links such that synaesthetes
still would “know” the colors of the graphemes. A perceptual
vs. memory distinction has been made for projector vs. asso-
ciator synaesthetes (Rouw and Scholte, 2010). Accordingly, one
would predict a different age-related trajectory for associate vs.
projector synaesthetes. As we have not included a projector vs.
associator questionnaire in this study, we cannot test this hypoth-
esis. However, this may be an interesting avenue for future
research.
Another possibility is that synaesthetic associations change
across time and thus, the number of consistent grapheme color
associations decreases. While we cannot exclude this possibility,
this explanation cannot account for the present results because
the retest was within the same test session and thus a change
in associations across this short time-window is not realistic. A
further explanation is that with increasing age multiple concur-
rents develop for a particular inducer and thus, the synaesthetic
associations are systematic but not stable. For example, Simner
(2012) reported that a minority of synaesthetes fulﬁll most of
the criteria for the condition, but fail to pass the test of con-
sistency due to changing grapheme-color associations. Although
this explanation is possible, it is still not clear why multiple
concurrents would be more likely in older age. Moreover, as
our results suggest that the number of inducers decreases with
age, this explanation cannot fully account for the whole pattern
of results.
Thus, an explanation that posits that with increasing age some
graphemes do not trigger the synaesthetic colors anymore and the
speciﬁc associations are also lost is more likely. Such an expla-
nation would imply that lower-level perceptual processes as well
as higher-level cognitive processes are involved in the change of
synaesthetic consistency. Speciﬁcally, it is likely that with age the
processing of lurid colors is reduced such that their sensation
becomes weaker and eventually fades away. Moreover, it seems
also that the association between an inducer and a concurrent
may change, most likely toward pastel colors, and then eventu-
ally the association is forgotten over time. For example, a yellow
concurrent may fade toward white, and later on, the concurrent
white experiencemay be completely lost. There is wide-spread evi-
dence for an age-related decline in memory processes, and under
the assumption that some of the grapheme-color associations are
re-established due to fading perceptual processes, it may be that
these re-established associations are also most likely to be for-
gotten, similar to re-consolidated memories (Nader and Hardt,
2009). However, in order to provide stronger evidence for this
explanation, longitudinal data are necessary.
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We acknowledge that an important restriction of the present
study is its cross-sectional nature. Cross-sectional studies are not
suited to investigate individual trajectories and thus rather provide
a snapshot of evidence. Moreover, a further drawback of cross-
sectional studies is their susceptibility to cohort effects. It may also
be argued that the grapheme-color matching task draws on mem-
ory for the previously chosen association and as a consequence
memory effects (potentially favoring the younger participants)
may have inﬂuenced the age-related decline in the consistency
measure. However, for the present study, we have no reason to
assume any confounding cohort effects. Rather, we believe that by
using an internet-based approach we may have biased our sample
toward more active and highly motivated older adults and as such
neither the decline in bandwidth nor the changes in the synaes-
thetic color experiences can be accounted for. Similarly, if the
age-related decline in the consistency measure would be simply
caused by memory effects, it would be reasonable to expect that
this occurs uniformly across the color spectrum. Nevertheless, we
believe that studies with a longitudinal design will lead to more
detailed insights about the trajectory of synaesthesia attrition in
future studies.
The main focus of this study was on the number of consis-
tent grapheme-color associations. In line with previous studies we
have used a pre-deﬁned color palette which may not have rep-
resented the speciﬁc color experience for a particular grapheme
for each synaesthete. In fact, several participants complained
that the color palette was too small to capture their synaesthetic
experiences. Despite this,many synaesthetes didnot report synaes-
thetic color experiences for each and every grapheme. In fact, the
age-related decline in the number of consistent grapheme-color
experiences was mainly due to the fact that with increasing age
fewer graphemes triggered synaesthesia. However, we would like
to emphasize that the method used in the present study is not
particularly suited to measure the speciﬁcity of the synaesthetic
color experiences as they are used in other methods in which col-
ors can be chosen from amuch larger palette (e.g., Eagleman et al.,
2007; Rothen et al., 2013b). It is an interesting direction for future
research to address whether the speciﬁcity of the color experi-
ences also changes with age. Similarly, future studies may also
address the question of the intensity of the color experience more
directly. So far, there is only limited evidence that the experience
of color intensity changes, however, from the results of present
study, we would also predict a decline in the experience of color
intensity.
Rather than the speciﬁcity of synaesthetic associations, we
have found that the bandwidth of grapheme-color synaesthesia
was reduced across the adult lifespan. Although the bandwidth
of synaesthesia is an important issue, so far, it has not received
much attention. In a study on the revised test of genuineness,
Asher et al. (2006) noted that broad-band synaesthetes reported
percepts to a wide range of stimuli (80–100%) while narrow-
band synaesthetes report percepts to a smaller range of stimuli.
There are also differences in bandwidth across different types of
synaesthesia. For example, in sound-color synaesthesia there is
an inﬁnite amount of inducers, while for grapheme-color synaes-
thesia the maximum number is clearly deﬁned (i.e., 26 for the
roman alphabet and 10 for digits). For other forms of synaesthesia
the amount of possible inducers is much smaller, for example
four for swimming-style synaesthesia (Nikolic et al., 2011; Rothen
et al., 2013a) and only one for mirror-touch synaesthesia (see
Rothen andMeier (2013) for a discussionwhether the latter should
be regarded as a form of synaesthesia at all). There have been
suggestions that in the most common forms of synaesthesia, the
bandwidth in adult synaesthetes is typically 80–100% (e.g., Ward
et al., 2005; Simner and Bain, 2013). However, so far there is no
clear criterion how many consistent synaesthetic grapheme-color
experiences a person must have to be considered as a genuine
synaesthete.
To summarize, this is the ﬁrst study that has tested the synaes-
thesia attrition hypothesis in a large sample of grapheme-color
synaesthetes. Our results showed a small but consistent decline
in the bandwidth of synaesthesia across the adult lifespan and
thus support the idea of synaesthesia attrition in older age. This
result ﬁts with an age-related decline in many other perceptual
and cognitive functions. It also ﬁts with evidence of an age-
related decline in other forms of cross-modality (Simner and
Ludwig, 2012; Ludwig and Simner, 2013). Moreover, together
with recent ﬁndings from developmental studies, our results
suggest that the bandwidth of synaesthesia follows an inverted
u-shape function (Simner et al., 2009; Simner and Bain, 2013).
We also found age-related changes in the breadth of the color
spectrum of the synaesthetic concurrents. Speciﬁcally, there was
a decline in the occurrence of lurid colors while brown and
achromatic tones occurred more often as concurrents in older
age. These shifts in the color spectrum suggest that synaesthesia
does not simply fade, but rather undergoes more comprehensive
changes.
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